DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SUBMARINE FORCE ATLANTIC
1430 MITSCHER AVENUE
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2492

5830
Ser N00L/S010
14 Mar 16

~~SECRET - UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of basic letter and enclosures (1) through (84)~~

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on CAPT (b)(6) , USN ltr 5800
of 18 Dec 15

From: Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic
To: File

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

1. (U) Executive Summary. A command investigation and an independent investigation initiated by the convening authority, were completed following the discovery of the allison and grounding of USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE). On 25 November 2015 at 0540L, the ship entered the Saint Mary's River entrance range buoy chain and approached the Fort Clinch turning basin on its return to port into Kings Bay, Georgia. The ship had a scheduled pilot pick up at Fort Clinch which resulted in transiting the entrance channel and conducting the pilot transfer. While conducting the pilot transfer, the ship exited the channel to the southwest. While attempting to regain the channel, the Commanding Officer judged the ship to be in extremis and took evasive maneuvers, alliding Buoy 23. During evasive maneuvers, the ship crossed the channel and exited on the opposite side to the north. While answering an All Back Emergency, the ship grounded, ultimately the ship regained the channel and returned to port without further incident.

2. (U) All appropriate accountability measures have either been completed or, in the case of the formal detachment for cause process concerning CAPT (b)(6) , are in progress. The crew responsible for this incident was relieved of their responsibility with an exchange of command on 30 November 2015.

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

I am confident that leadership has taken all necessary steps to prevent a reoccurrence in the future.

3. (U) The findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations contained in this investigation, as modified by Commander, Submarine Group TEN, are approved. This investigation is considered final and no further endorsement is required.

(b) (6)

J. E. TOFALO

Copy to:
CSG-10
CSS-16
USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER SUBMARINE GROUP 10
[redacted]
KINGS BAY, GA [redacted]

5830
Ser 00/S029
29 Dec 15

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CAPT (b)(6) , USN ltr 5800
of 18 Dec 15

From: Commander, Submarine Group 10
To: Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Ref: (a) (U) JAGINST 5800.7F
(b) (U) U.S. Navy Regulations
(c) (U) Chief of Naval Operations Charge of Command of 8 Nov 11

Encl: (83) (U) Email and Statement from LCDR (b)(6) of 7 Dec 15
(84) (U) Redacted Unclassified Copy of CAPT (b)(6) (b)(6) USN ltr 5800 of 18 Dec 15

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded. Enclosure (83) was submitted after the underlying report, which I consider relevant to Findings of Fact indicated below. Enclosure (84) is a true copy of the underlying report redacted to modify classification to unclassified and to correct the portion markings.

2. (U) Investigative Summary. Per reference (a), Commander, Submarine Squadron 16 (CSS-16) directed a command investigation into the facts and circumstances regarding a buoy allision by USS GEORGIA (BLUE). Inspection of the submerged exterior of the ship revealed that she had grounded and the Squadron's investigating officer discovered several potentially contributory external factors. Based on a preliminary report of these details, I exercised my authority as a senior Convening Authority to convene my own investigation and substantially

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broaden the investigatory scope. With Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic's concurrence, I appointed CAPT (b)(6) (b)(6) Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic N7, a post-major commander, as the investigating officer. CAPT (b)(6) performed an unbiased, objective investigation.

3. (U) Executive Summary. On 2 November 2015, USS GEORGIA finished a year-long Maintenance and Modernization Period. Following about three weeks underway for training and certifications, GEORGIA was returning to port, Kings Bay, on 25 November 2015 for a one day stop (return and departure same day) to replace a failed towed array. Although the ship desired a longer in port period, the Immediate Superior in Command, CSS-16 determined that the additional underway time gained from a one day stop would benefit the ship. The crew had a limited underway period prior to their deployment and upcoming readiness evaluation. On 25 November 2015, during the inbound transit, the GEORGIA allided with one of the channel marker buoys, and during extremis maneuvers, grounded. A more detailed summary of facts follows:

a. (U) On the morning of 25 November 2015, USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) commenced a return to port into Kings Bay, Georgia.

b. (U) At 0540, the ship entered the Saint Marys entrance range buoy chain and approached the Fort Clinch turning basin.

c. (U) The ship had a scheduled 0630 pilot pickup at Fort Clinch in support of a 0730 moor time. This resulted in transiting the entrance channel and conducting the pilot transfer just prior to civil twilight [the allision and grounding occurred at 0627, civil twilight was 0634 and sunrise at 0700].

d. (U) The C-Tractor carrying the Pilot was further west (further inland) than expected as the ship entered the turning basin. This poor positioning, coupled with the excessive speed of the ship approaching the pilot pick up point, resulted in the pilot transfer occurring late.

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Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

e. (U) While conducting the pilot transfer, the ship exited the channel to the southwest.

f. (U) While attempting to regain the channel, the Commanding Officer (CO) judged the ship to be in extremis and took evasive maneuvers, striking buoy 23.

g. (U) During evasive maneuvers, the ship crossed the channel and exited on the opposite side to the north.

h. (U) While answering All Back Emergency, in attempt to regain the channel, the ship grounded.

i. (U) Using further maneuvers, the ship regained the channel. The C-Tractor assisted in lining up the ship's head to the track and the ship returned to port without further incident.

4. (U) Standards of Review. In determining my actions on the underlying report, and in addition to the previously referenced authorities, I also considered the following:

a. (U) Article 0702 of reference (b) states that commanders "shall be responsible for the satisfactory accomplishment of mission and duties assigned to their commands" and "shall exercise positive leadership and actively develop the highest qualities of leadership in persons with positions of authority and responsibility throughout their commands."

b. (U) Article 0802 of reference (b) states that the responsibility of the CO for his command is "absolute," except when, and to the extent to which, he has been relieved by competent authority, or as provided otherwise in U.S. Navy Regulations.

c. (U) Reference (c), The Charge of Command from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 9 November 2011, sets forth the responsibilities and governing principles of a CO. COs are held "to the highest standards of personal and professional conduct" and "accept the extraordinary responsibility of Command with

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

full regard for its consequences." The Charge further says, "It is the duty of every Commanding Officer to understand his or her authorities and responsibilities, prior to assuming command."

5. (U) Administrative Changes. Per reference (a), I reviewed this investigation for completeness; the proceedings of this investigation are approved as modified below.

a. Preliminary Statement: Paragraph 4, change "corroboration" to "collaboration."

6. (U) Findings of Fact. The Investigating Officer's Findings of Fact are approved except as modified below:

a. (U) Add: "CONFIDENTIAL upon removal of enclosures" under SECRET//NOFORN banner line on all pages of the basic letter.

b. (U) Findings of Fact 1 through and including 128: Replace all portion markings identified "(U//FOUO)" with "(U)" portion markings.

c. (U) Finding of Fact 2 is changed to read: "The PowerPoint slide used to guide the piloting brief did not contain any evidence that the use of backing bells was considered during the pilotting brief." (Encl (##))

d. (U) Finding of Fact 3: Add ", scope operator," between the words "Register" and "stated."

e. (U) Finding of Fact 5: Delete the "(CSS 16; ISIC) and replace with "(CSS 16)."

f. (U) Finding of Fact 10: Delete the "," between "piloting" and "brief" and insert "," between "briefs" and "watchstanders."

g. (U) Finding of Fact 11: Delete "King's" and replace with "Kings."

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

h. (U) Finding of Fact 13: Add "to the incident" between the words "day" and "(Section 1)" and add "The individuals specifically affected were the Contact Manager, Quartermaster, Deck Log Recorder, and Officer of the Deck."

i. (U) Finding of Fact 15: Delete "CSL" and replace with "Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic (CSL)."

j. (U) Finding of Fact 21: Add "CSL N3A," between " (b)(6) ," and "There."

k. (U) Finding of Fact 23: Replace "[RTP]" with "rtp" and add "[return to port]" after "rtp."

l. (U) Finding of Fact 25: Replace (b)(6)

m. (U) Finding of Fact 33: Delete the words "The previous week, SWFLANT had agreed to support a ship movement in the EHW on 27 November." Add "Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic" between "at" and "SWFLANT" and add "( )" around "SWFLANT". Replace "COA" with "Course of Action (COA)", and replace "EHW" with "Explosive Handling Wharf."

n. (U) Finding of Fact 48: Replace "CSG 10" with Commander, Submarine Group 10 (CSG 10)."

o. (U) Finding of Fact 51: Add "In his statement to the Investigating Officer, CAPT (b)(6) ," prior to "CAPT (b)(6) ."

p. (U) Finding of Fact 52: Add "25 November 2015" prior to "Timeline", and replace "Timeline" with "timeline."

q. (U) Finding of Fact 52h: Replace "Command" with "Center."

r. (U) Finding of Fact 52ae: Delete "(F//FOUO)" and replace with "(U)" in the classification portion marking.

s. (U) Finding of Fact 60: Replace "COSOE" with "Commanding Officer's Safe Operating Envelope (COSOE)."

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Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

t. (U) Finding of Fact 69: Replace "BTB" with "Bridge to Bridge (BTB)."

u. (U) Finding of Fact 101: Add ", the Pilot," between the words " (b)(6) " and "stated."

v. (U) Finding of Fact 105: Modify to read, "The ship exited the channel a second time at 30 degrees 42.789 minutes North, 081 degrees 27.692 minutes West, moving at a speed of approximately 13 knots."

w. (U) Finding of Fact 110: Replace the entire finding with "(U) The stopping distance for a 726 Class submarine at All Back Emergency exceeded the distance USS GEORGIA had available before grounding given the ship's initial speed."

x. (U)) Finding of Fact 123: Delete the word "disparaging."

y. (U) Finding of Fact 125: Delete "1. (U//FOUO) Debris in shaft seal water strainers."

z. (U) Finding of Fact 126, subparagraph c: Delete the word "moderate."

aa. (U) Finding of Fact 126: Add subparagraph e as "e. (U) All screw blades with leading edge damage to varying extent."

ab. (U) Add Finding of Fact 128: "The ship did not establish positive communications with the C-Tractor and/or Pilot prior to making the turn into the Saint Marys Entrance Channel at 0526R."

ac. (U) Add enclosure (83) to support Findings of Fact 32, 33, and 35 through 39.

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

7. (U) Opinions. The Investigating Officer's opinions are approved, except as modified below:

a. (U) Opinions 1 through and including 30: Replace all portion markings identified "(U//FOUO)" with "(U)" portion markings.

b. (U) Modify Opinion 2: Replace the entire first sentence with the following two sentences "The ship's plan was marginally adequate, but should have been more robust to include mitigation of known risks. The team was not able to work together to execute pre-built tripwires when some of their planning assumptions played out differently in situ." The following sentence in the opinion remains.

c. (U) Modify Opinion 3: Add "Although the ship had significant concerns with piloting into Kings Bay without the Pilot onboard, they failed to take adequate measures to determine the C-Tractor and Pilot's readiness or weather conditions off Fort Clinch prior to the expected pilot transfer point." as the first sentence. The following three sentences in the opinion remain.

d. (U) Modify Opinion 21: Replace the entire first sentence with "The CO's focus on getting the Pilot onboard, both during preparations for and execution of the piloting evolution, resulted in some of the crew also focusing on getting the Pilot onboard, to the detriment of adequate focus on executing the briefed navigation plan."

e. (U) Modify Accountability 1: Change to Opinion 31 and delete "Accountability" heading. Additionally, change portion markings of new Opinion 31 and all subparagraphs from "(U//FOUO)" to "(U)."

f. (U) Modify Opinion 31.a.: Replace "CAPT (b)(6) personally advising the CO to slow the transit timeline down" with "CDR(b)(6) personally advised the CO that he should "just slow things down" [.]"

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

g. (U) Modify Opinion 31.g.: Delete ", in aggregate," add ", Navigator, OOD, XO and CO,[.]"

h. (U) Add Opinion 32: The ship allided with buoy 23 due to poor seamanship and failure to adhere to their operational plan and tripwires. Although conditions were challenging, they were within the crew's ability to manage. They failed to adequately control ship's position with respect to time and complicated the already complex situation by entering the channel before their briefed time (0545), using excessive speed during the transit, and without having established positive communications with the Pilot prior to channel entrance. [FF (1), (5), (9), (10), (18), (52.o), (52.t), (52.u), (52.af), (52.am), (52.aq), (52.as), (52.au), (52.av), (52.aw), (52.ay), (52.az), (52.ba), (52.bd), (52.be), (52.bg), (52.bm), (52.bn), (52.bq), (53-57), (59), (60), (65), (75-78), (83), (85), (87), (92), (93), (102)]

i. (U) Add Opinion 33: The level of certification and training prior to the ship's underway was at the intermediate level. The return to port evolution was a complex piloting situation and the increased risk was not recognized by the chair of command. Given the level of experience onboard, this piloting evolution should not have been attempted without additional risk mitigation in place. While concerns for visibility did increase the planning effort and added uncertainty until conditions could be verified in situ, visibility was not the proximate cause of this incident; the crew achieved their go/no-go criteria for entering the buoy chain of at least three buoy sets visible as well as navigation aids on shore. [FF (3), (5), (6), (11), (52.f), (52.aq), (52.ay), (52.az), (52.ba), (52.be), (53-56), (59), (63), (65), (67-74), (81), (92), (93), (109)]

j. (U) Add Opinion 34: The decision to start the transit before twilight added complexity; however, the most significant factors were the tug's poor positioning and the high speed of the ship entering the turning basin. [FF (3), (5), (6), (11), (52.f), (52.aq), (52.ay), (52.az), (52.ba), (52.be), (53-56), (59), (63), (65), (67-74), (81), (82), (93), (109)]

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

k. (U) Add Opinion 35: Although the CO expressed his reluctance to give the appearance of insubordination, the charge of command and Navy regulations are clear that he has ultimate responsibility for the safety of his vessel. His concern for lighting conditions could have been alleviated to a large extent by just executing the "as briefed" operational plan that was covered by the piloting brief along with the Commodore's guidance before the incident to "just slow things down." The Pilot transfer would have occurred between civil twilight and sunrise. In the end, the CO reported to the Commodore before the event that he assessed that the "plan was executable," yet he and his crew failed to execute the plan. [FF (6-10), (57), (58), (63), (75-78), (82-85), (87), (89)]

l. (U) Add Opinion 36: CAPT (b)(6) CSL N7, and his subordinates, did not influence the timing of the GEORGIA's return to port. He and his team were only involved with discussions on whether or not the Tactical Readiness Evaluation could be convened without a towed array. [FF (15), (16), (19-22), (28), (29), (32), (33), (35-38), (50), (51)]

m. (U) Add Opinion 37: With the ship's recent completion of an extended maintenance availability, the formality and basic submarining level of performance on GEORGIA was below standards, but improving. The issues identified in these areas were not significant contributing factors to the incident. [FF (118-124)]

n. (U) Add Opinion 38: The CO's personal lack of comfort with piloting into Kings Bay, enhanced by the additional complexity of entering in darkness, created a climate of fear that stifled the competency of the ship's crew and resulted in an over-reliance on the CO when the evolution did not proceed as expected. This is contrary to the expectations for a CO, who should inspire confidence and encourage employment of the skills his team possessed. [FF (3), (6), (10), (11), (59), (88), (97-100), (103), (115), (116), (120)]

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

o. (U) Add Opinion 39: The bridge team failed to effectively utilize available tools to manage the safe navigation of the ship during the pilot transfer, instead relying on the piloting team to identify critical piloting tripwires. [FF (10), (52.t), (52.ay), (52.be), (81), (82)]

p. (U) Add Opinion 40: The piloting team mismanaged the ship's speed up to, during, and following the pilot transfer. Allowing the ship to slow to below bare steerageway in a heavy current situation put the ship at the mercy of the river. [FF (52.u), (52.z), (52.ak-an), (52.aq), (52.as), (52.au), (52.be), (52.bf), (52.bh), (52.bm), (52.bn), (52.br), (52.bs), (76-79), (98-100), (103), (104)]

q. (U) Add Opinion 41: The Navigation/Operations Officer had a level of knowledge deficiency with respect to ship handling, thinking that adequate speed over ground would permit the ship to turn effectively. [FF (52.au)]

r. (U) Add Opinion 42: While darkness was not the proximate cause of the incident, it did create concern amongst the officers and crew that may have affected their actions. The darkness also possibly contributed to the poor positioning of the C-Tractor, although other tools were available both on the C-Tractor and ship to resolve this well before the pilot pick up time. Ultimately, had this crew (and the Pilot) executed the same plan in the same manner during broad daylight, there is nothing in the ship's planning effort, demonstrated seamanship, or response to tripwires that indicates the outcome would be any different. [FF (3), (6), (11), (58), (67-69), (71-73), (98)]

s. (U) Add Opinion 43: The Squadron 16 Commodore did not accommodate the CO's desires, failed to provide unambiguous direction to the CO and did not ensure his staff was adequately addressing operational issues in his absence. [FF (19), (20), (25-31), (37-39), (45)]

t. (U) Add Opinion 44: My Chief of Staff and Director of Operations recognized the plan involved increased risk, but failed to take effective action to resolve it. Instead, they relied on the assumption that the CO would heed the advice of the Commodore to insert margin himself. [FF (48), (49)]

u. (U) Add Opinion 45: This incident would likely not have occurred if the C-Tractor were positioned sufficiently east in the channel for the pilot transfer. The C-Tractor captain and Pilot were not diligent in ensuring they were in a position that provided adequate margin for the transfer prior to the turn to 294 leg, especially given the high flood currents that decreased the time available for the transfer. In addition, the Pilot failed to recognize the ship's precarious position and provide direction from the tug and delay his boarding of the ship. [FF (52.o), (52.ah), (52.ai), (65), (67), (68), (71-74)]

v. (U) Delete Opinion 17.

8. (U) Actions Taken / Pending Completion as Soon As Practical

a. (U) The crew responsible for this incident was relieved of their responsibility for the ship with an exchange of command to CAPT (b)(6) and his GOLD crew on 30 November 2015. The exchange of command occurred one (1) week earlier than scheduled due to the incidents giving rise to this investigation.

b. (U) The ship was dry-docked for a full assessment of damage and repair on 15 December 2015. The Trident Refit Facility fully assessed the damage, obtained Naval Sea Systems Command concurrence on assessment and repair plans, and is executing the required repairs. Damage was cosmetic with the exception of the ship's screw, which is suspected to have been damaged by the buoy chain, and the AUTEC range pinger and Starboard EM Log Rod Meter, which were damaged when the ship grounded. The anticipated repairs costs to date for this incident are approximately $1 million.

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

c. (U) Based on repair plans, CSS-16 developed a revised schedule for the ship that supports all previously planned mission capabilities with a six-day delay in deployment.

d. (U) The GEORGIA BLUE crew is decertified in piloting until completion of a comprehensive corrective action plan of action and milestones approved by CSS-16, satisfactory evaluations during their upcoming Advanced Homeport Training Period, and proof of competency at sea under the oversight of CSS-16. CSS-16 will report crew readiness for independent at sea operations for my concurrence prior to removing direct oversight.

e. (U) Submarine Group 10 is developing a more comprehensive and thorough process for planning and executing Kings Bay piloting events. This will include more precise designation of the pilot pick-up point, improved review of weather and tidal conditions, and the provision of important information to the ship to aid in their planning. This process will account for recommendations from the Safety Investigation Board that was separately convened for this incident.

9. (U) Accountability

a. (U) After careful consideration of the investigating officer's and my own findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, I do not believe the facts and circumstances warrant disciplinary action, in the form of non-judicial punishment or court-martial, in any of the cases of the individuals involved in the underlying incidents.

b. (U) I have considered the investigating officer's recommendations and intend to take the following actions:

(1) (U) I intend to relieve the CO due to my loss of confidence in his ability to command. His inability to effectively manage the complexity of the situation and failure to respond to the circumstances in a manner sufficient to protect the safety of the ship and crew is beneath my expectations for any CO.

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c. (U) I intend to take appropriate administrative action in the following cases:

(1) (U) The Executive Officer for his failure to maintain adequate standards of professionalism, failure to provide for the adequate sleep of key members of the crew prior to the piloting evolution, and failure to provide forceful back-up to his CO when the situation turned dangerous.

(2) (U) The Chief of the Boat for his failure to adequately manage the sleep plan for key members of the crew prior to the piloting evolution.

(3) (U) The Navigation/Operations Officer for his failure to produce an adequate operational plan that provided the ship additional margin to safety, in particular one that controlled arrival time at the Saint Marys Buoy, entrance into the channel and arrival at pilot pick-up; and level of knowledge deficiencies regarding ship handling.

(4) (U) The Weapons Officer, Officer of the Deck, for his failure to manage the pilot transfer evolution, execute the ship's navigational plan, and provide forceful backup to the CO during extremis maneuvers.

(5) (U) The Assistant Navigator for his failure to aggressively insert his expertise and provide forceful backup to the Navigator and CO when clearly required.

d. (U) I intend to issue Commodore (b)(6) a non-punitive Letter of Caution for his failure to provide his ship a plan with adequate margin to safety, specifically in not providing sufficient guidance and training to his staff that developed the plan in his absence and not aggressively pursuing complete resolution of the ship's requested arrival through personal intervention with the Type Commander staff.

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

e. (U) I intend to issue my Chief of Staff, CAPT (b)(6) (b)(6), and Director of Operations, CAPT (b)(6), non-Punitive Letters of Caution for their failure to pursue acceptable resolution to the concerns they had with the plan for the ship's arrival.

f. (U) I intend to relay the results of this report to the Commanding Officer, Submarine Base, Kings Bay, for consideration of investigative action, as possible, against the C-Tractor Captain and Pilot on the day of this incident for failing to ensure their positioning in the river provided sufficient room for pilot transfer given the high flood current. Furthermore, the Pilot failed to recognize the ship was standing into danger and failed to take action to prevent allision while on the tug instead of boarding the vessel.

10. (U) Conclusion. This incident was entirely preventable and very unfortunate. The CO and crew were presented with a series of complex circumstances including the early arrival time, gusty winds, strong current and a pilot transfer vessel out of position. Additionally, the leadership on GEORGIA was inexperienced at piloting on the Saint Marys River. It is clear these circumstances increased the level of risk and made the ship's mission very challenging. Unfortunately, the ship was ineffective at mitigating the known risks, and as such, more risk was accepted than should have been. The CO had complete responsibility and authority to ensure this event was completed successfully. It is my assessment that the primary cause of this event was a failure of leadership and hence, I no longer have confidence in the CO. He failed to properly prepare his team and, as a result, endangered the ship. The failure to delay the arrival time, vice arriving early at the channel turning basin was significant and the decision to proceed into restricted waters without positive communications with the Pilot was unacceptable. The ship failed as a team to control speed and failed to properly execute the operational plan as briefed. Leadership did not ensure key watch standers were rested and did not properly control the stationing of the maneuvering watch.

Subj: (U) COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

When making my decision to relieve the CO and recommend detachment for cause, consideration was given to the fact that our Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) are commanded by a second tour major command CO for a reason. The SSGN schedule is challenging, the missions we ask the ship to perform are complex and the team often lacks experience. Strong leadership is required to ensure the team is prepared, that operational plans are sound, and that risk is managed, not unknowingly accepted. In this case, the CO did not build a confident team on GEORGIA, rather he fostered an environment that allowed the team to fail when the situation went beyond his experience level.

(b)(6)

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5800
18 Dec 15

From: CAPT (b)(6) USN
To: Commander, Submarine Group 10

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Ref: (a) (U) JAGINST 5800.7F
(b) (U) Continuing Training & Qualifications Manual
(c) (U) Submarine Organization & Regulations Manual (SORM) COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPACINST 5400.49
(d) (U) Submarine Operations Manual (SOM) COMSUBBLANT/COMSUBPACINST C3120.26A
(e) (U) TM FZ5-01.04-12, Submarine Operational Planning

Encl: (1) (U) SUBGRU10 ltr 5830 of 7 Dec 15
(2) (U) COMSUBRON 16 ltr 5800 of 25 Nov 15
(3) (U) CAPT (b)(6) . USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 26 Nov 15
(4) (U) CAPT (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 9 Dec 15
(5) (U) LCDR (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN of 26 Nov 15
(6) (U) LCDR (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 9 Dec 15
(7) (U) LT (b)(6) . USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 26 Nov 15
(8) (U) LT (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 9 Dec 15
(9) (U) LT (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b) (6) . USN, of 25 Nov 15
(10) (U) LT (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 9 Dec 15
(11) (U) ETC (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) . USN, of 25 Nov 15
(12) (U) ETC (b)(6) . USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, 9 Dec 15
(13) (U) LT (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 25 Nov 15

Classified By: LCDR (b)(6)
Derived From: (b)(1)1.5a
Declassify On: (b)(6)

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Subj- COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

(14) (U) LTJG (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 25 Nov 15

(15) (U) LTJG (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 11 Dec 15

(16) (U) ETC , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 25 Nov 15

(17) (U) ETC (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 11 Dec 15

(18) (U) ET2 (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 25 Nov 15

(19) (U) ET2 (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, 11 Dec 15

(20) (U) ET3 (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN of 25 Nov 15

(21) (U) LT (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) of 25 Nov 15

(22) (U) ET3 (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN of 25 Nov 15

(23) (U) ET3 (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 11 Dec 15

(24) (U) ET2 (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 25 Nov 15

(25) (U) ET2 (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 11 Dec 15

(26) (U) LTJG (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 25 Nov 15

(27) (U) LTJG (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 11 Dec 15

(28) (U) ET1 (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 25 Nov 15

(29) (U) CAPT (b)(6) , USN, Statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN of 10 Dec 15

(30) (U) MM CM (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 9 Dec 15

(31) (U) CAPT (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 10 Dec 15

(32) (U) LCDR (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 10 Dec 15

(33) (U) CAPT (b)(6) , USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 10 Dec 15

(34) (U) CAPT (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 11 Dec 15

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

(35) (U) CAPT (b)(6) USN, statement to CAPT (b)(6) USN, of 10 Dec 15
(36) (U) CAPT (b)(6) Kings Bay Harbor Pilot, statement to CAPT (b)(6) , USN, of 25 Nov 15
(37) (U) CAPT (b)(6) Kings Bay Harbor Pilot, summary of statement to CAPT (b)(6) (b)(6) , USN, of 27 Nov 15
(38) (U) VMS Chartlets for Kings Bay, Ga Entrance Channal IVO Fort Clinch.
(39) (U) USS GEORGIA's Bell Log of 25 Nov 15
(40) (U) Piloting Watch bills USS GEORGIA
(41) (U) Weather data for Kings Bay on the 25 Nov 15
(42) (U) Tide and currents for Kings Bay, Ga for the 25 Nov 15
(43) (U) CTQS qualification data for relevant piloting party personnel
(44) (U) Certification data (CTQS attribute sheets) for Ready for Sea and Prospective Navigator certification by CSS 16.
(45) (U) USS GEORGIA fathometer logs for 25 Nov 15
(46) (U) USS GEORGIA Record Gyro Bearing of 25 Nov 15
(47) (U) USS GEORGIA Piloting preparation checklist for Kings Bay, GA of 24 Nov 15
(48) (U) USS GEORGIA Piloting course card for Kings Bay Inbound of 20 Nov 15
(49) (U) USS GEORGIA Kings Bay Piloting Inbound Brief of 25 Nov 15
(50) (U) USS GEORGIA OPREP-3NB collision with buoy 23
(51) (U) USS GEORGIA Engineering logs of 25 Nov 2015
(52) (U) USS GEORGIA Commanding Officer's Night Orders 24 Nov-25 Nov 15
(53) (U) USS GEORGIA Commanding Officer Standing Orders of 3 Nov 15
(54) (U) USS GEORGIA Commanding Officer Temporary Standing Orders of 24 Nov 15
(55) (U) USS GEORGIA's Ship's Deck Logs of 25 Nov 15
(56) (U) US Coast Guard Safety Broadcast to Mariners 261907Z Nov 15
(57) (U) Kings Bay Submarine Movement Message (SMM) 191503Z Nov 15
(58) (U) CD of VMS Navigation Plan for USS GEORGIA

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

(59) (U) CD of VMS Screen Shots for USS GEORGIA Piloting
(60) (U) CD of VMS Playback for USS GEORGIA Piloting
(61) (U) CD of RLGN/GPS Piloting data for USS GEORGIA
(62) (U) CD of Surf Piloting Deck Logs for USS Georgia
(63) (U) TRF Damage assessment email of 27 Nov 15
(64) (U) Transcript of Audio file Open_Mic_25NOV_1100Z-1115Z
(65) (U) Transcript of Audio File Open_Mic_25Nov_1115Z-1130Z
(66) (U) Transcript of Audio File Open_Mic_25Nov_1130Z-1145SZ
(67) (U) Propeller Walk, Defined by Inland Waterways Cruising School of 2004
(68) (U) Ships System Manual, Volume 7, Chapter 4
(69) (U) SSGN Advance and Transfer Table
(70) (U) COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC OPORD 2000 C3140 (series)
(71) (U) Pilot (b)(6) statement to LCDR (b)(6) (b)(6) , USN, of 15 Dec 15
(72) (U) Summary of statement from Mr. (b)(6) and Mr. (b)(6) given to CDR (b)(6) , USN, of 15 Dec 15
(73) (U) VMS Chartlet reconstructed from ship's data by ETCS (b)(6) , USN
(74) (U) Reconstructed timeline on chart
(75) (U) SSGN Schematic, Ship System Manual Volume 1
(76) (U) CAPT (b)(6) , USN, email of 14 Dec 15 at time 0841
(77) (U) CAPT (b)(6) , USN, email of 14 Dec 15 at time 1323
(78) (U) CAPT (b)(6) , USN, email of 15 Dec 15 at time 1555
(79) (U) CAPT (b)(6) , USN, email of 15 Dec 15 at time 1044
(80) (U) Commander out of area advisory DTG: 161921ZNOV15
(81) (U) CO, USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) Investigation Photos
(82) (U) Navy Technical Publication 4, Radio Voice Logs

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Preliminary Statement

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) In accordance with reference (a), this reports the command investigation convened pursuant to enclosure (1) to inquire into the facts and circumstances concerning the buoy allision and grounding by USS GEORGIA (BLUE) (GEO)(B) on 25 November 2015.

2. (U) I am confident I met each of the convening authority's directives.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~)

4. (U//~~FOUO~~)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

5. (U//~~FOUO~~)

(b)(1) 5a

6. (U//~~FOUO~~)

(b)(1) 5a

7. (U//~~FOUO~~)

(b)(1) 5a

8. (U//~~FOUO~~)

(b)(6)

(b)(1) 5a

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Findings of Fact

USS GEORGIA (BLUE)'s Preparation and Training

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) The following is a list of key piloting supervisors in place [redacted] eorgia on 25 Nov 15 with a summary of their assi [redacted] date reported, and date qualified in their position in accordance with ref (b). (b)(1)1 5a

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Commanding Officer (CO), CAPT [redacted]. Reported 3 July 2015, Qualified for Command 2000, Second Command tour. [Encl (43)] (b)(6)

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Executive Officer (XO), LCDR [redacted]. Reported 9 October 2014, Qualified for Command 2011. [Encl (43)] (b)(6) (b)(6)

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Navigation/Operations Officer (NAV), LT [redacted]. Reported 10 September 2015, Qualified Navigator on 31 October 2015. [Encls (43), (44)] (b)(6) (b)(6)

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Officer of the Deck (OOD), LT [redacted]. Reported 10 July 2014, Qualified OOD December 2014. [Encl (43)] (b)(6)

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) Assistant Navigator (ANAV), ETC [redacted]. Reported 17 June 2015, Qualified ANAV October 2014. [Encl (43)] (b)(6) (b)(6)

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship did not brief the possibility of need to use backing bells to slow ship for pilot transfer. [Encl (49)]

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) ETC [redacted] stated the crew was tense and "scared out of their minds" with the thought of proceeding without a pilot. [Encl (17)] (b)(6)

4. ~~(C)~~ [redacted] [Encl . . . (b)(1)1 5a

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Commander Submarine Squadron 16 (CSS 16; ISIC) observed and provisionally certified the USS GEORGIA (BLUE) navigation team for VMS 9.3 operations in port on 10 and 11 August 2015. CSS 16 recertified the team with LT [redacted] as (b)(6)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Navigator (NAV) in port on 18 September 2015. At sea, CSS 16 observed piloting and all phases of navigation onboard USS GEORGIA (BLUE) from 31 October through 2 November 2015, and certified the crew for VMS 9.3 at sea operations on 02 November 2015. With the exception of the Lookout who was qualified OOD, all piloting party personnel were qualified in their assigned position. In accordance with ref (c), OOD qualification satisfies the requirement for standing Lookout. [Encls (7), (43), (44)]

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship determined that the pilot was a necessity to mitigate the risk of an inbound piloting event in darkness. [Encl (5)]

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) In accordance with ref (d), the crew conducted a piloting brief the day prior to the piloting evolution. [Encls (3), (5), (7), (11), (49)]

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) Counter to ref (d), line handling supervisors were not at the piloting brief, but were briefed separately by the Chief of the Boat (COB). [Encl (7)]

9. (U//~~FOUO~~) Per the Powerpoint piloting brief, the Go/No-Go for entering the buoy chain was to hold three sets of buoys 1500 yards prior to buoys 1 and 2. [Encls (7), (49)]

10. (U//~~FOUO~~) During the piloting brief watchstanders briefed their planned actions for each turn, to include OOD briefing the visual turn queues he expected to see on the Bridge. [Encls (5), (7), (11)]

11. (U//~~FOUO~~) GEORGIA's 25 Nov 15 inbound would be the first actual King's Bay inbound transit for the CO, XO, and NAV. [Encls (3), (5), (7)]

12. (U//~~FOUO~~) The OOD (WEPS) briefed he wanted to transit the channel at ~~ahead~~ 2/3 to assess for currents, but was overruled by consensus of others at the brief to use ahead standard. [Encl (10)]

13. (U//~~FOUO~~) The command team (CO, XO, COB) did not ensure the watch rotation was adjusted to account for impending sleep deficits for those standing 12 hours of watch the previous day

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

(Section 1) and those involved in troubleshooting the FURUNO. [Encls (3), (5), (30)]

14. (U//~~FOUO~~) Prior to the scheduled inbound transit, the QMs, CM, OOD, Deck Logger, and Lookout had about 2-3 hours of sleep due to ship's schedule, watch rotation, and other tasks. [Encl (21), (24), (26), (27)]

Type Commander (COMSUBLANT), Immediate Superior in Command (CSS 16) and Team Kings Bay Response to USS Georgia's Request for Delayed Return to Port and Planning

15. (U//~~FOUO~~) When confronted with the issue of whether to conduct GEO's Tactical Readiness Evaluation (TRE) with or without an operational towed array (TA), CSL N7's preference was to conduct the TRE with an operational towed array, but if TA replacement proved not possible or the array did not work, the TRE would be conducted without an array. [Encls (77), (78)]

16. (U//~~FOUO~~) GEORGIA planned to execute a return to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay on 25 Nov 15 in order to replace its towed array (TA) for use in an upcoming TRE. [Encls (3-6), (29), (31-35), (57)]

17. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Kings Bay Submarine Movement message (SUBM) indicated a 0730R warping wharf arrival time. [Encl (57)]

18. (U//~~FOUO~~) The SUBM permitted the ship to arrive at the pilot transfer point as late at 0645R (the 0730R RTP time requires a pilot transfer at Fort Clinch approximately one hour prior to arrival - 0630R - the message also permits plus/minus fifteen (15) minutes of prescribed time). [Encl (57)]

19. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 18 and 19 November, CAPT (b)(6) informed CAPT (b)(6) that he was "working with CSL N5 for a TA replacement plan." [Encl (35)]

20. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) was acting CSS 16 Commodore for CAPT (b)(6) from 171200R-the morning of 24 November 2015. [Encls (35), (80)]

21. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) told Mr. (b)(6), "There exists a large probability that the GEO will not make the same

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

day [underway]. Approval of diver ops waiver is not anticipated and the [towed array] swap personnel do not think they can capture the array to offload without diver support." [Encl (35)]

22. (U//~~FOUO~~) In a 20 Nov 15 email, the acting CSS 16 CDRE, CAPT (b)(6), explained to the USS GEORGIA (BLUE) CO that "Doing TWP/TRE without array was disapproved." [Encls (3), (4), (29), (35)]

23. (U//~~FOUO~~) In a 20 Nov 15 email to the acting CSS 16 CDRE, CAPT (b)(6), the USS GEORGIA (BLUE) CO expressed concern with his "inexperienced crew and leadership team doing first [RTP] and second [underway] in the dark." [Encl (3)]

24. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 20 Nov, CAPT (b)(6) expressed his concerns with the 0730R arrival time to CAPT (b)(6), CSS 16 Deputy for Training during the ship's Operations Brief on-board USS GEORGIA. [Encl (31)]

25. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) stated that the primary reason he requested the sixty (60) minute delay in arrival time was because he was concerned that he himself, his XO, and NAV had never transited inbound to Kings Bay, and that the mission called for his team to do so in "the dark." [Encl (3)]

26. (U//~~FOUO~~) From 21 - 22 Nov, CAPT (b)(6) was underway aboard GEORGIA. [Encl (35)]

27. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) expressed his concerns to CAPT (b)(6), in-person during his embark, with the TA replacement plan. [Encl (35)]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) had concerns with the early arrival time.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) desired to give his crew a chance to spend Thanksgiving in port.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) believed the ship could safely execute the TRE without the TA.

28. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 23 Nov, CAPT (b)(6) directed his staff to explore the possibility of conducting the TRE without the TA

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

because CAPT (b)(6) had observed CAPT (b)(6) and his crew operate and felt they were safe to operate without the TA. [Encl (35)]

29. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 23 Nov, CAPT (b)(6) directed his staff to take action to move the GEORGIA RTP one hour later. [Encl (35)]

30. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) stated the RTP arrival time was "a reasonable plan, especially if the boat delayed arrival by 10 or 15 minutes." [Encl (35)]

31. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) stated that he "asked my team to push ~~for the~~ later arrival because it met CAPT (b)(6) desires." [Encl (35)]

32. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 23 Nov 15, CSS 16 Operations Officer (SQUOPS) requested a 0830R moor time from LCDR (b)(6), CSL N36, for the anticipated GEORGIA RTP. [Encl (32)]

33. (U//~~FOUO~~) LCDR (b)(6) asked, "Why can't SWFLANT support on 27 Nov?" (referencing a possible COA that would have had GEORGIA RTP on 25 Nov, and return to sea on 27 November after replacing the TA at SWFLANT EHW). The previous week, SWFLANT had agreed to support a ship movement in the EHW on 27 November. [Encl (32)]

34. (U//~~FOUO~~) SQUOPS explained to LCDR (b)(6) that "SWFLANT said civilian employees are on leave." (Encl (32)]

35. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 1337 on 23 Nov, LCDR (b)(6) explained, via email to SQUOPS, that "We would like to keep GEO's arrival time. It seems an extra hour could make a difference in completing the repairs. Understand the concern and I can continue to work on the request, but there is significant interest here to maintain the arrival time." [Encl (32)]

36. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 1340R on 23 Nov, SQUOPS replied to LCDR (b)(6), "Rgr moor time, Still working pier options." [Encl (32)]

37. (U//~~FOUO~~) On the morning of 24 November, SQUOPS briefed CAPT (b)(6) on the 23 November 1337R email response from LCDR (b)(6), including "I told the CDRE that SUBLANT wanted us to

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

maintain the 0730R moor time, but if he wanted to revisit it at his level they might reconsider the 0830R." [Encl (32)]

38. (U//~~FOUO~~) Also on the morning of 24 November, CAPT (b)(6) verbally told CAPT (b)(6) that the request to delay the RTP by one hour "had been denied." [Encl (35)]

39. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 24 November, Commodore (b)(6) directed his staff to: [Encls (32), (35)]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Contact the pilot and assess his comfort level of returning to port at the specified time;

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Contact Commander, Submarine Squadron 20 (CSS 20) to determine if any CSS 20 units had recently conducted nighttime piloting events;

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conduct an analysis of tides and current.

40. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CSS 16 Assistant Navigator (ANAV) informed the CSS 16 CDRE that the Pilot was "comfortable with the planned arrival time." [Encl (35)]

41. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CSS 16 SQUOPS conferred with CSS-20, who reported that they had completed a recent piloting event in darkness and that it "went fine." [Encl (32)]

42. (U//~~FOUO~~) The predicted current was a moderate flood current. [Encls (32), (42)]

43. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CSS 16 SQUOPS reported the above three answers to CAPT (b)(6) . [Encls (32), (35)]

44. (U//~~FOUO~~) When asked, CSS 16 SQUOPS told CAPT (b)(6) that if he were the GEORGIA NAV, he believes that he would be comfortable with the 0730R moor time. [Encl (32)]

45. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) then concurred with the plan to maintain the scheduled moor time as 0730R. [Encl (35)]

46. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 24 Nov at approximately 0930R, in a phone conversation between CAPT (b)(6) and CAPT (b)(6) : [Encl (35)]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) informed CAPT (b)(6) that the moor time remained 0730R.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) relayed the Pilot's opinion that he was comfortable with the plan.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) told CAPT (b)(6) that the "plan was executable."

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) told CAPT (b)(6) that "he should just slow things down" if he felt uncomfortable, and that he (CAPT (b)(6)) "was not going to be concerned if he arrived lat to the warping wharf."

47. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) stated he didn't feel like he had the authority to say no (to the 0730R moor time) without additional mitigating factors ([e.g.] reduced visibility). [Encl (4)]

48. (U//~~FOUO~~) On the night of 24 November 2015, CSG 10 N3/9, CAPT (b)(6) noted, when reviewing the CSS 16 Towed Array Replacement Plan message, that GEORGIA's moor time remained at 0730R. He attempted to call CAPT (b)(6) , CSS 16 Deputy, without success, to see if CSS 16 had changed their desire to shift the moor time later. He then contacted the CSG-10 Chief of Staff, CAPT (b)(6) . [Encl (33)]

49. (U//~~FOUO~~) On the night of 24 November 2015, following CAPT (b)(6) 's call, CAPT (b)(6) contacted CAPT (b)(6) to ascertain the Commodore's assessment of the planned time for GEORGIA's RTP. CAPT (b)(6) relayed his conversation with CAPT (b)(6) to CAPT (b)(6) (See paragraph 46 above). [Encl (34)]

50. (U//~~FOUO~~) Commencing on 20 November 2015, the ship requested, via a series of emails and telcons to CSS 16, to arrive one hour later than originally scheduled. The scheduled TP was 0730R to support replacement of the TA and return to sea t 1600R for follow on tasking. [Encls (3-6), (29), (31-35)]

51. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) stated, "There was no easily viable lan to berth the GEO over Thanksgiving and get her back nderway on Friday. The only possible plan would have been to eep her in until Monday." [Encl (35)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

USS GEORGIA (BLUE)'s Piloting Planning and Execution
(See previous FF's (2-5), (7), (10), (11), (14))

52. (U//~~FOUO~~) Timeline derived from audio recording, official record, and statements: [Encls (3-28), (36-39), (45-51), (55), (58-62), (64-66), (68), (69), (71-74)]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0328R, the ship shifted CO's Safe Operating Envelope (COSOE) to Red Sounding-4ft, Yellow Sounding-6ft, Max Depth- Surfaced only, Max Speed-14kts. [Encl (55)]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0420R, the ship stationed the *Modified* Piloting Party with the ANAV, ETC (b)(6), as the Navigation Supervisor. [Encl (55)]

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0436R, the ship tested Astern propulsion. [Encl (55)]

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0444R, the CO was on the Bridge. [Encl (55)]

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0449R, the ship crossed 13NM from land inbound. [Encl (55)]

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0500R, LT (b)(6) assumed the position as Lookout. He assessed visibility to be excellent for the inbound transit. [Encl (14)]

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0507R, the ship stationed the Maneuvering Watch and the Piloting Party. [Encl (55)]

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0515R, while in the vicinity of STM, the XO contacted Naval Submarine Support Command on Chat to confirm the arrival time. This communication and other attempted communications with the pilot were not logged. [Encl (5)]

i. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0530R, the XO attempted to hail the pilot on Bridge to Bridge (BTB) channel 73 while inbound in the buoy chain. [Encl (5), (7), (11)]

j. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0535R, LT (b)(6) relieved the Deck and the Conn as Officer of the Deck (OOD). [Encl (55)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

k. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0535R, the NAV relieved as Navigation Supervisor. [Encl (55)]

l. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0536R, the NAV marked the turn to 268, and the OOD ordered Left full rudder, steady course 268. This turn marks the approach to buoys 1 and 2 and the St. Mary's entrance range. [Encl (55)]

m. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0545R, the OOD ordered All Ahead Standard (15kts). [Encl (55)]

n. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0600R, the NAV reported to the Bridge that set and drift had increased to two knots. [Encl (64)]

o. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0604R, the ship gained C-Tractor 4 visually. [Encl (64)]

p. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0608R, the ship secured rotating and radiating on BPS-15H primary RADAR. [Encl (64)]

q. (U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0608R, GEORGIA had a momentary loss of soundings. [Encls (11), (45)]

r. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0609R, the ship lost GPS, and shifted primary fix source to visual. At this time, there was no secondary fix source, as the RADAR was not operating. [Encls (55), (64)]

s. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0610R, the ship passed through the St. Mary's entrance jetties. [Encl (38)]

t. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0611R, the ship passed buoys 18 and 19. This was the pre-briefed point at which the ship would come to All Stop to commence slowing the ship in preparation for pilot transfer. [Encls (38), (49), (64)]

u. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0612R, the ship was still making 15 knots. NAV reported to the Bridge, "passed the buoys where we were to order all stop". [Encls (38), (55), (64)]

v. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0612R, the BPS-15H RADAR was raised. [Encl (64)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

w. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0612:09R, the ship answered All Stop. [Encl (64)]

x. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0612:40R, the ship commenced rotating and radiating on the BPS-15H RADAR. [Encl (64)]

y. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0613R, the ship regained military GPS. [Encl (64)]

z. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0614R, the NAV reported 11kts speed over ground (SOG), and recommended All Back 1/3. The OOD ordered All Back 1/3. [Encl (64)]

aa. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0614R, the NAV shifted primary fix source to military GPS, backup fix source to Visual. [Encl (64)]

ab. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0614R, the ship secured rotating and radiating on the BPS-15H RADAR. [Encl (64)]

ac. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0614R, the ship lowered the #2 multi-function mast. [Encl (64)]

ad. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0614R, the ship passed buoys 20 and 21. [Encl (38)]

ae. (F//~~FOUO~~) At 0614R, the NAV reported 8.5 kts SOG to the Bridge. [Encl (64)]

af. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0615R, the NAV reported to the Bridge, "hold Set and Drift 2.2kts at 270." [Encl (65)]

ag. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0615:17R, the ship answered All Stop. [Encl (65)]

ah. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0615R, the XO made contact with the C-Tractor via BTB radio. [Encl (65)]

ai. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0616R, the XO reported to the Bridge, "Made contact with C-tractor 4, they are approaching us at 6 kts, ready to come along our port side." [Encl (65)]

aj. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0616R, the Bridge ordered personnel topside for the Pilot transfer. [Encl (65)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

ak. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0616R, the NAV reported 1200 yards to the turn [to the 294 leg]. [Encl (65)]

al. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0617R, the OOD ordered All Back 1/3. [Encl (65)]

am. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0617R, the NAV reported Set and Drift of 3kts, 270, with a SOG of 7.5kts. [Encl (65)]

an. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0617R, the OOD ordered All Back 2/3. [Encl (65)]

ao. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0618R, the CO directs the C-Tractor to only transfer the pilot and no other passengers. [Encls (3), (65)]

ap. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0618:57R, the OOD orders All Stop. [Encl (65)]

aq. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0618:59R, the NAV reports to the Bridge, "5.6kts SOG, 500 yards to the buoys." [Encl (65)]

ar. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0619:14R, the OOD orders All Back 1/3. [Encl (65)]

as. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0619:38R, the Helm reports loss of steerageway. [Encls (55), (65)]

at. (U/~~FOUO~~) At 0619:44R, the OOD orders All Stop. [Encl (65)]

au. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0619:49R, the NAV reports, "15 yards left of track and opening, recommend 272." The OOD responds, "We have lost steerageway." The NAV responds, "Making 4kts SOG," at which point the OOD orders Right Full Rudder. [Encl (65)]

av. (U//~~FOUO~~) LTJG (b)(6), the Lookout, stated that at approximately 0620R, during the pilot transfer he told the CO that "We are heading toward Fort Clinch and that we should make way to turn away." [Encl (14)]

Subj: [redacted] INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

aw. (U//[redacted]) At 0621:27R, the NAV reports to the Bridge "150 yards to the edge of channel bearing 250." [Encl (65)]

ax. (U//[redacted]) At this point, the ship was making course 266, over ground. [Encls (38), (65)]

ay. (U//[redacted]) The ship crossed the critical point for completing pilot transfer on VMS. This critical point stated "PILOT PICKUP COMPLETED, ALL HANDS DOWN BELOW, INCREASE SPEED FOR TURN." No reports were made to the Bridge regarding the critical point. [Encls (38), (65)]

az. (U//[redacted]) At 0621:38R, the Bridge informs the NAV that they, "Are (garbled) the pilot transfer, just bringing the pilot on, at which point we will come up to 2/3rds to regain center of track". [Encl (65)]

ba. (U//[redacted]) With the C Tractor alongside, the XO instructed the NAV to hold his recommendation to the Bridge for a speed increase until the pilot transfer was complete. [Encls (5), (6), (7), (8)]

bb. (U//[redacted]) XO stated he was worried for the pilot's safety because the pilot was about to step onto the tug's brow. The XO was concerned the pilot would be in danger if the GEORGIA began her turn. [Encl (5)]

bc. (U//[redacted]) At 0622:48R, the ship's head passed 260, swinging to the right. [Encl (65)]

bd. (U//[redacted]) At 0622:52R, the NAV recommended marking the turn to 294 by the sidebar. The OOD then ordered Right Full Rudder, steady 294. [Encl (65)]

be. (U//[redacted]) At 0623:13R, the NAV recommended All Ahead 1/3, and the OOD ordered All Ahead 1/3. At this time the ship's speed through the water (STW) was 1.2kts and the ship was 700 yards past the critical point for "PILOT PICKUP COMPLETED." [Encls (38), (65)]

bf. (U//[redacted]) At 0623:27R, the Bridge reported "The brow is coming across, the pilot is coming topside." [Encl (65)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 28 NOVEMBER 2015

bg. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0623:31R and 0623:33R respectively, the ANAV stated in control, "Recommend 2/3," and, "We need to go 2/ to regain the channel." [Encls (11), (65)]

bh. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0623:39R, the OOD orders All Ahead 2/3, and the NAV concurs. [Encl (65)]

bi. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0624:11R, the ship loses the one [illegible] RADAR. [Encl (65)]

bj. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0624:17R, the NAV recommends coming right to course 297. The OOD orders Right Full Rudder, steady 297. [Encl (65)]

bk. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0625:10R, the ANAV tells the pilot as he passes through control, "We're pushing out of the buoy chain right now." [Encl (65)]

bl. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0625:16R, the pilot begins the climb to the Bridge. [Encl (65)]

bm. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0625:33R, the XO reports to the Bridge, "We have exited the channel to the south, recommend aggressively regaining track." [Encl (65)]

bn. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0625:38R, the Bridge orders Right Hard Rudder steady 300, immediately followed by All Ahead Full. [Encls (3), (65)]

bo. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0626:24R, the NAV reports buoy 23 is now "on the left, drawing left." [Encl (65)]

bp. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0626:42R, Bridge orders Left Hard Rudder. [Encls (3), (65)]

bq. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0627:00R, the ship allided with St. Mary's channel buoy 23, along the port side, in vicinity of the Missile Compartment Logistic Escape Trunk (LET). [Encls (3), (16), 50), (56), (65)]

br. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0627:09R, as the ship crossed track, the Bridge ordered All Stop, immediately followed by All Back

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Emergency. The ship was making 14.1kts SOG as it crossed track. [Encls (3), (38), (65)]

be. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0627:16R, the NAV reports to the Bridge, "Hold the ship exiting the channel to the Starboard side." [Encl (65)]

bt. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0627:49R, the ship's heading was 320, swinging to the left. [Encl (65)]

bu. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0627:53R, the ship received a Yellow Sounding. This sounding was not reported to Bridge, nor logged. [Encls (45), (55), (65)]

bv. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0627:54R, the ship received a Red Sounding immediately followed by a loss of soundings. These events were not reported to the Bridge, nor logged. [Encls (45), (55), (65)]

bw. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0628:25R, Maneuvering reports to the Bridge, "answering all back emergency, limited by total power." [Encl (65)]

bx. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0628:40R, an unknown person states "alright, coming back in the channel". [Encl (65)]

by. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0629:19R, the OOD orders All Stop. [Encl (65)]

bz. (U//~~FOUO~~) From 0628R to 0634R, the ship, utilizing the C Tractor under the pilot's direction, repositioned in the channel onto the 294 leg. [Encls (3) (36), (65), (66)]

ca. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0634R, the OOD ordered turns for 12 knots and the ship recommenced piloting inbound to Kings Bay, GA. [Encls (3), (36), (66)]

cb. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0634:23R, Maneuvering reports, "Bridge maneuvering (garbles) 72 turns, answering all ahead standard." [Encl (66)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

cc. (U//~~FOUO~~) From 0634R to 0730R, the ship executed the remaining portion of the inbound piloting event without further incident. [Encls (55), (66)]

cd. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0730R, the ship moored port side to, warping wharf, Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay, GA. [encl (55)]

This concludes the detailed timeline. Additional facts follow.

53. (U//~~FOUO~~) XO stated GEO arrived at Saint Mary's Buoy (STM) at 0530R. [Encl (5)]

54. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ANAV told the XO it took 45 minutes to transit from STM to the turning basin. [Encl (6)]

55. (U//~~FOUO~~) Based on time, speed, and distance calculations, in accordance with ref (d), the ship would have arrived in the turning basin at 0615R, 15 minutes earlier than the ship intended. [Encl (57)]

56. (U//~~FOUO~~) Ship arrived in the vicinity of Fort Clinch at 0614R. [Encl (38)]

57. (U//~~FOUO~~) For the KINGS BAY SMM, on time arrival at the pilot rendezvous point is specified as one hour prior to mooring (0730R) plus or minus fifteen minutes (0615R-0645R). [Encl (57)]

58. (U//~~FOUO~~) In a recollection of the discussion between the CO, XO and COB, the XO stated, "the CO had already asked to stay on for Thanksgiving, and CSS 16 said we were getting underway regardless of [redacted] so the CO did not want to appear insubordinate." [Encl (6)]

59. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 25 November 2015, twilight was expected at 634R, and sunrise at 0700R. At 0615R, winds were 16mph from NE gusting to 24mph. Moon was full and moon set was 0626R. This information was included in the piloting brief. [Encls (41), (42), (49)]

60. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship exceeded the COSOE, specifically max speed, throughout the 268 leg (COSOE max speed 14kts). [Encls (12), (38)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

61. (U//~~FOUO~~) GEORGIA's call sign for the inbound was KILO 1. [Encl (57)]

62. (U//~~FOUO~~) GEORGIA conducted the inbound transit with all running lights, the masthead light, and the SUB ID Beacon energized. [Encl (12)]

63. (U//~~FOUO~~) Watchstanders reported good visibility of at least three buoy sets and visible navigation aids on shore to support entering the buoy chain (briefed go/no go criteria). [Encls (7), (14), (15)]

64. (U//~~FOUO~~) The passing of buoys was not logged for entering buoy chain, not marked until passing buoys 14 and 15, and inconsistently marked/logged after passing buoys 20 and 21. [Encl (55)]

65. (U//~~FOUO~~) Based on Automated Information System (AIS) data, the C Tractor was located west of buoys E/F at time 0617R. [Encl (38)].

66. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0617R, the ship was passing buoys Charlie/Delta at a speed of 7.9 knots over ground. [Encl (38)]

67. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Pilot stated the C Tractor initially arrived in the vicinity of buoys 20/21 at 0530R. [Encl (36)]

68. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) and (b)(6) riders observing from the wheelhouse on the C Tractor, reported that they remembered, while waiting for the submarine in the Fort Clinch turning basin, the C Tractor positioning itself at Buoys Charlie/Delta, drifting West to Buoys Echo/Foxtrot, then having to reposition back to Buoys Charlie/Delta. [Encl (72)]

69. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CO and XO stated they attempted to contact the pilot over BTB between buoys 18/19 and 20/21. [Encls (3), (5), (64)]

70. (U//~~FOUO~~) XO stated he attempted to contact the C Tractor three additional times while transiting buoy chain inbound with no success. [Encl (4)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

71. (U//[redacted]) At 0614R, based on AIS data, as the ship passed buoys 20 and 21 and entered the turning basin, the C Tractor & pilot were due north of Fort Clinch, and West of turning basin buoys Echo and Foxtrot. [Encls (38)]

72. (U//[redacted]) GEORGIA expected the C Tractor to be much closer as it entered the turning basin. [Encls (3-6), (14), (16), (21)]

73. (U//[redacted]) Radio contact with the C Tractor was made as the ship passed buoys 20/21. The XO stated that the response to his hail was that the submarine "snuck up on them." [Encls (5), (11), (36)]

74. (U//[redacted]) The C Tractor then asked GEORGIA over arm if she was KILO 1. [Encl (6)]

75. (U//[redacted]) The ship's Navigation plan included two critical points (all stop point at buoys 18/19, and pilot pull out point). [Encls (38), (49)]

76. (U//[redacted]) Ship did not execute pre-briefed action of ordering All Stop at the critical point IVO buoys 18/19 (0611R) [Encls (38), (55), (64)]

77. (U//[redacted]) The ship ordered All Stop more than one minute after the critical point, in accordance with ref (d), this correlates to slowing 600-700 yards late as calculated by time, speed, distance rule. [Encls (38), (55), (64)]

78. (U//[redacted]) The ship exceeded 15 knots SOG (exceeding Position of Intended Movement (PIM) speed by 3 knots). [Encl (38)]

79. (U//[redacted]) The ship used astern propulsion in an attempt to slow. [Encls (39), (55), (64)]

80. (U//[redacted]) Operating astern propulsion adds hydrodynamic effects to ship's handling characteristics such as prop walk. [Encl (67)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

81. (U//~~FOUO~~) The OOD stated the full moon provided adequate light to see the day shape (turn mark Beacon "9") used as the visual turn mark to the 294 leg. [Encl (9)]

82. (U//~~FOUO~~) Contrary to ref (d), USS GEORGIA did not perform the normal countdown for the turn to course 294. [Encls (7), (11), (24), (64)]

83. (U//~~FOUO~~) Ship did not execute their second Fort Clinch critical point, pilot pull out. [Encls (38), ~~(44)~~, (64), (65)]

84. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Powerpoint piloting brief stated the Go/No-Go to complete pilot transfer was 700 yards prior to buoys Echo/Foxtrot. [Encl (49)]

85. (U//~~FOUO~~) It was briefed at the piloting brief that the pilot transfer should be complete by 700 yards prior to buoys Echo/Foxtrot. [Encl (49)]

86. (U//~~FOUO~~) The NAV stated the Go/No-Go point for pilot pickup was the buoy pair [Echo/Foxtrot]. [Encl (7)]

87. (U//~~FOUO~~) The critical point "pilot transfer completed, all hands below, speed up for the turn" in the VMS Navigation plan was 300 yards prior to buoys Echo/Foxtrot. [Encls (38), (58)]

88. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (OK) stated that when he was in the turning basin, he was uncomfortable about proceeding any further without the pilot due to the current set and drift. [Encl (3)]

89. (U//~~FOUO~~) ANAV stated he informed the NAV that GEORGIA was past the No-Go point and that he had to mark the turn. [Encl (11)]

90. (U//~~FOUO~~) NAV passed data on bearing and range to turning basin buoys assuming the Bridge knew the context of his reports. [Encl (7)]

91. (U//~~FOUO~~) Knowing the time for transfer was going to be shorter than anticipated, the CO contacted the C Tractor and asked to expeditiously transfer the pilot, but that all other C Tractor passengers wait until the ship was at the pier. [Encls (3), (9)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

92. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0623R, VMS computed current in the vicinity of Port Clinch as 3.8 knots flood, which was higher than briefed at the piloting brief and anticipated by the piloting team (2 knots flood). [Encls (10), (22), (38), (49), (60)]

93. (U//~~FOUO~~) When interviewed, the Pilot assessed that high easterly winds and full moon conditions drove higher than anticipated tide and flood current. [Encl (36)]

94. (U//~~FOUO~~) The pilot stated that the C Tractor could turn with GEORGIA and that a pilot transfer is safe up to speeds of nine knots. [Encl (36)]

95. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship exited the channel at the West end of the Fort Clinch Basin at 0625:33R at position 30 degrees 42.492 minutes North, 081 degrees 27.412 minutes West. [Encls (38), (65)]

96. (U//~~FOUO~~) ANAV recommended All Back Emergency to NAV in an attempt to minimize additional advance and transfer outside the east side of the basin and to prevent alliding with Buoy 23. [Encl (11)]

97. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CO stated he heard the NAV pass the recommendation to the Bridge for All Back Emergency. He also stated the OOD seemed to agree, but did not speak. [Encl (3)]

98. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0626R, Captain (b)(6) assessed that All Back Emergency would not work, as GEORGIA was past the point to allow stopping prior to buoy 23; instead, he ordered the OOD to come to All Ahead Full. [Encls (3), (39), (65)]

99. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0626R, STW was 8.3 knots, SOG 10.6 knots, HDG was 299.2. Captain (b)(6) judged the GEORGIA to be in extremis. He began directing the OOD on specific orders to the Helm. He did not take the Conn or give direct orders to the helm. [Encls (3), (11), (60)]

100. (U//~~FOUO~~) At 0626R, Captain (b)(6) directed the OOD to order Right Hard Rudder, then Left Hard Rudder after the bow swung past buoy 23 to the right. [Encls (3), (5), (14), (36), (55), (65)]

Subj: ~~COMMAND~~ INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

101. (U//~~FOUO~~) Captain (b)(6) stated that All Ahead Full, Right Hard Rudder was the best course of action at that point, to avoid an allision with buoy 23. [Encl (36)]

102. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship Allided with buoy 23. [Encls (3), (14), (16), (50), (56), (65)]

103. (U//~~FOUO~~) When CAPT (b)(6) asked the Lookout, LTJG (b)(6) if the ship hit buoy 23, LTJG (b)(6) informed the CO that he did not care about the buoy, but thought the ship was going to run aground on the beach forward of the ship. [Encls (3), (14)

104. (U//~~FOUO~~) Once the GEORGIA passed buoy 23, she continued to cross the channel and head towards shoal water. [Encl (36)]

105. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship exited the channel a second time at 30 degrees 42.789 minutes North, 081 degrees 27.692 minutes West. [Encl (38)]

106. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship's headway was checked at position 30 degrees 42.892 minutes North, 081 degrees 27.831 minutes West. [Encls (38), (65)]

107. (U//~~FOUO~~) Charted water depth at 30 degrees 42.892 minutes North, 081 degrees 27.831 minutes West is 18 feet. [Encls (38), 73), (74)]

108. (U//~~FOUO~~) The 726 Class submarine drafts -36 feet 6 inches Encl (75)]

109. (U//~~FOUO~~) Mex calculated tidal shift for 25 November 2015 as 8 feet above charted water datum. [Encls (42), (49)]

110. ~~TC~~

(Encl (68)]

111. (U//~~FOUO~~) The advance and transfer at 14kts, utilizing a ull rudder to accomplish a 40 degree turn, is 525 yards advance nd 145 yards transfer. [Encl (69)]

112 (U//~~FOUO~~) Captain (b)(6) called the C Tractor and asked : to cross in front of the submarine's bow from port to

Subj: ~~CONFIRM~~ INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

starboard and come along the starboard side to push the bow around. [Encls (14), (36), (72)]

113. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) and [redacted], riders observing from the wheelhouse on the C Tractor, reported the Tug Master would not cross in front of the submarine in that area because he believed it was too shallow there for the C Tractor to operate, and they said the C Tractor waited until the ship backed towards the channel before crossing the bow. [Encl (7)]

114. (U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 0627:54R, the ship grounded at location 30 degrees, 42.892 minutes north latitude, 81 degrees 27.831 minutes west longitude, southwest of Cumberland Island, GA. [Encls (38), (65), (73), (74)].

115. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CO stated "if I had treated this as a combat readiness test, I would have prepared more." [Encl (4)]

116. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CO stated "I didn't believe we [were] going to actually do it until the day prior." [Encl (4)]

117. (U//~~FOUO~~) The bearing recorder logged all times one hour later than actual local time. [Encl (46)]

118. (U//~~FOUO~~) The deck log is missing bell orders, multiple buoy reports, received red/yellow soundings and reveille. [Encls (39), (55), (65)]

119. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship's original plan in regards to radar usage was to utilize the FURUNO. When the FURUNO was damaged the previous evening, no adjustment to the radar plan was made. [Encls (6), (8), (49), (64), (65)]

120. (U//~~FOUO~~) The only command-level entry in the CO's Night Orders stated simply, "Mitigate Risk," and "Tough day ahead." [Encl (52)]

121. (U//~~FOUO~~) Contrary to Navy Technical Publication [illegible], the Ship did not record BTB communications. [Encl (82)]

122. (U//~~FOUO~~) Some personnel interviewed were not aware of the requirement to record BTB communications. [Encls 12), (27)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

123. (U//~~FOUO~~) Sonar watch standers were recorded having informal conversations in Sonar during the maneuvering watch, to include disparaging remarks concerning the XO's and CO's behaviors. [Encl (64), (65), (66)]

124. (U//~~FOUO~~) VMS audible alarms were cut out during the piloting evolution. [Encl (25)]

125. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 26 November and 27 November, diver operations were conducted to assess damage to USS GEORGIA. Damages include: [Encl (63)]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Autec Pinger damaged.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Starboard EM Log Rodmeter broken at 10 inches.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Mud and sea shells in forward MBT grates.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) estimated 500 sq ft paint removed on non-pressure hull plating from sonar dome to frame 25.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) Buoy 23 missing. (sunk or adrift)

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) CD-35 phonographic surface damaged.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) All screw blades with leading edge damage to varying extent.

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) Lower rudder gouges.

j. (U//~~FOUO~~) Port vertical stabilizer gouged.

k. (U//~~FOUO~~) Forward edge of port horizontal stabilizer damaged.

l. (U//~~FOUO~~) Debris in shaft seal water strainers.

26. (U//~~FOUO~~) USS GEORGIA was dry docked on December 15 and a visual inspection was conducted indicating the following damage: Encl (81)]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Autec Pinger cracked and damaged.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Starboard EM log Rodmeter broken.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Moderate paint damage.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Port horizontal stabilizer dented and gouged.

Additional Observations

127. (U//~~FOUO~~) During t[illegible] of ascern propulsion and aggressive ship handling in the turning basin, VMS displayed sea and drift varied from 0 to 5 knots. (Encl 38)

Opinions

USS GEORGIA (BLUE)'s Preparation and Training.

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CO distracted himself from adequately focusing on safe piloting operations because he focused the majority of his attention and efforts on turning the RTP tasking off and/or changing the moor time. This fostered a lack of situational awareness, which continued from the planning stage through the execution of the piloting evolution. The CO assessed that an embarked pilot was absolutely necessary to mitigate the added risk of piloting at night and piloting into Kings Bay for the first time. [FFs (3), (6), (11), (22-25), (27), (31), (46), (47), (50), (56), (88), (115), (116)]

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although the ship's plan appeared adequate, the team was brittle and was not able to work together to execute pre-built tripwires when some of their planning assumptions played out differently in situ. Regardless of all other factors, had the team executed its tripwires, the transit would likely have been uneventful. [FF (3), (9), (52.t), (52.u), (52.ay), (52.be), (76), (77), (82), (83), (87), (92)]

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) The piloting brief did not adequately detail the plan for who would be contacting the C Tractor and at what point. Additionally, there was inadequate discussion on "what if" the ship was unsuccessful in hailing the C Tractor via BTB radio. Finally, there was no mitigation plan to ensure the C

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Tractor was in the expected location prior to entering the buo chain. [FF (6-10), (65-74), (121), (122)]

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although the CO discussed three related lessons learned during the piloting brief, the ship did not "learn" fr the lessons by inserting appropriate measures in the plan to prevent similar events from happening during the inbound transit. Additionally, the discussion of lessons learned was not effective, as most personnel interviewed could not recall what the three lessons learned were. [FF (7), (9), (56), (75-77), (83-87), (120)]

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship's 7-5-5.7 watch routine, coupled with a 0415R reveille, provided no opportunity for Section 1 to get adequate sleep prior to a high risk evolution. Additionally, those personnel troubleshooting the FURUNO did not get adequate rest, some of whom were key personnel in the piloting party. [F.F. (13), (14)]

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Command Team [CO and COB] failed to adequately mitigate the sleep deficit that Section 1 personnel and the Piloting Party would encounter. [F.F. (13), (14)]

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CO's Night Orders did not contain clear guidance or expectations for the Officers and Crew for the piloting evolution. They were not consistent with the guidance defined in the ref (e), in that they did not operationalize the navigation plan nor address the CO's specific concerns and mitigations. [FF (120)]

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship did not have a well thought-out plan to optimize use of the BPS-15H primary radar with the FURUNO radar inoperable. [FF (7-10), (13), (14), (52.p), (52.r), (52.v), (52.x), (52.ab), (119)]

USS GEORGIA (BLUE)'s Pilot Preparation and Execution of Return to Port Piloting Evolution.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Although the ANAV informed the XO that the transit from STM to the basin would take 45 minutes, neither expressed any issue with the ship's probable arrival at the basin 15 minutes earlier than planned. Delaying the arrival at the turning basin until 0645R, which was completely within the

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

control of the ship, would have provided additional margin to safety for the CO's primary concern of piloting the dark. [FF (4), (6), (46.d), (47), (52.s-u), (52.ad), (53-57), (60), (78) (91)]

10. (U//~~FOUO~~) Prior to entering the buoy chain, visibility was unlimited and ambient lighting was adequate to support safely conducting the RTP. [FF (52.f), (52.aa), (59), (63)]

11. (U//~~FOUO~~) Regardless of the effects of the current, there is no indication that the ship recognized they were exceeding PIM speed by 3kts STW (and SOG), nor that they were violating the maximum speed of the COSO during the 268 entrance leg. [FF (12), (52.a), (52.n), (52.u), (52.z), (60), (77), (78)]

12. (U//~~FOUO~~) Once the ship realized the C Tractor's position was much further West than the team anticipated, the ship should have made additional efforts to contact the C Tractor other than hails over Channel 73 on the BTE radio. [FF (6), (52.i), (52.o), (52.ah), (52.ai), (61), (65), (67-72), (121), (122)]

13. (U//~~FOUO~~) Given the ship's location, relative closing speed towards the basin, and the tug's position West of buoys E/F, the ship should have recognized pilot transfer was not achievable prior to reaching the ship's planned pilot pullout point and postponed it until after the next turn. This is a common training anomaly during SPAN trainers at Trident Training Facility. [FF (6), (52.i), (52.m), (52.u), (52.z), (52.ah), (52.ai), (52.aj), (52.ak), (52.am), (52.ao), (52.au) (52.av), (52.aw), (52.ay), (53-55), (60), (65), (66), (68-73), (76-79)]

14. (U//~~FOUO~~) If the C Tractor had been in the proper position when the ship approached the turning basin, the transit would likely have been uneventful. The independent tug riders' account of the C Tractor's position is not consistent with the pilot's account of the C Tractor's position. The C Tractor was located by AIS and visually to the west of the Fort Clinch turning basin, not to the East as described by the pilot. This additional distance significantly hampered the ability to complete the pilot transfer prior to the ship's planned turn point. [FF (52.i), (52.o), (52.ah), (52.ai), (52.aj), (52.ak), (52.am), (52.aq), (52.ay), (52.az), (56), (65-68), (70-73)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

15. (U//~~FOUO~~) The C Tractor was not in the anticipated position when GBO approached the Fort Clinch basin. It is possible that the C Tractor reported to the normal/expected position (IVO buoys 20/21) when first arriving at 0530R, but, due to the floc current, the C Tractor drifted Westward during the 45 minute loiter before the ship arrived. The C Tractor did repoeition several times from the Western side of the basin Eastward. [FF (52.o), (52.af), (52.ai), (52.am), (52.au), (66-68), ~~173-~~ (92), (93)]

16. (U//~~FOUO~~) The briefed critical point to answer All Stop at buoys 18/19 was sufficient to slow the ship for pilot transfer, but only if the ship was transiting at PIM speed (12kts), and if the ship executed the pre-planned action to order All Stop at the critical point, neither of which was done. [FF (52.m), (52.t), (52.u), (54), (75-78)]

17. (U//~~FOUO~~) The use of astern propulsion to slow the ship, given the excessive entrance speed, contributed to the loss of steerageway in the turning basin. The prop walk effect, added with the set and drift contribution and the lack of speed at the turn point, caused the ship to exit the channel to the West of the turning basin. [FF (2), (12), (52.m), (52.t), (52.u), (52.z), (52.ad), (52.ae), (52.al), (52.an), (52.ar-au) (52.aw), (52.ax), (52.bd), (52.be), (52.bk), (52.bm), (52.bn), (77-80), (92), (93), (95)]

18. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although the ship had established a critical point in VMS to mitigate the risk of missing the turn if the ship encountered difficulty with pilot transfer, the satisfying conditions for the "Pilot transfer complete" critical point were not clearly defined, nor conveyed to applicable personnel. This resulted in a widespread lack of understanding by the crew as to when pilot transfer was considered complete. This directly contributed to the ship failing to execute the pre-planned response and subsequently exiting the channel. [FF (6), (7), (52.ay-bb), (52.be-bg), (75), (83-87), (89-91), (94)]

9. (U//~~FOUO~~) Once the ship was in extremis, the Navigation team was slow to recommend either an urgent backing bell to remain in the basin (which may have been appropriate prior to the initiation of forward speed) or an earlier, more aggressive speed change to enable a successful turn. Additionally, the

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

team did not consider taking on the C Tractor to reposition the ship back on track. Any one of these actions could have prevented the ship from exiting the channel to the West of the basin (268 leg). [FF (52.aq), (52.as), (52.au-aw), (52.ba-bh) (52.bj), (52.bk), (52.bm), (52.bn), (76) (77), (79), (80), (82 (83), (89), (90), (94-99)]

20. (U//~~FOUO~~) Based on the ship's 14.1kts speed as the ship crossed track back to the North during extremis shiphandling, the Back Emergency stopping distance, advance and transfer, the 35 yard channel width from centerline, and the shoaling rate outside the channel, the ship could not have stopped without grounding. [FF (52.br-bw), (103-114), (125), (126)]

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) The CO's nearly exclusive focus on getting the ilot onboard, both during preparations for and execution of th iloting evolution, resulted in the crew also focusing primarily n getting the pilot onboard, to the detriment of adequate focu n executing the briefed navigation plan. This focus was based n the CO's belief that, due to an anticipated lack of daylight pilot was critical to successfully executing the piloting volution. [FF (3), (6), (52.a), (52.t), (52.u), (52.w), 52.z), (52.ay), (52.ba), (52.bd), (60) (75-78), (82-89), (115)

. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although the ship had done an adequate job of entifying hazards/risks and developed a sufficient operational an, the widespread absence of supervisory leadership during ecution removed substantial margin to safety. As an example, th the Maneuvering Watch OOD and Navigator did not relieve til 28 minutes after the Maneuvering Watch was stationed and e minute before the ship turned to make its approach to annel entrance leg, the part of the transit of which the CO s most concerned. [FF (7-10), (52.b), (52.j-l)]

. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship did not use all available navigational ls to aid in maintaining situational awareness cifically, the ship did not effectively use Radar Nav Lines, s of Parallel Indices, and hand-held GPS units. litionally, the ship operated with VMS audible alarms in OUT due to the receipt of an unmanageable number of alarms ing piloting in restricted waters. [FF (13), (52.p), (52.r), .v), (52.x), (52.y), (52.ab), (124)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729) (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

24. (U//~~FOUO~~) Contrary to CO's Standing Order 3, paragraph 3.3.1, the radar was not operated to the maximum extent practical. [FF (13), (52.p), (52.r), (52.v), (52.x), (52.ab)]

Decisions Regarding the Scheduling of GEO(B)'s Return to Port and the Towed Array Repair Plan

