13 Jan 2012

From: CAPT Investigating Officer
To: Commanding Officer, USS ESSEX (LHD 2)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO DEATH OF PS1 REGAN YOUNG ONBOARD USS ESSEX (LHD 2) ON 23 NOVEMBER 2011

Ref: (a) JAG Manual

Encl: (1) Commanding Officer, USS ESSEX (LHD 2) ltr 5800 dtd 23 Nov 11
(2) Commanding Officer, USS ESSEX (LHD 2) ltr 5800 dtd 7 Dec 11
(3) Captain , USN, ltr dtd 13 Dec 11
(4) Commanding Officer, USS ESSEX (LHD 2) ltr 5800 dtd 13 Dec 11
(5) Member Data Summary ICO PS1 Regan Young
(6) ESSEX Deck Log dtd 20 Nov 11
(7) ESSEX Deck Log dtd 23 Nov 11
(8) Supply Department (CS02) Liberty Log dtd 21 Nov 11
(9) Supply Department (CS02) Liberty Log dtd 22 Nov 11
(10) NCIS Results of Interview dtd 28 Nov 11
(11) Witness Statement of dtd 28 Nov 11
(12) Witness Statement of dtd 3 Dec 11
(13) Witness Statement of dtd 28 Nov 11
(14) Photograph Subj: Text message to from V/YOUNG's cell phone at 0758, 23 Nov 11
(15) USS ESSEX Plan of the Day dtd 20-23 Nov11
(16) Witness Statement of dtd 27 Nov 11
(17) USS ESSEX (LHD 2) Instruction 5100.1 – Authorized Use of Personal Electronic Devices Policy
(18) Photograph Subj: Outgoing call from V/YOUNG's cell phone at 0806, 23 Nov 11
(19) Photograph Subj: Outgoing call from V/YOUNG's cell phone at 0819, 23 Nov 11
(20) NCIS Results of Interview ICO dtd 26 Nov 11
(21) Excerpt from ESSEXINST 1601.1F – Commanding Officer's Standing Orders (Standing Order Number FIVE) dtd 5 Aug 11
(22) NCIS Sworn Statement ICO dtd 30 Nov 11
(23) NCIS Sworn Statement ICO dtd 29 Nov 11
(24) Witness Statement ICO 5 Dec 11
(25) Certification of Death (Overseas) ICO Regan A. Young dtd 28 Nov 11
(26) Photograph Subj: Launcher base as viewed from port forward looking to starboard
(27) Photograph Subj: Launcher base as viewed from forward looking aft
(28) Photograph Subj: Starboard side inner bottom missile tube cover as viewed from forward centerline
(29) Photograph Subj: Starboard side view of missile launcher as viewed from starboard side and forward
(30) Photograph Subj: Close up starboard side inner bottom missile tube cover as viewed from forward centerline
(31) ESSEX Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Combat Systems and Intelligence (C5I) Department Organizational Chart dtd 23 Nov 11

(32) Designation as Division Officer for CSF Division ICO] dtd 26 Sep 11
(33) PQS Qualification Finder for CF Division – Watch Station 304 (LCPO/Division Officer) dtd 26 Nov 11
(34) NCIS Sworn Statement ICO dtd 30 Nov 11
(35) Witness Statement ICO dtd 1 Dec 11
(36) Leave Request ICO dtd 14 Nov 11
(37) Excerpt of EDVR, pages 25-27, dtd 29 Nov 11
(38) Descriptions of Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC)
(39) PQS Qualification Finder for CF Division – Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) dtd 26 Nov 11
(40) PQS Qualification Finder for CF Division – Watch Station 303 (Work Center Supervisor) dtd 26 Nov 11
(41) Designation as CSF4 Workcenter Supervisor ICO dtd 9 Aug 11
(42) Diagram of ESSEX depicting locations of NSSMS (Aft) spaces
(43) Current Ship's Maintenance Project Report (CSMP) – Work Center CSF4 dtd 27 Nov 11
(44) Excerpt from OPNAVINST 5100.19E Navy Safety and Occupational Health Program - Chapter C1 dtd 30 May 07
(45) Excerpt from ESSEXINST 1601.1F – Commanding Officer's Standing Orders (Standing Order Number ONE) dtd 5 Aug 11
(46) Commanding Officer's Daily Tactical Orders dtd 18-19 Nov 11
(47) NCIS Sworn Statement. dtd 1 Dec 11
(48) Volume 1.5 Change Instruction Sheet, CSOSS Change record and Volume Index / List of Effective pages for Master Set (MK-38 – Link) dtd 1 Jun 10
(49) Volume 25.8 Change Instruction Sheet, CSOSS Change Record and Volume Index / List of Effective Pages for CIC (NSMSS/RAM Technician) dtd 1 Jun10
(50) Volume 68 change Instruction Sheet, CSOSS Change Record and Volume Index / List of Effective Pages for NSSMS (Aft) Technician dtd 1 Jun 10
(51) Volume 69 Change Instruction Sheet, CSOSS Change Record and Volume Index / List of Effective Pages for NSSMS (Aft) Technician (BFTT) dtd 1 Jun 10
(52) Excerpt from CSOSS User's Manual – Table 2-1. Standard Communication and Status Phrases
(53) Combat Systems Operational Sequencing System (CSOSS) Procedures for NSSMS Initialization (CSOSS ID SP 0/NSSMS and SP 1/NSSMS)
(54) MRC 71 FPVG N for System Operability Test dtd Jul 11
(55) Correction to the Planned Maintenance System Manual for CSF4 Workcenter
(56) Planned Maintenance System List of Effective Pages dtd 6 Aug 11
(57) Maintenance Index Page Control Number 4821/021-71 dtd Jul 11
(58) Workcenter CSF4 13-Week Report for Quarter 17, Week 8, dtd 21 to 27 Nov 11
(59) C5I Department Master Light-off/Pre-underway Check List for departure from Bali dtd 23 Nov 11
(60) Witness Statement ICO dtd 3 Dec 11
(61) NCIS Sworn Statement ICO dtd 29 Nov 11
(62) NCIS Sworn Statement ICO dtd 27 Nov 11
(63) NCIS Additional Results of Interview ICO dtd 28 Nov 11
(64) Witness Statement ICO dtd 4 Dec 11
(65) ESSEX CSOOW Electronic Log dtd 23 Nov 11