25. (U//~~FOUO~~) The decision to replace the TA and the planning to support its replacement were not well-coordinated or communicated amongst Team Kings Bay stakeholders (Submarine Base Kings Bay and tenant commands, including Submarine Group 10, Submarine Squadron 16, Trident Refit Facility, Naval Submarine Support Center, Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic) and with and throughout COMSUBLANT. There exists today confusion, whether perceived or real, as to who owns the various decisions (eg. Whose decision is it to pull the boat in; who manages arrival times, when/how do gridlocks like SWFLANT EBW non-supportability get escalated, etc.). There is room for improvement in the articulation of the command and control regarding these types of issues, including when and how possibl high-risk issues should be escalated. In this case, some communications, when heard at lower levels, likely led to a vie that somebody higher, with seeming authority, directed certain actions. [FF (16-51)]

Additional Opinions

26. (U//~~FOUO~~) The indicated VMS set and drift calculations may not have been accurate during operations with astern propulsion or during periods of aggressive ship handling. It is possible that GEO did not experience the significant increase in set and drift from approximately 2 to 4kts inside the Fort Clinch basin, even though the algorithms within the Ring Laser Gyro Navigator (RLGN) system and VMS calculated it as so. [FF (42), (52.n), (52.z), (52.af), (52.am), (92), (93), (127)]

27. (U//~~FOUO~~) There were two occasions where the XO identified appropriate actions that could have made a difference in the outcome of the event, but in both cases, he inappropriately assumed that action would happen on its own, and therefore provided no backup himself. Specifically, he was aware that the C Tractor was on the Western side of the basin and out of

position, but he assumed the C Tractor saw the ship coming do the entrance leg, and therefore took no additional action to contact the C Tractor or notify the Bridge of the C Tractor's position other than attempting to hail it on VTS Channel 73. Additionally, when the ship found itself in extremis, the XO assumed the tug, which was along the port side, would readily push the ship's head to allow it turn on time without having speed. [FF (52.o), (52.aa), (52.bb), (52.ee), (65), (69-73)]

28. (U//~~FOUO~~) The XO fostered a sarcastic and unprofessional work environment. There are instances of unprofessional comments he made on the voice recording leading up to the event. Additionally, the sonar watch team had a near continuous shoot-the-breeze session during the maneuvering watch leading up to the mishap. During those conversations, watchstanders were telling stories of things the XO had said or done previously and were giggling. The informal conversations in sonar ceased after the mishap. [FF (123)]

29. (U//~~FOUO~~) There are indications of previous informal or unprofessional behavior by the CO from the conversations occurring in sonar as recorded during the inbound transit. [FF (123)]

30. (U//~~FOUO~~) Sonar watchstanding during the maneuvering watch was informal. [FF (123)]

Accountability

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Despite the Commanding Officer's expressed concerns with a one-day return to port turnaround and associated nighttime transits, he did not identify or ensure the actual execution of numerous appropriate mitigations to increase his margin to safety. Specifically:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although his biggest concern was piloting in the dark, and with CAPT (b)(6) personally advising the CO to slow the transit timeline down to mitigate the CO's concern, not only did the ship not take advantage of transiting at a later time, but the ship arrived 16 minutes early at the pilot transfer point. [FF (3), (4), (6), (46.d), (47), (52.h), (52.l) (52.u), (52.ad), (53.60)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) The maneuvering watch was not fully manned until one minute before the turn to the channel entrance leg. [FF (52.g), (52.j-l)]

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) There was widespread misunderstanding of the definition and location of the No-Go point to abort the pilot transfer. [FF (52.ay-ba), (52.be), (75), (83-87), (90)]

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship exceeded the maximum allowable speed of the COSOE during piloting, directly contributing to arriving at the pilot transfer point earlier than planned. [FF (52.a), (52.m), (52.u), (54-56), (60), (78)]

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship was late to identify that the C Tractor was out of position, and then failed to recognize that a successful pilot transfer was not feasible given the situation. [FF (6), (52.l), (52.m), (52.o), (52.u), (52.z), (52.af), (52.ab), (52.ai), (52.ak), (52.am), (52.ao), (52.au) (52.av), (52.aw), (52.ay), (53-55), (60), (65-73), (76-79), (92), (93)]

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ship failed to execute All Stop at the briefed critical point to commence slowing the ship for pilot transfer. [FF (52.t), (52.u), (52.w)]

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) The team, in aggregate, was just not focused and paying attention to the items that mattered most. [FF (3), (52.t), (52.u), (52.w), (52.ay, (52.ba-bc), (76), (77), (82), (83)]

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) He did not manage his team to ensure it was adequately rested. [FF (13), (14)]

i. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although early in his tour, the CO had not yet instilled the proper levels of formality, standards, forceful backup, and professionalism within his subordinates. [FF (52.j), (52.k), (97), (117), (118), (120), (123), (124)]

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS [redacted] (BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Recommendations

(U//~~FOUO~~) I recommend that Commander, Submarine Group 10 take the following administrative actions in the cases of those directly culpable and responsible for the allision and grounding.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Consider relieving CAPT [redacted] as Commanding Officer, USS GEORGIA (BLUE), due to potential loss of confidence. To support a more informed decision on whether or not to do so, I recommend CSS 16 arrange a culture workshop or similar venue to assess the culture on the ship in the areas of fostering forceful backup, formality, and decisiveness when taking pre-planned responses for tripwires, and then make a determination on CAPT [redacted]' ability to improve those areas.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT [redacted] should receive a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution for the following reasons:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to properly prepare and train his crew for the Return to Port.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to maintain situational awareness prior to the Return to Port in that the CO focused his attention on either turning the event off completely or changing the arrival time to the extent that he lost focus on preparing for, both mentally and operationally, and on executing the Return to Port.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to maintain situation awareness throughout the execution of the Return to Port by directing his attention to the pilot transfer to the extent that he lost focus on executing critical maneuvers necessary for mission accomplishment.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to understand his authorities as Commanding Officer.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) LCDR [redacted] should receive a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution for the following reasons:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to properly prepare and train his crew for the Return to Port.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to maintain situation awareness throughout the execution of the Return to port by directing h attention to the pilot transfer to the extent that he lost fo on executing critical maneuvers necessary for mission accomplishment.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to set a proper example for formality and to foster a culture where backup in encouraged.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) LT (b)(6) , Navigation Officer, USS GEORGIA (BLUE), should receive a non-punitive letter of caution for the following reasons:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to follow and execute the Piloting Plan.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Failure to provide forceful backup to t CO.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) LT (b)(6) Officer of the Deck on 2 November 2015, should receive a non-punitive letter of caution for failure to follow and execute the Piloting Plan.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) , Acting Commodore, Submarine Squadron 16 f[illegible] and 23 November, should receive a non-punitive letter of caution for failure to ensure a reasonable and acceptable plan was effectively coordinated in advance, given the mission to replace the towed array on GEORGIA.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) , Commodore, Submarine Squadron 16, should receive a non-punitive letter of caution fo failure to ensure the Commanding Officer's voiced risk was mitigated to the most reasonable extent possible, given the mission to replace the towed array on GEORGIA.

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) MMCM (b)(6) should receive formal counseling for failure to adhere to the basic tenets of the Force Commander's Crew Rest Policy.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) CSG 10 should review coordination practices between the ships, Squadron, Sub Group, and applicable Team Kings Bay organizations, and take appropriate actions to address shortcomings.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) COMSUBLANT should review coordination practices between the Type Commander and Team Kings Bay, as well as within the Type Commander staff, and take appropriate actions to address shortcomings.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER SUBMARINE GROUP 10
1060 USS GEORGIA AVENUE
KINGS BAY, GA 31547-5140

5830
Ser 00/324
7 Dec 15

From: Commander, Submarine Group 10
To: CAPT (b)(6) USN

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BUOY ALLISION AND GROUNDING BY USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) ON 25 NOVEMBER 2015

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F, Chapter II

Encl: (1) CAPT (b)(6) ltr dtd 30 Nov 15

1. Per reference (a), I appoint you to investigate the circumstances surrounding the buoy allision and grounding by USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) in the Saint Mary's River on 25 November 2015.

2. Investigate all causes and contributing factors, and any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore, and recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form by 17 December 2015, unless I grant an extension. If you have not previously done so, read Chapter II of reference (a) in its entirety prior to commencing your investigation.

3. I directed Commander Submarine Squadron 16 provide me enclosure (1), the initial Investigating Officer's report, prior to the Squadron Commander's endorsement. Upon independent review and consideration, you may select all, some, or none of the evidence and findings of fact for inclusion in your report.

4. LCDR (b)(6) , my Staff Judge Advocate, will provide you legal support and advice throughout the course of your investigation.

5. By copy of this appointing order, I direct LCDR (b)(6) and ETCS(SS) (b)(6) to furnish you necessary assistance.

Copy to:
LCDR (b)(6)
LCDR (b) (6)
ETCS(SS) (b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (1
1 of 1

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SUBMARINE SQUADRON 16
1050 USS GEORGIA AVENUE
KINGS BAY, GA 31547

5800
25 Nov 15

From: Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
To: CAPT (b)(6) USN

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT OCCURRED ONBOARD USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729/BLUE)

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F

1. This appoints you, per Chapter II of reference (a) to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding an allision with a buoy that occurred on USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729/BLUE) in the St. Mary's River on 25 November 2015.

2. Report your findings and recommendations in letter form by 27 November 2015, unless an extension of time is granted. You are directed to read reference (a) before beginning your investigation. In your report you should recommend administrative and/or disciplinary actions as appropriate.

3. In conducting your investigation, you are directed to comply with the Privacy Act of 1974. If you need assistance, please contact LT (b)(6) JAGC, USN at (b) (6) (b) (6) (b)(6).

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (2)
1 of 1

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SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT (S... GMAN 0170)

FULL NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b)(6)		O6	USN
ALL UNIT/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
USS GEORGIA (BLUE)			14JUL1966
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b)(6)		CAPT	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
CSS-16		DEPUTY FOR TRAINING	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
CO STARBOARD		1045	11-26-15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

ARTICLE 110, IMPROPER HAZARDING OF VESSEL

(2) I have the right to remain silent; - - -

(5) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	0947	26 NOV 15
(b)(6)	1048	11-26-15
(b)(6)	215	11/26/15

(b)(5)

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 1 & 1/2 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

ENCLOSURE (3)

2 of 25

Ref (a) Email to CDRE (b)(6) Nov 24, 2015 1033 a/m.

Ref(b) Email chain with Captain (b)(6) , Nov 20, 2015 1707

Ref (c) Email from LCDR (b)(6) Nov 23, 2015 1708

Ref (d) Email chain with Captain (b)(6) , Nov 23, 2015 0942

Ref(e) Email chain GEO(S) email with CSL from CSS-16, Nov 24, 2015 1232

Ref(f) Email from Nav wrt 11/25 pull in plan, Nov 21, 2015 1643

1) Given the plan was for GEO to come in the dark, my inexperience handling a boat of this size, and the inexperienced of our crew/leadership team (new CO/XO/NAV and crew first trip Kings Bay in two years), I conducted full piloting certification and discussed lessons learned including the impact of previous buoy collisions in Kings Bay due to set and drift. The incidents I was aware and discussed occurred prior to STM. Based on previous certification and underway, I was confident in team's ability to Navigate in routine and even complex situations but remained concerned with the additional risks for piloting at night. I assessed it to be a good certification, based on predicted conditions did not consider or anticipate the additional challenge of a heavy flood current (which was not predicted). In retrospect, the discussion was too general wrt contingencies for failure to quickly transfer on the pilot (our primary risk mitigation) and actions for higher than expected set and drift. In execution, our discussion of the trip wire of the pilot pullout proved to be inadequate.
2) GEO piloted into Kings Bay at STM staring at 0515, after gaining red and green lights of the buoy lines. I had desired to go in later (around 0530) but by the time I got to bridge the picture developed rapidly and I didn't expect daylight prior to the pilot rendezvous, so we proceeded in. We worked to gain better situational awareness and had some discussion on the bridge about buoys appearing closer than expected. The transit to Fort Clinch went faster than expected likely due to set and drift.
3) My best recollection is that we ordered all stop approximately 200 yards past what we had certified and we came into Fort Clinch basin about 10 knots (faster than normal due to set and drift and several entrance buoys appearing closer than indicated in the dark) and due to loss of GPS which I assessed might make it more difficult to assess set and drift. The pilot and sea tractor was in site in the basin and I had been attempting contact him for the previous 1 nm (prior to entering the Ft Clinch basin) with garbled responses. The sea tractor appeared close enough that the transfer could occur fairly soon,
4) I was surprised that sea tractor was not coming alongside and was concerned about making topside ready. We used backing bells to reduce STW to less than 1 knot but still had 5 knots SOG. At this point steerage became difficult. GPS was restored and I assessed that 5 knots SOG was good for pilot transfer and we discussed that we had less than 6 minutes remaining based in time distance to conduct the transfer but failed to abort as might have been appropriate.
5) At this point, I was uncomfortable proceeding in without the pilot in the dark. The set and drift was higher the 1 knot predicted and higher that what I had learned was typical in my two tugs

ENCLOSURE (3)
3 of 25

rides and outbound in USS Alaska in preps for SSGN command and during my outbound USS GEORGIA. Although I had trained my team for drifts up to 5 knots in the trainer, the set of 3-4 knots pushing us down track was more difficult to counter than in the trainer. The head pushed left even with a full right rudder.

6) I ask OOD to have NAV mark the distance to the pullout point or something to that effect. I never heard a response. I used bridge-to-bridge to request the pilot move to aggressively come onboard as he was still with Sea Tractor sitting in the near buoy echo, he did not appear to immediately take position to come alongside despite my request. I repeated my request to get him onboard numerous times. The ship was getting set left of track, but I waited to get the pilot on board, instinctively sensing we were standing into danger.

7) It took what seemed to be a long amount of time to get the pilot to come alongside and get onboard. I monitored position as we were pushed left. The lookout expressed concern about "hitting Fort Clinch," and I assessed that we were still at least 150 yards inside the basin buoy markers but situational awareness was difficult in the dark. Next, I believe the XO reported we were exiting the channel to the left ahead.

8) With the pilot now on board (set and drift had pushed about 125 yards left of track) I assessed the situation, we raised speed to 2/3rds and came hard right to regain track. The ship turned slowly to right, and I assessed risk of colliding with bouy 23 (currently ahead on the right and requiring it to be on the left). I was unsure of its exact range as all the buoys had seemed closer in the dark. I nevertheless increased speed to full with hard right rudder and the ship's head responded allowing us to place buoy 23, 10 feet off the port bow (drawing left) as was my objective.

9) I immediately ordered the OOD to shift his rudder to left hard rudder, which in my experience would clear buoy by moving the stern away and allowing me to regain track, the head of the boat responded slowly (potentially due to the high set and drift) and I verified the rudder hard left. I collided with the buoy 23 just fwd of the missile compartment LET due to ships head not swinging as quickly as expected. The buoy swung smoothly free at the stern planes and we had no indication that it contacted the screw.

10) After the buoy was clear and it appeared we would exit the channel to the right (head still not swinging fast enough to port and red buoys in line off my port bow), I ordered back emergency and the pilot arrived the bridge as we backed the ship into the channel and used the tug to push the bow to regain track. I had no indications that ship grounded with respect to shudder or sounding.

11) The ship returned to port without further incident.

12) Based on my initial assessment, I have identified the following failures in my command leadership which irrespective of the outcome of this investigation will serve as learning points for personnel improvement in the future.

    a. Despite my significant reservation -- expressed face-to-face, on the phone, and in e-mails with staff and leadership (ref a thru e refer) -- concerning the risks of proceeding into Kings Bay in the dark with an inexperienced team, when my requests to delay rtp one hour later were denied, I failed in my command responsibilities by driving to achieve mission success at the expense of appropriately acting to mitigate risks to

ENCLOSURE (3)
4 of 25

(b)(6)

increase our margin to safety. In retrospect, I should have loitered at STW until I was satisfied that the risks were commensurate with the mission gain. My team had developed a timeline and contingency plan for this course of action which we decided not to execute (ref f). Exacerbating this poor decision making was my assessment that any delay would be perceived as a recalcitrant attempt to stall our ordered mission to change out the fat line towed array and return to sea in one day. Any delay might be perceived as an attempt to allow our crew to spend Thanksgiving with their families (a course of action I had repeatedly and forcefully advocated because the ship was returning to port the day prior to the holiday. See ref a which summarizes the position I had taken for the previous two weeks).

b. I failed to ensure my team had an adequate plan and actionable trip wires for encountering high set and drift during pilot transfer. Also, we failed to utilize and trust all available tools maintain situational awareness in the dark. We failed to seriously consider proceeding into Kings Bay without the pilot in the dark. We failed to clearly call and execute the trip wire we had set for the pilot pullout point. I improperly assumed the pilot would meet us at the Fort Clinch entrance given the unique circumstances associated with this rtp.

c. More significantly, when in extremis, I got ahead of my team and failed to allow watch team backup and have not cultivated the adequate advanced, night time navigation skills and more importantly, a culture which that would have allowed for early, forceful recommendations during a challenging situation like the one we encountered on Nov 24.

- The team clearly broke down as the complexity increased due to challenging situational awareness in dark on the bridge, high set and drift, and the pilot out of position. During the event, my recollection is that there were recommendations from my Nav team as to the course of action which sometimes not understandable to me on the bridge because of the high wind while standing on the sail to observe pilot transfer.
- Once the pilot was onboard (enroute to the bridge), the OOD took the NAV's recommendation to raise, speed, come right and regain track.
- Immediately, after I assessed the ship to be in <u>extremis</u>, I took over for the OOD, I allowed the OOD no opportunity to give independent orders given aggressive ship handling I assessed would be required to regain track (there were many reports on the MC circuits, so at one point I ordered him to "do what I say") in attempt to avoid hitting buoy 23 or going out of the channel. I recall the Navigator recommending back emergency and the OODs body language suggested that he agreed; I purposely waited to take his recommendation until clear of the buoy, now marked abeam at less than the stopping distant of the ship by my assessment. I was also initially concerned about running aground by slowing with high set and drift (at the edge of the channel with stern now pointed outside the channel). Taking this recommendation may have prevented the collision.

ENCLOSURE (3)
5 of 25

(b)(6),

- In the end, all decisions were mine and mine alone. In retrospect, we should certainly have aborted pilot transfer early and headed inbound less the pilot or attempted to back down more forcefully and stay center basin.
- Exacerbating this decision was my poor confidence in attempting the dog legs without the pilot in the dark and my confusion and with the ship's behavior/position (it all happened very quickly) during the transfer in the dark. I alone made the decision to attempt to aggressively regain track (after pilot transfer) which resulted in the collision.

13) I solely bear full responsibility and accountability for this collision and subsequently the consequences thereof.

ENCLOSURE (3)
6 of 25

(b)(6)

Rank/Name: CAPT (b)(6)
Role: Commanding Officer

11/26 Interview

Q. Did you feel the piloting brief was sufficient? Did you discuss lessons learn from prior evolutions, both at sea and at TTF?

A. The piloting brief was adequate to very good. Interactive brief, that covered lessons learned (three prior incidents of buoy allisions due to high set and drift) and mitigations for key risks during planned event to include pilot rendezvous, darkness, and high set and drift. Turn battle rhythm and Go-no go points.

Q. Can you characterize your attempts to contact the tug to confirm pilot rendezvous and location?

A. XO reported that he had permission to enter port. XO attempted to contact the tug multiple times. CO attempted when approximately one NM from the tug; grabbled responses. Pilot stated after event that he did not hear or see the ship and that the ship's lights were deceiving in the dark.

A. At the brief, we assumed the pilot would be there. He looked large at initial visual contact, I assumed he was near buoy Echo and we had 6 minutes for the transfer. I passed this to the team.

Q. Do you have a normal battle rhythm for marking turns in the bridge?

A. Yes, and the first turn marking was done in a professional and proper manner.

Q. When you were close to the go/no go point near the pilot pickup, did the NAV, OOD, or anyone else recommend action?

A. I asked about the pullout point but do not recall getting a response. Not aware if they did, if so I did not hear it. I focused on the pilot transfer and trying to maintain situational awareness, but this was difficult at this point.

Q. Did you hear the turn to 294 marked by Nav team?

A. Pretty sure that normal battle rhythm happened, but think the team on the bridge did not realize the GNG point was passed. I was focused on the high wind across the deck as we took on the pilot. The pilot was just on board when the turn was marked. The tug was still along side, but we attempted to execute the turn.

Q. Did you feel your team was providing data or recommendations to you? Did you receive adequate recommendations from your team?

A. Mostly passing data, for instance, LT (b)(6) kept saying that the boat was going to hit Port Clinch.

A. WRT making succinct recommendations, we haven't developed that culture yet. We were also having difficulty hearing due to the high winds on the bridge. I think the team, me included, were in over our heads in those conditions. I was focused on getting the pilot on board for necessary assistance.

A. I knew bow was drifting south, but lost track of the No Go point for pilot pickup.

Q. Describe the orders that occurred on the bridge.

A. The OOD ordered right full rudder, ahead 2/3. The buoy was close at this point. In my opinion it was within our stopping distance. I took over and ordered all ahead full, right full rudder. About 30 seconds later, someone recommended all back emergency. The OOD's body language indicated he agreed. I did not take the recommendation, we were too close. I thought we needed speed and rudder to save the ship. See my statement.

ENCLOSURE (3.)
1 of 29

Rank/Name: CAPT (b)(6)
Role: Commanding Officer

11/26 Interview
Q. Did you feel the piloting brief was sufficient? Did you discuss lessons learn from prior evolutions, both at sea and at TTF?
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A. WRT making succinct recommendations, we haven't developed that culture yet. We were also having difficulty hearing due to the high winds on the bridge. I think the team, me included, were in over our heads in those conditions. I was focused on getting the pilot on board for necessary assistance.
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ENCLOSURE (3)
8 of 75

(b)(6)

A. When the buoy was 30° on the port bow, I shifted the rudder hard left. My experience said that we would not contact the buoy, but I didn't account for the set pushing us closer as our bow passed.

Q. Describe the buoy impact.
A. The buoy hit hard, bounced off, never went under nor did it jerk. There was no screw hit. The buoy chain was probably under the ship based on how it was hit. Any damage under the boat was probably caused by the buoy chain. The buoy did not go under. Paint scrapes down the port side were due to buoy impact.

Q. Looking back, could you have done anything differently?
A. In retrospect, all back emergency may have worked, instead of trying to make the turn past buoy 23, but it would have to have been ordered earlier than when the recommendation was made. My training is that speed is life in high set and drift, a factor we should have taken into account much earlier.

Q. About how far out of the channel to the north do you think you ended up?
A. The buoys off the port bow were in line. We were definitely outside the channel; approximately ½ o the boat was out. By this point the light was better and we had increased situational awareness.
A. I ordered all back emergency, I thought there was a chance we might hit the buoy again. However, tug was alongside, so I was less concerned with this. We needed the tug to get back in the channel. It would have been challenging but doable without it.

Q. In light of the concerns you had expressed with a night evolution, what were your thoughts when you arrived on the bridge at 0445 and you were running about 15 minutes ahead of time?
A. Things were moving quickly. The STM was right there, the XO stated it was 600 yards away, but it looked much closer. I did not think we had the situational awareness necessary to turn around. One hour would have been a significant change in the light, not 15 minutes. I was never comfortable because of the poor situational awareness, but the mission was still achievable. There was high risk going through the buoys with high set and drift, we sighted the sea tractor prior to entering and I believed the pilot would be ready to board based on the fact this was a night evolution. Additionally, we could see him as we approached on the entrance range.

Q. Do you believe the NAV was capable of doing his job?
A. Yes. However, no one's experience, including my own, provided necessary extra margin of safety for this event. I thought we had a margin of safety, but just not by a lot. We considered how to open our margin of safety, but in retrospect we did not do enough to increase pilot margin. I didn't think this would be a huge problem and we did not add any additional trip wires. There was no discussion about going in without the pilot while on the bridge when he was not at the expected point. The set and drift and pilot position reduced our margin of safety pushing the team to its limits.

Q. How do you feel about the CSS-16 certification of the NAV?
A. Certification prepared the NAV to do his job. Certification did not prepare the NAV, CO, or XO to go in at night with a max flood. Night evolutions are not be routine in my experience and I had to write a risk mitigation to CSP to rep at night for a nighttime homevac in a port to which I had piloted routinely over ten years.

Q. Did you prepare your team?
A. I did not adequately prepare the team. My initial response when presented with going in at night was that it wasn't going to happen. It was not until two days out that I informed the team to focus on

the night evolution. However, by the certification brief, the team was focused on the task and they gave a good discussion of how to execute in the piloting brief. I was clear that we were going to execute as briefed. I believe the team was competent for routine navigation anywhere in the world, including when there is high set and drift with visual cues.

Q. What was your greatest concern why you needed the pilot?
A. The set and drift in the channel and in the dog legs. In retrospect, this concern may have been misplaced, the team formally executed every turn without pilot assistance after the collision. It was personal discomfort with Kings Bay that drove us toward ensuring the pilot was onboard. He did mention after the fact that he believed we made the right choices given the situation we got ourselves into right of track, close to buoy 23.

ENCLOSURE (3)
16 of 29

(b)(6)

(ref a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 10:33 AM
To: (b)(6) COMMODORE
Subject: RTP ~~(C)~~

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Commodore,

I know you are aware of my concerns but I wanted to spell it out in some more detail. As my team and I have formulated, reviewed, and certified our plan for (b)(1)1 5a , and U/W to sea, we have come up with the following concerns:

1. Conducting (b)(1)1 5a I believe requires a TYCOM waiver (I am guessing we have it because they (b)(1)1 5a) and given the fact we have not pulled in for (b)(1)1 5a , there is (b)(6) to lean on. CO/XO/NAV have not piloted into Kings Bay in the last 28 years. All of the untoward incident I know of occurred between STM and Fort Clinch. My assessment is that this not a prudent plan for rtp. I will may just slow it down as necessary.

2. (b)(1)1 5a
Having been back at sea for a few weeks, I have not built enough depth, I am concerned about the fatigue level of my command element. Given an all day evolution and subsequent U/W, we will have spent the majority of 36 hours awake and are set to pilot out and submerge on the mid-watch at 0330.

3. The logistics of mooring at a pier not supported brow is an issue. Normally the IA shop comes off on to check status of the arrays. We have five pallets or so of fresh food diverted from Key West to Kings Bay, numerous high priority parts at SUBSAT, administrative tasks, and many other less significant items that are best done with a brow.

4. In order to complete provisional qualifications, we planned on using the Thanksgiving S/D and S/U for practical factors. We will need a S/D and S/U next to the pier once moored after TRE and prior to EOC to accomplish required practical factors. This will delay the fast start - another reason why the a short RTP with a s/d makes sense because it not impact schedule the downstream schedule.

5. The optic of pulling the ship the day before Thanksgiving without a critical mission that requires immediate return to sea remains somewhat of a concern, especially given the crew's ALL IN performance (185 weeks/non-duty) to get the ship to sea (closing 758 jobs, 366 qa

~~Look for Classification Marking in Message Body~~

tests, PRVT, rod testing, ~~PORSE, and fast cruise~~) ~~to see in 62 days from~~ SOC. We can and will come through this.

I will drive to achieve our mission with success. Standing bye to execute orders as fragged. Truly appreciate all you and your staff are doing to support our mission.

Warmest Regards and Very Respectfully, (b)(6)

Captain (b)(6) , USN
Commanding Officer
USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 729B)
KILL THE BASTARDS!

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a

DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (3)

ref(b)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO**

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2015 5:07 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Subject: RE: (U) FLTA Sked ~~(S)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) → I meant to put not here.

None of this corresponds with my desires or what I assess to be best for my crew's readiness. One day plan does look executable from a reasonable risk standpoint with an (b)(1) 5a . Not sure we have the risk calculus right for (b)(6) but we can likely support. CDRE onboard tomorrow and we will discuss. Thanks for the support.

VR (b)(6)

Captain (b)(6) USN
Commanding Officer
USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 729)
KILL THE BASTARDS!

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
[mailto: (b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2015 4:51 PM
To: (b)(6) 'CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Subject: (U) FLTA Sked

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

Current plan is to (b)(1) 5a

The (b)(1) 5a . If it works, plan for [illegible] u/w.

If array cannot Fri afternoon.

Doing THP/TRE without array disapproved.

B2 (b)(1) 5a a couple hours to disprove need for (b)(1) 5a . There is no time in (b)(1) 5a . There is u/w time on midwatch for a few (b)(1) 5a so we can eliminate possibility of sked change due to need for (b)(1) 5a . Mr. (b)(6) will embark from here to perform sound cuts.

BZ on ICERT. Everyone here pleased with results.

See you at AUTEC.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (3)
13 of 75

(b)(6)

Vr,

(b)(6)
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1 Sa

Classification:~~SECRET~~

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 Sa
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 Sa

ref (c)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS | (b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 5:08 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR USS GEORGIA SSGN-729 (BLUE)
Subject: ~~(b)(1) 1.5a~~ Schedule

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CO,

Discussions on your (b)(1)1 5a

(b)(1)1 5a

...,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (3)
15 of 25

(b)(6)

(refcd)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO**

From: (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV)
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 12:32 PM
To: XO
Cc: CO
Subject: FW: (S) (b)(1) 1.5a (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Captain,

Here is the (b)(1) 1.5a .

Very respectfully, NAV

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS [mailto: (b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:45 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR MNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) LCDR MNPI-COMSUBLANT, N85/97
Cc: (b)(6) ETC MNPI- CSS-16 ANAV; (b)(6) ETC NSSC Kings Bay GA (OPS), N3A; (b)(6) O-3/LT OPS, N3; (b)(6) ET2 MNPI-NSSC KB (OPS), N3A2; (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV); (b)(6) LT MNPI-COMSUBLANT; (b)(6) LCDR MNPI-TRF Kings Bay, 700; (b)(6) LT NSSC KINGS BAY Weapons Officer N7/N9; (b)(6) LCDR MNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, N7 - Weapons Officer; (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, 305; (b)(6) CDR NSSC KB GA (CO), N00; (b)(6) CDR MNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer; (b)(6) CAPT MNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
Subject: (S) (b)(1) 1.5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) ,

1) We will update (b)(1) 1.5a on CSL's selected (b)(1) 1.5a .

2) Concerning the (b)(1) 1.5a in Kings Bay, request a (b)(1) 1.5a noor time at the warping warf. The ship requests this extension so they do not have to pilot during darkness during their first return from underway.

The logistics of conducting the swap are increasing in complexity due to waivers not being approved. Below is a (b)(1) 1.5a being worked:

Primary Plan-

(b)(1) 1.5a

Backup Plan (COA 1):
TA swag is unsuccessful or takes too long
Move into EHW

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (3)
16 of 25

(b)(6)

S/D reactor
Conduct swap

(b)(1) 5a

Backup Plan (b)(1) 5a : Investigating this but initial report is (b)(1) 5a outboard another unit is not possible.

(b)(1) 5a
(b)(1) 5a

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b)
(CELL) (6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1) 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: 20481123

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1) 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1) 5a

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (3)
17 of 25

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO**

From: (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV)
Sent: Saturday, November 21, 2015 4:43 PM
To: CO
Subject: (b)(1) 1.5a plan (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Sir,

Below is the timeline that the ANAV, STSC3, and myself could best put together: (b)(1) 1.5a which has (b)(1) 1.5a to support not running the channel at dark. I believe is not [illegible]

(b)(1) 1.5a

(b)(1) 1.5a surface (b)(6)
pumped out but could surface later in the evening and do 12 knots. Does not buy us anything significant because twilight does not change)

(b)(1) 1.5a

0545

0634

0645

0701

0730

0830

0900

0930

1430

1500

1530

1600

1725

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (3)
18 of 25

1730

1757 (b)(1)1 5a

1800

(b)(1)1 5a , will be able to (b)(1)1 5a th)

Based on this estimate we have (b)(1)1 5a [illegible] with a small
array. STSCS estimates that boat and then the (b)(1)1 5a hour job, which total a best case 6:45 to
complete the (b)(1)1 5a replacement.

This plan does not allow for any issues with the (b)(1)1 5a
The is no room for troubleshooting in the plan.

If we shutdown the (b)(1)1 5a the next day if
required.

(b)(1)1 5a

The ship could support a late afternoon underway. This allows for most personnel to see their families on thanksgiving and allows for time to come through any (b)(1)1 5a .
On this day we would perform (b)(1)1 5a for equipment not being shut down.

(b)(1)1 5a

The ship could support a (b)(1)1 5a . This would allow for all crew members to see their families. This additional time would mean that we could [illegible] the
(b)(1)1 5a .
[illegible] (b)(1)1 5a not being (b)(1)1 5a .

(b)(1)1 5a

The (b)(1)1 5a [illegible] to a full time
and (b)(1)1 5a . ISE nor
. 3 additional hours to work (b)(1)1 5a with this option,
allowing (b)(1)1 5a .

I think family and thanksgiving is an important option based on the fact that every married person onboard will lose FSA as soon as we throw a line over in Kings Bay. (b)(6)

Very respectfully, NAV

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a

DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (3)

Amendment and correction to my previous statement

Ref (a) Ghost E-mail " (b)(1)1 5a Concerns"

Ref (b) Email from CDRE (b)(6) (b)(1)1 5a Repair, Nov 24, 2015 1738

Ref (c) MSG DTG (b)(1)1 5a NOV 15

1) Concerning questions wrt to my arrival "15 minutes early."
   a. Based on questions by the investigators, "what were your thoughts when you were running 15 minutes ahead of time," I incorrectly assumed we had arrived at stn at 0515 (15 minutes early within 0530 +- 15 min allowed) and included that in my statements.
   b. The morning of the incident, I woke up around 0400, I reviewed our position (ahead of PIM) and immediately went to the conn and directed the ANAV to "slow down" and something to the effect of "don't be early like is a normal Submarine Force practice, but to be on time at best." The control team immediately recomanended slowing to the bridge and I preceded with my personnel preps for rtp.
   c. The deck logs and RLGN data show we arrived at (b)(1)1 5a . The early arrival at Fort Clinch resulted from heavy flood at a normal standard bell to ensure best compensation for set and drift. The record shows that we arrived at (b)(1)1 5a one minute late not 15 minutes early.
2) WRT to my concerns outlined in my e-mail (ref a of previous statement which we now know the CDRE did not receive until Nov 25).
   a. I outlined my concerns with the RTP in the dark face-to-face with CDRE on Nov 22. When he left the ship on Nov 22, he stated that his top priority would be to "fix the schedule."
   b. At the operations brief on 23 Nov, despite concerns about the plan from my entire team, I directed them to prepare for RTP in the dark as our top priority for Tuesday (most important being the full piloting test). The team continued to express concerns and I directed the XO to draft me an e-mail outlining all our team's concerns with RTP plan.
   c. I received the Ghost e-mail (ref a of this statement) from XO on Tuesday morning. I edited the e-mail (replacing one concern and expounding on others) and printed it out. The draft e-mail stated that "I intend to call the you directly about each and every one of these issues." I considered this a good idea. (b)(1)1.5a good phone connectivity and called the (b)(1)1 5a
   d. E-mail in hand (ref a of previous statement), I went down each and every concern we had outlined in the final draft. WRT to the rtp in the dark, I asked when the last time a RTP in the dark had been done in Kings Bay which I considered to be the most difficult port I have every piloted. The CDRE informed me that he had discussed it with the Pilots and "they had no concerns." My recollection is telling him that "all the untoward incidents I knew of Kings Bay were prior to the pilot coming aboard." This was my first indication that the CDRE was not supportive of my attempts to adjust to a daylight schedule that appropriately managed risks.

ENCLOSURE (3)
21 of 25

(b)(6) 12/1

e. We discussed all the issues in the e-mail and in conclusion, I requested that he call the CSL Chief of Staff "to walk through my concerns." He said he would consider it.

f. I returned to my desk and re-read my e-mail. I reflected on the phone conversation, edited the e-mail adding a statement concerning pilot comfort level. "All of the untoward incident I know of occurred between STM and Fort Clinch" as I had discussed with the CDRE on the phone.

g. I sent the e-mail to the CDRE. I consider the e-mail to CDRE (ref a of previous statement) to be a substantive summary of my phone conversation with the CDRE.

3) I received an e-mail (ref b) from the CDRE at 1730 p.m. where he informed that he had decided not to engage CSL and ended with "I hope we can (b)(1)1.5a tomorrow." I took this as a response to my previous e-mail.

4) Later received message DTG 242003Z NOV 15 which (b)(1)1.5a . It also stated that if TB-16 replacement is unsuccessful, (b)(1)1.5a without an operational TB-16. I previously advocated without success for a plan to stay at sea without a TB-16 to avoid the associated risks of the one day plan. I commented to the XO, "then why are we taking all these risks."

ENCLOSURE (3)
22 of 25

(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ref(a)

(b)(6) **CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO**

From: (b)(6) LCDR USS GEORGIA SSGN-729 (BLUE)
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 4:04 AM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Cc: (b)(6) MMCM USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE COB
Subject: Ghost E-mail "FLTA Replacement Concerns" (U)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Commodore,

As my team and I have formulated, reviewed, and certified our plan for RTP, FLTA replacement, and U/W to sea, we have come up with the following concerns that I believe warrant addressing:

1. Conducting piloting

2. A [redacted]
way. My Command element will be exhausted as it is once we moor. but given an all day evolution and [redacted] which has significant risk associated with it.

3. The logistics of mooring at a pier not supported by a brow is becoming an issue. We have one officer to leave in port (LTJG (b)(6) baby due in a week), five pallets or so of fresh food diverted from Key West to Kings Bay, numerous high priority parts at SUBSAT, administrative tasks, and many other less significant items that are best done while in port.

4. Housekeeping will prove difficult with the whole crew on board, awake, and using the facilities while we are steaming in port next to the pier. This is a challenging task and unnecessary given the available berths (Warrior Wharf).

5. In order to complete provisional qualifications, we planned on using the (b)(1)1.5a (b)(6) for practical factors. We (b)(1)1.5a next to the pier once moored after TRE and prior to EOC to accomplish required practical factors.

I intend to call you directly about each and every one of these issues once into my OPSKED water. I think we need to address what is actually in the [redacted] realm of the possible in this homeport. The fastest I have ever [redacted] with a proficient crew that was fully worked up for deployment. As always, I will carry out the plan as briefed, but these concerns need to be addressed. Standing by for rudder orders.