(66) Excerpt from ESSEXINST 1601.1F – Commanding Officer's Standing Orders (Standing Order Number TEN) dtd 5 Aug 11
(67) Witness Statement ICO dtd 2 Dec 11
(68) ESSEX Security Department Statement ICO dtd 23 Nov 11
(69) NCIS Sworn Statement ICO dtd 27 Nov 11
(70) NCIS Sworn Statement ICO dtd 27 Nov 11
(71) NCIS Results of Interview ICO dtd 29 Nov 11
(72) NCIS Results of Interview ICO dtd 29 Nov 11
(73) Administrative Remarks ICO dtd 24 Jun 11
(74) Administrative Remarks ICO dtd 25 Jun 11
(75) Administrative Remarks ICO dtd 25 Jun 11
(76) Administrative Remarks ICO dtd 25 Jun 11
(77) Administrative Remarks ICO dtd 4 Aug 11
(78) Administrative Remarks ICO dtd 4 Aug 11
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(110) Email from . depicting part number and unit cost of Launcher Cell Cover
(111) USS ESSEX Incident NSWC PHD NSSMS Shipboard Investigation Team Preliminary Report Executive Summary dtd 5 Dec 11
(112) USS ESSEX Incident NSWC PHD NSSMS Shipboard Investigation Team Preliminary Report Detailed Summary dtd 5 Dec 11
(113) Results of NCIS Interview of Naval Surface Warfare Division Electronics Technicians dtd 2 Dec 11
(114) DVD containing photographs of personal effects, incident scene and video of NSSMS (AFT) dynamic recreation completed by qualified technicians and NSWC PHD Shipboard Engineering Investigation Team conducted 1222, 02 Dec 11

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO DEATH OF PS1 REGAN YOUNG ONBOARD USS ESSEX (LHD 2) ON 23 NOVEMBER 2011

Preliminary Statement

1. A thorough investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of PS1 Regan Young, USN, onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2) on 23 Nov 11 has been conducted pursuant to enclosures (1) and (2) in accordance with reference (a). There were no difficulties encountered during the course of this investigation. , USN, was detailed to provide administrative assistance.

2. All parties interviewed provided testimony or cooperated fully in all respects. I was delayed from beginning this investigation for five days after receipt of the convening letter while NCIS determined an investigation was warranted.

3. Special Agent , Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), NCISFO Singapore, conducted interviews of personnel directly related to the incident and individuals suspected of offenses were advised of their Article 31b rights.

4. Per enclosure (3) one extension to complete the investigation was requested. This request was a result of the length of time necessary to obtain NCIS final report enclosure witness statements. The NCIS final report enclosure witness statements were considered critical to the investigation. An extension of two days following receipt of the NCIS final report enclosure witness statements was granted (enclosure (4)). As a result of protracted delay in receipt of the NCIS final report, material was provided by NCIS in order to expedite investigation completion. However, not all documents provided are final enclosures to the NCIS final report.

5. All known and available evidence was collected and all witnesses known to have information concerning the incident were interviewed or provided a written statement. The final autopsy report remains outstanding and will be forwarded as an amendment upon receipt.

6. All documentary evidence contained herein is original, a certified true copy, or an accurate summary of the information or statements gathered in the course of this investigation.

Findings of Fact

1. Personnel Specialist First Class (SW/AW) Regan Aloysius Cobang Young (PS1 Young) was in the United States Navy on active duty assigned to USS ESSEX (LHD 2) on 23 Nov 11. [encl (5)]

2. PS1 Young reported to ESSEX on 29 Nov 08. [encl (5)]

3. PS1 Young's projected rotation date from duty aboard ESSEX was Dec 12. [encl (5)]

4. ESSEX was anchored in the vicinity of Bali Indonesia (LAT 08°46.55'S, LONG 115°14.56'E) from 20 to 23 Nov 11. [encl (6), (7)]

5. PS1 Young was on liberty with the nights of 21 and 22 Nov 11. [encl (8), (9)]

6. PS1 Young did not drink any alcoholic beverages the night of 22 Nov 11. [encl (10)]

7. PS1 Young returned from liberty with to ESSEX at 0130H, 23 Nov11. [encl (10), (11)]

8. PS1 Young exhibited no unusual behavior prior to the morning of 23 Nov 11. [encl (10), (11), (12)]

9. PS1 Young met with his Division Officer, in the Disbursing Office from 0730H to 0740H the morning of 23 Nov 11. [encl (11)]

10. witnessed PS1 Young walking towards the DC shop located aft on the O-2 level at approximately 0745H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (13)]

11. A text message was sent from PS1 Young's cell phone at 0758H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (14)]

12. A navigation brief was conducted in ESSEX Wardroom at 0800H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (15)]

13. Morning colors was executed at 0800H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (7), (15), (16)]

14. Cleaning quarters ended at 0800H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (15)]

15. In accordance with ESSEXINST 5100.1, the three places available for use of personal electronic devices are the Starboard Troop Walkway, Port Troop Walkway and RAS Station FIVE. [encl (17)]

16. witnessed PS1 Young walking onto the aft missile deck at approximately 0803H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (16)]

17. A call was placed from PS1 Young's cell phone at 0806H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (18)]

18. A call was placed from PS1 Young's cell phone at 0819H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (19)]

19. Medical Emergency was announced over the 1MC for the aft missile deck at 0822H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (7)]

20. PS1 Young was taken to ESSEX medical ward at 0850H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (20)]

21. ESSEX was scheduled to set the Sea and Anchor Detail at 0900H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (15)]

22. ESSEX was scheduled to get underway from anchorage at 1000H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (15)]

23. Restricted Maneuvering Doctrine is set when navigating in restricted waters. [encl (21)]

24. ESSEX Commanding Officer's Standing Order Number FIVE prohibits all equipment maintenance while the restricted maneuvering doctrine is set. [encl (21)]

25. arrived at the Aft Missile Deck shortly after the incident occurred. [encl (22), (23)]

26. Arriving on the Aft Missile Deck shortly after the incident occurred, observed the Aft NSSMS Launcher pointing up at max ELEVATION, 85° relative to the deck and TRAIN, 180° degrees relative to the bow. [encl (22), (24)]