Very Respectfully,

ENCLOSURE (3)
23 of 25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)

DERIVED FROM: OGF SCG

DECLASSIFY ON: Source Marked OADR, (b)(1) 1.5a

ENCLOSURE (3)
24 of 25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ref(b)

(b)(6) **CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO**

From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore [(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 5:38 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Subject: (U) TA Repair

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) ,

I wanted to let you know that I did not go forward with an argument to CSL for you to stay in Kings Bay until Friday. I re-read my earlier email with CSL N3 -- I really made a strong argument for you to not pull into Kings Bay. As we discussed on the phone, I really didn't feel I could try to undo that previous argument.

I know you are disappointed with this outcome -- I hope we can get the TA swap done and get you back to sea tomorrow.

R/

(b)(6)

CAPT
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
912-573- (b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CAPT (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (3)
25 of 25

(b) 6

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)

ACTIVITY/UNIT	DATE OF BIRTH
USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 7295)	

NAME (INTERVIEWER)	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)	CAPT O-6	USN

ORGANIZATION	BILLET
COMSUBLANT	N7

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW	TIME	DATE
CSG-10		

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties + Hazarding a Vessel (b)(6)
Art 92 Art 110

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b) (6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (4)
1 of 9

(5) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ----------

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the classsing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (4)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	TIME 1827	DATE 9DEC15
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)	TIME 1829	DATE 12/9/15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b)(6)	TIME 1835	DATE 12/9/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____ page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

Statement to be provided SEPCOR.

ENCLOSURE (4)
3 of 9

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: CAPT (b)(6)
Role: CO

Q. From initial statement question was asked concerning "uncomfortable with proceeding in without the pilot in the dark." What does that mean? Did you mean you were going to get the pilot on at all cost?

- I did not assess we were in extremis prior to me taking actions. Every instinct was telling me that we were drifting out of position and complexity was increasing. I was intent on getting the pilot aboard to help, didn't assess we were going to be in extremis until after the pilot was aboard.
- I knew the ship was getting pushed, knew we were getting close, did not know we were past the pullout point, I thought I had time to get the pilot onboard.
- Could have attempted to aggressively back down earlier as a COA or asked the pilot and tug for help w/o him being aboard.

I was convinced the pilot would be aboard based on previous conversations (in person and on the phone) with CDRE (b)(6) . I was very concerned with the dismissiveness of my concerns about piloting in the dark and was initially focused more on getting the evolution turned off than doing it right. We discussed the pilot pullout, but did not specifically discuss the option and additional risks of proceeding without the pilot onboard at the piloting certification.

Q. What is the "pilot pull out point?"

- We did not define this clearly enough. Our thought was if the pilot was not there but he was IVO. We should have clearly defined it as, if the pilot is not on the ship at the pullout point, we break away and go.

Q. How was the OPORD 2000 waiver (issue) resolved?

- Not resolved, attempted to email concerns about this in an email but the email was not received by the CDRE. I assumed it was resolved based on the fact we were sent an OPS Directive directing the return to port. The XO expressed this concern but I did not read the guidance. I recalled having to have a waiver and a risk mitigation to return to Pear Harbor in the dark for medevac, a port I had navigated dozens of time over three tours.

Q. During the piloting brief when you discussed lessons learned, specifically the Kentucky, was there specific mitigations put in place for the lessons learned?

- We did focus on the speed plan and conning plan with respect to set and drift. We spoke about using the scope to ensure buoys were on the right drawing right and left drawing left. Not enough discussion about what does pilot pullout point meant, this was not clearly defined. We did not dissect the (Fort Clinch) basin portion in additional detail from our normal discussion of all the key points (each member who owned a piece discussed turn bearing, turn range, visual

ENCLOSURE (4)
4 of 9

(b)(6) NIMS

cue) but did not dissect the other buoy chain portions (beyond our normal piloting certification). The ANAV did discuss the lighting characteristic of each NAV AIDE.

Q. When did you lower the RADAR?

- Ordered the RADAR stopped until everyone was on the bridge then restored until we reached the turning basin. When I received the report of loss of GPS I ordered the RADAR restored, and then I believe the OOD secured it once GPS was restored. I was focused on deck safety and pilot transfer in high winds at that point. Ultimately lowered the RADAR to allow the pilot and myself to man the bridge.

Q. What was the impact of the damaged FURUNO? What would still work (what was broke, was repeater with track still available)?

- I was informed of the fact the cable was severed and had Chief report to my stateroom. I was informed that it could not be fixed and order him to try harder. I ordered it fixed and the XO (COO) was working the problem on the mid-watch.

Q. Was there an external MC speaker rigged on the bridge? Could you hear recommendations?

- We do not have one yet, directed the NAV team to obtain a speaker shortly after change of command but we have not achieved that goal yet. I was told that it was not standard in Kings Bay so obtaining it is difficult. Attempts were made. Chief (b)(6) had for action and Chief (b)(6) (NAV DEPT Chief) was aware of my direction and working it with Chief (b)(6)
- Two days before underway I was informed that we didn't have the parts but had a plan to ensure it was installed prior to our next underway.

Q. Did you consider/think you could CONN around the buoy and regain track? Could you have taken Buoy 23 to STBD? Why do you think the ships head did not swing as expected?

- At the time I didn't consider taking buoy 23 down the STBD side. I needed to regain track and the bow was already swinging right on the OODs order.
- Once ship was in extremis, I heard some announcements from control but no clear recommendations, I made the decision to tell the OOD to "do what I say," I needed buoy 23 on the left drawing left. That worked and then I shift the rudder to kick the stern away. I was surprised it didn't work, I don't have a lot of experience with the ship's handling characteristics of the SSGN but I had studied it carefully and even developed tacaids that I distributed to SSBN/SSGN PCO and PXOs. I did not order back emergency until buoy 23 was clear of the stern.
- Yes, I thought I might be able to CONN around the buoy but it was going to be very close. After I had buoy 23 on the left drawing left, I assessed that we could narrowly escape a collision.
- The head did not shift as quickly as I expected.
- After we collided with the buoy, I looked forward and saw red buoys inline as I drove across the channel. I ordered back emergency several times and OOD replied that he was doing it.

ENCLOSURE (4)
5 of 9

- I think the ship's swing could not be checked because either set on the rudder, buoy chain on the rudder or maybe the rudder was aground. The pilot was on the bridge, at this point and did not think we grounded. At least that is what he told me.

Q. How wide is the channel in the area of Buoy 23?

- About 175 yards.

Q. What is the stopping distance of the ship at 14-15 KTS? According to my studies I developed a tacaid which I had not yet had the chance to verify:

- The stopping distance at 6 knots 125 yards
- At 9 knots it is 200 yards.
- At 15-16 knots it is 700-800 yards or more.
- I did not feel that grounding had stopped the ship; ship reacted like it did during man overboard drills, did not feel a shudder.
- Ship seemed to reverse quicker than expected during MOB drills.
- Grounding seems likely when confronted with the math. However, it still seems we would have felt a hard grounding that stopped the ship. The crew felt grounding at site six with zero knots.

Q. Did you have a hand held GPS in the bridge?

- Yes, I used the GPS the entire time, was showing 10-11 meters left of the range, 55 meters left the last time I looked it during at the pilot transfer. Didn't look at tools during pilot transfer, focused on the transfer.

Q. Were you aware that VMS audible alarms were off? Were any concerns regarding the number of VMS alarms during outbound piloting reported to you?

- No, I added some specific guidance in either my COSO or a TSO concerning operating with VMS alarms – I was concerned about this issue due to previous experience.
- No alarm issues were reported to me by the crew or the CSS-16 NAV/EVAL team.

Q. Did you hold the tug on RADAR?

- I think so; not sure. I did hold him visually from STM. Thought the tug was in position. I did not know we held the tug on AIS (and therefore in VMS)—"I wish I would have known that". I looked at the BDU when entered the basin since the tug was not in (expected) position.

Q. What channel did you attempt to contact the tug on? Did you try channel 16, is there any difference? Were there any successful communications on the bridge to bridge prior to the maneuvering watch?

- Believe I attempted to use channel 73, I had the WEPS (OOD) verify the proper channel. I did not try to use channel 16. During my berth shifts, I had trouble contacting the pilot and tug on 16. They seemed to be only on the working channel

ENCLOSURE (4)
6 of 9

(b)(6) 4/11/17

- Wing bridge to bridge communications had been problematic when at PD. I was concerned about the range on the #2 scope vs the multifunction. I wasn't terribly concerned with the inability to contact the tug, I thought the tug was in place, it looked in place and the CORE told me he had spoken with the tug and they had a plan and "no concerns."

Recollection of conversation with tug once contact was established.

- I thought the tug looked big but VMS showed him further away. I called twice, focused on slowing the ship, then hailed him again and told him to get aboard quickly and forget the passengers. I remember the first successful communication attempt being from the boat to the tug after we entered the basin. During the conversation someone said something to the effect of 4000yd to transfer the pilot so I said we have 6 minutes to complete. I was also concerned with high wind; there was wind driven water spray across the missile deck.
- I asked the pilot (later, when on the bridge), why he wasn't in position. He said I saw the SUB ID beacon but his depth perception was off and that he did not think the sub was that close. He also said that "came and got me and told me I needed to get onboard."

Q. Control thought the tug was out of position, did they tell you?

- No. It wasn't until later when I looked at VMS (entering the basin). I was more concerned with the channel buoys (268 legs) than the tug since the buoys appeared much closer in the dark. I still thought he could close quickly and get onboard as was my experience in other ports. Typically, my first communications with the transfer vessel in Pearl Harbor were to give him permission to come alongside. They were always ready, as were they in every Navy port on my western pacific deployment.

Q. Where there any impacts/considerations given to sleep with respect to this evolution?

- Very little discussion on sleep. 2/3 of the crew sleeps on the mid-watch, knew it was going to be tough. Did not get intrusive. Officers had done mitigations; I know some things were in place. The WEPS did not stand the evening watch as was initially planned. I thought he would not stand evening to get some sleep. We did not have a good enough plan. In general we could make it work but we did not put enough into the plan. We had to account for in-port schedule as well (which COB had told me he planned to put people down who were not on watch). I still believed there was to be a piloting evolution later that day, so sleep routine was going to be rough. We should have developed a better plan.

Q. Regarding the ship's position wrt PIM

- When I got up in the morning, the ship was ahead. I told the ANAV to not be ahead. ANAV adjusted, so ship was on-time at STM. Buoy STM seemed very close, I focused on entering the channel and we were going in, worried about the buoy chain. We used All Ahead Standard limited to propulsion limits on the surface; the following seas resulted in a higher speed through the water.

ENCLOSURE (4)
1 of 9

(b)(6) 4/15

- I initially wanted to be 15 minutes late but was ok with on time given it would make a difference in the buoy chain before the pilot transfer where all the untoward incidents I knew of had occurred. I was early to the basin, probably because of Ahead Standard 72 turns and the set. We are not that good at managing ship's position minute for minute at this point. We were working on that – surface on time, dive, be at a specific point but were not there yet. I didn't assess that a few minutes would make a difference and focused on the risks in the initial buoy chain where my first ship had collided with buoy 16 days before I reported aboard.

Q. Did you feel comfortable that you had the authority to delay the commencement of transit?

- Didn't feel like I had the authority to say no w/o additional mitigating factors (i.e. reduced visibility). I considered it but based on an order that I could execute I was obligated to follow this order. I was not a moral issue and considered cc'ing the Admiral on my final e-mail. I was frustrated and didn't want to be in subordinate.
- I felt that my alternate plans (PCAN, stay out without a TB-16 for example) were well thought out but denied. Then the plan became increasing ridiculous with piloting in the dark and all the other factors being considered were obviously that a one day array swap out was the only acceptable option to CSL and that CSS-16 had eventually given up as all the options had been denied. The CDRE had actually apologized (while onboard) for not being able to get any of things we requested but stated that he would "fix the schedule" for Kings Bay.
- I felt like my authority was being undercut, I told the CDRE and Deputy (specifically mentioned Submarine Force Commander's Guidance), thought he was going to fix it based on conversation I had with him. I was told Captain (ret) (b) (6) was the obstacle to every plan submitted and that he was very clear that the ship was "only going to get one day" and "he didn't care what the CO wanted." GEORGIA was not going stay in port over Thanksgiving. TRF said TA replacement couldn't be done unless ship showed up early in the dark drove the imprudent schedule and turned out to be a very conservative estimate. The array was swapped by noon.
- If I said delayed, it would have been considered as me trying to get his crew in for Thanksgiving holiday. Thought my motives would have been in question and it would be viewed as insubordination. I had to push the crew very hard to raise standards, pass PORSE, and get ready for ICERT. I am trying to improve crew morale. Coming in on Wed and not staying for Thanksgiving did not help crew morale and would alienate the families. They were going to lose their FSA (a few bucks for Christmas is a big deal to lower enlisted) and not even see their families. In my view, absolutely no reason to come in the dark or staying until Friday. My crew would be ready for TRE. We had delivered better than expected on PORSE and ICERT.

Q. Were you aware of any pushbacks with a U/W on Friday?

- I was told at some point that we could not get U/W on Friday due to SWFLANT support for the underway.

Q. Having now done the nighttime transit, do you feel your almost exclusive focus on getting pilot onboard was a distraction which adversely impacted crew performance?

ENCLOSURE (4)
A nc a

b)(6) 11/18/15

- no, I don't think the crew knew I was focused on my significant pilot concerns because I didn't articulate these. However, it is possible they heard my conversation with the pilot telling him to "aggressively close, forget the other passengers, and get onboard. Recommend you ask the control team why they didn't call the NO-GO point.

Q. Did CDRE give any indication that coming in later would be ok?

- No indication, he was very dismissive and said the pilots had "no issues." I told him that all "untoward incidents in Kings Bay happen before the pilot get onboard."

Q. I think you had a good brief and good plan.

- I agree. Good but not great. I think the team just froze under the circumstances.

CO additional Comment: If I had treated this as a combat readiness test, I would have prepared more. It might have been OK. I didn't believe we are going to actually do it until the day prior. We are taught that is not worth the GAIN, don't do it. A point that had been reinforced to me many times as I had been trusted to make risk gain calculus in some of the most difficult circumstances in command in Afghanistan and of USS SANTA FE.

I could not get past the taking these unnecessary risks with a team that only piloted once and with a new CO/XO/NAV/ANAV who had zero experience coming into Kings Bay in those positions and little experience with Kings Bay at all.

Returning to port in the dark with this team was a foolish plan by any standard I have known in my 30 years as a Submariner. That doesn't change the fact that we failed to define the pull out and executed poorly in the basin. I lost situational awareness, did not have enough experience handling a ship of this size, and was not capable of directing my team to safety. The ultimate accountability rests on me.

Additional Requests:

If there are command climate findings related to this event, request Chaplain (b)(6) who rode the ship recently be interviewed.

12/11/15

CAPT (b)(6) Commanding Officer
USS GEORGIA (BLUE) SSGN 729

ENCLOSURE (4)
9 of 9

(b)(6)

(b)(6)		RATE/RANK: O4/LCDR	SERVICE (BRANCH): USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT: EXECUTIVE OFFICER/USS GEORGIA (SSGN-729)(BLUE)			DATE OF BIRTH: 9/8/79
NAME (INTERVIEWER): (b)(6)		RATE/RANK: CAPT	SERVICE (BRANCH): USN
ORGANIZATION: CSS-16		BILLET: DEPUTY FOR TRAINING	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW: YO STATEROOM		TIME: 0850	DATE: 11/26/15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

ARTICLE 110, IMPROPER HAZARDING OF VESSEL (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with a lawyer prior to any questioning. This lawyer may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; and (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent; (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement; (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning; (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such lawyer present with me during this interview; and (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (5)

any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	TIME	DATE
	0851	11/26/15
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)	TIME 1250	DATE 11/26/15
SIGNATURE (b)(6)	TIME 1230	DATE 11/26/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 3 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

(b) (6)

NO ENTRIES THIS PAGE

ENCLOSURE (5)

2 of 5

26 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM

From: LCDR (b)(6), Executive Officer USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE)
To: CAPT (b)(6) CSS-16 N7

Subj: STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO SUSPECTED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 110

1. The following is a recollection of the events prior to and leading up to a collision with Buoy 23 of the Kings Bay Channel on 25Nov2015:

A certification for conducting a Kings Bay inbound to port was conducted at 1330 on 24Nov2015. All required personnel were present and announced their duties and responsibilities per COSO #1 Step 3 of the (b)(1)1 5a . As this was the first inbound to Kings Bay for our piloting party and it was being performed in the dark, the team was concerned about the added risk and further discussion occurred to develop a plan to mitigate the added risk and safely conduct the maneuvering watch. Some tripwires to slow down at buoys ~~19/20~~ 18/19 and ensure pilot transfer was completed by 700 yards to buoys E/F were agreed on and the concerns for piloting in the dark and the inexperience of the team reiterated. I had discussed the necessity of an OPORD 2000 waiver requirement for a nighttime movement and remarked CSS-16 must've gotten the waiver because 60% of our piloting was in the dark. The team agreed the presence of the pilot would mitigate these concerns, so setting up for the pilot was a necessity.

The ship commenced the inbound to Kings Bay at 0530 (~15 minutes early for a 0730 moor at Warping Wharf as planned) in full darkness, but radar and color over IR settings on the No. 2 periscope were used to identify the location of the channel. At 0515, the ANAV and I used chat to report to the NSSC CDO the ship was on time and ready to enter port. The Captain expressed a uncertainty and uneasiness with how close the buoys "felt" (the ANAV, NAV, and I verified the ship passed 600YDS from buoy STM by GPS even though the Captain reported the distance appeared to be less) and I assured him we were tracking them and they checked with charted locations. The range was identified immediately and the pilot and security escorts appeared to be waiting to the northwest of Fort Clinch. I attempted to hail them on VHF BTB CH 73 ~0530 and three times after that with no success. The Captain did the same with no luck until passing buoys ~~21/22~~ 20/21 and entering the turning basin.

The tug reported we had "snuck up on him" and he was now heading towards us at 6KTS for the transfer. I thought the transfer would be tight and hard to conduct in time to turn on to our next leg, but only discussed this in Control and did not voice my concern to the Bridge. I recommended slowing more aggressively (we planned on ordering all stop at buoys ~~19/20~~ 18/19 and coasting to 6KTS, but set/drift was pushing us 5.5KTS towards buoy E, so we were not slowing down very quickly) as the ANAV had just chastised the Piloting team for not calling the tripwire to the order all stop to the Bridge by 200YDS. With the Piloting team focused and everyone anxious to get the Pilot on as planned, we set up for the transfer a few hundred yards from the breakaway point. The tug had permission to conduct the transfer, but was slow to execute and the ship was set further to the WSW at 3.5KTS, higher than expected. The Piloting team was apprehensive about the proximity to shoal water and agreed to turn to the next course on the slide bar. I looked back and saw the brow across about 1FT from the edge of the turtleback and ordered the NAV not to recommend turning because the pilot was walking across. Once the

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (5)

3 of 5

transfer was complete, I expected the tug to push the ship's bow north to get back on track, but it did not.

The WEPS (OOD) ordered 10KTS and a course that would not get us back into the channel. I reported the ship had exited to the channel to the south and a more aggressive course (330) would be required to regain the planned track. The OOD ordered 18KTS and a right hard rudder (RHR) to clear buoy 23, which was on our left drawing right. The ship's bow cleared the buoy and the OOD ordered a left hard rudder (LHR) to swing the stern away from the buoy, a common maneuver learned throughout our submarine pipeline. Due to the higher than expected set/drift pushing the stern west, it drifted into buoy 23 at between 5-8KTS, impacting the hull by the reactor compartment and multiple times thereafter as it spun down the port side of the ship healing over to 30° at one point, broke free, then hit the stern planes where it healed over again before finally clearing the stern planes. At no point did the buoy contact the screw or rudder.

The OOD used aggressive maneuvers (RHR, LHR, and back emergency) to keep the ship in the channel (at one point, red buoys were in line with the sail on the opposite side of the channel. Once the pilot got to the Bridge, he ordered the tug to help point the ship's bow down track (294) so we could continue with the inbound.

I have conducted extensive self-assessment and discussed how our plan failed with the NAV and have concluded: our contingency plan to abort pilot pickup was sound, but not carried out. I am confident the inbound would have been completed safely without the pilot aboard and when he was not in the correct position (east end of the turning basin), not communicating on BTB CH 73, and not efficient in conducting the transfer, I should have made the recommendation to abort the transfer and continue with the inbound. I did not require the Bridge (OOD/Captain) to provide the Control party with its planned deviation from the approved and certified track per the SOM. I knew this was required and did not demand it. With an updated plan, readdressed tripwires, and sufficient abort criteria, this collision would've been avoided. I relied on my experience as a Navigator/Operations Officer in Hawaii to be my guide when I shared my concerns with the Captain regarding piloting in the dark. I am disappointed I did not have the courage to more forcefully back up the Captain and demand a piloting evolution during daylight.

I am thankful for the opportunity to serve under Captain (b)(6) who has never stopped loving submarines and sharing his joy and energy with others, seeking to communicate what an amazing task we are charged with in operating one of the most versatile platforms in the Navy. I expect to continue serving under him on board GEORGIA as we prepare for deployment, something I have looked forward to since I relieved as an Executive Officer.

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (5)
4 of 5

Rank/Name: LCDR (b)(6)
Role: XO
Where positioned: Control
From time-time: 0500-0800

Follow up Questions: (11/26)

Q. Did we mark turn 294 on time? Why didn't you ensure this occurred?
A. No, Nav team about to recommend turn to bridge, but I saw in scope that tug's brow was about 1' from the edge of the ship and pilot about to enter the brow. I was concerned for his safety b/c unaware of the brow's weight limit. I stopped the NAV's recommendation b/f it got to the bridge, delayed by about 20 seconds needed to get pilot on board.

Q. Why didn't we re-evaluate go/no go point when pilot not were expected? Why didn't we do anything about it?
A. B/c pilot almost there, team relying on the pilot to supplement the team to mitigate the added risk. Slow transfer shocked XO.

Q. You are a previous navigator, and records show that LT (b)(6) is certified by the CO as the ship's Navigator. Do you feel you or he are unqualified to serve in this position?
A. No, he is qualified. For myself, qualifications are undefined, but qualified for command and successfully completed the Submarine Command Course. Learning how to be an XO at sea. This was first underway. Believe performed duties and feel qualified.

Q. Did you participate in piloting events in port in TTF?
A. Yes, I have been observing and critiquing parties for 2.5 years.

Q. Were you observed in any squadron observed certification events in the span trainer at Trident Training Facility for your home port prior to getting underway? Did you find this training challenging? What types of casualties/drills did you overcome? How did you feel you performed in this event?
A. Probably participated in 4 squadron events, and probably participated in 40% of other navigation trainings. I would consider training was at intermediate level. Both LCDR (b)(6) and LT (b)(6) performed well during the trainers I observed. ANAV in the upper quarter of about 20 XO has observed in his career.

Q. In addition to TTF SPAN trainers, you were observed piloting out of Kings Bay by ISIC and certified for VMS 9.3 operations. How did you feel you performed during that piloting event?
A. Early in the Home Port Training Period, performance not as good as best with 8.3. Chalk up to slower mechanics with 9.3, this improved in subsequent practice sessions. However, during the at sea piloting event, the navigation team performed well. NAV maybe making too many recommendations within cross track trip wires; he needed to let the OOD drive the boat. I mentored him and saw improvements during Key West events.
A. ANAV was most proficient, QM right under him in trainers.

Q. Did your experience and training mean you had the tools to execute event safely?
A. Yes. Confident event would have been executed safely w/o pilot.

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (5)
5 of 5

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACTIVITY/SHIPBOARD) (b)(6)	SSN	RATE/RANK O4/LCDR	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE)			DATE OF BIRTH 9/6/71
NAME (INTERVIEWER) CAPT (b)(6)		RATE/RANK CAPT O-6	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ORGANIZATION COMSUBLANT		BILLET N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW LSG-10		TIME	DATE

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties & Hazarding Vessel (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (6)
1 of 1

(5) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- [ ]

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- [(b)(6)]

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- [(b)(6)]

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- [(b)(6)]

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- [(b)(6)]

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- [(b)(6)]

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. [(b)(6)]

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- [(b)(6)]

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (6)
2 of 6

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	TIME	DATE
XO	1626	12/9/15
SIGNATURE (INTERPRETER)	TIME 1626	DATE 12/9/15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS)	TIME 1626	DATE 12/9/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following _____page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

SEE ATTACHED

(b)(6)

12/9/15

XO

No ENTRIES THIS PAGE

ENCLOSURE (6)
3 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LCDR (b)(6)
Role: XO

Q. Why was the ship 15 minutes early?

- Ship was not early we were on time, Buoy STM 0530 by message, ANAV said it was 45 minutes from STM to the turning basin.

Q. Was there any discussion to be 15 minutes behind for daylight?

- Plan was to take inbound methodically. The CO had already asked to stay in for Thanksgiving, and CSS-16 had said we were getting underway regardless of TA repair, so the CO did not want to appear insubordinate. At the command level, we surmised about 50% of the inbound transit would be conducted in the dark, so following the guidance in the CSS-16 message made more sense.

Q. What were your expectations leaving the piloting brief for use of the RADAR?

- Expected RADAR to be lowered for the actual pilot transfer based on previous experience. Expected order to secure the RADAR at about buoys 18/19 and lower it when entering the turning basin. I cannot remember exactly when the RADAR was secured, but remember RADAR was offset to the West at Buoy STM and buoys verified in line.

Q. If RADAR was secured at STM would you recommend operating?

- No, we had clear visibility; digital scope had color over IR with good visual lighting.

Q. Where did you discuss the OPORD 2000 requirements for dark movements?

- Only with CO based on previous experience as the CSS 7 operations officer.

Q. Could you see the tug?

- Yes, he was on the west side of the turning basin, out of position. I transmitted bridge-to-bridge channel 73 ~3 times prior to the buoy chain, CO attempted several times in buoy chain. Tug seemed surprised when we made contact in the turning basin that we "snuck up on them".

Q. Were you mitigating all risks with just channel 73 tug contact attempts?

- At the time I thought we were taking all necessary actions. I was concerned about navigation and position wrt buoys. In my experience, tugs monitor working channels, so I did not consider channel 16.

Q. Any other actions taken other than BTB to contact tug?

- No other actions, expected the "cued up" tug would see us and we had visually ID'd the tug. Assumed the tug would see the sub ID beacon.

ENCLOSURE (6) (b)(6)
4 of 6

Q. Any thought to having NSSC contact the tug?

- I did not think about chat, not sure if the HDR mast was raised, I was focusing on driving range and providing back up to navigation.

Q. Is there any difference between channel 16 and 73?

- Yes, it is possible to get responses more frequentlyon channel 16.

Q. Why didn't you voice concerns to the bridge concerning the pilot transfer going to be tight?

- Initially thought it would be tight, but based on developing situation believed the transfer could be done and turn on the slide bar or within 100 yards and remain in the channel.

Q. Do you have a specific phone circuit with the CO?

- No, CO and COB have one.

Q. Have you seen other command teams use that type of walkie-talkie circuit?

- Yes, but I didn't think it was necessary based on previous experience. CO usually talked to me on official phone circuits for situation awareness of the Control Room, he thought it was a better idea.

Q. Were you aware the QMOW had turned off audible alarms?

- I subconsciously noticed there was a lack of audible alarms based on alarms I expected to receive when the ship's head swung in and out of the channel.

Q. You stated you expected the tug to push the ship's bow north after the transfer. Why did you expect that?

- I assumed the tug would push the bow to get back on track because they were out of position for the transfer in the first place.

Q. Did anyone take action to make that happen or did you hear anything indicating that would happen?

- No, assumed tug would take action under the pilot direction.

Q. Was there any discussion about sleep management leading up to the evolution?

- I had discussions w/ANAV and NAVSUP to ensure personnel associated FURUNO troubleshooting were going to get enough sleep. WEPS was a specific discussion and I reminded him to get enough sleep to pilot in the next day because it would be a long day. He understood the order and based on him standing only a portion of the evening watch the night before, I assumed he would get enough sleep. The CO and I were getting plenty of naps, I did not bring it up to CO level and left it up to the chiefs, and I managed officers.

ENCLOSURE (4) (b) (6) 12/11/15

5 of 6

Q. Did the team conduct any inbound transits in SPAN?

- Each trainer block was an out and in with debriefs in between and transition to modified piloting party to exercise contact management.

Q. Any at night?

- Not that I attended, expect 0. We did conduct transits in reduced visibility.

(b) (6)

LCDR, USN
Executive Officer, USS Georgia SSGN 729 BLUE

ENCLOSURE (6) (b) (6)
6 of 6

STATEMENT (SAILOR)

FULL NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b) (6)		LT	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE			11/24/1977
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b) (6)		CAPT	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
CSS-16		DEPUTY FOR TRAINING	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
NOSR, USS GEORGIA		1400	11/16/15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

ARTICLE 110, IMPROPER HAZARDING OF VESSEL

(b) (6) (b) (6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b) (6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b) (6) (b) (6)

(4) I have the right to consult with a lawyer prior to any questioning. This lawyer may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; and ---------- (b) (6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. ---------- (b) (6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b) (6) (b) (6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent; ---------- (b) (6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement; ---------- (b) (6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning; (b) (6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such lawyer present with me during this interview; and ---------- (b) (6)

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (7)

...waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b) (6) (5/6)

	TIME	DATE
SIGNATURE (b) (6)	2012	11/25/15
SIGNATURE (b) (6)	0852	11/26/2015
(b) (6)	0852	11/26/2015

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 3 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

3 ATTACHED PAGES

ALL PERSONEL REQUIRED PER SOMO 1.2.7.2 PILOTING BRIEF WERE PRESENT IN CREWS MESS. THE COR REPRESENTED LINE HANDLING SUPERVISORS AND CERTIFIED THEM SEPERATELY AFTER THE PILOTING CERTIFICATION.

(b) (6) 11/27/15

ENCLOSURE (7)
2 of 6

(b) (6)

Rank/Name: LT (b) (6) 11/20/15
Role: Navigator 11/20/15

Follow up Questions: (11/26)

Q. You stated you were inexperienced as navigator, but I have records where you are certified by the CO as the ship's Navigator. Do you feel you are unqualified to serve in this position?
A. Not at all. Felt like I did well at SWOAC, certified by squadron, observed by CO. Felt very qualified, not perfect, but sufficient to give back up to the team.

Q. Were you observed in any squadron observed certification events in the span trainer at Trident Training Facility for your home port prior to getting underway? Did you find this training challenging? What types of casualties/drills did you overcome? How did you feel you performed in this event?
A. Preformed adequate...at standards. Loss of radar, loss of GPS, high set and drift, loss of fathometer, yellow sounding, loss of bridge suitcase, and reduced vis.

Q. In addition to TTF SPAN trainers, you were observed piloting out of Kings Bay by ISIC and certified for VMS 9.3 operations. How did you feel you performed during that piloting event?
A. At standards. Experienced 4 knot set and drift, might have been a stern current. Because of current; emphasized unexpected changes at piloting brief. Specifically discussed tip of the jetties affect; how some boats mark the turn early; shift course based on conditions.

Q. Did your experience and training mean you had the tools to execute event safely?
A. Had team and tools to execute safely. Two biggest factors in why not are driving in at night, bridge not having picture to drive in; second, boat had tunnel vision in getting the pilot on board. Coming in at day, bridge has better overall picture of situation.

Q. Surprised that OOD said he could see visual turn marks?
A. Doesn't surprise, there was a full moon. Discussed with XO how it would be an asset, provide better visibility. Still an issue, no one on boat had piloted into KB, CO/XO/NAV never inbound to KB in real life before.

Q. If inbound all the way to pier at night, where would be biggest risk?
A. Dog leg sections.

Assumed telling speed and distance that bridge understood they were to the GNG point.

Screw tip damage may have occurred in Key West. 11/8 deck log reported that ship may have snagged a fishing wire. Week later, ENG reported speed .5-1 knot lower than expected. Sonar recorded something in the aft end of the ship, an abnormal noise. Noise has since cleared.

ENCLOSURE (7)
3 of Co

(b) (6)

Statement of
Navigator of the USS GEORGIA BLUE SSGN 729

For several days previous to the inbound transit we requested from squadron to move the time of the inbound 0730 moor time at KB. While the squadron commodore, deputy, and operations officer we laid out all the reasons that the plan given us by squadron was high risk and should not be performed. A 100 NM transit, followed by a dark inbound transit, a challenging maintenance day inport, to another 100 NM transit. Despite all the requests from the boat, squadron told us to complete the plan as ordered via message on the evening of the 24th.

Over the midwatch, I discussed with the CDO, the XO, why were pulling in, in the dark. He stated that the operational commander gave us an order and we had to execute. I told him I would prefer to loiter at STM until 0630 when we would get first light of day. We did discuss that the moon was full and bright with low cloud coverage which may aid in the ability to see at night.

On the 24th we held a piloting certification in crews mess to cover the inbound transit to KB on the 25th of November. The certification included all required personnel IAW the SOM and contained all the suggested elements for the certification. During the certification I specifically covered the go-no-go points, the pilot pickup point, the pilot abort point, and expected current and expected shifts in current. We believed we would see 2 knots set & drift based on tidal information but actually saw a max of 3.9 knots. My team was able to certify every turn based on bearing, range, and visual observations.

The pull-in started normally with stationing the maneuvering watch. The bridge team seemed concerned about visibility; specifically the distance to the STM buoy. They believed it was 200-300 yards away when in actuality it was 600-1000 yards away. We held 5 buoy pairs inline which met our criteria of 3 buoys inline for go-no-go. We held the range and the tug for most of the inbound 268 leg from control. The bridge was having minor difficulty picking out the range as the first few buoys and felt they were off center of channel based on distance to each pair of buoys. We briefed them on status of buoys and how were we lining up of the range. We held on range visibly and a 20 yard offset by GPS. As we came through buys 20-21 GPS dropped due to a GRVC fault. At this moment the bridge ordered the radar secured and lowered. I reported to the bridge to raise the radar to maintain a backup fix source which they did. 3 minutes later GPS was restored and verified and switch to the primary fix source.

The XO attempted to contact the tug several times, none of which were logged into the deck log, but the tug was at the back of the turning basin, not where I would have expected to see the tug. We were about 1 minute late slowing from a standard bell as we entered the turning basin. I told the bridge several times their speed over ground to provide backup on the status of making way through the channel. They continued using back 1/3rd and back 2/3rd bells to try and slow the shift. I then began passing speed over ground and distance to the buoy pair which was the no go point for pilot pickup. At 500 yards, I reported the ship was 5 knots over ground and the helm reported a loss of steerage way. I reported that we were opening to the left and had exceeded our 25 yard XTE. The pilot was not yet on. The CO made arrangements with the tug to come along quickly and drop off only the pilot and not the

entire TA team as previously planned. The ANAV recommended counting down the turn but I told him we were at the turn by the slide bar being so far to the left of track.

I recommended speed to start the ship turning and reported to the bridge that we had 150 yards to the edge of the channel. The bridge ordered 1/3rd because the pilot transfer was still in progress. The ship exited the channel and the pilot was now onboard. I recommended a course of 310 to the bridge to aggressively get to center of channel. The boat had ordered 300 which was directly pointing the buoy. At this time the pilot arrived in the bridge. I, the XO, and ANAV had a discussion about backing bell but the bridge ordered all ahead full. Believing that the bridge and pilot had the situation under control our recommendation never went to the bridge because it would add too much confusion at that moment.

We tried to turn hard and then swing the ship in the opposite direction to clear the buoy but the ship did not turn and struck the buoy. I was not aware of the buoy allusion until we passed the security gates 1 hour later.

As the boat passed the buoy at Ahead full and then used a back emergency and tugs to regain center of channel following crossing channel. I believed GPS was too far off showing 75 yards outside channel at this moment. I believed the ship would be grounded if this was our actual position. We shifted to visual as primary fix source and it had us very close to the same position. Throughout the maneuvering watch just about every sounding was 10 feet deeper than charted due to the flood tide. Sounding were lost momentarily due to aggressive bells and the tug wash to control the boat.

We got centered up in the channel and piloted the rest of the way inbound using visual as the primary fix source

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (7)
5 of 6

11/26/15 (b) (6)

The screw damage may have occurred in Key West based on the following observations:

From the OOD turnover log

11/8 evening watch, the Weapons officer had in his turnover log of a possible snap of a fishing line due to noise transient but no indications of a close contact.

11/15 evening watch, the Engineer officer had in his turnover log a possible issue with shaft turns and ships speed being off, as high as 2 knots. Sonar though there may be a noise in the screw.

11/16 mid watch, the Navigator troubleshot the possible speed mismatch. First verified the outboard was not lowered. The performed a series of bell step ups from 1/3rd, to 2/3rd, to standard, the noises got louder with speed increase, speed remained 2 knots slower than expected. Ship executed large and turns to the left and right. The sound was evident throughout all events. Sonar recorded all noises throughout the trouble shooting.

After ICERT ships speed was exercised and normal speed was present throughout the transit and abnormal sounds was gone.

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (7)
6 of 6

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b)(6)		LT	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE			11/24/1977
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)		CAPT O-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
CSG-10			9 Dec 15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties & Hazarding a vessel // (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (8)
1 of 6

(6) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. (b)(6)

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PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

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(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).


(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (8)
2 of 6

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	TIME 1536	DATE 12/9/15
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)	TIME "	DATE "
SIGNATURE (WITNESS (b)(6)	TIME "	DATE "

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____ page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)



ENCLOSURE (8)
3 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LT (b)(6)
Role: NAV

Q. Have you ever been evaluated on a Kings Bay inbound piloting evolution?

- Yes, Inbound in the SPAN trainer as well as Port Canaveral and several SPANS in SOAC.

Q. How many times does the crew conduct SPAN trainers when inport?

- 3 times since I relieved due to closing out availability, I think one of the sessions was an inbound transit.

Q. What was the specific Go/NOGO critical point for the pilot transfer? What actions were you taking?

- Point was 500 yards prior to the final set of buoys, which assumed speed of 5KTs, equates to 3 minutes. I could hear the CO discussing on BTB the pilot transfer, informing pilot that we would only be taking on the pilot not the passengers. The bridge was concerned about the depth perception and visibility in the bridge so I was passing the range to the edge of the channel and ship's speed to the CO.

Q. Frequency and content of your reports to bridge:

- Not sure how frequently. I was counting down SOG and Distance to buoys on each side as we passed them. The bridge was concerned throughout the transit with their perception of range to buoys. That is why the bridge wanted me to report distances to buoys. I started counting down SOG after buoys 18/19. I continued to pass the same information between backing bells, etc...

Q. When did you call the pre-planned tripwire to slow down?

- ~1 min late

Q. Did you learn anything in situ from a tripwire not being called when it was supposed to?

- Not sure, just to call up and provide back up.

Q. Did the XO stop you from making report?

- XO stopped my Ahead 2/3 and turn recommendations due to being at the transfer point.

Q. Do you work for OOD or XO (as NAV during piloting)?

- OOD, XO's job is to supervise piloting and contact management and deconflict navigation w/contact management when appropriate. I generally took XO advice because I was new and thought he could help.

Q. Were the words passed to the bridge at the NOGO point?

- No. I passed range and speed indicating we were at the NOGO point, but did not actually say the words. I assumed the CO knew that was the NOGO point. I also felt the pilot would call off the transfer if they felt it was unsafe.

ENCLOSURE (8)
4 of 6

(b)(6)

Q. Can you turn with a tug alongside?

- Yes but the ship didn't want to due to pilot transfer in progress. XO had the best picture based on being on the scope so I deferred to his decision.

Q. Did CSS 16 provide any guidance to help you execute the piloting evolution?

- GENADMIN message with an outline of requirements and plan for inport period was received. I was concerned about the plan because it had been 34 months since the crew had piloted into port.

Q. What channels were attempted to be used on bridge to bridge?

- No sure what they used but assumed Channel 73 due to message.

Q. Are there any difference between channel 16 and 73?

- I believe channel 16's power is higher.

Q. What was the expectation for RADAR operation as you left the piloting brief?

- Expected for the RADAR to be operating until the turning basin but would be available if needed.

Q. What happened to the FURUNO?

- While rigging the FURUNO the "hand crank" slipped and the cable was sliced, not sure exactly what happened but the cable was damaged.

Q. Who owns the hand held GPS on the bridge? Are you aware of any inaccuracies?

- Radio
- No, we bought 10 new units at the end of MMP.

Q. Do you feel the CO would have listened to you if you had recommended turning on the 7/27MC?

- Not sure if he would have.

Q. Any instances during your previous underway period where you were discounted or brushed off wrt recommendations? Did the CO explain why for those times?

- A few times, because of my selections for tactical positioning of the ship, but I felt it was part of developing me as an operations officer.

Q. How much sleep did you get prior to the maneuvering watch?

- My section was the most rested being on the midwatch for the last 3 weeks, I was specifically worried about the QMOW and the Declog recorder who was in section Kingfish and had the evening watch. I spoke with them to ensure they were getting enough sleep.

Q. Did the COB participate in any discussion wrt sleep management? Was sleep management discussed at the piloting brief?

- I don't recall if COB discussed it. We spoke about fatigue at brief but don't recall who discussed it.

ENCLOSURE (8)
5 of 6

(b)(6)

Q. Were you aware the QMOW had secured all VMS audible alarms while piloting?

- No.

12/11/15

(b)(6) LT, USN
USS GEORGIA SSGN 729, NAVIGATOR

ENCLOSURE (8)
6 of 6

(b)(6)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT (SEE JAGMAN 0170)

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b)(6)		LT	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			**DATE OF BIRTH**
USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE			25 AUG 1979
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		**RATE/RANK**	**SERVICE (BRANCH)**
(b)(6)		CAPT	USN
ORGANIZATION		**BILLET**	
CSS-16		DEPUTY FOR TRAINING	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		**TIME**	**DATE**
ONBOARD USS GEORGIA		1910	11-25-15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

ARTICLE 110, IMPROPER HAZARDING OF VESSEL

(b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; - (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(5) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	1900	25 Nov 2015
(b)(6)	1910	11-25-2015
(b)(6)	1910	25 Nov 15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 2 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

SEE ATTACHED

ZONOVIS - FOLLOW UP STATEMENT - BASED ON CLEAR SKIES AND LIGHTING FROM THE FULL MOON, I DON'T ASSESS VISIBILITY OR TURN AIDS WAS A FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT. AS THE OOD, I WAS ABLE TO SEE THE TURN MARKER FOR THE TURN IN QUESTION.

(b)(6) 11-30-15

ENCLOSURE (9)
2 of 4

KINGS BAY INBOUND PILOTING MISHAP – 25 November 2015

LT (b)(6)
WEAPONS OFFICER/OOD

1007: Maneuvering watch was already manned in the bridge with the exception of the gunner who was standing by in Control. The CO was in the bridge.

1028: CO recognized a disparity between reported range to STM and visual range (visual range was closer by about 150-250 yards). OOD ordered a course adjustment to the left by seven degrees and corrected again an additional four to steady on 305. This disparity was discussed with the Navigator and with Control.

1031: Nav marked the turn to course 286 and ship used a 15 degree rudder initially – shifting to a full rudder to swing the head around to the ordered course. Visibility was good with a full moon to identify proximity to buoys.

1034: Once steady on course, CO, JOOD, and OOD had a discussion about the challenges of night-time channel navigation to include the importance of understanding range markers, bearing drift of buoys and effects of set and drift. Minor course adjustments were made to align the ship center of channel as . Visual alignment with the range checked with VMS but the channel buoys were clearly set to the South.

1036: Nav marked the turn to course 268 and ship used a full rudder. The OOD continued to make minor course adjustments to maintain center of track.

1113: Nav reports a loss of GPS and shifts primary fix source to visual. GPS was restored shortly thereafter and primary fix source was shifted back to commercial GPS with visual backup. Ship passed buoys 18 and 19 at 12 kts.

1117: OOD ordered all stop followed by AB 2/3 per navigator's recommendation to take off speed for the pilot transfer. The backing bell was applied when it was recognized that set and drift was pushing the ship from behind, making speed over ground about 2 kts faster than speed through the water.

1120: The ship ordered all stop. The CO directed AB1/3 to continue to slow.

1122: The OOD ordered rudder amidships to set up for the pilot transfer. The Nav reported the ship still had about 4 kts over ground.

1124: The tug reported they were making 6 kts towards us for the rendezvous. Set and drift was continuing to push us to the South East. The helm reported a loss of steerage way. The OOD ordered a right hard rudder to attempt to carry us towards the center of the channel. CO

ENCLOSURE (3)
3 of 4 -

contacts the tug and asks to expeditiously transfer the pilot only and wait until the ship is on the pier to transfer all other personnel.

1126: While the transfer was in progress, the NAV recommended AA1/3. OOD ordered AA 1/3 to regain steerage way and right full rudder to course 297. Steerage way had not yet been regained. The bow was being pushed far to the left as the ship was set to the South. The Nav made a report of 150 yards to the buoy.

1128: Pilot transfer completed. Pilot made it to the bridge as the team recognized the ship was drifting out of the channel. The bow of the ship was pointed towards the green buoy and set and drift continued to push the ship South West. OOD ordered RHR. CO directs OOD to order AAII as the bow continued to point the buoy at a range of approximately 40 yards.

1129: The bow swung right far enough to clear the buoy and it passed along the port side at approximately 10 yards. The OOD passed the CO's order of left hard rudder and the ship hit the buoy on the port side about ¼ of the way down the length of the ship. The head didn't swing on the left hard rudder and the ship crossed the channel and left the channel on the red side. OOD ordered A8 emergency. There was no indication the ship ran aground on the red side of the channel.

1130: The pilot assisted in the ship backing out and regaining the channel. OOD passed orders to the helm as they were recommended by the pilot and CO.

1135: The ship regained the channel and proceeded inbound without further incident.

ENCLOSURE (9)
4 of 4

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(Rev JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b) (6)		LT	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
USS GEORGE SSGN 729 BLUE			25 AUG 1979
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b) (6)		O-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
E56-10		1136	9 DEC 15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in performance of duties

Wrongfully & unlawful (b) (6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b) (6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b) (6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b) (6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b) (6)

A-1-v

ENCLOSURE (10)
1 of 6

(6) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b) (6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that: ---------- (b) (6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b) (6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b) (6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b) (6)

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(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (10)
2 of 6

SIGNATURE (~~ACCUSED~~/SUSPECT) (b) (6)	TIME 1215	DATE 09 DEC 2015
SIGNATURE (~~INTERVIEWER~~) (b) (6)	TIME 1215	DATE 09 DEC 2015
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b) (6)	TIME 1215	DATE 09 DEC 2015

The statement which appears on this page (and the following _____page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b) (6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

see attached statement

ENCLOSURE (10)
3 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LT (b)(6) (WEPS)
Role: OOD (b)(6)

Q. Walk me through what was discussed at the piloting brief with respect to tides and currents.

- 1-2 knots. briefed and I expected it to swirl around and come behind us, seemed reasonable.

Q. What was the briefed speed you intended to use during the piloting brief?

- I briefed I intended to use an A2/3 bell vs 12 knots and "ease into the jetties" to make an assessment of set and drift based on my experience as a Junior Officer in Kings Bay. Overarching consensus by the group was to instead keep Ahead Standard heading in and then slow down at the designated point. I briefed I intended to keep a standard bell until after the breakers until the current falls off then slow down.

Q. Was a slower speed considered since being pushed from behind?
- No, mostly consideration of crab angle and being set.

Q. What is your definition of "pilot transfer complete?"

- Pilot on board and below decks. Tug is irrelevant. Really a safety of personnel issue.

Q. Do you recall hearing passing GO/NOGO point w/o the pilot on board?

- No, several reports were being made but I do not recall those specific words.

Q. If you had received that report, what would you have done? Was there a preplanned response?

- Waive off pilot transfer, but that decision in the dark in these conditions I considered a command level decision.

Q. Who decided to continue with the transfer?

- I discussed with the CO in the bridge and he said it would be fine if only the pilot came aboard, no passengers.

Q. When you lost GPS what did NAV shift the fix source to?

- I do not recall.

Q. What was the position of the RADAR?

- Down, primary fix source was visual, normal practice to lower the RADAR.

Q. What were your expectations at the piloting brief for RADAR employment?

ENCLOSURE (10)
4 of 6

- Expected radar to be lowered for piloting to allow access on top of sail to allow us to practice escalated force protection posture for upcoming TRE.
-Whether we would actually use radar was not specified at the brief.

Q. Who used the bridge to bridge radio?

- CO in bridge, XO in control.

Q. Is that normal?

- Not atypical, CO has assessed position and transmitted/made arrangements in the bridge in the past.

Q. What point did the CO or the XO attempt to hail the tug?

- XO attempted at STM when we gained the tug visually. CO attempted near the basin but not yet in the basin. Tug made comment when contact was made that they had the pilot and a few passengers. CO passed that only the pilot would be brought aboard.

Q. What channel did CO use?

- I believe 73, either 73 or 16.

Q. During the transit were there any successful bridge to bridge communications prior to the maneuvering watch?

- Not to my knowledge.

Q. What is the estimated range to the tug when the CO was able to make contact?

- ~2000 yds, we could clearly see him.

Q. How often were attempts made?

- Not sure.

Q. How much sleep did you get before maneuvering watch?

- 2-3 hours' sleep.
-don't think fatigue affected performance
-There were no sleep mitigation discussions that he was aware of

ENCLOSURE (16
5 of 6

(b)(6)

Q. Was there a handheld GPS on bridge?

- CO had. He used it. Was not accurate. Offsetting, so it was discounted.

(b) (6)

- (b) (6) 13-11-15
LT, USN
USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 WEPS

ENCLOSURE (10)
6 of 6

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT (See JAGMAN 0170)

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)		RATE/RANK ETC	SERVICE (BRANCH) NAVY
ACTIVITY/UNIT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE			DATE OF BIRTH 06/19/77
NAME (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)		RATE/RANK CAPT	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ORGANIZATION CSS-16		BILLET DEPUTY FOR TRAINING	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW XO STATEROOM		TIME 1920	DATE 11/25/15

RIGHTS

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ARTICLE 110, IMPROPER HAZARDING OF VESSEL (b)(6)

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(2) I expressly desire to make a statement; (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning; (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such lawyer present with me during this interview; and (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (1)
1 of 5

(5) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

	TIME	DATE
SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	1921	11/25/15
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)	2050.	11/25/15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b)(6)	2050	11/25/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 3 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

FOR THE PURPOSES OF 11/25/15 I FELT THAT THE PHOTOS WERE SUFFICIENT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT LOOKING IN AT NIGHT (EARLY MORNING) SHIFT AND DRIFT AND EFFECT OF CURRENT. WE TALKED ABOUT USE OF RUDDER AT TURNING RADIUS AND GO/NO GO POINTS FOR PILOT PICKUP. WE HAD BOAT AT BACK, COMES INTO TURNING RADIUS BUT AT TIMES 16/17 WHEN THE BOAT PASSING BUOY 3 WE NEEDED ALL STOP TO KEEP BACK. I LOOKED AT STW AND SOG AND WAS UNSURE IF WAS. WE WENT TO PASS BUOY 15/17 AT CLOSE TO 15KTS SOG. NEEDED TO SLOW THE BOAT AT THAT SPEED TO ALLOW BOAT FOR PILOT PICKUP. SHIP WAS TURNED TO STARBOARD TO GET THE WIND FROM FORWARD QUARTER. AT BUOY 16 AND 31 CONTACT WAS MADE W/ TUG ABOUT PILOT PICKUP. THIS FIRST TUG WAS NEAR FORT CLARK AT 1/2 PREPARED TO TRANSFER W/ BOAT. I LOOKED AT STW, SOG AND WIND AND SAW SOG AT NOW 2.5 KTS AND SOG AT 2.5 KTS TO 3.0 KTS. DURING SHIP WAS PREPARED TO HALT AND LOOKING AHEAD, RECOMMENDED TO MAY NEED SPEED, BUT OK'D TO SLOW MORE BACK. HOUR RADIATE LOSS OF STEERAGE WAY, LOOKED AT REAL WORLD AT RADAR, ASKED TO MAY SLOW WE NEED BOAT, OK'D IT SLOW MORE OR WE WILL NEVER MAKE THE TURN. PILOT IS TRANSFERRED AT FOUR TURNS, ASKED PILOT TO MAY NEED OK'D TO MAKE TURN. WAS TWO OR 3 TO CAUSE WE DID TRANSFERRING FIRST. REMINDED # 2 LOOK TO SEE PILOT, BACK TO WORK TO TELL HIM TO MAKE TURN. DURING PASSAGE TO MAKE TURN. ASK TO SLOW AND SPOKE PILOT TO TELL HIM SHIP WAS PUSH OUT OF CHANNEL. I RECOMMENDED AT 1 SLOW TO BUOY 30 AND TURN FIRST, WHILE I LOOKED AT VOS AND #2 SLOW. WAS TOLD TO DECIDE IF PASSING BUOY 31 ON LEFT HAND

ENCLOSURE (4)

Rank/Name: ETC (b)(6)
Role: ANAV

Piloting brief: felt it was sufficient. Covered many concerns: coming in at dark, set and drift and its effect on us and potential COAs. Looking back now, chart did not indicate the current was going to be as high as it was when passing jetties. Talked about tide table, slide pointing out turning basin, GNG point for pilot trans. Talked about fuller rudder needed if flood coming behind us at turn. Where going to slow coming into basin. I brought up all stop b/t 18 and 19 due to time needed to get into turning basin. Call sign. Pull out point if pilot not on board, coat. transit. Interactive cert. brief: scope, radar, lookout, OOD for each turn.

Contact with tug: 267 leg, looking at range. Tug left of range the whole time. As close in, knew from prior b to b coms, need to be closer to contact. B/f jetties confirmed tug's name. XO went to B to B to hail tug, 2-3 times. No call from tug. Bridge also trying to contact, no reply. Tug came on b to b around buoy 20-21. Didn't realize how far away tug was. Odd tug on b to b asking ID of Georgia (kilo 1). Found out later that tug did not see until this point. All running lights on.

Turn: confirmed known course of events. First set of basin buoys- started drifting left. Went all back 1/3. Tug not along side, starting movement near last set of basin buoys. Passing first set of basin buoys b/f tug started coming up to us (near Charlie-Delta). Down to 6-7 knots over ground. 3 knots over water.
Turned to NAV- sir we need to put a bell on; all ahead 1/3 (helm reported loss of steerage way)
Turned around, looked at bell indicator to make sure what actual bell was. Saw at all stop. Told NAV speed on boat or never make this turn. Starting to drift left. B/t foxtrot, echo and Charlie delta. Vectox showed outside of basin, almost directly into buoy 23. Yelling to NAV, put all ahead 2/3. XO said no bell on, trans right at this moment. Told NAV all ahead 2/3 again. Passing F and E. Said we got to break away, we'll never make it.
Pilot on board. Said at the turn, mark the turn. Boat on the sidebar when pilot walked through control. Already at 1 knot. Knew that would be trouble. Pilot on ladder, expressed to him we weren't going to make the turn. He said we'll get her back in and went to the bridge.
Tug had started to break away. All ahead 1/3 first, went 2/3 soon after came from the bridge. Looking at VMS, trying to figure out best COA. All ahead full came too late. (2/3 not in deck log)
CO never officially announced he took comm., but CO was ordering WEPS. WEPS making announcements. Felt they never related what they were trying to do.
Recommended all back emergency to NAV. Think he passed rec over mic to the bridge. Right after bridge ordered all ahead full. ANAV said he realized that was it.
Someone said after and CO said All back emergency was recommended to stop from swinging into the buoy.
Ran to secondary VMS, getting ready to tell NAV to go left of buoy/take it on its right side (didn't actually recommend). Chart indicated 22-33 feet of water left of buoy. Scope said buoy bearing straight ahead.
Time to change after right full rudder? Very hard to say. Scope had said no bearing drift on buoy.
Retrospec after right full rudder think still should have gone left of the buoy?

Crossing the track: speeding pushing north of channel then what? Could see this on VMS. Went to #1 scope, took from operator. Trying to asses visually where we were going. Gut was saying we were in extremis, trying to help by any method.

ENCLOSURE (11)
3 of 5

North of track? Somewhere around 90 yards. Whole ship not past buoy, somewhere around the mid-part of the boat.

Countdown to the turn? Passing of GNG point? What failed?
It was the distraction of drift while being pushed from behind /location of pilot, trying to get him on board.

Did team let you down by not call past GNG point? No, ANAV reported GNG to NAV. Bridge called down at that time and asked "port status relevance of position to GNG point?" Control reported at GNG point. ANAV told NAV he had to mark the turn. Pilot coming to control at this point. Agreed past GNG point b/c at 1 knot, not 5 knots. That's why upset at NAV/XO for not having bell on- kicked in when at 2 knots.

Lost sounding out of channel to the north? Don't remember.

Felt tried to do 100% of what I could to help the boat.

11/25/16

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (11)
4 of 5

Safety was possible. I want to #1 keep to main scope and look visually and fix ships position. At this point I was on the scope station ocean to fix radar and get ship out of extreme. Felt I did everything I could do short of when using IMC as tactical coup of ship to right the situation. If felt that any pilotage team did everything it could to get ship out of Extremis.

(DIB)

ENCLOSURE (11)
5 of 5

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b)(6)		ETC	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
USS GEORGIA SSGN 729B			05/19/77
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)		O-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
CSO 10		0945	9 Dec 15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties + Hazarding of a vessel (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ---------- (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (12)
1 of 5

(6) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (12)
2 of 5

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	1021	09 DEC 2015
SIGNATURE (WITNESS)	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	1021	09 DEC 2015
SIGNATURE (AUTHORITY)	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	1021	09 DEC 2015

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. A

(b)(6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

See attached document.
INITIAL

ENCLOSURE (12)
3 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ETC (b)(6)
Role: ANAV

Q. Was the SUB ID Beacon on?

- Yes, always is.

Q. Prior to the maneuvering watch, were there any successful bridge to bridge communications?

-There were no successful bridge to bridge communications.

Q. What is the ship's normal method for recording BTB comms?

- This ship had no method. Thought our BTB unit satisfied the requirement. In hindsight, I found out it only buffers 2 minutes of recording.

Q. What was the predicted set/drift?

- 1-2 knots, based on flood to near slack tide. Did not account for New Moon/Full Moon (adds to current) Learned about that when I spoke with other crew ANAV following the event about this. We knew it was a full moon because we could see the moon.

Q. Any discussion about mitigating the currents?

- We spoke in great detail at the piloting brief. Specifically discussed if "getting pushed too fast" need to call off pilot transfer and make the turn, need to slow entering turning basin. Need to slow 18/19 or before, expected all stop, expected 5-8 knots for pilot transfer. Do not recall if it was specified speed through water vs over ground. Discussed that if get to second set of buoys, need to turn. Lengthy discussion on this.
- At 18/19 I told NAV to order all stop, NAV did. I was watching speed I told NAV to order back 1/3, back 2/3. He recommended it to bridge. Ship was back 2/3 as passing 20/21 speed through the water 6 knots, but still 9-10 knots over ground. Bridge reported they wanted to slow even more.

Q. What was the COSOE max speed and PIM speed on the 2.88 leg? Did you ever see a COSOE violation/get an alarm?

- PIM speed was 12 knots through the water, COSOE max speed was 14 knots (he thinks, not positive). I think the max speed I saw through the water was 13.5 knots. Speed over ground was 1-1.5 knots higher. Speed was masking set and drift. I do not believe we received a COSOE alarm.

Q. What do you consider pilot transfer complete? Can ship turn with tug alongside?

ENCLOSURE (12
4 of 5

- Pilot on ship, tug away so ship could maneuver. Also making sure personnel are down below before radical speed/course changes. I try to ensure people below before we turn, I believe it takes about 1 minute to get all personnel down the hatch.
-I argued with the XO on the ship turning, XO said ship can't turn. I believe all we needed to do is tell the tug we are turning. Brow across is the only point where we need to be steady.

Q. Why was the ship 15 minutes ahead at STM?

- The ship was not 15 minutes ahead, we were at STM at 0531 (one minute late). We entered the basin at ~0617-0618 due to being pushed from behind (~15 mins early)

Q. Was the XO receptive to your recommendations?

- XO was standing in way of NAV trying to make recommendations to the bridge; NAV was trying to make recommendations to the bridge but it was almost like NAV was waiting for XO's concurrence on what NAV was allowed to pass to the bridge. I made speed recommendation to the XO and he said no.

Q. What if the pilot could not be brought on board?

- This was discussed at brief; CO said we would just continue on. We discussed the point of no return.

Q. Was radar in operation during the piloting evolution? What's the ship's policy?

- My expectation was the radar would be operated. If we are holding turn ranges, etc... use it. I didn't fight the lowering of the radar.

(b)(6)
ETC, USN 12/11/15

ENCLOSURE (12)
5 of 5

2 of 2, (b)(6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6)

Name: _____ Rank/Rate: LT

Command: SSGN 726(B) Division: NAV/OR DOET

TAD from/to: N/A Until (give dates):

Whereabouts for next 30 days: _____ Phone: (b) (6)

I, LT (b)(6), hereby make the following statement to CAPT (b)(6), who has identified himself as an investigating officer for SSGN 726(B) ICING'S BAM BOOM 23 ALLISON.

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the 2 attached pages is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

(b)(6)
(Witness' Signature) _____ 11/25/15 (Date) 1720 Time

Sworn to before me this date

(b)(6)
(Investigator's Signature) _____ 11/25/15 (Date) 1842 Time

ENCLOSURE (13)
1 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

(b)(6) 11/25/15

LT (b)(6) (Control Room Supervisor) Statement (b)(6) 11-25-15

The ship's control team, (COW, Control Room Sup, and Helm) all noticed on VMS that the ship was drifting to the south of the channel, and eventually outside of the channel. The ANAV made recommendations when he began to notice that the ship would end up outside of the channel if we did not put a bell on, and he recommended to the NAV to inform the OOD to ring up A1/3. This seemed to have gone unnoticed. He repeated this several times. Eventually the NAV made a recommendation for A1/3 to the OOD. As we noticed the ship approaching the outside of the channel even more, the ANAV then recommended A2/3. This also went unnoticed. The OOD ordered the helm to make course adjustments, and I ensured that the helm was correctly answering the ordered maneuvers, whether it was a rudder or bell order. I was unable to see an Imaging/ISIS screen to see whether or not the ship had an allision with buoy 23. I heard someone in control say that we missed the buoy, and that it was drawing aft. Then someone said we did hit it, but there was no discussion or agreement on whether or not we did hit the buoy.

ENCLOSURE (13)
2 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LT (b)(6)
Role: Control Room Supervisor
Where positioned: Control
From time-time: 0500-0720

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached:
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Q. Did you think piloting brief was sufficient?
A. Definitely yes. Everyone said their responsibility around the room for the CO.

Q. Normally countdown to turn in bridge and control?
A. Yes, but not extremely familiar. But familiar with normal method.

Q. Did you hear expected turn countdown of the 268?
A. Can't recall specifics of that. Thought countdowns playing out very well.

Q. Conversations between XO, NAV, ANAV?
A. ANAV drove conversation, get everyone thinking about recommendations. NAV was quiet during this time. Early on ANAV was recommending speed. During pilot transfer, XO prompted NAV to make a recommendation.

Q. Did helm and engineering officer of the watch respond to bells in rapid matter?
A. Yes, everyone very rapid in response.

(b)(6) 4/25/15

(b)(6) 4/25/15

ENCLOSURE (13)
3 of 5

(b)(6)

11/25/15

- 25 Nov 2015

- 0507 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder, ABOUT THIS TIME, HELM INFORMED OOD LOSS OF STEERAGE WAY. WE BEGAN TO NOTICE SHIP DRIFTING TO SOUTH END OF BUOY CHAIN/CHANNEL ANAV RECOMMENDED SPD

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3 TO AVOID DRIVING OUT OF CHANNEL. THIS SEEMED TO HAVE GONE UNNOTICED BY NAVY & A 1/3 RECOMMENDATION WAS DELAYED, POSSIBLY 2 MINUTES. THEN ANAV RECOMMENDED A 2/3 TO SPD UP MORE.

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

- 0628 (OMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards)

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (13)
4 of 5

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 AB2/3

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300. All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

-0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier ABOUT THIS TIME I WAS RELIEVED TO WRITE ORDERS 3 NAVY BLUE FITTER.

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (B)
5 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6) Hts 0-2

Name Position

729 B

Command Division

TAD Inquiry Until (give date)

Whereabouts for next 90 days Phone

I, (b)(6), hereby make the following statement to

(b)(6), who has identified himself as an investigating

officer for .

See attached sheet for timeline

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the 2 attached page is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

(b)(6) 25 Nov 15 1635

(Witness Signature) (Date) Time

Sworn to before me this date.

(b)(6) 11-25-15 1820

(Investigator's Signature) (Date) Time

ENCLOSURE (14)
1 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

ENCLOSURE (H)

2 of 4

KINGS BAY INBOUND PILOTING MISHAP – 25 NOVEMBER 2015

LTJG (b)(6) **DIVING OFFICER / LOOKOUT**

I was the lookout in the bridge for the maneuvering watch. As the ship was inbound I assessed visibility to be excellent, as we could see the EHW lights from just west of STM boty. We progressed inbound on the 268 track with 15kts out of the east north east.

1036: We passed inbound and I marked the ship's progress through the channel by observing the bearing drift of the the red and green bouys, as well as marking the visual distance as they passed individually. We were center of channel, drifting to 5-10yds left then 5 yards right at the point of the levees. I reported this to the Captain and the OOD.

1100: As we passed inside the levees, I reported that we were no longer taking wash over the turtleback, and that it was safe for personnel to come topside through the Port LOC. We had held the tug visually since entering the channel and we were now in the process of slowing as we approached Fort Clinch.

1114: There were a series of backing bells put on to slow the ship for the pilot transfer. I was watching personnel come topside; I saw the COB, the swimmer, and two others come topside. I was also watching the tug and force protection vessels come towards the ship. Throughout this time period, I was observing the ship come further left of track based on the entrance range marker and the buoys progress.

1120: As the ship was slowing, I reported to the OOD that we had an excessive crab angle compared to the track. We were pointing some 10 degrees to the left of track and we were still putting on backing bells and a right rudder to try and slow for the pilot transfer. I heard them discuss the excessive flood current. I mentioned to the captain that we were heading towards Fort Clinch and that we should make way to turn away. We waited for the pilot transfer.

1127: The pilot came onboard and we started to make way forward. I observed that the channel buoys were far to the right, and about the same time the XO called on the 7MC saying we had passed south out of the channel, and that he recommended aggressively maneuvering to regain track. I asked the captain if we were going to use the tug to get us back up to the channel.

1127 We continued to get pushed towards fort clinch, and I heard the report for shoal water to the west south west.

1128 At that time the captain ordered all ahead full and right hard rudder. I reported the rudder was right hard and saw the wash from the full bell. As the ship's head was coming up towards the channel the captain continued with the full bell and hard rudder, he stated it would get us back in to the channel and that he was trying to avoid hitting the buoy. The pilot made it to the bridge about that time and was looking around trying to assess the situation. We were holding the bell, coming up in speed, with the rudder hard, and the captain expressed to the bridge to standby to shift the rudder once on the other side of the buoy.

1129: We passed the buoy 10yds to the east, and shortly after the captain ordered the ood to shift the rudder. The order was passed, and I saw the rudder shift and announced it to the bridge. The captain was looking back at the buoy as it came closer to the port side of the ship, it hit the ship

ENCLOSURE (14)
3 of 6

very far aft, just in front of the stabilizer. He asked me if the buoy hit the ship, I told him I thought we were going to run aground on the beach forward of the ship.
1129: The OOD ordered all back Emergency and we watched the ship's way come off. The Pilot called the tug and asked him to get over to where we were, at which point the tug came along the stbd side.
1131: We continued to back out, putting on right rudders with the pilot's assistance and the tug pushing, and brought the ship back to the center of the channel.
1135: At this point we assessed the conditions, and continued with the inbound transit. The rest of the transit was smooth and held the ship within 5yds center of track the entire way.

ENCLOSURE (17)
4 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LTJG (b)(6)
Role: Look Out
Where positioned: On Sail
From time-time: 0500 til 0730

Statement:

1. **I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.**
2. **Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached:**
3. **I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.**

Timeline in witness statement, all times Zulu in other statement. Time from deck logs that I reviewed. Levies-jetties

Q. Since tug visual from bridge early while on the entrance range, any conversation on bridge as to whether the tug was ready to execute transfer?
A. Conversation on the bridge to bridge between tug recognizing we were coming in once we slowed, but didn't really hear. I wasn't focused on it as lookout.

Q. From the bridge, when the XO reported out of channel, what was action on bridge…
A. Assessed as immediate action- Captain ordered right full rudder.

Q. As buoy 23 came down port side, did it go fully underwater?
Never saw it go full underwater. From what I saw, buoy pushed with flood and waves, saw rudder come over , looked back at buoy saw it move out. Hit in front of stabilizer, some contact with side of the hull, slip around stabilizer. Captain asked: If I saw ship hit buoy? Lookout said: I don't care about buoy, cared about ship running aground- Note, the CO had already ordered left full rudder. Pilot on bridge at this point.

Q. After ship went out of channel to North, did you back into channel, tug push bow around?
A. Yes, but I felt like the ship was moving astern and swinging left more due to the back emergency bell and full rudder than tug action.

Q. How far north of channel did you end up?
A. 35 yards.

Q. Do you feel the pilot brief was sufficient?
A. Yes, more of a certification. Everyone knew what they should be doing. Soundings, visual queue marks all known.

Q. Did you brief visual turn marks?
A. Yes.

Q. Why, if everything good, didn't you make the turn?

ENCLOSURE (14)
5 of 6

A. Wind had greater effect and prevented us from sending personnel topside until inside jetties. Pilot transfer also later than scheduled- had to go in a lot further. I think late pilot transfer the reason transit didn't go well.

(b) (6) (b)(6)

USN

25 Nov 2015

(b)(6) 11/25/15

ENCLOSURE (14)
6 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LTJG (b)(6)
Role: Lookout

Q. Was the CO exclusively focused on the buoy at the expense of driving out of the channel?

- In my opinion "undue" focus on the buoy, focus should have been on grounding and he was focused on whether or not we hit the buoy.

Q. Could you tell where the tug was with respect to the channel?

- Clearly see range marker and tug but I could not tell if the tug was in the correct position. Tug looked right.

Q. Explain how the ship theoretically responds with a backing bell and a right full rudder?

- Increase the crab angle. Believe backing bell was not affecting ship heading, only reducing speed through the water. I do not believe backing bell will affect the ship's head.

Q. When was the ABE bell rung up?

- As buoy 23 passed the missile compartment LET. CO asked if we hit buoy. I said, "Sir, I don't care about the buoy..."

Q. Was the SUB ID beacon on?

- Yes

Q. Was there an external speaker in addition to the bride suitcase rigged in the bridge?

- No external speaker, ship hasn't done that before. The bridge box was working but I could not hear the 7 MC above ~7 knots, heard it fine during the pilot transfer.

Q. Does the CO/XO/COB have a hand held radio?

- Yes, CO and COB talk to one another, XO does not have a radio.

Q. Was there a hand held GPS on the bridge?

- Yes, the CO has a hand held GPS, I am not sure if it was used.

Q. Were any bridge personnel not receptive to your recommendations?

- I was passing reports of concern to the CO, Passed general ship' handling and position in the channel to both the CO and the OOD. Made report to the CO we were way too close to Fort Gilach, I cannot recall specific response from CO.

ENCLOSURE (15)
1 of 2
(b)(6)

Opinion: CO's plan was to leave buoy 23 to port. CO gave impression, even said "I got this" that he was going to order the rudder shift to swing the stern back to avoid the buoy.

Q. What did the pilot say/do?

- Nothing said, trying to assess where ship was. Once past buoy, shift rudder and ABE and the ship was slowing and the pilot radioed tug to get tug to come around to starboard side. The tug came around the stern up the starboard side and started pushing the bow to port once the ship was moving astern back towards the channel. Pilot did not tell CO to order ABE.

(b)(6)

USN

ENCLOSURE (15)

1 of 2

(b)(6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6) Name ETC Rank/Rate

USS GRIDLEY (CG-21) (DWC) Command ANMF Division

TAD from/to Until (give dates)

Whereabouts for next 30 days Phone

I, ETC (b)(6), hereby make the following statement to CAPT (b)(6), who has identified himself as an investigating officer for BMMT ASSESSMENT.

AS QUESTIONS ARISE WHILE BOARD (21-23, AS SCOPE OPERATOR, I WITNESSED MORE "GRINDS THAN NORMAL". SPECIFICALLY (2-3 TIMES) LATER LEARNED THAT "THE MALFUNCTIONS" WERE AS IF THEY WERE GETTING WET DURING TRANSITS. ONCE AT THE DATUM, FIRST SET OF RUNS, I WITNESSED THAT THE RPM POTENTIALLY AT SET CA AT 15KTS JUST AFTER LAST CLOCK LEARNING CALLED

- DATE TRANSIT
- THE WAS INDICATED AS QUESTIONABLY DAMPED
- SET FROM CURRENT

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

(b)(6) ETC (Witness Signature) 25 MAY 2015 (Date) 1213 Time

Sworn to before me this date.

(b)(6) (Investigator's Signature) 25 MAY 2015 (Date) 1235 Time

ENCLOSURE (16)

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ETC (b)(6)
Role: Scope Operator
Where positioned: SCOPE OPERATOR
From time-time: 0500 - 0730

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached.
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Coming into buoy chain (12-13 maybe as far as 8-10), looking like tug in position, but when getting in position not where we thought it would be. Was on time.

Q. Contact the tug?
A. Heard someone on bridge to bridge, not really listening. Focused on keeping on track.

Q. Dark?
A. Full moon, civil twilight when coming to line of demarcation.

Q. See buoys?
A. Using #1Scope had difficulty seeing buoys due to Full Moon, was able to use buoy lights and Nav Aid lights to reference their position.

Q. How was everyone coming in?
A. Tense-not used to it being dark. Calmed down when report of center of canal. Team performing well. Had visual nav aids. Turning basin- tug not in desired spot. Not sure of speed, but sure going pretty fast.

Q. How was piloting brief?
A. One of the better ones on this ship. Briefed turn ranges, bearings and visual turn marks. OOD was familiar with turn marks.

Q. How well did turn plan get executed before allision?
A. Everything fine into buoy chain- good turn. On track, maybe five yards off.

Q. Next turn?
A. Started backing down at basin, things started going south. Drift pushing us from astern. Kept going left of track. Anav and Nav recommended speed to OOD, but XO said we couldn't because tug along side, and we need to be more aware of what the OOD needs. Helm reported loss of steerage way.

Q. Execute countdown of turn?
A. Don't remember countdown, remember "mark the turn." Countdown normally NAV. Normally track turn bearing through turn. Watching what was going on instead, Tapped Nav on shoulder to notify move outside of buoy chain south of buoy 23 and had him come to scope.

Q. Why didn't you execute countdown to turn?

ENCLOSURE (16)
7 of 5

A. Don't know. Think too much emphasis getting pilot on board.

Q. Did you talk about overshoot pilot transfer go/no go at piloting brief?
A. Yes, if so keep on going, leave pilot.

(b)(6)
25 NOV 2015
(b)(6)

1125-15

ENCLOSURE (16)
3 of 5

Same Operation

25 Nov 2015

- 25 Nov 2015
- 0607 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder,

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

- 0626 (OMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards)

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (16)
4 of 5

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 AB2/3

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300. All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

-0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (16)
5 of 5

Rank/Name: ETC (b)(6)
Role: Scope Operator

Q. Elaborate about your comment in your initial statement that the SUB was "going pretty fast."

- I am experienced in Kings Bay. I made the statement based on the fact the ship felt like it was going too fast, I could not tell exactly.

Q. To whom or how did you express your concern?

- To NAV, asked him to come to the scope and told him I felt like we were "coming in hot."

Q. What did NAV do?

- He looked out of the scope, got a feel for NAVAIDS and went back to the plot. I assumed he evaluated our position and took action.

Q. Was there any indication that the NAV agreed with you?

- NAV nodded when he left the scope.

Q. Did NAV translate your report that we are going too fast into a recommendation?

- I do not recall.

Q. What was the conversation between ANAV and the XO?

- I felt like something was wrong, XO stated something to the effect of bold reports and be aware of what is going on outside of control.

Q. Is this the first instance of that type of interaction with the XO?

- No, no specific examples but some of the things he does do not sit well. I felt the XO was on the #2 scope and had a good picture of the situation, saw the boat was in extremis. I cannot understand why XO did not recommend turning to the bridge.

Q. Does something tell you not to turn with a tug alongside?

- Yes, I cannot think of it, but you can turn with a tug alongside in extremis.