27. Shortly after the incident occurred, directed to stow the Aft NSSMS Launcher. [encl (22)]

28. ESSEX set Flight Quarters at 0915H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (7)]

29. PS1 Young was pronounced dead at 1007H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (7), (20), (25)]

30. Certification of Death (Overseas) stated that the death was accidental due to "Blunt Force Injuries of The Torso," dtd 28 Nov 11. [encl (25)]

31. Thunderstorm Condition I was set at 1044H, valid until 1230H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (7)]

32. The Low Visibility Detail was stationed due to rain showers in the vicinity at 1102H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (7)]

33. The incident scene was disturbed when personnel arrived on scene and stowed the Aft NSSMS Launcher immediately following the incident. [encl (22), (24)]

34. The incident scene was disturbed due to a FOD walkdown in conjunction with flight quarters and rain showers associated with Thunderstorm Condition I on 23 Nov 11. [encl (7)]

35. Photographs were taken of the incident scene by after the Aft NSSMS Launcher was stowed and prior to FOD walkdown and rain showers associated with Thunderstorm Condition I on 23 Nov 11. [encl (7), (26), (27), (28), (29), (30)]

36. was the C5I Department Head. [encl (31)]

37. was the C5I Assistant Department Head and the Combat Systems Officer (CSO). [encl (31)]

38. was the CSF Division Officer. [encl (31), (32)]

39. was qualified Watch Station 304 (LCPO/Division Officer) on 7 Jul 11. [encl (33)]

40. was the Combat Systems Maintenance Manager (CSMM). [encl (34), (35)]

41. was qualified Watch Station 304 (LCPO/Division Officer) on 8 Jun 10. [encl (33)]

42. was responsible for managing the Combat Systems Officer of the Watch (CSOOW) program. [encl (34), (35)]

43. was the CSF Division LCPO. [encl (31)]

44. was qualified Watch Station 304 (LCPO/Division Officer) on 22 Apr 11. [encl (33)]

45. is on emergency leave beginning 1630, 14 Nov 11 and ending 0700, 15 Dec 11. [encl (36)]

46. was the CSF division LPO and acting LCPO while was on emergency leave from 1630, 14 Nov 11 and ending 0700, 15 Dec 11. [encl (22), (31)]

47. The CSF4 workcenter is responsible for the NATO Sea Sparrow Missile System MK-57 MOD 2,3 (NSSMS), Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and Target Acquisition System (TAS). [encl (31)]

48. and held the NEC 1147. [encl (37)]

49. NEC 1147 is defined as a NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System MK-57 MOD 2,3 Technician. [encl (38)]

50. was qualified Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) on 9 Oct 10. [encl (39)]

51. was qualified Watch Station 303 (Work Center Supervisor) on 17 Sep 03. [encl (40)]

52. was the CSF4 Workcenter Supervisor. [encl (41)]

53. was qualified Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) on 26 May 11. [encl (39)]

54. was qualified Watch Station 303 (Work Center Supervisor) on 5 Jun 11. [encl (40)]

55. was qualified Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) on 4 Jan 10. [encl (39)]

56. was qualified Watch Station 303 (Work Center Supervisor) on 9 Oct 11. [encl (40)]

57. was qualified Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) on 4 Jan 10. [encl (39)]

58. was qualified Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) on 4 Jan 10. [encl (39)]

59. was qualified Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) on 4 Oct 11. [encl (39)]

60. held the NEC 1149. [encl (37)]

61. NEC 1149 is defined as Improved Point Defense Target Acquisition System MK-23 (IPD/TAS) Technician. [encl (38)]

62. [redacted] was qualified Watch Station 301 (Maintenance Person) on 11 Oct 11. [encl (39)]

63. The NSSMS (Aft) is comprised of the Aft NSSMS Launcher (02-130-0-W), Launcher Control Room (01-130-1-C), NATO Director Room #2 (05-87-0-C) and Combat Information Center (CIC) (02-65-0-C). [encl (42)]

64. The Aft NSSMS Launcher is located at 02-130-0-W. [encl (42)]

65. The Launcher Control Room (01-130-1-C) houses the Maintenance Interface Cabinet (MIC), Launcher Control Cabinet and Launcher Power Supply. [encl (42)]

66. NATO Director Room #2 (05-87-1-C) houses the Power Amplifier Cabinet, Controller Cabinet, Director Controller Cabinet, Environmental Support Cabinet, Auxiliary Cabinet, Signal Data Converter (SDC), Signal Data Processor (SDP) and Computer/System Evaluation Trainer (SEAT). [encl (42)]

67. Combat Information Center (02-65-0-C) houses the Firing Officer Console (FOC), Radar Set Console B (RSC) and the Low Light Level TV (LLLTV). [encl (42)]

68. There were no outstanding maintenance jobs listed in the CSMP affecting safety of the NSSMS (Aft). [encl (43)]

69. OPNAVINST 5100.19E states: "As a risk control measure and a consideration when using operational risk management (ORM) to plan an evolution consider assigning a safety observer, whose only responsibility is safety, during any evolution that could injure personnel or damage equipment." [encl (44)]

70. ESSEX Commanding Officer's Standing Order Number ONE states, "All supervisory watchstanders shall apply the principles of Operational Risk Management as an integral part of ESSEX operations." [encl (45)]

71. The Captain's Daily Tactical Orders include the following: "**VERBATIM COMPLIANCE**" and "Follow the approved procedures only. (IE. CSOSS, SOPs). Assumptions are not valid." [encl (46)]

72. [redacted], Assistant C5I Officer, drafts the Captain's Daily Tactical Orders for approval. [encl (47)]

73. All applicable NSSMS (Aft) workstation CSOSS Manuals were up to date with current changes incorporated. [encl (48), (49), (50), (51)]

74. The CSOSS User's Manual states that the definition of a WARNING is "Used to alert personnel to an action or series of actions that, if not strictly adhered to, may result in injury to personnel. Warnings will always precede the action or series of actions to which it applies." [encl (52)]

personnel. Warnings will always precede the action or series of actions to which it applies." [encl (52)]

75. The CSOSS User's Manual states that a NOTE is "Used to alert personnel to essential information, projected final results, or highlight a particular condition. Notes normally precede the action or series of actions to which it applies." [encl (52)]