Q. Why do you think the ship didn't execute the plan to not transfer the pilot after passing the NO-GO?

- Boat was tense during piloting evolution due to darkness and not having the pilot, "Scared out of their minds" not to have the pilot on board.
- I sensed it was tense on the bridge throughout from the questions the bridge kept asking NAV wrt distance off track, etc.... Even though they had the information on the BDU, they kept asking NAV.

ENCLOSURE (17)
1 of 2

(b)(6)

1 of 2

Q. Was the report made to the bridge about the NOGO point being reached?

- I do not recall the report going to the bridge.

Q. Why did the countdown/turn rhythm breakdown?

- Due to stress in the party.

Added conversation:

I was uneasy during the outbound piloting (when we left KBAY) because the bridge jumped the gun on one of the outbound turns. We discussed it at the piloting hotwash. Do you recall the root causes? No.

(b) (6)

_____

. ETC, USN

ENCLOSURE (17)
2 of 2

(b)(6)
'2052
11 Dec 15

(b)(6) E-5 / ET2

Name Rank/Rate

USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 (BLUE) COMMS

Command Division

N/A

TAD from/to Home Phone (Cell/Other Number)

ON BOARD / KINGS BAY GA (b) (6)

Where/when/for how long

Phone

I, (b)(6) _____, hereby make the following statement to CAPTAIN (b)(6) _____, who has identified himself as an investigating officer for _____.

REGARDING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE CONTACT WITH THE BUOY AND THOSE THAT FOLLOWED, MY STATEMENTS ARE SIMPLE. THE ANAV (CTC (b) (6)) SHOWED SUPERIOR RESOLVE AND COURAGE IN WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN A FAR MORE DISASTROUS SITUATION. THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH WE HAD TO OPERATE WERE NOT IDEAL. IT WAS DARK, WE LOST GPS AT ONE POINT, RADAR WAS LARGELY INEFFECTIVE AND EVENTUALLY SEIZED. EVEN AT "ALL STOP" WE WERE BEING PUSHED OUT OF THE CHANNEL AT GREATER THAN 5 KNOTS. THROUGH IT ALL ANAV WAS ABOUT THE ONLY ONE WHO DIDN'T FREEZE. HE ACTED WITHOUT HESITATION AND TOOK DELIBERATE ACTION. HE CONTROLLED THE (E) SCOPE AND SEARCHLIGHT AS RELIABLY IN THE CHANNEL. OUR NAVIGATION FROZE, EVEN THE ROLLING RECORDER AND THE GYRO FROZE SILENTLY, BUT ANAV DIDN'T. HE ROSE TO THE OCCASION AND SNATCHED THE PILOTING PARTY OUT OF THE HOLE WE WERE IN. THIS EVOLUTION WAS NOT A BRIGHT SPOT FOR GEORGIA, BUT IF THERE ARE ANY POSITIVES, IT'S THAT ANAV IS A HUGE REASON WE RECOVERED

swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

Witness' (Signature) 11/25/15 (Date) 1518 Time

Sworn to before me this date:

(b)(6) 11/25/15 (Date) 1900 Time

Investigator's Signature)

ENCLOSURE (1)
1 of 2

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

(b) (6)

RADAR OPERATOR

- 25 Nov 2015

- 0507 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder,

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

- 0626 (QMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards)

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (1)
2 of 3

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Wes recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 All2/3

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300, AllStop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder, steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 301

-0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

EXHIBIT (18)
3 of 3

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ET2 (b)(6)
Role: Radar Operator

Q. Do you remember when you secured rotating and radiating on the radar?

- Radar was operating when maneuvering watch was stationed, I do not remember exactly when the radar was secured. I am not required to keep radar logs; I imagine it is recorded in the deck log.

Q. What occurred during the loss of GPS?

- I was ordered to operate radar upon loss of GPS, re-secured when GPS restored, operated ~3-5 minutes.

Comments on Radar Effectiveness:
- Not operating a peak performance, this was my first u/w piloting evolution. I have had plenty of experience in the SPAN. I could distinguish between buoys scale 3:1 preferred for piloting but stayed 6:1, could see better picture. I did have NAVLINES up, tricky since NAVMARK returns weren't great, we were on course. Cross track error from the scope matched with radar.

Did you have the tug as a contact?

- Don't recall. Doesn't recall where the tug meet up point was.

Q. How is the radar employed on GEO?

- Radar was not used for Kings Bay u/w. Had several BSPs and maneuvering watches. I stand RMOW underway, I only stand radar during the maneuvering watch. Radar not used very much during maneuvering watch, I assume the CO likes to sit there or something. The most I have used the radar during the maneuvering watch was 5-10 minutes, CO would go to the bridge and it would be secured within 1-2 minutes.

Q. Did you provide recommendations for radar use when it was not being used as you expected?

- Yes, I brought it up to the Contact Manager.

Q. What was discussed at the Piloting brief with respect to Radar employment?

- Radar employment was discussed at piloting in detail, but was not discussed that radar would not be used.

(b)(6) 12/11/15
, ET2, USN

ENCLOSURE (19)
1 of 1

(b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6) ET1
Name Rank/Rate

USS GEORGIA (B) ET (b)(6)
Command Division

N/A
TAD from/to Until (give dates)

KINGSBAY (b) (6)
Whereabouts for next 30 days Phone

I, (b)(6), hereby make the following statement to CAPTAIN (b)(6), who has identified himself as an investigating officer for BOWY ALLISON.

PRIOR TO ENTERING THE CHANNEL ALL SOUNDINGS WERE CHECKING WITH CHART AND HAD A SOLID RETURN BUT PULLING INTO THE DREDGED CHANNEL THE FATHOMETER WAS HAVING A HARD TIME KEEPING ITS SOUNDING DO TO THE RETURNS BEING VERY WEEK. FOR MOST OF THE BEGINNING THE SOUNDING WAS 10 TO 15 FEET DEEPER. I INFORMED AND GAVE THE RECOMMENDATION THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY HIGH TIDE. FROM WHAT I COULD HEAR WE WERE HAVING A HARD START BY MAKING 65 KNOTS PAST THE ALL STOP MARK BUT AWAY RECOMMENDED THE SPEED TO ALL STOP BOWYS PULLED UP ALONG SIDE THE BOAT CAUSING ALMOST A ZERO RETURN ON THE FATHOMETER AND I CALLED LOST SOUNDING, AWAY ANNOUNCED YELLOW SOUNDING AND I CORRECTED BY SAYING LOSS OF SOUNDING AGAIN, HE ANNOUNCED LOSS OF SOUNDING TO THE BRIDGE AND I HEAR THAT THE PILOT CAME ALONG SIDE. SOMEONE RECOMMENDED A TURN BACK INTO CHANNEL BUT I DON'T REMEMBER WHO AS I WAS TRYING TO REGAIN SOUNDING. THE TURN WAS CANCELED DO TO WE REMAINING WE HAVE TUGS ALONG SIDE, THE PILOT MADE IT TO CONTROL BY THE TIME WE HAVING TURNING

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

(b)(6) 25 NOV 15 1511
(Witness' Signature) (Date) Time

Sworn to before me this date

(b)(6) 11-25-2015 1720
(Investigator's Signature) (Date) Time

ENCLOSURE (20)
1 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

SOUNDINGS WERE TAKEN AND WERE NOT SMALLER AS WE WERE APPROACHING A SHIP SPEED WAS INCREASED TO REGAIN STEERAGE AND TURN TOWARDS THE BOW. A HARDER RUDDER WAS RECOMMENDED AS GOD MADE HIS ADJUSTMENT. ALL NEXT WAS ACCOMPLISHED BUT WE KEPT TURNING TRYING TO MISS THE BOWS AFTER ABOUT WAS MIN WE CAME ACROSS AND WERE GIVING BELLS IN ORDER TO GAIN CENTER OF CHANNEL. RED AND YELLOW SOUNDINGS WERE NEVER SEEN BY EITHER OF THE CADETS AND NEGATIVES WERE IGNORED BY CADET O. AWAY ASTERN AND GIVING VISUAL FIRST, GOD WAS FOUND CROSSING IN INCREASING OF 200 DATA WHEN IT WAS A PRIMARY VISUAL FIX, AWAY BACKED OF THE FINISH OF THE CHANNEL, SET AND DRIFT WAS HIGHER THAN EXPECTED. AWAY ASTERN AT TIMES TO REGAIN SOUNDINGS. NAVIGATORS SEEMED NERVOUS WHEN GIVING RECOMMENDATIONS HOWEVER THEY DO WHAT SEEMED BEST AT THE TIME BEFORE APPROACHING THEM. TUGS PULLING ALONG SIDE LATE CAUSED A BIG DELAY IN TURNING THE BOAT BEFORE LEAVING THE CHANNEL.

EXHIBIT 201

11-25-15

11-25-15

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ET3 (b)(6)
Role: Fathometer Operator
Position: control
From 0500- 0800

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached:
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Q. Did you lose soundings at the time of the buoy allision?
A. No, I had a good return during that time.

Q. Did you ever get red or yellow sounding?
A. No, just a loss of sounding. When the wash came under the boat the fathometer was gone. Regained around 0635- (When exited channel to North)

Q. What time did you log loss of sounding?
A. 0634

Q. Do you remember if we marked the turn on time for 268-294?
A. I remembered someone recommended turning but someone said we couldn't turn because the tug was along side. As we got closer to the turn, someone recommended a hard rudder.

Q. Do you know who said we couldn't turn?
A. I believe it was the XO.

Q. Do you think the piloting brief was sufficient?
A. It was great. We've never done an in the dark channel. Everyone seemed to know exactly what they would be doing.

Q. Anything else that you would to add?
A. The ANAV did a good job at getting the return back. The Navigator seemed like he was thinking too much and taking too long and being too precautious.

ENCLOSURE (20)
3 of 5

(b) (6)

((FT

- 25 Nov 2015

- 0507 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16
SOUNDING STARTED TO THIN OUT AND IT WAS HARDER TO GET A GOOD TRACE

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3
SOUNDINGS WENT FROM 410-15 FT TO 438 FT DEEPER THEN EXPECTED

- 0617 All Stop

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder,

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

- 0626 (QMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards)

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (20)
4 of 5

- 0625 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 ABD/S

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300. All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (20)
5 of 5

(b)(6) LT

Name Rank/Rate

Command Division

PAD Unit (give dates)

KBAY, GA Phone

I, (b)(6) _____, hereby make the following statement to _____, who has identified himself as an investigating officer for Bay Allision/Collision

☐ Most members of the watchteam, including myself were concerned about the flow for 1125, specifically the steering KBAY assumed w/ dark conditions

☐ Some ships/bay members of the Piloting/Maneuvering Team only slept ~2hours or less (Call, cell, OOD, Dept Logs, Lookout) due to the schedule + watch rotations

☐ Ship made it to buoys 18/19 on track + center of channel

☐ Conditions were better towards Fort Clinch (visibility was improved, ship did not come down on speed quite enough, and we maintain ~4-5 knots in steering basin, ols drifted to left of channel during pilot transfer

☐ Myself + lookout expressed concerns; lookout was concerned about sighting Fort Clinch. I recommend right rudder to get ships head towards buoys due to left drifting. COB/Co made course + speed adjustments to recover

☐ Right when the party relocated on bridge, ship was left of channel + in extremis to recover. Tried to Come around buoy 23 (right + close) accomplished.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Witness signature 11/25/15 (Date) 1500 Time

Sworn to before me this date

Witness signature 11/25/15 (Date) 1610 Time

ENCLOSURE (21)

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

WITNESS STATEMENT
Rank/Name: LT
Role: JOOD
Position: Bridge
From 0500-0900.

10/25/15

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached.
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Q. What was your visibility like?
A. Entering the buoy chain we could see all of the green and red buoys but we couldn't see the lower level range light.

Q. When did you locate the C tractor?
A. We could see it at the turning basin by the time we were at the first 2 or 3 buoys.

Q. Did you talk about when you would hail the tug?
A. No, we discussed bridge to bridge comms but we didn't identify exactly where we would contact the tug during the piloting brief.

Q. When did you make contact?
A. We were past the jetties.

Q. Why so late?
A. At the piloting brief we didn't specific who would contact C tractor and when.

Q. Did you feel like the piloting brief was sufficient?
A. I think so. We mixed the piloting brief with the OPS brief. We could have identified more trip wire points. I think the attention span of people was starting to get lost due to back to back briefs.

Q. Why didn't we make recommendations?
A. I was assisting with the tug coming alongside and slowing down. We were concerned about approaching shoal water but this was mitigated because we knew the channel was wide here.

Q. Did you talk about your turn point?
A. No we did not.

Q. Anything that you would like to add?
A. I think we recovered well.

Q. How far north did we go?
A. I would say VMS is accurate.

ENCLOSURE (21)
2 of 4

11/22

(b)

- 25 Nov 2015
- 0507 Station mooring watch, Ship arrives at STM

WEPS was odd prior to STM.

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

- 0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop-

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder,

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer : I think Tug alongside @ 0622

- 0626 (CMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards)

- 0628 AAF..Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (21)
3 of 4

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 ASU/3

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300, All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

- 0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0643 Right full rudder steady 351, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

- 0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (21)
4 of 4

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6) LT
Name Rank/Rate

USS Colorado Norfolk
Command Division

TAD from: Until (give date):

Where/how to be reached for next 30 days Phone:

I, (b)(6) _____, hereby make the following statement to _____, who has identified himself as an investigating officer for Bang Allision / Collision

- Most members of the underway including myself, were concerned about the plan for 11/25, specifically the Morning KBAY UNREP with dark conditions
- Some ships/key members of the Piloting / Maneuvering Team only slept ~2hours or less. (CDR, CAPT, XO, Navigator, Lookout) due to the schedule & underway rotations
- Ship made it to Buoy 18/19 on time + center of channel
- Contacts were further towards Fort Glinch (Visit time speed, ship did not come down on speed quick enough, and we maintained ~4-5 knots in turning basin, O/S drifted to left of channel during pilot transfer
- Myself + Lookout expressed concerns, Lookout was concerned about closing Fort Glinch, I recommend right rudder to get ships head turning towards track due to left drifting - COB also made course + speed adjustments to recover
- By the time the party released on track, ship was left of channel + in extremis to recover. Tried to Come around buoy 23, but allision occurred

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b)(6) _____ 11/25/15 (Date) 1600 Time
(Witness signature)

Sworn to before me this date.

(b)(6) _____ 11/25/15 (Date) 1610 Time
(Investigator's signature)

ENCLOSURE (21)
1 of 4

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LT
Role: JOOD
Position: Bridge
From 0500-0800.

11/25/15

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached.
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Q. What was your visibility like?
A. Entering the buoy chain we could see all of the green and red buoys but we couldn't see the lower level range light.

Q. When did you locate the C tractor?
A. We could see it in the turning basin by the time we were at the first 2 or 3 buoys.

Q. Did you talk about when you would hail the tug?
A. No, we discussed bridge to bridge comms but we didn't identify exactly when we would contact the tug during the piloting brief.

Q. When did you make contact?
A. We were past the jetties.

Q. Why so late?
A. At the piloting brief we didn't specific who would contact C tractor and when.

Q. Did you feel like the piloting brief was sufficient?
A. I think so. We mixed the piloting brief with the OPS brief. We could have identified more trip wire points. I think the attention span of people was starting to get lost due to back to back briefs.

Q. Why didn't we make recommendations?
A. I was assisting with the tug coming alongside and slowing down. We were concerned about approaching shoal water but this was mitigated because we knew the channel was wide here.

Q. Did you talk about your turn point?
A. No we did not.

Q. Anything that you would like to add?
A. I think we recovered well.

Q. How far north did we go?
A. I would say VMS is accurate.

ENCLOSURE (21)
2 of 4

LT 11/25

- 25 Nov 2015

- 0507 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

WEPS wants COB prior to STM

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder,

- 0625 Right Hand Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 194, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD 4 — pilot transfer : 1 tug alongside @ 0622

- 0626 (QMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 257

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 230, 150 yards)

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (21)
3 of 4

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 331)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder. All stop

- 0632 A82/3i

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300. All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

-0640 Passed Buoy 25 & 27

-0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (21)
4 of 4

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6) ET 3/CTV
Name Rate/Rank

USS MCCAIN DD NAVIGATION
Command Division

N/A
TAD from/to Until (give date)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE SUBMARINE BASE (Blue Gold) (b)(6)
Command for next 30 days Phone

I, (b)(6), hereby make the following statement to CAPTAIN (b)(6), who has identified himself as an investigating officer for Collision 4 days 23 hrs

MAKING A LEFTWARD TRANSIT TO AVOID ANY BOATS THAT WERE OUTSIDE THE SCHEME, BUT IT WAS DETERMINED AT 30 THE CONDITIONS OBTAIN WE MUST BE UNSAFE TO THE SCHEDULE BEFORE BOTH [illegible] AND TO REMAIN IN A DIRECTION TO AVOID THE MOST DANGER. THE SHIP TRAVELS AT BOTH 18/19 AND NOT MUCH WIDER FOR THE MOST LARGE CLOSED BETWEEN THE TWO AND SHOULD TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE BUOYS. YET A SHIFT WAS DECIDED, WHICH THE SHIP THAT WAS DETERMINED WHICH CONTROLS THE SET & SHIFT TRAFFIC. THE BOAT DID NOT TRAVERSE IN A WAY SO AS TO BE AND REMAIN THERE IN THE MOST NO LONGER OF THE NORTHERN BOUND, WHICH THEN THE SHIP DID NOT TAKE THE ACTION TO AVOID SOME WATER OF TRAFFIC WHICH WAS TO [illegible] THE BOAT OUTSIDE THE CHANNEL ON A DIRECT PATH SHE HAD NOT TO FOLLOW THE SHIP TRAFFIC PROTECTION THROUGH THE CHANNEL IT THE STARB SHIPLANE THEN A REPORT OF LOSS OF SPD WAS MADE, WHICH THEN COMMUNICATED THE ANTHY STOP AND ON THE PT SIDE TO BECOME THE VOLS INFORMATION FURTHER AND VOLS SUFFERED COLLISION

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

(b)(6) 11/25/15 1525
(Witness' Signature) (Date) Time

Sworn to before me this date.

(b)(6) 11/25/15 1605
(Investigator's Signature) (Date) Time

ENCLOSURE (22)
1 OF 5

WITNESS STATEMENT (CONT) (con't)

ROUTINE. WE WERE ABLE TO REVIEW THE SURVEILLANCE PICTURE TO SEE IF ANYONE HAD BOARDED THE SHIP.

ENCLOSURE (22)
2 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ET3
Role: Deck Log Recorder
Position: Control
From 0500-0800.

11/6/15
11/25/15

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached.
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Q. Why weren't you able to communicate with the tug?
A. We weren't able to get comms until past buoy 18 and 19.

Q. Can you explain the go no go point for the pilot?
A. It was prior to the turn point. We discussed it.

Q. Did anyone say anything when you passed it?
A. No we were focused on shoal water. Also being at the southwest corner of the basin it made it more difficult.

Q. Why didn't they act on it?
A. I feel like we were just focusing on different situations other than the go or no go point. We focused on the shoal.

Q. Do you feel the pilot brief was sufficient?
A. I think it was. The Captain covered set and drift coming through the jetties. He specifically mentioned the Kentucky coming through.

Q. Anything else that you would like to add?
A. The ANAV got us back on track quickly.

ENCLOSURE (22)
3 of 5

Dock 02 ET3 (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

- 25 Nov 2015

- 0507 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16 HAD TOO VIGOROUS ATTEMPTED TO CONTROL, WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL.

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jettles), All Stop STILL HAD 15KTS AHEAD RECOMMEND ALL STOP, ½ WAY BETWEEN 19/17 & 2481 ALL STOP WAS ORDERED

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3 AND HAD IT WAS NOTICED THAT SET AND DRIFT INCREASED GREATLY

- 0617 All Stop

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships - LOSS OF STEERAGE WAY

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder, SET AND DRIFT PUSHING BOAT, WITH HIGHER SET & DRIFT THAN EXPECTED

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

- 0626 (QMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297 ANTICIP BEING ABLE TO FASTER TO THE 2nd LENGTH OF TURNING BASIN

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards) - STEERAGE WAY NO MEASURABLE MOTION WAS TAKEN

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (22)
4 of 5

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 310) - SHIP

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- SHOT THROUGH THE CHANNEL TO THE SOUTHWEST OF APPROACH BUOY

- 0631 Right full rudder. All stop

- 0632 AB2/3

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300. All Stop -

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships -

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 332

-0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (22)
5 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ET3 (b)(6)
Role: DECK LOG Recorder

Q. Was the RADAR operational during the piloting evolution?

- Cannot recall if the RADAR was lowered; it was not rotating and radiating.

Q. When the ship lost GPS what happened with RADAR?

- I don't recall when GPS was lost..

Q. What were the primary and backup fix sources?

- Initial GPS with b/u visual. When GPS was lost became visual with b/u commercial GPS. We did not shift to RADAR as a fix source.

Q. What did the CO discuss for lessons learned at the piloting brief?

- He specifically said that the lessons learned he discussed were applicable to this piloting evolution..

Q. What were the lessons learned?

- High set and drift and hitting a buoy.

Q. How were the lessons learned incorporated into operations?

- We talked about high set and drift but did not incorporate it into the plan good enough. No specific discussion about mitigation/tripwires based on set and drift.

Q. Is this type of brief typical?

- Normally discuss everyone's action and previous lessons learned as well as way to prevent it from happening to us..

Q. Explain your initial statement we did not meet speed trip wire at 18/19.

- Made statement because we did not ring up All stop until midway between 18/19 and 20/21. Supposed to ring up all stop at 18/19. I noticed this because ANAV specifically recommended to NAV to pass to OOD, which NAV did. AZ was immediately ordered.
- No one specifically assigned this tripwire. No one called tripwire until ANAV made recommendation for All Stop.

ENCLOSURE (23)
1 of 2

encl 5
1092

Q. Is it your responsibility (as deck log) to log BTB comms in deck log?

- Not sure.

[redacted]
ET3, USN

ENCLOSURE (23)
2 of 2

[redacted]
2 of 2

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6) — Name

ESTET — Rank/Rate

USS [illegible] 709 (DDG 65) — Command

N/A — Division

TAD from/to

Until (give dates)

[illegible] — Whereabouts for next 30 days

(b) (6) — Phone

I, (b)(6), hereby make the following statement to CAPT (b)(6), who has identified himself as an investigating officer for Allision of Boat on 25 October 2015

SEE ATTACHED

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

(b)(6) — (Witness' Signature)

11/25/2015 — (Date)

(b)(6) 1715 — Time

Sworn to before me this date.

(b)(6) — (Investigator's Signature)

11/25/2015 — (Date)

1545 — Time

ENCLOSURE (24)
1 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (cont'd)

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ETZ (b)(6)
Role: QMOW
Position: Control
From 0500-0800

11/25/15
11/25/15

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached.
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Q. What are the alarms?
A. Cross track error. CPA/TCPA Warning.

Q. Did you have a critical point set up that told you to slow at 18 and 19?
A. Yes sir.

Q. What are your responsibilities?
A. I maintain VM1, verify speed, and put in all of the bearings that the bearing recorder gives me.

Q. Did you shift to visual?
A. Yes sir, we regained maybe 5-10 minutes after we lost it. After the allision, we almost did visuals all the way in.

Q. What are your responsibilities in regards to counting down the turn?
A. I would say at 1000 yards, 500 yards, 400, 300, 200, 100 and mark the turn

Q. Did you do that countdown on course 294?
A. I don't think we counted down the turn?

Q. Why is that?
A. I think because we were past the turn. We slowed to pick up the pilot. I think I was more focused on speed at that point. I remember counting down the distance to the edge of the channel.

Q. Why didn't you mark the turn?
A. I normally do, all I remember is coming in fast towards the pilot pickup. I recommended a right hard rudder and 310 then 320 to starboard of the buoy.

Q. Have you done this before?
A. I've never done an inbound in real life.

Q. Radar terms?
A. We don't usually have the radar on. Furuno was not rigged because it was broken while rigging. The handle slipped and pinched the wire.

Q. When did you recognize that the tug was at the turn point?

ENCLOSURE (24)
2 of 6

A. We did not discuss that. I could see the contact in VMS. Once you got closer and closer you could see that the tug was right at the turn point.

Q. Did you talk about the pilot being at the turn point?
A. We talked about slowing at buoys 18/19, but there was no discussion about the pilot not being there.

Q. Did you talk about a critical point for pilot transfer?
A. No, we recommended slowing at 18 and 19.

Q. Did you tell anyone that you had passed the critical point?
A. The tug was already along side, so the ANAV already knew. I'm not sure that the NAV knew.

Q. Do you feel the pilot brief was sufficient?
A. At the time yes.

Q. What part was insufficient?
A. If the tug wasn't where it was supposed to be. A better discussion of set and drift.

ENCLOSURE (24)
3 of 6

QMOW ETC

- 25 Nov 2015
- 0507 Stand on maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

25 NOV 15

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

- 0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16
- AROUND 0608 (TURNED OFF THE ALARM BECAUSE DUE TO CONTINUOUS BEEPING.
2-3 ALARMS A SECOND.
- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop
- ANAV INFORMS NAV SHIPS SPEED AND TO SLOW

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop

* MULTIPLE LOSS OF MILITARY GPS. UNSURE OF TIME

- 0619 AB1/3

* SOUNDINGS ONCE IN THE CHANNEL WERE VERY INCONSISTENT.

- 0620 AB2/3

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder.

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

QMOW TO ANAV
- COUNT DOWN FROM 500, 400, 300, 200, 175, 150, 100, 50 ENTER CHANNEL

- 0626 (QMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 190 yards)

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (24)
4 of 6

If I were the CMC we are pursuing the Buoy

Quartermaster recommends to CMC Left Steady 310

Then I change it to 326

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 AB1/3

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300, All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, 4 kt (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 351, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (24)
5 of 6

On 25nov15 USS Georgia collided with a buoy while piloting inbound Kings Bay. The following reasons is why I think this happened; Crew Fatigue multiple people on the key maneuvering watch bill had only received 2 hours to sleep before the maneuvering watch. Piloting prior to sunrise, something I have never trained on. Excessive speed prior to and during the pilot transfer is the big factor in my opinion. We have set tripwires on the chart that state pilot must be on board by this line. The pilot was not on board at that time and the ship continued to proceed with the transfer. The fathometer was also very inconsonant. Military GPS still showed FOM1 but was not reliable.

(b) (6)

ETC (b) (6)

25NOV15

ENCLOSURE (24)
6 of 6

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ET2 (b)(6)
Role: QMOW

Q. What was the Pilot speed?

- 15 knot SOA to STM, 12 knots on the 268 leg. Slow at pilot p/u point to 7 knots then 12 knots through the dog legs.

Q. Would you get a COSOE alarm if violated? Did you get an alarm? Does the display turn red if you exceed the COSOE?

- Not sure if the display will turn red. I received multiple cross track error alarms, red and yellow sounding alarms but do not recall a COSOE alarm.

Q. Was STW > 12 KTs on 268 leg? What was the ordered bell for the 268 leg?

- Do not remember. We definitely "came in quick".

Q. What happened at the GO-NOGO point for completion of the pilot transfer?

- Called out alarm for pilot critical point, remember discussion of pilot was "walking across brow." NAV acknowledged report and said pilot is coming onboard now.

Q. How long after critical point was turn ordered? Was critical point ever announced on the 27MC?

- Don't know, I don't think critical point was ever announced on the 27 MC.

Q. What is the distance between the critical point to slow and the pilot pull out point?

- Not sure approximately 2000 yards, there was enough time to slow between the two points.

Q. What was briefed at the pilotsing brief with respect to set and drift?

- Knew it was going to be behind us, 2-4 knots. There was not an adequate spot light on max flood considerations and how to handle the ship at the stop.

Q. Was there any discussion at the pilotsing brief for turning early based on set and drift?

- No discussion for turning early, turning on the slide bar is money. We did discuss using a full rudder to start the ship's swing and easing the rudder afterwards.

Q. What did pilot pull out point mean? Can you maneuver with a tug alongside?

- Pilot transfer complete, free to maneuver, tug no longer alongside. Yes and no, if you need maneuver, try and contact the tug.

ENCLOSURE (25)
1 of 2

Q. When were key watchstanders stationed?

- ~15 minutes prior to the maneuvering watch.

Q. Why was the ship early; did you recognize the ship was early?

- Did not find out/recognize the ship was early; I was not worried about it because we were within parameters.
- No discussion at piloting brief on intent to be late or early at STM.

Q. What Navigation lights were on?

- All lights including the SUB ID beacon.

Q. Discussion about VMS alarms.

- VMS audible alarms were cut out, still received scrolling alarms, ship routinely receives 400-500 alarms during the piloting evolution using 9.3, alarms are unmanageable. You have to choose between navigating and alarms. Open ocean and restricted waters it works great.

EM2 [redacted], USN

ENCLOSURE (25)
2 of 2

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b)(6) LT/E-6
Name Rank/Rate

MSO GEORGIA —
Command Division

TAD from/to Unit (give dates)

Whereabouts for next 30 days Phone

I, (b)(6), hereby make the following statement to
CAPT (b)(6), who has identified himself as an investigating
officer for ALLISON WITH SHIP BS.

C DUSS STATIONED HIMSELF AS OA FOR MANEUVERING WATCH.
X LIGHT CONTACT PENSACOLA (#3 CONTACT). NONE OF CONCERN
AT RANGE OF ABOUT 6000 yds. GAINED CONTACT 4 ON AFS.
DEN IN FRONT OF P/S AT FORT LEONCH AT ~ 500-300 YDS.
BNG. C-TRACTOR CONTACTS P/S ON STB - STATES HE DID NOT
SEE GBR COMING IN. SHIP PROCEEDED DOWN TRACK. CO STATES
OVER STB THAT HE MAY HAVE TO TRANSFER PILOT. XO EXPRESSES
SOME DISAGREEMENT IN CONTEXT ABOUT CONDUCTING A TRANSFER IN
CHANNEL WITH LITTLE GOOD WATER AVAILABLE TO ANCHOR, THERE
APPEARED TO BE SOME CONFUSION IN CONTEXT ABOUT STATUS OF SHIP-
LAND OR CHANNEL MARKERS TO KEEP SHIP IN CHANNEL (AA 2/5)
BUT POINT TRANSFER WAS OUTSIDE. NO IDEA AS TO WHAT WAS PROCEEDING
TO PROVIDE. A SHIP FROM FULL RANGE WAS REQUIRED. BM SCOPE OPERATOR
IMMEDIATELY DETECTED CONTACT OVER BUOY 23. I TOOK CUSTODY OF #2 SCOPE
AND SAW CLOSE RNG TO BUOY. XO TOOK CUSTODY OF #1 SCOPE TO SEE BUOY PASS
BOW OF SHIP BUT NOT PORT AFT GUARD TREE.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above and on the __ attached page is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.

(b)(6) 11/25/15 1458
(Witness' Signature) (Date) Time

Sworn to before me this date

11/25/15 1516
(Investigator's Signature) (Date) Time

ENCLOSURE (26)
1 of 4

WITNESS STATEMENT ICO (con't)

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LTJG (b)(6) (b)(6) (b) (6) witness
Role: Contact Manager
Position: Contact Manager (b)(6) 9/25/15
From 0455- 0800

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. Signed witness statement with a summary of my recollection of key events is attached:
3. I concur the content of questions and answers below accurately capture my response.

Q. When did you identify C tractor in AIS?
A. I think we were past the jetties. I think it was 5000 yds. We had identified him on AIS first. I think it was around the time we came into the jetties that we identified him near the turn point IR.

Q. Anything seem strange to you in regards to the piloting evolution or pilot transfer?
A. It seemed normal. To me it seemed weird that we were going to conduct pilot transfer in the channel (past the turn basin).

Q. When did the XO express his concern wrt pilot transfer?
A. I think it was when the CO was on bridge to bridge arranging the pilot transfer.

Q. Did OOD have a Bridge Book?
A. Yes

Q. Do you feel the pilot brief was sufficient?
A. At the time, but now I think I would add tripwires for pilot transfer.

ENCLOSURE (26)
2 of 4

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b) (6)

4/25/15

- 25 Nov 2015

- 0507 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CONN

- 0536 Ship turns to 268T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/Jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop

- 0619 AB1/3

- 0620 AB2/3

(XO DISAGREES WITH DECISION TO CONDUCT TRANSFER IN CHANNEL)

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder,

(ANAV RECOMMENDS STEER)

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

(ANAV RECOMMENDS ANTS)

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

- 0626 (QMOW recommends RHR), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards)

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

ENCLOSURE (26)
3 of 4

A-18 WAS C-TRACTOR 4.
A-18 DID NOT SEE GEO UNTIL ≈ 500 - 700 yds (0614)

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Nav recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 All 3.

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300. All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

-0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (26)
4 of 4

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LTJG (b)(6)
Role: Contact Manager

Q. What is the ship's normal method(s) for bridge to bridge communications?

- Contact manager is supposed to handle this. XO typically handled communications with tug. I do not recall us attempting to hail the tug; my first recollection of communications was the tug hailing us. CO responded to BTB and drove communications. Any BTB comms in the control room for this incident were handled by the XO. I made no BTB comms.

Q. What channel was used?

- Channel 73 I think.

Q. Which antenna was the bridge to bridge aligned to?

- MFM for AIS, not sure if BTB aligned to the MFM or the B2 scope.

Q. Are you aware of the requirement to record bridge to bridge communications?

- NO

Q. Was the RADAR operating during the piloting evolution? Who secured it?

- We evaluated the contact picture prior to securing the radar, but I was not involved in securing the radar. I can't say when we stopped radiating, or why we stopped.

Q. When you left pilothouse brief, what was your expectation for use of the radar during this piloting evolution?

-Fully expected to use it when left brief.

Q. At the piloting brief what tripwires were briefed?

- I don't remember. Believe "Standard" contact management trip wires applied.

Q. Do you remember a discussion of pilot pick up point, speed plan, etc...?

- I do not recall any discussion of tripwires for this evolution. "I wasn't fully "there" for brief...was fumbling with force protection stuff (she is the ATO) and getting ready to brief the FP stuff.

Q. How much sleep did you get prior to the maneuvering watch?

- I had approximately 2 hours of sleep. We are in a 7-5-5-7 rotation; I had 12 hours of watch the day before and to off watch at ~0030. Actually got relieved late at 0045. I had to work on TRE message traffic after watch and went to bed around 0200, and reveille was called away at 0415. Reveille was not in the POD, and I thought we would be waking at 0445—30 minutes is a big difference for sleep. I told

ENCLOSURE (27)
1 of 2

1 of 2

the XO the message would be quick when he offered to help and said it was not required. I felt it was my duty to complete my job, in retrospect I should have asked for help.

Q. Was there any discussion at the command level/SWO level about sleep management?

- Not to my knowledge, QMOW stated he only slept for 30 minutes due to trouble shooting the FURUNO. (also in her watchsection)
-In retrospect, could have asked any of the midwatch guys to relieve early—other 2 sections were not impacted by the schedule.
-Do not recall any discussion that our watch section was going to be sleep-challenged.

Q. Do you think lack of sleep affected your performance during the piloting evolution? Comment on the 7-5-5-7 rotation.

- Not sure if it did.
- you get very tire after the 12-hour watch day, but have a chance to recover the following day. No one hated the rotation, no one loved it.

Q. Do you think lack of sleep contributed to not paying attention during the piloting brief?

- No, I was tired but rested. ATO duties were distracting me from the brief.

LTJG USN

ENCLOSURE (27)
2 of 2

2.82

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: ET1 (b)
Role: Bearing Recorder
Position: Control
From: 0500-0800

WITNESS
INVESTIGATOR
11-2015 0237

Statement:

1. I have reviewed the attached timeline of events and made pen and ink additions based on my recollection of events.
2. A summary of my recollection of key events is:

When we got to buoy STM we only had two Navigation aids. We were struggling to get offset. XO asked if we were green from navigation. We got our offset down and entered the channel. It was dark out and something new. We were on track once we got in the channel. We got ready to do the pilot transfer; there was no communication with them prior. It was kind of strange. Half way down 269 leg we saw the pilot and marked his bearing. Everything was fine until then. The speed wasn't coming down fast enough. The critical point alarm went off and quartermaster recommended all stop to Nav and ship went to all stop. The ship still had a decent amount of speed around buoy 1g and 19 but slowing. Once pilot transfer began, we noticed ANAV recommended to NAV that we needed to put speed on. XO said we can't because the tug was along side. We went ahead 2/3. The tug broke loose. At this point we were already out of the channel. Then I see the buoy in front of us. We cut hard right to avoid the buoy. The buoy was on portside. I noticed the IR was on the buoy. I saw it dip down in the back. It just dipped. We had the hard rudder on. We marked a visual round. We were north of the channel.

Q. Why are the bearings off one hour?
A. I started the times one hour later by mistake.

Q. Who marks the turn?
A. I do.

Q. Did you mark the turn?
A. The ship was already past the turn. The turn was late by 200 yards. We couldn't turn with the tug right there.

Q. Do you normally mark the turn during a piloting evolution?
A. Yes, but there was no countdown.

Q. Who does the countdown?
A. The Nav

Q. Why didn't he do one?
A. Everyone was focused getting the pilot on board and we couldn't turn because the tug was in the way.

Q. Do you feel the pilot brief was sufficient?

ENCLOSURE (28)
1 of 4

A. I did not go because I was on watch. The scope operator was able to go. Chief (b)(1)1.5a couldn't because he was on watch.

Q. Did anyone give you a back brief?
A. No I just reviewed the power point.

Q. What was the breakdown?
A. We were rushing to get in. I think people were scared to make any suggestionswithout getting shot down.

Q. What do you mean?
A. If I say 12 they would say one two.

Witnessed by CO2

ENCLOSURE (28)
2 of 4

ETA

- 25 Nov 2015
- 0907 Station maneuvering watch, Ship arrives at STM

XO ASK IF NAVIGATION WAS A GO FOR THE CHANNEL, NAV REPLIED NOT YET BC DO TO NOT HAVING A DRAFT DOWN DO TO NOT HAVING MANY VISUAL IN THE DARK. NAV WAS TOLD WE ARE ENTERING THE CHANNEL SO BE READY BY XO OR SOMEONE ALONG THERE THOSE WORDS.

- 0535 WEPS has the DECK and CO, N

- 0536 Ship turns to 168T, AI for buoy chain entrance

-0608 Ship passes buoys 15/16

- 0613 Ship passes buoys 18/19 (past breakwater/jetties), All Stop

- 0616 Ship passes buoys 20/21, (enter turning basin), AB1/3

- 0617 All Stop

→ Piloting Party NOW, voice ship going towards shoal water.