76. The CSOSS system procedure for NSSMS Initialization (SP 1/NSSMS) includes a WARNING on Page 10 immediately prior to Step "F" that states "WARNING: LAUNCHER MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE WHEN PLACED IN REMOTE. ENSURE LAUNCHER AREA IS CLEAR OF PERSONNEL AND OBSTRUCTIONS." [encl (53)]

77. The CSOSS system procedure for NSSMS Initialization (SP 1/NSSMS) includes a NOTE on Page 10 immediately prior to Step "F" that states "NOTE: Post safety observer, as required, in accordance with ship's doctrine." [encl (53)]

78. The CSOSS system procedure for NSSMS Initialization (SP 1/NSSMS) Step "F" states "To initialize launcher in Remote control, set controls and observe indications as follows: 1. d. Electrical Test Panel 22A1:
    1) Press and hold SERVO TRIP/PERS SAF ALM pushbutton indicator for 10 seconds.
    2) Set B.I.T.E. TEST CONTROLS - TEST TRAINING ON/TEST TRAINING OFF pbsi to TEST TRAINING OFF.
    3) MODE SELECT switch – REMOTE" [encl (53)]

79. CSOSS ID SP 0/NSSMS and SP 1/NSSMS do not specify number of people required to complete the procedure. [encl (53)]

80. CSOSS ID SP 0/NSSMS and SP 1/NSSMS reference MRC CODE 4821/021 W-2R which specifies that five people are required to complete the procedure. [encl (53), (54)]

81. MRC, page 2 of 12, Step "b" states "Establish communication between FOC, RSC A/B, SEAT, safety observer at launcher and MIC." [encl (54)]

82. The maintenance requirement description of the W-2R check is "Perform System Operability Test (SOT)." [encl (54)]

83. The Maintenance Index Page (MIP) Series 4821/021, List of Effective Pages (LOEP) and Maintenance Requirement Card 71 FPVG N (MRC) were current and incorporate the latest Force Revision. [encl (55), (56), (57)]

84. The W-2R SOT is required weekly, 24 hours prior to getting underway and 24 hours prior to missile firing. [encl (54)]

85. A W-2R SOT was completed for the NSSMS (Aft) on 21 Nov 11. [encl (58)]

87. , Duty C5IO, verified all entries of the "24 HOURS PRIOR TO GETTING UNDERWAY" as part of the C5I "MASTER LIGHT-OFF/PRE-UNDERWAY CHECK LIST," at 0730H, 23 Nov 11. [encl (59), (60)]

88. mustered CSF4 workcenter immediately after cleaning quarters to discuss maintenance he wanted to complete for the day on 23 Nov 11. [encl (61), (62)]

89. s stated, "we wanted to knock out as much maintenance as possible before we went into restricted maneuvering doctrine and were unable to perform maintenance until later." [encl (62)]

90. When underway, maintenance requests are made to CSOOW through the Fire Control Supervisor (FCS). [encl (22), (35), (64)]

91. When in port, maintenance requests are made directly to CSOOW. [encl (22), (64)]

92. stated that , the Fire Control Supervisor, informed him that since ESSEX was not underway, no permission was required. [encl (61)]

93. stated that she instructed to call CSOOW for permission to conduct maintenance. [encl (64)]

94. , Duty C5IO in CSOOW, stated that he was not contacted for permission to conduct any maintenance on the NSSMS (Aft) prior to the incident on 23 Nov 11. [encl (60), (65)]

95. stated that system maintenance and launcher movement could be conducted in port or at anchor with permission from CSOOW. [encl (22)]

96. stated, "Maintenance in port or at anchor is handled at the division level through the Work Center Supervisors and Chiefs." [encl (35)]

97. ESSEX Commanding Officer's Standing Order Number TEN states "My permission will normally be obtained by the OOD, CDO, or cognizant Department Head... moving guns or launchers requires the Captain's permission except as authorized by the Battle Orders." [encl (66)]

98. The Command Duty Officer, , did not receive a request to move the aft NSSMS launcher on the morning of 23 Nov 11. [encl (67)]

99. After calling the Fire Control Supervisor (FCS), gave his technicians "free reign to perform the check." [encl (61)]

100. During the workcenter muster, ordered his workcenter to complete a W-2R SOT on the NSSMS (Aft) without assigning personnel specific tasks. [encl (61), (62), (69)]

101. stated, "I asked to stand safety observer for the SOT and set the MIC/Launcher up for TEST AND TRAINING." [encl (62), (68)]

102. went to the Launcher Control Room with the intent to act as a safety observer after he was complete powering up the launcher. [encl (62), (68)]

103. was not qualified as a NATO Sea Sparrow Maintenance Technician (NEC 1147). [encl (37)]

104. was not familiar with the W-2R SOT procedure. [encl (62), (70)]

105. stated, "I then took up to the AFT NSSMS Director Room to instruct him on how to perform a SOT at the SEAT so he would be able to help out for future SOTs." [encl (62)]

106. After , and left the workcenter, assigned and to help with the W-2R SOT. [encl (61), (71), (72)]

107. After being assigned to help with the W-2R SOT, and gathered tools, made a head call and arrived at the scene after the incident had occurred. [encl (71), (72)]

108. Once in NATO Director Room #2, noticed that there was no power to the SDC and the MK 57 Computer and proceeded to CIC to investigate, leaving on station. [encl (62), (70)]

109. stated, "When I arrived in CIC, I noticed that the FOC had been de-energized by someone turning off the 25VDC circuit breaker CB1." [encl (62)]

110. stated that he had turned CB1 off for troubleshooting on 21 Nov 11. [encl (62), (69)]

111. was aware that maintenance troubleshooting utilizing the FOC occurred on the NSSMS (Fwd) on 21 Nov 11. [encl (34)]

112. reset CB1, called NATO Director Room #2 utilizing the J-dial and instructed to load the Computer Operational Program (COP). [encl (62), (70)]

113. told utilizing the J-dial that he did not know how to load the Computer Operational Program. [encl (62), (70)]

114. told utilizing the J-dial that he would return to NATO Director Room #2. [encl (70)]

115. stated he did not load the Computer Operational Program after called him in NATO Director Room #2 utilizing the J-dial. [encl (70)]