- 0619 AB1/3 I remember hearing Away Requesting Distance to shoal wat

- 0620 AB2/3

- THE NAV Reported the ship STILL HAD speed on 5kts and repeat Distance to shoal water.

- 0621 All Stop, AB1/3, Rudder amidships

Piloting Party called 150 yards to shoal water and bearing the ship still had 5kts of speed. Away Recommended ~~all ahead~~ AP 2/3, but was told Pilot transfer was still going no. AP 5 seconds after the bridge order AP 2/3.

- 0622 All Stop, Right Full Rudder.

- 0625 Right Hard Rudder, Right Full Rudder steady 294, AA1/3

- 0626 Tug alongside STBD for pilot transfer

- 0626 (QMOW recommends R/W), Right full rudder steady 297

- 0627 (Shoal water Bearing 250, 150 yards)

ENCLOSURE (2)
3 of 4

- 0628 AAF, Right hard rudder steady 297, Pilot to the Bridge

→ As the pilot was heading to the bridge the ship was already out of the channel.

→ Ship was picking the green buoy #? speed was reduced by PVA with backup from Pinney.

- 0629 Right hard rudder, Left hard rudder (Rev recommends Right full rudder steady 310)

- 0629 All Stop, All back emergency

- 0630 Rudder amidships

- 0631 Right full rudder, All stop

- 0632 AB2/3

- 0633 All Stop

- 0635 Left hard rudder steady 300. All Stop

- 0636 Pilot alongside, Rudder amidships

- 0637 Left full rudder steady 294, left full rudder steady 290, AAS (12KTS)

- 0638 Steer course 294

- 0639 Right 15 degree rudder, steady course 302

-0640 Passed Buoy 26 & 27

- 0641 Right full rudder steady 331, AAS (12KTS) *Regained track and continued to pier

- 0711 Passed through the security barrier

- 0714 Tug alongside

-0730 Ship is moored

ENCLOSURE (2)
4 of 4

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
STI (b) (6)		CAPT 06	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
CSS-16			2/24/62
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)		0-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
CSG-10			10 Dec 15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Article 92 Dereliction of Duty (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (29)
1 of 5

(6) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(b)(6) (2) I expressly desire ~~to make a statement~~ give verbal responses (b)(6) verbal questions only. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

N/A

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (29)
2 of 5

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	TIME 1430	DATE 20DEC15
SIGNATURE (INTERPRETER) (b)(6)	TIME 1452	DATE 20DEC15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b)(6)	TIME 1452	DATE 20DEC15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 1 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

See attached

A-1-a

ENCLOSURE (29)
3 of 5

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: CAPT (b)(6)
Role: CSS 16 Staff

Answers given to direct questions.

Q. Did you have knowledge of an actual timeline for Towed Array replacement?

- No

Q. What was the request for the ship to support towed array replacement?

- The production people wanted to pull the ship in as early as possible. I do not know where the 0730 request came from, I attempted to have the timeline changed to 0830 and the Squadron WEPS called and was told no.

Q. What was the discussion with respect to the timeline?

- CO (TRF?) and Weapons people said they had never done a non-diving towed array replacement so would not commit to a timeline. With divers there was a prediction of 3-6 hours.
- The request to dive critical was denied.

Q. Was it made known to you that SWFLANT would no support Friday?

- I spoke with (b) (6) (CO SWFLANT) and he stated that Friday was a non-starter, he would not call people in on a holiday weekend.

Q. What were COA's for the boat?

- Preferred COA was to do the TRE w/o the towed array
- Alternate COA was to pull the ship in on a Wednesday and get underway on Friday, SWFLANT said no to supporting an underway from the EHW. Site 6 was occupied by the USS Rhode Island and we could not moor outboard one of the CSS 20 units for maintenance reasons, not sure what they were.

Q. Did you communicate with CSG 10?

- Yes, the Chief of Staff discussing our options.

Q. Where there any emails from SWFLANT concerning them not working Friday?

- I don't recall exactly.

Q. Was there a conversation with Mr (b)(6) concerning the towed array requirement for the TRE?

- I spoke with CAPT (b)(6) concerning doing TRE w/o a TA He was clear we were not doing the TRE w/o the TA.
- I later spoke with you (CAPT (b)(6)) and you said you were not up to speed, and that you would get back with me.

ENCLOSURE (29)
4 of 5 (b)(6) 1 of 2

- Mr. (b)(6) called and said we would be required to have a TA for TRE because N7 does not concur with execution w/o a TA. We decided we would have to figure out the TA since we were conducting the TRE.

Q. Any additional discussion at CSS 16 about sending out an additional command served level person to assist with the inbound transit?

- I don't know; I believe there were discussions about mitigations.

(b)(6) 4DEC15

CAPT (b)(6) USN
CSS 16

—NON VERBATIM
—ACCURATE SUMMARY TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION.

ENCLOSURE (29)
5 of 5 (b) (6) 2 of 2

SUSPECT'S [redacted]S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
[redacted]		MMCM/E8	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
USS GEORGIA (SSGN729) (BLUE)			2 OCT 1970
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT [redacted]		CAPT O-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
CSG-10		1407	9 Dec

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties [redacted]

(2) I have the right to remain silent: ---------- [redacted]

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial: ---------- [redacted]

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both: ---------- [redacted]

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview: and ---------- [redacted]

A-1-v

ENCLOSURE (30)
1 of 5

(5) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (30)
2 of 5

	TIME	DATE
[redacted]	1445	12/9/15
SIGNATURE ([redacted])	TIME	DATE
[redacted]	TIME 1445	DATE 12/9/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____ page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUBJECT)

See attached

ENCLOSURE (30)

3 of 5

A-1-a

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: MMCM (b)(6)
Role: COB

Q. Did you go to the piloting brief?

- Yes

Q. Was there any discussion about fatigue or crews rest?

- We discussed crew rest. We are in a 7-5-5-7 rotation, 10 hour work days with a rest period. We knew the maneuvering watch was during a "sleep period". My thoughts were we would give the offgoing section a four hour window to sleep prior to waking them, and then we could put people to bed in port to prepare for the outgoing maneuvering watch and subsequent dive. We made a consciousness decision not to make any adjustments such as dogging the watch, etc... I thought people could recover and sleep in port. In hindsight, I could have done a better job, but up until the night prior we still thought that our arrival time would be pushed to the right to be during daylight.

Q. Who got rest in port?

- Opened up to "those people who did not get rest" to hit the rack. There was nothing in the Plan of the Day other than Towed Array work. Inport watches were stationed forward to drop watches to a minimum, and the section that had the most watch the day prior would have no watch other than piloting in and out of port. I was looking at mitigation for the entire day rather than the specific morning piloting.

Q. Did personnel take advantage of this?

- It wasn't long before we realized that we were not going back to sea so we worked to get topside rigged and send people home. Not a lot of the crew chose to utilize the period because of this.

Q. Whose idea was the 7-5-5-7 rotation?

- CO's idea. CO discussed it with me during off-crew. Achieves circadian sleep. It is not far off from 6's, but gets them to a 24-hour schedule.

Q. Did you consider going to 6's for the piloting evolution?

- No. The CO had made it clear to me that he desired to meet the commander's guidance on sleep rhythm, and when the topic had come up in the past to consider 6 hour watches (ICERT), he did not want to do it.

Q. Do you believe the CO had the authority to deviate from TYCOM sleep guidance?

- Yes, boats know they can change the schedule. Also didn't change the schedule because we were going back to sea the same day.

ENCLOSURE (30)
4 of 5
1 of 2

Q. What is the crew feedback on 7-5-5-7?

- Mixed reviews, people wanted to do 6's. CO and I both agreed it would be simpler reverting to 6's. Reason given to stay was to maintain the sleep rhythm. The DH's and DLCPO's voted to remain in 7-5-5-7 during an early run Ops brief.

Q. What does the Force Operations Note say?

- At least 6 hours of sleep at the same time every day.

Q. Did section I know they were getting woken up at 0430?

- I know they knew but not sure about it being in the Plan of the Day at the exact time I wake them. I believe I moved it to the right from the original plan 15 minutes or so.

Q. When was the piloting brief?

- Just before or after lunch, I don't exactly recall.

Q. Where were you during the maneuvering watch?

- Topside supervisor or getting teams ready for going topside. I was in Crews Mess when the ship hit the buoy.

Q. Are there any instances where the CO, despite recommendations from the team or when realizing the ship was operating past a tripwire, where he disregarded the recommendations and continued to execute as he was doing?

- The CO would acknowledge tripwires and work with the OOD to make a decision to take action on the tripwire or to continue operating past the tripwire. For example, our depth tripwire of 85 feet while at PD (and going deep) to ring up A2/3 cavitate to regain depth was always executed per tripwire while 78 feet to lower the scope for tactical security was adjusted on occasion based on CO's desires.

12/11/2015

(b)(6) [redacted], USN
USS GEORGIA SSGN 729, COB

EXHIBIT (50) 252
5 of 5

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
		CAPT	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
Submarine Squadron Sixteen			2/22/1972
NAME (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT		CAPT O-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
CSG-10		1400	12-10-15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent: (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial: (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and (b)(6)

A-1-r

ENCLOSURE (31)
1 OF 16

(6) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

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(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

A-1-y

ENCLOSURE (31)
2 of 16

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	TIME 1425	DATE 12/10/15
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)	TIME 1425	DATE 12/10/15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b)(6)	TIME 1425	DATE 12/10/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following _____page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b)(6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

Attached

A-1-

ENCLOSURE (31)
3 OF 16

(b) (6)

CAPT (b)(6) Statement

1. I was assigned to conduct a preliminary investigation into the buoy 23 allision and potential grounding of USS GEORGIA upon her RTP on Wednesday, 25 November 2015. An investigation finding of fact was that the Commanding Officer of USS GEORGIA communicated his desires to return to port later than scheduled. In response to his requests, the CSS-16 staff and CDRE (b)(6) actively worked to support CAPT (b)(6) numerous constraints on his requested return to port plan. (These included alternative locations of PCAN & Mayport, minimize number of days inport, maximize CODT, arrival Friday vice Wednesday, return to port one hour later than requested, execute TRE without TB-16)
2. An exhaustive discussion of CSS-16 schedule requests to support CAPT (b)(6) desires is included below. However, in execution of my investigation, I assessed the Commanding Officer and his team had ample opportunity to mitigate risk of a 0730 return to port arrival (IAW OPORD 2000) and conduct all piloting events in daylight with the exception of ~1 hour transit on the 268 leg entrance range. This range has a well-marked buoy chain and clearly visible, lighted range. Additionally, although there were strong winds from the NE on 25 November, environmental conditions during the transit on the entrance range included multiple visible navaids ashore and was executed under a full moon with unlimited visibility. It was also significant that the ship deviated from their briefed piloting plan and arrived in the turning basin for pilot rendezvous about 30 minutes earlier than planned. The briefed plan would have resulted in arriving in the turning basin at 0645, after morning twighlight ~0634 and mitigated lighting condition concerns.
3. From 4 November through 25 November I was heavily involved in supervising execution of the FLA(B) Pre Deployment Training Event, the GEO(G) Command Training Event, and was on travel to support GEORGIA's ICERT from 18-22 November. I did not engage in direct conversations or emails with the TYCOM staff regarding GEO's schedule, other than to discuss the feasibility of GEO(B) conducting a TRE without a towed array with the TYCOM TRE Team Senior Members. As I recall the phone conversations (the week of 9 and 16 November), both TRE members essentially stated it was not preferred to conduct a TRE without a towed array as long as there were options to get one prior to the TRE.
4. Although I didn't engage directly, the CSS-16 N3 (LCDR (b)(6)) back briefed me on schedule requests he was making to the TYCOM N3 staff on behalf of the ship and supported by CDRE (b)(6) . In every instance I observed and in all our daily conversations, CDRE (b)(6) carefuly considered and supported schedule change requests made by CAPT (b)(6) to the TYCOM N3 staff, and on several occasions reiterated CAPT . (b)(6) ' requests directly to the TYCOM N3. I only have direct knowledge of attached emails and message traffic. However, a summary of efforts to mitigate the Commanding Officer's concerns and accommodate CAPT (b)(6) ' schedule requests for TA swap (as I am aware of them based on face to face communications with our staff & CDRE (b)(6)) prior to 19 November follows:
    a. First request from CAPT (b)(6) was to do a TA swap in Port Canaveral. The CSS-16 staff communicated the request to the TYCOM N3 staff about the week of 9 November. On 12 November CDRE (b)(6) reiterated the request to CAPT (b)(6) directly. (TYCOM N3) (Attachment A). CDRE (b)(6) said that in his conversations with CAPT (b)(6) the CAPT conveyed he was extremely opposed to conducting the TA swap in Kings Bay, and would prefer to either do the swap in PCAN (preferred) or Mayport (backup). He said CAPT (b)(6) wanted to maximize his time at sea and CAPT (b)(6) felt that pulling into port, especially home port over the Thanksgiving holiday would be a distraction that would negatively impact the crew's focus and performance.

ENCLOSURE (31)
4 of 16

b. When PCAN and Mayport were denied, the CSS-16 N3 requested from TYCOM N3 staff via phonecon (as I recall on about 16 November) for a TA swap to occur in Kings Bay on Friday, 27 November based on CAPT (b)(6) request(Friday vice Wednesday) and concerns (minimize time in port). This request was denied because the TYCOM N3 staff preferred to have the ship return on Wednesday, 25 November so if GEO was delayed, the ship could get underway on Friday, 27 November, and not require a weekend underway.

5. The week of 16 November, CDRE (b)(6) was TDY, CAPT (b)(6) was acting CSS-16, and I embarked on USS GEORGIA (BLUE) from 19-21 November to conduct an Independent Dry Deck Shelter Certification event. While onboard, the ship received the Submarine Movement Message for Kings Bay, GA 48-15 DTG 191503Z NOV 15 (Attachment B) that had a planned 0730 return to port and 1600 underway. During the ship's operations brief onboard GEORGIA on 20 November, CAPT (b)(6) directly voiced his concerns with the Movement Message arrival & departure times, that he had provided his feedback to that effect, and that he did not intend to execute the movement message to return to port at 0730. After the operations brief, I approached CAPT (b)(6) and briefed him that LCDR (b)(6) and CDRE (b)(6) had in fact been carrying his message to the TYCOM and working to accommodate his requests. I also recommended that if he was dissatisfied with the return to port time he come up on chat with the Submarine Watch Officer and communicate his intentions directly to TYCOM, then if still not satisfied send a record message with his intentions to return to port at a later time. The next morning, on 21 November I BSP'ed off the ship and CDRE (b)(6) BSP'ed on. Prior to my departure, I had a conversation with CDRE (b)(6) about CAPT (b)(6) concerns with the planned return to port time, and my recommendations above.
6. On Monday, 23 August, the CSS-16 N3, LCDR (b)(6) emailed TYCOM N3 staff to ensure CAPT (b)(6) 's request for a later arrival was clearly communicated. LCDR (b)(6) sent an email to LCDR (b)(6) and (b)(6) on the TYCOM staff, and cc'ed the TYCOM N3A, USS GEORGIA, the CSS-16 chain of command, and other key stakeholders of CAPT (b)(6) and therefore the CSS-16 recommended return to port plans (0830 - (Attachment C). Of note, CAPT (b)(6) provide his copy of this email in his statement.
7. When CDRE (b)(6) arrived back from his ride on USS GEORGIA on Tuesday, 24 November, he sent an email to key members of the TYCOM staff stating the CSS-16 plan to execute the TA swap plan as written, and to return to port without the TA if necessary (Attachment D). He discussed at our daily roundup that he also socialized and had approval for the plan to conduct the follow on TRE without a towed array to preclude GEO remaining in port too long or getting underway in darkness.
8. To ensure NSSC, TRF, CSG-10, SWFLANT, CSS-16, and USS GEORGIA were aligned on the plan for how to execute a one day turnaround TB-16 repair at warping warf adjacent to EHW-2, CDRE (b) (6) directed our N3 draft a message explaining the services limitations of the warping warf (no potable, sanitary, shorepower, etc.), the sequence of events CSS-16 had coordinated with TRF and SWFLANT, how the TA would be snagged, who would do it, and what would happen if TA repair was unsuccessful (Attachment E). I believe the CDRE followed up the message with a direct conversation with the CO that evening as well.

ENCLOSURE (31)
5 OF 16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN**

From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 15:14
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Cc: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
Subject: (U) Towed Array Replacement on GEORGIA

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6),

I prefer GEORGIA pull into (b)(1)1 5a as opposed to Kings Bay.

I understand you are port visits, so I wanted to provide my reasoning:

1) I am (b)(1)1 5a here....not a rational argument, but I just worry that once they (b)(1)1 5a with all of the capacity of TRF nearby, we are going to find some new (b)(1)1 5a sea. Once again, I know that is not a completely rational argument, but I like the idea of (b)(1)1 5a and then leaving.

2) Pulling into (b)(6) that has limited underway time. (piloting in a port other than Kings Bay, practice overseas liberty policy, Rx accident drill in a port away from home)

V/R,

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CAPT (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (31)
6 of 16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATT (A) 1

~~No Classification in Message Body~~

(b)(6) **CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN**

From: NSSC KINGS BAY GA <postmaster@olc.navy.smil.mil>
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 19:14
To: NETWARCOM_SUFF_NOFORN; Message Traffic; KINGS.MSG; COMSUBGRU EIGHT REP NORTHWOOD UK; COMSUBGRU EIGHT REP NORTHWOOD UK; APL JHU LAUREL MD; CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL; TTRCB_Radio; trf.messaging; NAVSUP_FLCTR_MP_FL; MYPT Navsta Msg Traffic; Messaging_Metoc002.fct; (b)(6) CIV NNPI-TRF Kings Bay, 630; FNMOC.CDO; FNMOC.CDO; CLASS MSGS; CSG SDMDS NNPI-Comsubgru Nine; (b)(6) CIV FLEWEACEN Norfolk; (b)(6) OS1 CRS 10, N3 Operations; C20DCSP; (b)(6) ITC CRS-10, N6; NAVORDTESTU CAPE CANAVERAL FL; SWFLANT KINGS BAY GA
Cc: CSDS12_NWUN_STAFF; OTRSSP WASHINGTON DC; COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA; NSSC_NWLN_STAFF; NNPI-KINGS_NSSC_DMDS; SDO; (b)(6) ETCS @SDS12, COMMS RMC; KINGS_CS620_MESSAGES; cs20.messages; CSS16_MESSAGES; @SG-10 Messages NNPI; COMSUBLANT N62MSGS; COMSUBLANT N62MSGS; COMSUBLANT N62MSGS; CNRSE.ROC1; NAVTEST; NSSC NLON CDO NNPI
Subject: O 191503Z NOV 15 NSSC KINGS BAY GA SUBJ/MARINE MOVEMENT MESSAGE FOR KINGS BAY GA, MAYPORT FL AND PORT CANAVERAL FL 48-15 FOR THE WEEK OF 23 NOV 15(U)//
Signed By: postmaster@olc.navy.smil.mil

Importance: High

~~SECRET//NOFORN//MF~~

ENCLOSURE (31)
7 of 16
ATT (8)

~~No Classification In Message Body~~

BT
~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SUBJ~~

A.

B. FOR EVENTS WITH

2. (U) THIS MESSAGE IS THE AUTHORITY FOR MOVEMENTS AND WILL BE ISSUED ON A WEEKLY BASIS. REQUESTS FOR CHANGES TO THIS SCHEDULE WILL BE MADE TO CTF 84/144 VIA YOUR ISIC.
3. (U) ALL TIMES ARE PLUS OR MINUS 15 MIN. SIGNIFICANT UNAPPROVED TIME DIFFERENCES EARLY OR LATE OUTSIDE THE PLUS OR MINUS 15 MIN

ENCLOSURE (31)
8 of 16

4. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) 5a

(b)(1) 5a

(b)(1) 5a

5. (U) PORT CANAVERAL: UNITS INBOUND FOR ARRIVAL OR BSC WILL ARRIVE IVO BUOYS 3 AND 4 ONE HOUR PRIOR TO EVENT TIME FOR PILOT EMBARK. THE EVENT TIME LISTED BELOW IS ACTUAL PIERSIDE TIME. ANY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING PILOTS OR TUGS SHOULD BE MADE DIRECTLY TO PORT CANAVERAL NOTU PORT OPS VIA PHONE OR VHF RADIO. POC TEL: (b) (6)

6. (U) MAYPORT: UNITS INBOUND FOR ARRIVAL, BSC, OR BSP WILL ARRIVE IVO BUOY STJ 30 MIN PRIOR TO EVENT TIME. THE EVENT TIME LISTED BELOW IS ACTUAL PIERSIDE TIME. UNITS CONDUCTING BSP AT LOCATION 5 WILL ARRIVE IVO BUOY STJ AT THE EVENT TIME LISTED BELOW. ANY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING PILOTS OR TUGS SHOULD BE MADE DIRECTLY TO MAYPORT PORT OPS VIA PHONE OR VHF RADIO. POC TEL: (b) (6)
COAST GUARD ESCORTS WILL BE AT STJ ONE HOUR PRIOR TO BSC OR ARRIVAL TIME AND THIRTY MINUTES PRIOR TO BSP TIME. IN THE EVENT OF ANY DEVIATION FROM THE SCHEDULED EVENT, I.E. EARLY/LATE EVENT EXECUTION, CHANGE IN BSP LOCATION, OR FORCE PROTECTION ESCORTS NOT PRESENT, UNITS SHALL COORDINATE THE DEVIATION WITH MAYPORT OPERATIONS AND USCG FORCE PROTECTION ASSETS VIA VHF.

7. ~~(SNF)~~ SUMMARY: (b)(1) 5a

8. ~~(SNF)~~ (b)(1) 5a

(b)(1) 5a

DATE UNIT EVENT LOCATION TIME RMKS/NOTES

(b)(1) 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

(b)(1) 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

25 NOV

(b)(6)

26 NOV
NO SCHEDULED EVENTS
27 NOV
NO SCHEDULED EVENTS
28 NOV
NO SCHEDULED EVENTS
29 NOV
NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

ENCLOSURE (31)
9 of 16

9. (SNF) THE FOLLOWING MOVEMENTS ARE ANTICIPATED FOR THE WEEK OF 30 NOV 15:

DATE UNIT EVENT LOCATION TIME RMKS/NOTES

30 NOV

(b)(1)1 5a

01 DEC

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

02 DEC

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

03 DEC

(b)(1)1 5a

04 DEC

(b)(1)1 5a

05 DEC

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

06 DEC

(b)(1)1 5a

10. (C) LOCATION COLUMN:

LOCATION 1:

LOCATION 2:

LOCATION 3:

LOCATION 4:

LOCATION 5:

LOCATION 6:

LOCATION 7:

11. (SNF) NOTE COLUMN:

NOTE 1: DETAILS WILL BE PROMULGATED IN NEXT WEEKS SWM.

12. (C)

b 1) 5a

13. (U) C-TRACTOR CHARACTERISTICS AS FOLLOWS:

A. TRANSFER SIDE:

1.

2.

(b)(1)1 5a

B.

14. (C) FORCE PROTECTION:

A. (b)(1)1 5a

THE SUBMARINE WILL

FOR SCHEDULED EVENTS. (b)(1)1 5a SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. (b)(1)1 5a

(b)(1)1 5a

(b)(1)1 5a THE EVENT USING THE

FOLLOWING CALL SIGNS:

KINGS BAY CHANNEL (b)(1)1 5a

TRANSITING SUBMARINE - EVENT (NUMBER)

ENCLOSURE (31)

10 of 16

PATCOM . EAGLE LEADER
USCG SCREENING VESSELS.

B.
~~C.~~

1)

2)

3)
C.
EVENT UNESCORTED UNLESS THE CONDITIONS OF REF D ARE MET.
15. (U) KINGS BAY NAVIGATION NOTES AS OF 19 NOV:
A. ALPHA REAR,BRAVO FRONT AND DELTA FRONT LIGHTS ARE CURRENTLY EXTINGUISHED.
B. DRUM POINT ISLAND MIDDLE RANGE IS BARELY VISIBLE DUE TO HEAVY VEGETATION BUILD UP ON THE ISLAND.
C. BEACON SIERRA IS MISSING A DAYBOARD.
16. ~~(C)~~ IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B. (b)(1), 5a
(b)(1), 5a APPLY:
UNIT (b)(1), 5a CODE
USS ALASKA 06
17. ~~(C)~~ KINGS BAY ARRIVING UNIT MOORING ARRANGEMENT.
A. (b)(1), 5a //
DECL/ (b)(1), 5a
BT
#0001
NNNN
<DmdsSecurity>SECRET</ (b)(1), 5a
<DmdsReleaser: (b)(1), 5a
SECRET//NOFORN// (b)(1), 5a

EXCLOSURE (21)
11 of 16

~~SECRET~~

CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:45
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N35/37
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- OSS-16 USNAV; (b)(6) ETC NSSC Kings Bay GA (OPS), N3A; (b)(6) O-3/LT OPS, N3; (b)(6) ET2 NNPI-NSSC KB (OPS), N3A2; (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV); (b)(6) LT NNPI-COMSUBLANT; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-TRF Kings Bay, 700; (b)(6) LT NSSC KINGS BAY Weapons Officer N7 (N3); (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, N7 - Weapons Officer; (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CDR NSSC KB GA (CO), N00; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
Subject: ~~(S)~~(b)(1) 1.5a scheduling

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(5)

1) We will update (b)(1) 1.5a on CSL's selected COA.

2) Concerning the (b)(1) 1.5a . request a movement message chg for a 0830 moor time at the warning wharf. The ship requests this extension so they do not have to pilot during darkness during their first return from underway.

The logistics (b)(1) 1.5a Below is a summary of COAs being worked:

Primary Plan:
Moor 0830 Nov 25th
Remain Critical
Attempt to (b)(1) 1.5a
Conduct swap
Get underway same day

Backup Plan (COA 1):
(b)(1) 1.5a takes too long
Move into EMW
S/D reactor
Conduct swap
Get underway afternoon of the 28th or the 30th (SWFTLANT can not support the 26th or the 27th)

Backup Plan (COA 2): investigating this but initial report is TA swap outboard another unit is not possible.
(b)(1) 1.5a takes too long
Move outboard Unit at Refit 1 or 3
S/D reactor
Conduct swap

EXHIBIT (31) ATT (C)
12 of 16

~~SECRET~~

Get underway (b)(1)1 5a

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (31)
13 of 16

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN**

From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 12:47
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Cc: (b)(6) CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4A; (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N70A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer
Subject: (U) GEORGIA Towed Array Plan

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

N-Heads,

If we are (b)(1)1 5a on Wednesday, I intend to (b)(1)1 5a (b)(1)1 5a . If necessary, we would then work with the TRE team to modify the In port portion of the TRE as appropriate because of (b)(1)1 5a

I don't want (b)(1)1 5a through Friday because (b)(1)1 5a time. She has good (b)(1)1 5a

With that said, we do have a pretty good plan to (b)(1)1 5a using a small boat that does not require diver support.

V/R,

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CAPT (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ATT (D)

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (31)
14 OF 16

~~No Classification in Message Body~~

(b)(6) **CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN**

From: COMSUBRON SIXTEEN <postmaster@oix.navy.smil.mil>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 17:00
Cc: trf.messaging; KNGS_CSS20_MESSAGES; (b)(6) CIV NNPI-TRF Kings Bay, 630; css20.messages; CSS16_MESSAGES; CSG-10 Messages NNPI; COMSUBLANT N62MSGS; SWFLANT KINGS BAY GA
Subject: O 242003Z NOV 15 COMSUBRON SIXTEEN USS GEORGIA TOWED ARRAY TB-16 REPAIR INTENTIONS(U)//
Signed By: postmaster@oix.navy.smil.mil

Importance: Low

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//MR

Generated by OIX GATEWAY HONOLULU HI. Only authorized users may reply.

~~~~OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS~~~~
OTTCZYUW RHOIAAA0001 3282158-CCCC--RHSSSUU.
ZNY CCCCC
O R 242003Z NOV 15
FM COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
TO USS GEORGIA
INFO COMSUBRON TWO ZERO
NSSC KINGS BAY GA
COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA
COMSUBGRU TEN
USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
TRIREFFAC KINGS BAY GA
SWFLANT KINGS BAY GA
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
//N04790//
COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA//N40//
SECINFO~~/C/~~//
MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF/CSS-16//
SUBJ/USS GEORGIA TOWED ARRAY TB-16 REPAIR INTENTIONS(U)//
REF/A// (b)(1)1 5a '/
NARR/REF A IS (b)(1)1 5a '/
POC/LCDR (b)(6) ./OPERATIONSOFFICER/CSS16/
SMAIL: (b)(6) (AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL/ (b) (6)
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1.
(b)(1)1 5a

(b)(1)1 5a

(b)(1)1 5a

2.

(b)(1)1 5a

3. RECOMMENDED PREPARATIONS:
A. PUMP ALL TANKS AND PREPARE TO BE PIER SIDE WITHOUT SERVICES.

ENCLOSURE (31)
15 of 16

ATT (E)

~~No Classification in Message Body~~
~~~~

B.
C.
4.
A.

B.

C.
D

E.

F.
DECL
BT
#0001
NNNN
<Dmd[redacted]//
<[redacted]>
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//

ENCLOSURE (31)
16 of 16

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b)(6)		LCDR	NAVY
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
SQUADRON SIXTEEN			09 SEP 1982
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)		O-4	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
CSS 16		Ops Officer	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction of performance of duties [(b) (6)]

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

A-1-v

ENCLOSURE (32)
1 of 37

(5) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(b)(6)

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (32)

2 of 32

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	1310	10 DEC 15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS)	TIME 1345	DATE 12/10/15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b) (6)	TIME 1345	DATE 12/10/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____ page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

(b)(6)

A-1-W

ENCLOSURE (32)

3 of 27

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: LCDR (b)(6)
Title: CSS 16 OPS

Q. Were you part of the NAV's certification?

- Yes

Q. What were the dates of VMS 9.3 at sea certification?

- Don't remember exactly, was around Halloween

Q. Did you observe the piloting out of Kings Bay?

- Yes

Q. Did you observe VMS alarms during the outbound transit?

- VMS did alarm sometimes.

Q. Did VMS Alarm excessively?

- It seemed comparable to VMS 8.3; not overly a distraction.

Q. Did the ship use the radar?

- I don't believe so.

Q. As the CSS 16 OPS, what is your expectation for ships to use the radar?

- The Primary radar should be employed when conditions support. Frequently in King's Bay it is not employed in the inner harbor to aid visibility and due to space concerns on the bridge. The secondary radar should always be employed.

Q. Is the use of radar required by policy?

- Yes. Guidance is in the SOM.

Q. What are your observations of the NAV and the navigation party?

- NAV was at standards, but new, I did not observe any stressful situations at sea, he was progressing and what I would expect of a SOAC graduate.

Q. What is your assessment of the command climate?

- Crew was adjusting, big change with new CO. During sea trials and ICERT not a lot of back up provided from crew to command team.

ENCLOSURE (32)
4 of 37

- Don't believe I observed any critiques, informal hot washes were performed. I observed a piloting hot wash and the initial dive hot-wash.

Q. Did the CO attend?

- Sometimes

Q. Any major issues you noted during the hot washes?

- Not that I can remember.

Q. Based on your conversations (TELCON or email), what was your assessment of the TYCOM's position of performing the TRE w/o the towed array?

- The TRE team needed a towed array for the TRE.

Q. Where did the 0730 moor time come from?

- The maintenance activities and SUBLANT desired to get in as early as possible to support repairs and same day underway. NSSC said earliest they could support was 0730. OPORD 2000 says 0730 earliest in normal conditions.

Q. Was a towed array installation timeline provided?

- Nothing in writing, but there were several estimates floating around suggesting several hours. Several entities were concerned about the timeline. We had a large planning meeting the day before in the SWFLANT conference room, concerning the location to bring the GEO into port. The desire was to have an option that would allow her to stay until the 27th since there was low confidence in being able to grapple the towed array and get it replaced in one day.

Q. What day was that meeting?

- 23rd or 24th.

Q. What was your understanding of the official CSS 16 position?

- At what point in the timeline? Initially we wanted to pull into PCAN as earlier as possible to medalize CODT for the boat. At this point in the timeline we were trying to execute the direction of TYCOM but we were also exploring the option to not pull them in all together as directed by CAPT (b)(6) .

Q. When you sent the request to LCDR (b)(6) for the 1 hour delay, what was the response?

- He expressed there was a high level interest to maintain the 0730 time slot, initially sent to me via email with a follow up TELCON.
I felt that it was direction, but not out of the realm of possibility to change it. I briefed the CDR& of SU's response to the request.

ENCLOSURE (32)

- Discussion with the CDRE

- I told the CDRE that SUBLANT wanted us to maintain the 0730 moor time, but if he wanted to revisit it at his level they might reconsider, the 0830.
- CDRE directed me to speak with the pilot and get his assessment, review the expected tides and currents, and talk to CSS 20 to determine if they had conducted any similar events and briefed the CDRE on the results. The pilot reported he had no issues with the plan, we expected a moderate flood current, and CSS-20 had done a recent event that went fine. I reported these results to the CDRE.

Q. What was the CDRE's response?

- He acknowledged, and asked me if I thought as a served NAV if I would be comfortable with a 0730 moor time, and I said "Yes". He then said he would stay with the 0730 moor time as scheduled.

Q. What was the "as early as possible" driving factor? Was it based on the holiday? Where these any statements to that effect?

- There was no berth to keep her at if she stayed more than one day. SWFLANT was not willing to support a 27th underway; therefore we were restricted to the 1 day option. This made the repair timeline very important.

Q. Why couldn't SWFLANT support?

- Civilian crane workers were on leave and they couldn't impact their holiday.

Q. Why was the PCAN option turned off?

- My understanding from CSL was: Budgetary considerations, force protection assets
- Mayport was also explored as an option but was denied because Kings Bay has better maintenance capabilities.

(b)(6)
LCDR (b)(6), USN
CSS 16 Operations Officer

ENCLOSURE (32)
6 of 37

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 13:30
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBLANT, N702
Subject: RE: ~~(S//RD) GE FLTA~~
Attachments: GEORGIA Deployment Schedule COAs 12Nov15.xlsx

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) ,

See proposed schedule:

The 4 days was taking into account (b)(1)1 5a to/from King's bay and the longer surface transit to King's bay the crew is missing out on interacting with the higher contact density in/around SOF. Additionally specific skill sets (b)(1)1 5a . GEO CO also desires PCAN over King's Bay.

High tide is ~0600 low tide is ~1200 so an early morning mooring should be supportable.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 9:06 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: RE: ~~(S//RD) GE FLTA~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) ,

(b)(1)1 5a

(b)(6)

V/R,
(b)(6)

LCDR (b)(6)
COMSUBLANT
(b) (6)

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 11:27 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBLANT, N702; (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: ~~(S//RD) GE FLTA~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) ,

(b)(1)1 5a by the 24th. The CSS-16 CDRE requests the (b)(1)1 5a
(b)(1)1 5a as soon as possible following the CSO Key West BSP on the 23rd. We estimate conducting the (b)(6)
(b)(1)1 5a . I don't know what time the BSP on the
[illegible] is planned for yet or how long the TA maintenance will take. I will pass you that info when I know more.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
8 of 37

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 11:47
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: RE: (U) GEO KWOAS to KBAY

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CDRE asked me to look into a one day turn around in MAYPORT vice King's Bay on the 25th. Please look into that possibility and call me back.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 11:17 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Subject: RE: (U) GEO KWOAS to KBAY

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6)

Rgr thanks. Still trying to reach the boat. They have a BSP in 30 mon so not sure why they aren't up in chat yet.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
@navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36

ENCLOSURE (32)
9 of 32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 11:16 AM
To: (b)(6) ETC NNPI CSS-16 ANAV; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Subject: (U) GEO KWOAS to KBAY

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) -

I think (b)(1)1 5a kts. See attached track and points.

V/R,
(b)(6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
10 of 37

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 12:46
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: RE: (U) GEO KWOAS to KBAY

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) ,

As discussed we looked into Mayport availability; however, if (b)(1)1 5a to conduct any (b)(1)1 5a where they could be stuck for several days and affect follow on surface ship movements.

V/R,
(b)(6)

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 11:48 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: RE: (U) GEO KWOAS to KBAY

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) ,

CDRE asked me to look into a (b)(1)1 5a on the 25th. Please look into that possibility and call me back.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 11:17 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Subject: RE: (U) GEO KWOAS to KBAY

ENCLOSURE (32)
11 of 27

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) ,

Rgr thanks. Still trying to reach the boat. They have a BSP in 30 mon so not sure why they aren't up in chat yet.

V/r, .

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

~~Original Message~~
From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 11:16 AM
To: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Subject: (U) GEO KWOAS to KBAY

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6)

I think (b)(1)1.5a . See attached track and points.

V/R,
(b)(6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 16:46
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-N3
Cc: (b)(6) STSCS NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4211A; (b)(6) STSC COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBLANT, N702; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, N7 - Weapons Officer; (b)(6) CIV NNPI-NSSC; (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil; (b)(6) LCDR USS GEORGIA SSGN-729 (BLUE); (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, N4 - Engineer / Material Officer; (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 5a Replacement

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

I received word that the (b)(1)1 5a will occur in King's Bay vice PCAN. We will (b)(1)1 5a accordingly Request the same dates:
- NOV 25 Pull In
- NOV 26 (b)(1)1 5a
- NOV 27 U/W

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

~~Original Message~~
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 7:43 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-N3
Cc: (b)(6) STSCS NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4211A; (b)(6) STSC COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBLANT, N702; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, N7 - Weapons Officer; (b)(6) (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-NSSC Materials Officer, N4; (b)(6) CIV NNPI-NSSC
Subject: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 5a Replacement

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

CSS16 would like to update our request for GEO towed array replacement to:

-25 NOV pull into PCAN and set conditions

ENCLOSURE (32)
13 of 37

-26 NOV complete (b)(1)1.5a
-27 NOV Underway

TRF (Trident Repair Facility) is trying to make preparations in support of this plan request if we will be approved for PCAN.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-1b Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
.14 of 37

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 11:56
To: (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR USS GEORGIA SSGN-729 (BLUE); (b)(6) ETC(SEL) USS GEORGIA 729 BLUE ANAV; (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: ~~(S)~~ Options

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

NAV,

1) Do you want a (b)(1)1 5a North? I recommend (b)(1)1.5a to reduce chart preps and support [illegible].
2) CSL thinks the (b)(1)1 5a . If TRF can support would you want to pull in the 25th and get underway the same day?
3) If Mayport is an option do you want Kings Bay or MAYPORT?
4) I am in chat (BCA) if you want to talk to me.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 16:30
To: (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV)'
Subject: RE: (S) (b)(6) (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

NAV,

It wasn't. CSL said no to everything we asked for.