116. Attempting to energize the MIC, placed CB2 in the "ON" position and noted that there was no control power. [encl (69)]

117. attempted to call CIC utilizing the J-dial but got a busy signal. [encl (69)]

118. called NATO Director Room #2 utilizing the J-dial, spoke with and learned that had gone to CIC. [encl (69), (70)]

119. called at the FOC utilizing the J-dial to confirm that had turned control power (CB1) ON. [encl (62), (69)]

120. hung up the J-dial after confirming the status of CB1 ON with and began to energize the MIC. [encl (69)]

121. The Computer Operational Program requires approximately 1-3 minutes to complete the load sequence. [encl (22), (62), (69)]

122. The Computer Operational Program controls NSSMS Launcher movement with the MIC in REMOTE. [encl (68), (69)]

123. did not contact to alert him that the Computer Operational Program load sequence was not complete. [encl (62), (69)]

124. Prior to energizing the MIC in REMOTE, did not attempt to contact NATO Director Room #2 to verify that the Computer Operational Program load sequence was complete. [encl (62), (69), (70)]

125. was aware that energizing the launcher without the Computer Operational Program being loaded might cause the launcher to move. [encl (69)]

126. The CSOSS procedure for initializing the NSSMS instructs the MIC operator to sound the personnel safety alarm for 10 seconds in order to alert personnel of imminent launcher movement. [encl (53)]

127. did not depress the personnel safety alarm prior to placing the MIC in REMOTE. [encl (69)]

128. stated that he did not attempt to sound the personnel safety alarm due to the alarm being inoperable for approximately one year. [encl (69)]

129. stated that he did not visually clear the aft missile deck prior to placing the system in REMOTE. [encl (68), (69)]

130. did not act a Safety Observer stationed on the aft missile deck. [encl (68), (69)]

131. stated he knew the personnel safety alarm was known to be a problem and that it regularly fails. [encl (61)]

132. Maintenance Records indicate that there were no outstanding jobs on the NSSMS (Aft) personnel safety alarm. [encl (43)]

133. After placing the MIC in REMOTE, heard the Aft NSSMS Launcher moving. [encl (68), (69)]

134. Upon hearing the Aft NSSMS Launcher moving, ran out on the fantail and looked up at the aft missile deck and saw PS1 Young walking back into the ship with blood on the left side of his face. [encl (68), (69)]

135. After seeing PS1 Young from the fantail, proceeded to the O-2 level passageway leading to the aft missile deck and found PS1 Young collapsed in the passageway next to the SHIP'S ACFT WORK CTR (02-128-4-Q). [encl (68), (69)]

136. notified personnel in a nearby workcenter to contact Damage Control Central and to announce Medical Emergency. [encl (68), (69)]

137. stated that while he stayed with PS1 Young in the passageway next to the SHIP'S ACFT WORK CTR (02-128-4-Q) waiting for the Medical Response Team to arrive, PS1 Young took his cell phone out of his pocket and dropped it on the deck. [encl (69)]

138. After the Medical Response Team arrived, stated that he went out to the aft missile deck and noticed the Aft NSSMS Launcher was pointed straight up, PS1 Young's cover was lying on the port side of the aft missile deck and PS1 Young's watch was located behind the Flagstaff. [encl (69)]

139. tated that he picked up PS1 Young's cell phone and placed it with his cover and watch next to a piece of Medical Response Team equipment on the aft missile deck. [encl (69)]

140. and stated that they did not reference the CSOSS when they began initializing the system. [encl (62), (69)]

141. stated that he had previously seen and and other workcenter personnel not utilizing the CSOSS manual when performing CSOSS procedures. [encl (61)]

142. did not enforce the use of the CSOSS manual in his workcenter and did not punish workers when they did not follow the procedures. [encl (61)]

143. stated that prior to the incident he was unaware that CSF4 sailors were not using their CSOSS or MRC as required. [encl (22)]

144. stated that prior to this incident he was unaware that the personnel safety alarm on the aft NSSMS was not working and he stated that it was not in the Current Ship's Maintenance Projects (CSMP) list. [encl (22)]

145. signed Administrative Remarks (Page 13) regarding procedural compliance and

possible disciplinary action if they failed to follow 3M and CSOSS procedures whenever applicable in the course of their duties. [encl (34), (47), (73), (74), (75), (76), (77), (78), (79)]

146. stated that he was unaware of any maintenance issues with the NSSMS (Aft). [encl (47)]

147. stated that he believed that his division sailors followed required checklists 100% of the time. [encl (23)]

148. ; stated that he was unaware that the NSSMS (Aft) personnel safety alarm was not working. [encl (23)]

149. Appropriate danger signs, such as warnings, cautions, and safety precautions shall be posted conspicuously in all areas where ammunition and explosives are stowed, handled or fired. [encl (80)]

150. An explosive safety precaution placard will be conspicuously posted in all shipboard ordnance handling areas. [encl (80)]

151. The Standardized General Safety Regulations for Ordnance Handling placard is shown in NAVSEA OP 4 NINTH REVISION, APPENDIX D, SIGNS PLACARDS, HAZARD MARKINGS AND LABEL PLATES, FIGURE D-3. [encl (80)]

152. For launcher areas, a "DANGER STAND CLEAR OF LAUNCHER DECK AREA" sign shall be conspicuously located on each side of the launcher deck. [encl (80)]

153. NAVSEA OP 4 NINTH REVISION, APPENDIX D, SIGNS PLACARDS, HAZARD MARKINGS AND LABEL PLATES, paragraph D-4.2, states, "DANGER CIRCLE. The Weapons Program Manager, in conjunction with NAVSEASYSCOM, is required to establish a danger circle around power-driven systems, such as gun mounts, turrets, gun/missile directors and missile launchers. The circles shall meet the following requirements:

a. The danger area shall be encircled by a painted red line, 4 inches wide. The inside of the red line shall be approximately 18 inches from the maximum rotating projection of the armament.
b. The danger area shall be labeled by painting the words 'DANGER AREA' in 2-inch high white letters, centered within the 4-inch wide red circle line described in subparagraph a. The words 'DANGER AREA' shall be repeated around the circle every 4 feet." [encl (80)]

154. NAVSEA OP 4 NINTH REVISION, APPENDIX D, SIGNS PLACARDS, HAZARD MARKINGS AND LABEL PLATES, paragraph D-4.3, states, "MISSILE BLAST AREAS. The Weapons Program Manager, in conjunction with NAVSEASYSCOM, is required to establish a missile blast area in the vicinity of all missile launchers." [encl (80)]

155. For ships with aft missile launchers/VLS, the weather decks aft of the aft extremity of the deckhouse and the weather decks immediately below the launcher deck shall be considered a missile blast area. [encl (80)]

156. For NATO SEASPARROW Launchers, the launcher deck extending to a 50-foot radius or bounded by bulkheads shall be considered a missile blast area. [encl (80)]

157. NAVSEA OP 4 NINTH REVISION, APPENDIX D, SIGNS PLACARDS, HAZARD MARKINGS AND LABEL PLATES, paragraph D-4.3, subparagraph b., states, "The missile blast area requires danger signs that are a minimum 12 x 12 inches in size containing white lettering on a red background posted five feet above the deck. The missile blast area shall be identified as follows:

(1) Danger signs shall be conspicuously displayed on exterior bulkheads in missile blast areas. These signs shall read 'DANGER: MISSILE BLAST AREA'.

(2) Danger signs shall be conspicuously displayed on the interior of doors, hatches and other openings to missile blast areas. The signs shall read 'DANGER: MISSILE BLAST AREA'.

(3) Danger signs shall be conspicuously displayed at boundaries and accesses to launcher blast areas. These danger signs shall read 'DANGER: THIS OPENS TO A MISSILE BLAST AREA, DO NOT LOITER, LAUNCH MAY OCCUR WITHOUT WARNING'." [encl (80)]

158. Danger signs, warnings, cautions, and safety precautions were posted conspicuously in all areas of the NSSMS (Aft) on 23 Nov 11. [encl (81), (82)]

159. stated that he found PS1 Young's NWU cover on the port side of the aft missile deck. [encl (69)]

160. stated that he found PS1 Young's watch on the aft missile deck behind the flag staff. [encl (69)]

161. Evidence collected from the incident scene included the following items: (1) cellular telephone; (2) watch; (3) belt; (4) belt buckle; (5) sunglasses; (6) multi-tool; (7) multi-tool case; (8) NWU cover; (9) boots; and (10) pen. [encl (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92)]

162. Evidence of Aft NSSMS Launcher damage collected from the incident scene included remnants of the frangible missile launch cover. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (93)]

163. All evidence collected from the incident scene was turned over to NCIS S/A on 30 November 2011. [encl (83), (93)]

164. PS1 Young's personal effects were inventoried and turned over to (SC), ESSEX Assistant Supply Officer for disposition. [encl (94)]

165. PS1 Young's cell phone memory contained zero text messages in his Messages Inbox. [encl (95)]

166. PS1 Young's cell phone memory contained 94 sent text messages in his Messages Sent Folder. [encl (96)]

167. A large shaded area extended from underneath the Aft NSSMS Launcher left-hand missile quadrant to beyond the red painted danger circle on the Aft NSSMS deck, within an hour of the incident on 23 Nov 11. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30)]

168. Frangible cell cover number four of the Aft NSSMS Launcher left-hand missile quadrant was damaged as result of the incident on 23 Nov 11. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (97)]

169. Frangible cell cover fragments were found scattered on the Aft NSSMS Launcher Base and the Aft NSSMS Launcher weather deck inside the red painted danger circle. [encl (23), (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (109)]

170. Two discernible groups of frangible cell cover fragments were found scattered on the Aft NSSMS Launcher Base and the Aft NSSMS Launcher weather deck inside the red painted danger circle. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (109)]

171. A group of smaller frangible cell cover fragments were observed scattered on the Aft NSSMS Launcher weather deck from approximately 050° to 055° relative to the Aft NSSMS Launcher. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (109)]

172. A group of larger frangible cell cover fragments were observed scattered on the Aft NSSMS Launcher Base from approximately 090° to 140° relative to the Aft NSSMS Launcher. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (108), (109)]

173. An eighteen-inch long scuffmark was observed on the Aft NSSMS Launcher Base extending radially from approximately 285° to 310° relative to the Aft NSSMS Launcher. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (99), (100), (101), (102), (108)]

174. A five-inch long scuffmark was observed on the Aft NSSMS Launcher Base extending radially from approximately 309° to 313° relative to the Aft NSSMS Launcher. [encl (28), (29), (30), (99), (101), (102), (108)]

175. A seventeen-inch wide scuff was observed on the Aft NSSMS Launcher Base extending radially from approximately 326° to 090° relative to the Aft NSSMS Launcher. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (98), (99), (102), (108)]

176. Several minor scuffs of varied lengths were observed on the Aft NSSMS Launcher Base extending radially from approximately 065° to 141° relative to the Aft NSSMS Launcher. [encl (26), (27), (98), (99), (103), (104), (108)]

177. A blood smear was observed on the port side passageway bulkhead at approximately frame 128 that was approximately four inches in width and four and one quarter inches in height. [encl (105), (106), (107)]

178. Replacement cost for the broken frangible missile cell cover, P/N: 2895867; NIIN: 010181024 totaled $2,466.87. [encl (110)]

179. Engineering Team Lead. Naval Surface Warfare Command (NSWC), Port Hueneme Division (PHD), , Electronics Technician, NSWC PHD, and , Electronics Engineer, NSWC PHD performed an Engineering Investigation of the USS ESSEX (LHD 2) Aft Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) from 2 to 5 Dec 11. [encl (111), (112), (113)]

180. , Electronics Engineer, NSWC PHD, has 22 years experience working with the NSSMS program. [encl (113)]

181. , Electronics Technician, NSWC PHD, has 35 years experience working with the NSSMS program. [encl (113)]

182. stated there has not been a casualty resulting from a safety incident/mechanical malfunction of the NSSMS dating back to 1978. [encl (113)]

183. The Engineering Investigation Team Executive Summary stated, "The Guided Missile Launcher (GML) movement observed on the USS ESSEX (LHD 2) during the recreation demonstration was consistent with the MIC set to REMOTE and CB2 (Servo Power) to ON while the NSSMS Computer Operational Program (NSSCOP) was not loaded." [encl (111)]

184. The Engineering Investigation Team Executive Summary stated, "When properly loaded, the NSSCOP provides valid position commands to position the GML to air ready (180° TRAIN (TN) and 0° ELEVATION (EL) for the GML). When the NSSCOP is not properly loaded, no valid position commands are provided to the GML causing the GML to move to an unordered position." [encl (111)]

185. The Engineering Investigation Team Executive Summary stated, "Testing performed by the Engineering Team demonstrates the NSSMS performs as designed. The Engineering Team found no equipment causalities that could have caused the GML to move to an unordered position." [encl (111)]

186. The Engineering Investigation Team Executive Summary stated, "NSWC PHD performed a groom for the NSSMS onboard during August 2011. Discrepancies were provided to the Ship at the completion of the groom. The Ship has made significant improvements in the material condition of the NSSMS since the groom with all major discrepancies corrected." [encl (111)]

187. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated the Engineering Investigation Team tested the equipment functionality and material condition by performing the LHD 2 NSSMS Combat Systems Operational Sequence System (CSOSS) equipment light off procedures and Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) 7211/005 M-1R and 4281/021 W-2R. [encl (112)]

188. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated MRC 7211/005 M-1R performs the Guided Missile Launcher System (GMLS) BIT off-line test which tests the functionality of the launcher positioning, servo electronics, servo trip/overspeed, and the personnel safety alarm in LOCAL mode. [encl (112)]

189. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated MRC 4281/021 W-2R performs the System Operability Test (SOT), which tests the launcher positioning and servo electronics in REMOTE mode. [encl (112)]

190. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated that MRC 7211/005 M-1R and MRC 4281/021 W-2R were utilized to check the functionality of the launcher movement. [encl (112)]

191. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated, "The system passed satisfactorily with the exception of the personnel safety alarm which was unsatisfactory." [encl (112)]

192. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated the NSSMS Engineering Team and ship's company assisted in both demonstrating the GMLS functionality and setting up and performing a possible incident recreation. [encl (112), (114)]

193. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated the following findings and results for two recreation events that occurred:

- LHD 2 AFT GMLS. NSSMS was brought to readiness condition as per CSOSS procedures. MIC control power was set to OFF and mode in LOCAL with CB2 (GML Servo Power) ON. Digital Computer was then set to OFF. MIC control power was then set to ON and mode to REMOTE. GML moved clockwise (CW) in TRAIN from 180° to approximately 166° (approximately 346° in rotation) and up from 0° to 85° in ELEVATION (GML reached upper stops).

- Surface Warfare Engineering Facility (SWEF) GMLS. The event was recreated at the NSWC PHD SWEF. MIC control power was set to OFF and mode in Local with CB2 ON. Digital Computer was then set to OFF. MIC control power was then set to ON and mode to REMOTE. GML moved counterclockwise (CCW) in TRAIN and down in ELEVATION to lower stops until the servo trip at approximately 10° in TRAIN. The servo trip/overspeed circuitry was then bypassed and the test performed again. With servo trip/overspeed circuitry bypassed, GML moved CW in TRAIN approximately 345° and down in ELEVATION to -5°.

- LHD 2 AFT GMLS and SWEF GMLS Differences: SWEF GMLS only functioned like LHD 2 AFT GMLS when servo trip/overspeed was bypassed. Extensive troubleshooting of LHD 2 FWD & AFT GMLS servo trip/overspeed circuitry yielded no faults. Dynamic testing was not conducted due to concerns of possible GMLS damage. Further SWEF GMLS testing was not performed. [encl (112)]

194. The Engineering Investigation Detailed Summary stated to determine consistency of GMLS movement direction, the NSSMS Engineering Team and ship's company conducted static tests mimicking the initial recreation test, but with CB2 OFF, preventing actual GML movement yielding movement direction in TN and EL was consistent on both AFT and FWD GMLS. [encl (112)]

195. The Engineering Investigation Team made the following recommendations to be the responsibility of NSWC PHD:

- Further testing of the servo trip/overspeed circuitry at NSWC PHD Surface Warfare Engineering Facility (SWEF) and Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) at NSWC PHD to determine proper behavior of circuitry. May require additional testing onboard LHD 2.

- Create an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to automate the personnel safety alarm with launcher movement in MK 57 MOD 2/3 NSSMS. The personnel safety alarm is already automated in MK 57 MOD 10-13 NSSMS.

- Inform Fleet, via Technical Letter, to stress the testing of personnel safety alarms and provide repair and replacement information.

- Place warning label on MIC next to REMOTE/LOCAL switch indicating launcher movement possible (may be included with ECP to automate personnel safety alarm). [encl (112)]

196. and stated that there were two potential causes for NSSMS Launcher movement when placed in REMOTE at the MIC; (1) The MK 57 Computer could have been off, or (2) there could have been a disturbance of the data due to a bad signal. [encl (113)]

197. and stated that there has been a widespread problem in the Navy with the personnel safety alarm unreliability due to corrosion. [encl (113)]

198. and stated that the NSSMS does not automatically record operational history and that there was no electronic history of the incident on 23 November 2011. [encl (113)]

199. and concurred with the theory of PS1 Young sitting under the NSSMS Launcher, being hit, pinned and dragged around the launcher base was consistent with photographic and system technical operation evidence. [encl (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (98), (99), (102), (108), (109), (113), (114)]

Opinions

1. PS1 Young was utilizing his cell phone in an unauthorized space (aft missile deck) within the danger circle. This was a violation of ESSEX policy and a contributing factor to his death. [FF 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 29, 30, 35, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 191, 192, 193, 194, 199]

2. PS1 Young was sitting under the Aft NSSMS Launcher at approximately 090° relative to the bow when the launcher began to move. Without warning, the launcher simultaneously rose to maximum elevation and rotated in a clockwise direction. PS1 Young was struck by cell number four of the left quadrant, pinned and dragged around the base of the launcher before being able to free himself at approximately 270° relative to the bow. Aft NSSMS Launcher contact with PS1 Young resulted in severe blunt force trauma to his body that ultimately caused his death. [FF 26, 29, 30, 35, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 138, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 191, 192, 193, 194, 199]

3. A single dynamic NSSMS (Aft) recreation based on interviews was replicated by qualified ESSEX personnel and Naval Surface Warfare Command (NSWC), Port Hueneme Division (PHD) engineers aboard ESSEX. Results were commensurate with witness statements and known characteristics of the system. Several static system recreations were conducted on both NSSMS (Fwd) and NSSMS (Aft) to determine repeatability and consistency of results. All static results supported the dynamic recreation results. [FF 183, 184, 192, 193, 194]

4. The NSSMS (Aft) danger signs, warnings, cautions and safety precautions met the intent of NAVSEA OP 4 NINTH REVISION requirements to be posted conspicuously in all areas where ammunition and explosives are stowed, handled or fired. [FF 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158]

5. and failed to follow established CSOSS procedures for the initialization of the NSSMS. This led to the unintended movement of the Aft NSSMS Launcher. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 140, 141]

6. and failed to ensure that a qualified safety observer was posted on the aft missile deck with proper net communication established with all stations prior to system initialization. Furthermore, consciously skipped sounding the personnel safety alarm because he knew it was inoperable, and had been for over a year. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 69, 76, 77, 80, 81, 101, 102, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 191, 197]

7. failed to follow published CSOSS procedures by not referencing the checklist prior to applying power to the system. In doing so, he failed to confirm that the Computer Operational Program had fully loaded prior to placing the MIC in REMOTE. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 112, 113, 115, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 140]

8. The Computer Operational Program load sequence was never initiated. When placed the MIC in the REMOTE position, launcher movement duplicated in the dynamic recreation occurred. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 108, 112, 113, 114, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 133, 183, 184, 192, 193, 194, 199]

9. left an unqualified technician in NATO Director Room #2 when going to troubleshoot and reset CB1 (FOC). failed to inform that the Computer Operational Program had not been initialized. Had taken positive, forceful action when informed that did not know how to load the computer, he could have prevented from initializing the system improperly. He did not inform while talking to him on the J-dial phone; instead he tried to remedy the problem without communicating his intentions. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 123]

10. Assigned as the workcenter supervisor, did not cultivate an environment in his workcenter that enforced strict adherence to established maintenance procedures and doctrine. s laissez-faire management style produced complacency and over-confidence leaving members of CSF4 confident they could execute procedures without reference to checklists. He failed to provide effective leadership by assigning specific tasks, conducting risk analysis and mitigation, and supervising proper procedural execution. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 52, 54, 88, 92, 93, 99, 100, 106, 131, 132, 141, 142, 145]

11. By contacting the Fire Control Supervisor, clearly questioned whether he required permission to conduct the maintenance. However, instead of seeking out guidance from his chain of command, he pushed forward with the maintenance in order to get it done prior to getting underway. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 106]

12. Confusion exists regarding procedures and permission requirements for conducting maintenance that requires gun mount and launcher movement when in port (moored and at anchor). Witness statements were conflicting regarding in port and underway combat systems maintenance procedures and permission requirements. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99]

13. While the incident interrupted the maintenance, the intent was to complete the W-2R SOT with only two qualified technicians and one trainee. The MRC manpower requirement includes one FC2, two FC3 and two FCSN personnel. Later in the MRC, personnel are directed to establish communications between five stations (FOC, RSC A/B, SEAT, safety observer at launcher and MIC). and did not establish continuous communication between the stations they manned (FOC and MIC). They relied solely on J-dial phone calls instead of a sound-powered phone net monitored by all stations. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 80, 81, 82, 84, 100, 101, 102, 103 105, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124]

14. The W-2R (SOT) that was ordered on the morning of 23 November had been completed on 21 November. The check on 21 November met the requirement for both the pre-underway and weekly planned maintenance. There was no requirement to perform the procedure on the morning of 23 November. Furthermore, because this maintenance was ordered on a morning filled with complex evolutions and limited time availability, the workers proceeded with a false sense of urgency to complete the SOT prior to setting Restricted Maneuvering Doctrine. This was a contributing factor to the death of PS1 Young. [FF 21, 22, 24, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89]

15. Documentation and witness statements demonstrated that ESSEX leadership from the Commanding Officer down through the CSF Division CPO/LPO fostered a culture of procedural compliance and accountability. From OPNAV instructions, Commanding Officer's Orders, all the way to division Administrative Remarks (Page 13's) completed by the division LCPO, a culture of procedural compliance and professionalism was sought. The workcenter supervisor was the one exception to this rule. By giving "free reign" and not planning and supervising the execution of his orders, he disregarded those principles of ORM that are central to the Commanding Officer's Orders. Additionally, by not enforcing standards when he knew they were not being followed, he nullified the efforts of his Chain of Command. [FF 69, 70, 71, 72, 88, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 131, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148]

16. PS1 Young's death was in the line of duty and not due to his own misconduct. [FF 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 29, 30]

Recommendations

1. Refer to legal authority to assess accountability under applicable laws and regulations as a result of his actions on 23 Nov 11.

2. Revoke maintenance qualifications for a period to be determined at a later date.

3. Refer to legal authority to assess accountability under applicable laws and regulations as a result of his actions on 23 Nov 11.

4. Revoke maintenance qualifications for a period to be determined at a later date.

5. Refer to legal authority to assess accountability under applicable laws and regulations as a result of his actions on 23 Nov 11.

6. Revoke Workcenter Supervisor qualification for a period to be determined at a later date.

7. Revoke maintenance qualifications for a period to be determined at a later date.

8. Recommend that ESSEX codify and clarify Combat Systems maintenance doctrine and provide training to all C5I workcenters and CSOOW qualified personnel.

9. Recommend ESSEX provide continued support to NSWC PHD in pursuit of the Engineering Investigation Team's recommendations:

- Further testing of the servo trip/overspeed circuitry at NSWC PHD Surface Warfare Engineering Facility (SWEF) and Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) at NSWC PHD to determine proper behavior of circuitry. May require additional testing onboard LHD 2.

- Create an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to automate the personnel safety alarm with launcher movement in MK 57 MOD 2/3 NSSMS. The personnel safety alarm is already automated in MK 57 MOD 10-13 NSSMS.

- Inform Fleet, via Technical Letter, to stress the testing of personnel safety alarms and provide repair and replacement information.

- Place warning label on MIC next to REMOTE/LOCAL switch indicating launcher movement possible (may be included with ECP to automate personnel safety alarm).

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