V/r,
OPS

---Original Message---
From: LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV) [mailto: @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 4:48 PM
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 5a ~~(S)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

OPS,

Understand the plan, but i don't think this is the same plan the Commodore and my CO talked about today.

Very Respectfully, NAV

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS [mailto: (b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2015 3:16 PM
To: (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV)
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR USS GEORGIA SSGN-729 (BLUE); (b)(6) ETC (SW/SS) CSS-26 (NAV); (b)(6) ETC USS GEORGIA 729 BLUE ANAV
Subject: ~~(S)~~ FLTA Replacement

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

NAV,

CSL said no to MAYPORT and no to pulling in on the 27th. Expect a (b)(1)1 5a arriving in the 25th and getting underway on the 25th.

V/r,

CDR (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (32)
16 of 37

~~SECRET~~

CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
17 of 37

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV) < (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil>
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2015 16:25
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Subject: return to port plan (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

OPS,

Here is how we see our schedule laying out for Wednesday. We will (b)(1) 5a in the dark.

11/25

0545

0634 (b)(1) 5a

0645

0701 Sunrise

0730 Fort Clinch

0830

0900 (b)(1) 5a

0930 Moor

1430 Station Maneuvering watch

1500 Commence backing out EWH

1530 Sill time

1600 Underway

1725 Sunset

1730 Fort Clinch

ENCLOSURE (32)
18 of 37

~~SECRET~~

1757 Twilight ends

1800 (b)(1)1 5a

(b)(6) knots, will be able to dive after 0100 on the 26th)

Based on this estimate we have (b)(1)1 5a , STSCS estimates that it will take (b)(1)1 5a with a small boat and then the (b)(1)1 5a hour job, which would be best case (b)(1)1 5a .

The plan we request is pull in on Wednesday and an underway on Friday afternoon. This does not effect waterspace for us getting to AUTEC.

Very Respectfully, NAV

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a

DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

ENCLOSURE (32)
19 of 37

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 13:40
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) ,

Rgr moor time, Still working pier options.

V/r,
OPS

~~----Original Message----~~
From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 1:37 PM
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Thanks, one follow up. We would like to keep GEO's arrival time. It seems like an (b)(1)1 5a could make a (b)(1)1 5a (b)(1)1 5a . Understand the concern and I can continue to work on the request, but there is significant interest here to maintain the arrival time.

V/R,
(b)(6)

~~----Original Message----~~
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:32 PM
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

SWFTLANT said civilian employees are on leave.

I am also looking into potential of moving (b)(1)1 5a

v/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
~~SS~~16 Operations

ENCLOSURE (32)
20 out 37

~~SECRET~~

(COMM (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:26 PM
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) ,

Why can't SWFLANT support on 27 Nov? I believe they were able to support 27 Nov previously when we were discussing a Friday arrival. Thanks.

V/R,
(b)(5)

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:45 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N35/37
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV; (b)(6) ETC NSSC Kings Bay GA (OPS), N3A; (b)(6) (b)(6) O-3/LT OPS, N3; (b)(6) ET2 NNPI-NSSC KB (OPS), N3A2; (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV); (b)(6) LT NNPI-COMSUBLANT; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-TRF Kings Bay, 700; (b)(6) (b)(6) LT NSSC KINGS BAY Weapons Officer N7/N9; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, N7 - Weapons Officer: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT. N3A: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CDR NSSC KB GA (CO), N00; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
Subject: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) .

1) We will update (b)(1)1 5a on CSL's selected COA.

2) Concerning the (b)(1)1 5a in Kings Bay, request a movement message chg for a 0830 moor time at the warping arf. The ship requests this extension so they do not have to pilot during darkness during their first return from nderway.

The logistics (b)(1)1 5a not being approved. Below is a immary of C[illegible].

imary Plan:
Moor 0830 Nov 25th

ENCLOSURE (32)
21 of 37

~~SECRET~~

Remain (b)(1)1 5a
Attempt to snag (b)(1)1 5a
Conduct (b)(1)1 5a
Get underway same day

Backup Plan (COA 1):
(b)(1)1 5a or takes too long
Move into (b)(1)1 5a

Conduct (b)(1)1 5a
Get underway afternoon of the 28th or the 30th (SWFTLANT can not support the 26th or the 27th)

Backup Plan (COA 2): Investigating this but (b)(1)1 5a
(b)(1)1 5a or takes too long
Move outboard unit at (b)(1)1 5a
(b)(1)1 5a
Conduct (b)(6)
Get underway (b)(1)1 5a

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
22 of 37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 14:06
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) O-3/LT OPS, N3
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV; (b)(6) ET2 NNPI-NSSC KB (OPS), N3A2; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBLANT, N702; (b)(6) LT NNPI-COMSUBLANT; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N35/37
Subject: RE: (U) GEO

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CSS16 Concurs

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 2:05 PM
To: (b)(6) O-3/LT OPS, N3; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Cc: (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV; (b)(6) ET2 NNPI-NSSC KB (OPS), N3A2; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBLANT, N702; (b)(6) LT NNPI-COMSUBLANT; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N35/37
Subject: (U) GEO

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Just to make sure we are all on the same page. I have the GEO planning to arrive and depart tomorrow. During the nport time GEO will try to repair the array, but will get underway regardless of completing the repairs and execute her remaining schedule.

Based on this, I don't think we need changes to SMM or SUBNOTEs. GEO's TRE subnote just transmitted today. If someone thinks otherwise please let me know. Thanks for everyone's support on this.

V/R,
CDR (b)(6)
COMSUBLANT
(b) (6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
23 nC 22

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
24 of 37

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 17:08
To: (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil'
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR USS GEORGIA SSGN-729 (BLUE)'
Subject: ~~(S)~~ (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CO,

Discussions on your (b)(1)1.5a are ongoing. Right now the base plan is to pull you into Waroine Warf at 0730 (CSL did not agree to your request to push it later in support of sunrise). The (b)(1)1.5a will attempt to (b)(1)1.5a . If the pier-side/barge snag is unsuccessful or takes too long you will be moved into EHW. Other COAs are in the works I will keep you posted.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 16:10
To: (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV)'
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ movement message ~~(S)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

NAV,

No, I sent your CO/XO an email yesterday at 1700. There is a message up to the CDRE for release that will provide more information about tomorrow's expectations.

V/r,

LCDR (b)(6)
CSS-16 Operations
(COMM) (b) (6)
(CELL) (b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.mil
(b)(6) @navy.smil.mil

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) LT (SS) USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE (NAV) [mailto: (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 4:04 PM
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS
Subject: movement message (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

OPS,

Request if movement message was approved for time later.

Thank you, NAV

CLASSIFIED BY: LCDR (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
27 of 37

LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS

From: CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:38
To: CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4
Cc: CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore; CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT. N3: LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS: CAPT; CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; CDR NNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer; CDR NSSC KB GA (CO), N00; CDR COMSUBLANT; LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N31; LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N35/37; LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4A
Subject: RE: (U) GEO EHW Support
Signed By: @NAVY.SMIL.MIL

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

What the heck is going on in Kings Bay? As we discussed, keeping GEO on schedule is a high priority and the plan is for GEO to come in and change her array on Wednesday. If that can't be completed on Wednesday to get her back underway, I expect support until she is underway. It doesn't excite me that no one will work on Thanksgiving but I suppose I can understand. Friday is not a federal holiday and I see no reason why I can't get services to finish array replacement and get her underway.

Please engage and let me know the state of play.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
SUBLANT N3A
Deputy Director for Operations
(b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.(smil.)mil

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: (U) GEO EHW Support

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

N3/N3A,

EXHIBIT (32)
28 of 37

(b)(6)

(b)(1) 5a

...

CAPT (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1) 5a
DERIVED FROM:
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1) 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (32)
29 of 37

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS**

From: (b)(6) O-3/LT OPS, N3
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 17:08
To: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS; (b)(6) ETC NNPI- CSS-16 ANAV
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) ET2 NNPI-NSSC KB (OPS), N3A2; (b)(6) ETC NSSC Kings Bay GA (OPS), N3A; (b)(6) CDR NSSC KB GA (CO), N00; (b)(6) @swflant.navy.smil.mil; (b)(6) @swflant.navy.smil.mil; (b)(6) NNPI-COMSUBRON 20, N33 ANAV; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N93
Subject: ~~(S//RD)~~(b)(1)1.5awork

Classification: ~~SECRET//RESTRICTED DATA~~

Gentlemen,

Here are a couple of thoughts regarding the GA's towed array replacement:

1. I recommend using the previous arrival time of 0730 because this maximizes the amount of time for the replacement so that the ship may actually get underway on the same day.
2. I propose a (b)(1)1.5a . This way, if we have not successfully (b)(1)1.5a (b)(1)1.5a ". This eliminates the uncertainty about when the workers would again be needed to help with the next birth shift.

Both of the above also minimize the impact on holiday plans and are up for discussion.

VR

NSSC OPS

LT (b)(6)
NSSC OPS N3A OPS
W: (b) (6)
C: (b) (6)

CLASSIFIED BY: LT (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM:
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~SECRET//RESTRICTED DATA~~

[redacted] 3282200-UUUU--RUCORGP.
ZNY CCCCC
O R 242003Z NOV 15 PSN 189112K22
FM COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
TO RUCORGP/USS GEORGIA
INFO ZEN/COMSUBRON TWO ZERO
ZEN/NSSC KINGS BAY GA
ZEN/COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA
ZEN/COMSUBGRU TEN
RUCORGP/USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
ZEN/TRIREFFAC KINGS BAY GA
ZEN/SWFLANT KINGS BAY GA
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
//N04790//
CONSUBLANT NORFOLK VA//N40//
SUBJ/USS GEORGIA TOWED ARRAY TB-16 REPAIR INTENTIONS(U)// REF/A//SSN 6-3-13/OI-637-10B// NARR/REF A IS SHIPS HABITABILITY TOWED ARRAY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS// POC/LCDR (b)(6) /OPERATIONSOFFICER/CSS16/ EMAIL: (b)(6) (AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL/ (b) (6)
(b)(6) //
[redacted]

2. (b)(1)1 5a

3.
A.
B.

4.
A. (b)(1)1 5a

B.

C. (b)(1)1 5a

E.

F.
DEC
BT
#4167
NNNN

EXHIBIT (32)
31 of 37

VMSY Cert

P 0218003Z NOV 15
FM COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
TO COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA
COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
USS GEORGIA BLUE
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMSUBRON SIXTEEN/NOV/001//
SUBJ/USS GEORGIA (BLUE)(SSGN-729) ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION FINAL CERTIFICATION//
REF/A/CSLCSPINST 3530.8A/-//
REF/B/CSLCSPINST C3120.26A/-//
REF/C/MSG/COMSUBRON SIXTEEN/171403ZAUG15//
NARR/REF A IS ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION CERTIFICATION INSTRUCTION. REF B IS SUBMARINE OPERATIONS MANUAL. REF C IS USS GEORGIA (BLUE) PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION.//
POC/ (b)(6) /LCDR/COMSUBRON SIXTEEN/TEL: (b) (6) //
RMKS/1. PER REF A, COMSUBRON SIXTEEN COMPLETED A SUCCESSFUL AT-SEA EVALUATION OF ALL PHASES OF NAVIGATION ONBOARD USS GEORGIA (BLUE) (SSGN-729). USS GEORGIA (BLUE) IS CERTIFIED TO NAVIGATE WITH VMS 9.3 REV A AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF NAVIGATION.//
BT
#0001

NNNN

ENCLOSURE (32)
32 of 32

GEO_VMS

PATUZYUW RUCBKMB0001 2291403-UUUU--RUCBKMC.
ZNR UUUUU
R 171403Z AUG 15
FM COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
TO COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA
COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
USS GEORGIA BLUE
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/CSS-16/-/001//
SUBJ/USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN-729) ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION//
REF/A/CSLCSPINST 3530.8A/-//
REF/B/CSLCSPINST C3120.26A/-//
NARR/REF A IS ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION CERTIFICATION INSTRUCTION. REF B IS SUBMARINE OPERATIONS MANUAL.//
POC/ (b)(6) /LCDR/CSS-16/TEL: (b) (6) //
RMKS/1. PER REF A, USS GEORGIA (BLUE) (SSGN-729) IS AUTHORIZED TO UTILIZE THE BPS-15H WITH VOYAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (VMS) VER. 9.3 WITH PROCEDURES DELINEATED IN REF B CHAPTER 1 AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF NAVIGATION.
2. THIS AUTHORIZATION APPLIES ONLY TO THE FIRST UNDERWAY FOLLOWING THE INPORT CERTIFICATION. THIS UNDERWAY PERIOD WILL BE USED BY THE ISIC TO COMPLETE AN AT-SEA CREW EVALUATION. UPON SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF AN AT-SEA EVALUATION, A FINAL CERTIFICATION MESSAGE WILL BE SENT TO THE SHIP AND IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO SUBSEQUENT ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION.//
BT
#0001
NNNN

Hold
AWAIT INSTALLATION
9.3

ENCLOSURE (32)
33 of 33

Training Session Detail

USS Georgia (Blue) **Session ID: 2350522 Date: 08OCT2015 Time: 1200-1600 POC Phone:** (b) (6)

Status: Completed **Trainer: SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)**

Trainer Mode: VMS 9.3

Location: P-Can Inbound/Outbound
Target Group: Piloting Party
Difficulty Level: Intermediate
Training Type: Responsive Training
Instructor Intervention: Level I - Minimal Intervention
Instructor Involvement: Low - No Instructor written or TSU feedback required
Special Request: Request PCAN Outbound/Inbound Starting on the 310 Leg/speed 12kts inbound ivo buoys 3 and 4 Starting on the 146 Leg/speed 6kts inbound ivo Pier
Training Goals: Request PCAN In/Out scenarios for development of Piloting Party. Individual CTQS Attribute: Cyclic Routine, Piloting - NP18 Team Attribute: Piloting - NP14.01

Completion Data

Primary Mission Area	Performance	Grade(0-100)
null	N/A	0

Secondary Mission Area
Primary Core Competency
Secondary Core Competency

Instructor: ET1 (b)(6) **Evaluator:** ETC (b)(6) **Senior Member:** CO
Start Time: 1200 **Stop Time:** 1530
If actual time was less than scheduled time select reason: N/A
Was ISIC monitoring the training? No
Did Training Group complete its prerequisites? yes
Trainer Performance: Full Ready
Session graded? no
Comments on Trainer's Performance: Full Ready
Comments on Training Group Performance: Crew conducted 1 intermediate Port Canaveral Inbound Scenario and 1 intermediate Port Canaveral outbound Scenario with comments below: Scenario #1: NP18 Cyclic Routine, Piloting (Intermediate) - 72% NP14.01 Team Attribute Piloting (Intermediate) - 70% Scenario #2: NP18 Cyclic Routine, Piloting (Intermediate) - 73% NP14.01 Team Attribute Piloting (Intermediate) - 71% Major Comments: Piloting team failed to establish concern for a pleasure craft operating outside the channel transiting inside the channel in front of own ship resulting in a loss of standoff zone awareness. Crew was slow to recognize a passing situation under rule 9 of the ROR resulting in excessive XTE. Minor Comments: C/T SOM F.3.2.4 ? Crew failed to completely utilize the loss of soundings procedure resulting in a loss of situational awareness. C/T SOM 3.6.3 ? Crew failed to utilize BTB communications correctly while hailing a vessel resulting in prolonged BTB communications. Recommendations None Current level of proficiency is AT STANDARDS over all.

ENCLOSURE (32)
34 of 37

Training Session Detail

USS Georgia (Blue) **Session ID: 2183211 Date: 18SEP2015 Time: 0800-1200 POC Phone:** (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Status: Completed **Trainer: SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)**

Trainer Mode: VMS 9.3

Location: Kings Bay Inbound/Outbound
Target Group: Piloting Party
Difficulty Level: Intermediate
Training Type: Responsive Training
Instructor Intervention: Level I - Minimal Intervention
Instructor Involvement: Low - No Instructor written or TSU feedback required
Special Request: Team Building for Piloting Party Outbound/Inbound Kings Bay CMEX IVO Drum Island for Outbound C-152 S-8kt CMEX IVO Buoys 17-18 for Inboound C-268 S-12kt
Training Goals: Request Kings Bay In/Out scenarios for development of Piloting Party. Individual CTQS Attribute: Cyclic Routine, Piloting - NP18 Team Attribute: Piloting - NP14.01

Completion Data

Primary Mission Area	Performance	Grade(0-100)
null	N/A	0

Secondary Mission Area
Primary Core Competency
Secondary Core Competency

Instructor: ET2 (b)(6) **Evaluator:** ETC (b)(6) **Senior Member:** CO
Start Time: 0800 **Stop Time:** 1100
If actual time was less than scheduled time select reason: Completed Training Early
Was ISIC monitoring the training? No
Did Training Group complete its prerequisites? yes
Trainer Performance: Full Ready
Session graded? no
Comments on Trainer's Performance: FULL READY. OOD - WEPS / PHONE TALKER - ENS (b)(6) / JOOD - LT (b)(6) / LOOKOUT - LSSN (b)(6) / HELMSMAN - LS3 (b)(6) / CONTROL RM SUP - LT (b)(6) / CONTACT MANAGER - LTJG (b)(6) / NAVIGATOR - PNAV / ANAV - ANAV / SCOPE OP - ETC (b)(6) / BEARING REC - ET1 (b)(6) / QMOW - ET2 (b)(6) / DECK LOG REC - ET3 (b)(6) / FATHOMETER - ET3 (b)(6) / RADAR - ET2 (b)(6) / FURUNO - ET3 (b)(6) / MK-43 GUNNER - MMFN (b)(6) /
Comments on Training Group Performance: Squadron evaluated PNAV. See Squadron comments for PNAV. Crew conducted (2) Outbound Kings Bay Piloting scenarios with comments below: NP14.01 (INTERMIDIATE) 1st scenario - 80% NP18 (INTERMIDIATE) 1ST scenario - 78% NP14.01 (INTERMIDIATE) 2nd scenario - SEE SQUADRON GRADES. NP18 (INTERMIDIATE) 2ND scenario - SEE SQUADRON GRADES. Major Comments: C/T ROR Rule 6/19 - No discussion of safe speed during reduced visibility. Minor Comments: C/T SOM 1.2.7.4- Scope, QMOW, Radar continue to struggle with reporting gain and loss of NAVAIDS. C/T IC Manual - Several reports conducted by the team were lost due to the piloting team talking over each other. Noise level is improved but still needs work. C/T SOM 1.2.7.4 - The piloting party continues to struggle passing key reports i.e. buoys in line, distance to the turn and shift of set/drift. Recommendations: Recommend the Navigator utilizes abbreviated communications during reports to the Bridge, specifically Mark the turn (visually) reports. Current level of proficiency is AT STANDARDS.

ENCLOSURE (32)
35 of 37

Training Session Detail

USS Georgia (Blue) Session ID: 2183209 Date: 14SEP2015 Time: 0800-1200/ POC Phone (b) (6)
(b) (6)

Status: Completed Trainer: SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Trainer Mode: VMS 9.3

Location: Kings Bay Inbound/Outbound
Target Group: Piloting Party
Difficulty Level: Basic
Training Type: Responsive Training
Instructor Intervention: Level I - Minimal Intervention
Instructor Involvement: Low - No Instructor written or TSU feedback required
Special Request: Team Building for Piloting Party Outbound/Inbound Kings Bay CMEX IVO Drum Island for Outbound C-152 S-8kt CMEX IVO Buoys 17-18 for Inboound C-268 S-12kt
Training Goals: Request Kings Bay In/Out scenarios for development of Piloting Party. Individual CTQS Attribute: Cyclic Routine, Piloting - NP18 Team Attribute: Piloting - NP14.01

Completion Data

Primary Mission Area	Performance	Grade(0-100)
null	N/A	0

Secondary Mission Area
Primary Core Competency
Secondary Core Competency

Instructor: ET1 (b)(6) / ET1 (b)(6) **Evaluator:** ET1 (b)(6) / ET1 (b)(6) **Senior Member:** XO
Start Time: 0830 **Stop Time:** 1200
If actual time was less than scheduled time select reason: N/A
Was ISIC monitoring the training? No
Did Training Group complete its prerequisites? yes
Trainer Performance: Full Ready
Session graded? no
Comments on Trainer's Performance: Full Ready
Comments on Training Group Performance: Crew conducted (2) Outbound Kings Bay Piloting scenarios with comments below: NP14.01 (ADVACED) 1st scenario ? 78% NP18 (ADVANCED) 1ST scenario ? 76% NP14.01 (BASIC) 2nd scenario - 84% NP18 (BASIC) 2ND scenario ? 86% Major Comments: C/T SOM Figure 1-8 Note 1 QMOW failed to setup VMS 9.3 IAW SOM Checklist by not having the ship ground stabilized, preventing the displayed ship?s position from being 100% accurate. C/T ROR Rule 19- No discussion of safe speed during reduced visibility. C/T SORM The OOD did not conduct a proper watch turnover with the Navigator after a loss of communications with the Bridge. Minor Comments: C/T SOM 1.2.7.4- Scope, QMOW, Radar did not report loss of NAVAIDS. C/T IC Manual- Several reports conducted by the team were lost due to the piloting team talking over each. Noise level is improved but still needs work. C/T SOM 1.2.7.4 The piloting party failed to pass key reports i.e. ? buoys in line, gaining and losing Nav Aids, distance to the turn and shift of set/drift. Recommendations: The Piloting Party reported ?Rudder?s Right!? when the helm had turned the wrong way, this does not place the appropriate amount of attention on the helm to realize that a mistake has been made. Recommend reporting ?Rudder?s WRONG!? On several occasions it was noted that the entire party?s situational awareness was severely lacking, this can lead to lost reports, reports not made, and overall can eventually lead to the ship running aground. The entire party needs to become more situationally aware. Current level of proficiency is AT STANDARDS.)

Exhibit (32)
36 of 37

Training Session Detail

USS Georgia (Blue) Session ID: 2176837 Date: 10AUG2015 Time: 0800-1200 POC Phone: (b)(6)

Status: Completed Trainer: SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Trainer Mode: VMS 9.3

Location: Kings Bay Inbound/Outbound
Target Group: Piloting Party
Difficulty Level: Intermediate
Training Type: Responsive Training
Instructor Intervention: Level I - Minimal Intervention
Instructor Involvement: Medium - Instructor assessment and TSU + verbal feedback on performance and goal achievement required
Special Request: Kings Bay Inbound on the 268 leg. Then Kingsbay Outbound starting on the 152 leg.
Training Goals: NP 10.01, NP 14.01

Completion Data

Primary Mission Area	Performance	Grade(0-100)
null	N/A	0

Secondary Mission Area
Primary Core Competency
Secondary Core Competency

Instructor: ET1 (b)(6) **Evaluator:** ETC (b)(6) **Senior Member:** XO
Start Time: 0800 **Stop Time:** 1100
If actual time was less than scheduled time select reason: Completed Training Early
Was ISIC monitoring the training? No
Did Training Group complete its prerequisites? yes
Trainer Performance: Full Ready
Session graded? no
Comments on Trainer's Performance: Full Ready
Comments on Training Group Performance: Crew conducted (1) outbound and (1) Inbound Kings Bay Piloting scenarios with comments below: NP14.01 (Intermediate) 1st scenario ? 76% NP10.01 (Intermediate) 1ST scenario ? 78% NP14.01 (Intermediate) 2nd scenario - 82% NP10.01 (Intermediate) 2ND scenario ? 80% Major Comments: C/T SOM 1.2.7.4.5 the QMOW, Scope, and Radar operators failed to accurately update the Navigator of cross track error while in receipt of a yellow sounding. The error was later passed to the bridge causing a delay in regaining center of track. C/T ROR Rule 19- No discussion of safe speed during reduced visibility. Minor Comments: C/T SOM 1.2.7.4- Scope, QMOW, Radar did not report loss of NAVAIDS. C/T IC Manual- Several reports conducted by the team were lost due to the piloting team talking over each. Noise level is improved but still needs work. OOD orders to the helm NOT IAW IC manual. C/T SOM 1.2.7.4 The piloting party failed to pass key reports i.e. ? buoys in line, gaining and losing Nav Aids, distance to the turn and shift of set/drift. C/T SOM 1.2.7.4- Team failed to recognize casualties on multiple occasions it took the team up to 4 minutes to recognize either a loss of equipment or a regain of equipment. This slow response takes away from the overall picture for the team and leads to team confusion. C/T SOM 1.2.7.4- Team did not consistently follow order of round as briefed. This can and will lead to confusion within the party and can create a larger disparity when entered incorrectly. Current level of proficiency is AT? STANDARDS.)

[illegible] : (32)
37 of 37

(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUBJECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (b)(6)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
		CAPT, USN	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
CSG-10			23 SEP 60
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)		CAPT O6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties - Article 92 (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

A-1-v

ENCLOSURE (33)

1 of 6

(6) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b) (6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b) (6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

EXHIBIT (33)

		TIME	DATE
SIGNATURE (b)(6)		0940	10DEC15
SIGNATURE (b)(6)	(witness)	TIME 0941	DATE 10Dec15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b)(6)	(Interviewer)	TIME 0941	DATE 10Dec15

(b) (6)

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (33)
3 of 10

CAPT (b)(6) GEO Investigation Statement

The below is a summary of my interaction in the planning for GEO's return to port in Kings Bay for towed array replacement to the best of my recollection.

At some time during the ship's Independent Certification (ICERT) (date unknown), CAPT (b)(6) (CSS-16 Deputy for Training) told me the Squadron was working with CSL N3 to arrange a port visit following the ship's ICERT to get the crew some additional piloting experience and change out the failed TB-16 towed array prior to the ship's scheduled Tactical Readiness Evaluation (TRE). The primary location they were seeking was Port Canaveral (PCAN). I supported and stood by as CSS-16 worked through the details. At some later time, CAPT (b)(6) told me they were going to bring GEO into Kings Bay vice PCAN due to the cost of Force Protection for a stop in PCAN. The next I saw anything on this was the Submarine Movement Message (SMM) 48-15, which contained a 0730 arrival and 1600 departure on 25 November. I did not question the timing of the arrival with respect to darkness at this time. CAPT (b)(6) and I later (late in the week of 16 Nov or early in the week of 23 Nov) discussed that Squadron was working to shift the arrival time to the right by 30 minutes to deconflict with darkness. I fully supported, but did not directly involve myself in these efforts.

Planning for this visit got more attention late in the week of 16 Nov due to poor coordination between the Naval Submarine Support Center Operations team, who develops the local mooring plan with inputs from the Squadrons, and Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic (SWFLANT), who controls the intended mooring location of Explosive Handling Wharf 1 (EHW 1); when the SWFLANT CO highlighted the poor coordination to CAPT (b)(6) (CSG-10 Chief of Staff (CoS)). Further complexity with the plan caused lots of conversation between key players in Kings Bay (NSSC, CSS-16, SWFLANT, CSG-10) and CSL N3 throughout Mon (11/23) and Tues (11/24) to ensure the ship was able to execute arrival, towed array swap and departure in the same day to preserve ship's training time. Discussion concluded sometime on Tues (11/24) with the plan to moor at the warping wharf between the EHWs, attempt the towed array swap and return to sea regardless

ENCLOSURE (33)
4 of 6

of success all on Weds (11/25). I was unaware of specific timing plans at this time and still believed the intent was to shift the arrival to later in the morning.

Shortly after 1700 on Tues (11/24), I received CSS-16's USS GEORGIA TOWED ARRAY TB-16 REPAIR INTENTIONS message that brought my attention back to the arrival time. I believe I first attempted to call CAPT (b)(6) to determine the reasoning for maintaining it with no joy, then sent a short UNCLAS e-mail to him with a request for the reasoning, and finally went to discuss with CAPT (b)(6) (CSG-10 Chief of Staff (CoS)) to see if he had discussed it with anyone at CSS-16. I was not exceedingly concerned with the ship transiting the entrance channel at night due to no turns and the lighted range, but the margin for adequate light to conduct a safe pilot transfer was little. I discussed continuing attempts to contact CAPT (b)(6) but CoS (b) (6) decided to contact CDRE (b)(6) directly. While driving home, I called CoS (b)(6) to see what he got from CDRE (b)(6) . He stated that CSS-16 had requested the change, but it was denied at the CSL N3 level. He also said the CDRE had discussed the arrival with CAPT (b)(6) and encouraged him to slow things down as needed. This satisfied me because I expected the ship to enter the entrance channel somewhat late and increase margin to my tripwire of available light by pilot pick-up.

The next I interacted with the situation was immediately upon my arrival in the office on 11/25 when I was called to RDML (b) (6) office and heard about the ship's troubles with Buoy 23.

(b)(6)

CAPT, USN

ENCLOSURE (33)

5 of 6

Rank/Name: CAPT (b)(6)
Role: CSG N9

Q. Please verify from your statement that CAPT (b)(6) told you one of the objectives for a PVST after ICERT was to "gain some additional piloting experience" in addition to swapping out the towed arrays.

- Primary purpose was to swap out the TA, but CAPT (b)(6) did mention it was an opportunity to also get piloting experience before TRE (TRE would have included a return to port Kings Bay).

Q. Discuss any CSG-10 participation/knowledge of schedule discussions.

- Initial plan was to pull into EHW—that was decided the week of 16 Nov between CSS 16 and SWFLANT.
- On Friday of that week, CO SWFLANT (CAPT (b)(6) called COS (b)(6) and told him he was unhappy with the coordination to pull GEO into the EHW on Wednesday for a 1-day in and out. (b)(6) (CO NSSC) called me and apologized for poor coordination.
- I called CSS-20 to discuss moving an SSBN at the refit piers or mooring GEO outboard an SSBN. CDRE (b)(6) gave a couple options to support these alternate COAs. I also called TRF to ensure they could do a (b)(1)1 5a if moored outboard an SSBN.
- I was then told that it was worked out with CSL that GEO could do the TRE (b)(1)1 5a Given that, CSS-16 decided that the plan to try and do a 1-day (b)(1)1 5a was OK, knowing that if the swap was not successful, the ship could get underway the same day and execute the TRE (b)(1)1 5a
- I was aware that CSS-16 was still trying to push the RTP by 30 minutes or so. When I saw the msg on Tuesday night that the arrival time was still 0730, I discussed with COS (b)(6)
- (bottom line) The timing worked, and with the buffer that I assumed would be utilized based on the CDRE's discussion with the CO, I had no problems with the plan.

(Everything else is adequately discussed in CAPT (b)(6)'s voluntary stmt)

Q. Please comment freely in your capacity as one of our most experienced Kings Bay SME for this type of evolution.

- Entering the entrance channel at night-- not an issue. But having light for the pilot transfer is important. Given that, the critical piece is the time that the ship arrives at the entrance channel.
- During a flood current, pilots are typically waiting out near the jetties (IVO 18/19, or slightly west of that). This allows the pilot transfer to complete even before the basin.
- This pilot was way west of basin. Based on that, in conjunction with lack of comms with the tug, it was impossible to get the pilot on before the first turn. Given this scenario, I would have contacted the pilot and told him to embark after the first turn.

- In 2009, WVA had similar problem. Their speed was too high and they blew by the tug and had a close interaction with the same buoy. CSS-20 and TTF train on that scenario all the time—they force ships in training scenarios at TTF to deal with pilot transfer anomalies like the tug losing comms, tug falls, tug is out of position, etc. all to test this very point.

(b)(6) 4 DEC 15
CAPT USN
N3/N9, CSG 10

ENCLOSURE (33)
6 of 6

~~SUSPECT'S~~ RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
(b)(6)		CAPT/O-6	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
CSG-10			11/11/68
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)		CAPT O-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties (b)(6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (34)
1 of 4.

(4) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (34)
2 of 4.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	1308	12/9/15
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER)	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	0940	11 Dec 15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS)	TIME	DATE
(b)(6)	0840	11 Dec 15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

(b) (6)

Attached

CAB

ENCLOSURE (34)
3 of 4

Witness Statement: (b)(6) , CAPT, USN

Subj: USS GEORGIA Buoy Allision

As the Chief of Staff at COMSUBGRU TEN, I was kept informed of the USS GEORGIA (b)(1)1.5a issue and the ship's desire to have the towed array replaced prior to her Tactical Readiness Evaluation (TRE). Squadron SIXTEEN leadership was working to have it replaced in PCAN, Mayport, or Kings Bay. The Squadron had preferred PCAN, however, there were factors (unknown to me) associated with the other ports that drove the ship back to Kings Bay for the replacement. Pier space in Kings Bay was an issue – During the week of 23 November, I had numerous discussions amongst SWFLANT, NSSC, and both Squadrons on berthing options for the ship. On or about 23 November (might have been at the end of the week of 16 Nov), CAPT (b)(6) (CSG-10 N3/N9) and I talked about the scheduled arrival time of 0730 for the ship. Both of us agreed that this was not desired since it would involve part of the inbound transit in darkness. CAPT (b)(6) was to talk to CSS to have the arrival time shifted later.

On the evening of 24 November, I discussed the arrival time with CAPT (b)(6) again to see if it had shifted. He informed me that it hadn't been. I told him that I would call and talk with CDRE (b)(6) I immediately called the CDRE. I asked CDRE (b)(6) why the time had not been shifted. He told me that CSS had said no, that they wanted to keep it at 0730. I expressed my reservations to the CDRE and he informed me that the ship would be at the pilot pickup point at civil twilight, and that the ship would be only in darkness during the entrance channel leg. He also told me that he had discussions with the CO the previous evening and that the CO knew to slow things down if he was uncomfortable. This placated me with respect to the arrival time.

(b)(6)

CAPT, USN

ENCLOSURE (34)

4 of 4

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT
(See JAGMAN 0170)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b)(6)	SSN	RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
		O6	USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT			DATE OF BIRTH
CSS 16			12/26/68
NAME (INTERVIEWER)		RATE/RANK	SERVICE (BRANCH)
CAPT (b)(6)		CAPT O-6	USN
ORGANIZATION		BILLET	
COMSUBLANT		N7	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW		TIME	DATE
CSG-10		1505	10 Dec 15

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

Dereliction in the performance of duties [(b) (6)]

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ---------- (b)(6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial; ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; ---------- (b)(6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and ------ (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (35)
1 of 33

(6) If I decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, I will have the right to stop this interview at any time. ---------- (b)(6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ---------- (b)(6)

(1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent. ---- (b)(6)

(2) I expressly desire to make a statement. ---------- (b)(6)

(3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. ---------- (b)(6)

(4) I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. ---------- (b)(6)

(5) This acknowledgement and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (b)(6)

(6) I further understand that, even though I initially waive my rights to counsel and to remain silent, I may, during the interview, assert my right to counsel or to remain silent. ---------- (b)(6)

NOTE: IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE IS WILLING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SHOULD FIRST BE ASKED WHETHER HE HAS MADE A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SUSPECTED OFFENSE TO ANYONE HE BELIEVED WAS ACTING IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY PRIOR TO THE PRESENT INTERVIEW. IF THE SUSPECT INDICATES HE HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, ADVISE THE SUSPECT AS FOLLOWS:

PREVIOUS STATEMENTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) My previous statement may not be admissible at courts-martial and may not be usable against me. (It may not be possible to determine whether a previous statement made by the suspect will be admissible at some future court-martial; this suggests it may be wise to treat it as inadmissible and provide the cleansing warning).

(2) Regardless of the fact that I have talked about this offense before, I still have the right to remain silent now.

ENCLOSURE (35)
2 of 33

	TIME	DATE
SIGNATURE (WITNESS/OBSERVER) (b)(6)	1500	12/10/15
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b)(6)	1600	12/10/15
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b)(6)	1600	12/10/15

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ____ page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

See attached

ENCLOSURE (35)
3 of 33

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6) wanted to use PCAN as the port for towed array replacement for a number of reasons he outlined in an email to me dated 9 November (enclosure 1). On November 12th, I sent an email to CSL N3 indicating I would like to have GEORGIA pull into Port Canaveral (PCAN) for towed array replacement. (enclosure 2) CAPT (b)(6) subsequently called and informed me that PCAN would not be possible because of limitations on force protection assets. I then informed CAPT (b)(6) by email (enclosure 3) on the same day that a PCAN visit would not possible because of force protection asset limitations.

(Note: On November 17th, I flew to Millington, TN for a selection board. I remained in Millington until November 20th. I then flew to Key West and boarded GEORGIA on the morning of November 21st and departed GEORGIA on the afternoon of November 22nd. I returned home on November 23rd and returned to work the morning of November 24th. During my absence, CAPT (b)(6) was the acting Commodore. We communicated periodically by phone and by UNCLASS email.)

CAPT (b)(6) informed me in two emails on November 18th and November 19th (enclosures 4 and 5) that he was working with CSL N3 for towed array replacement plan.

While underway on GEORGIA, CAPT (b)(6) articulated to me his displeasure with the towed array eplacement plan. He disagreed with three aspects:

) Arriving early morning around the time of sunrise
) Departing the same day – he wanted to give his crew a chance to spend Thanksgiving in port
) Replacing the towed array at all – he felt he could safely execute the TRE without a towed array

committed to him that I would look closely at the schedule when I returned to Kings Bay and would ork to change if possible. During my final out brief with CAPT (b)(6) I gave him five observations and commendations from my ride. One of these five recommendations was to be prepared to not get his esires in regards to the towed array swap. I knew that much ground work had probably been laid in e effort to swap the array and I may not be able to undo that effort during my one day in the office.

n the morning of November 23rd, I held a teleconference with my staff leadership prior to starting my vel back home. CAPT (b)(6) . CAPT (b)(6), CDR (b)(6) and CMDCM (b)(6) participated in the phone ll. During the call, I directed that:

Explore the option of conducting the TRE without the towed array. After discussing the idea with PT (b)(6) and seeing his crew operate, I was comfortable with the idea of conducting the TRE thout the towed array.
If GEORGIA was going to pull into Kings Bay, move the return to port time one hour later. I had served an operations brief while onboard GEORGIA that showed the planned Fort Clinch arrival time s going to be 4 minutes prior to civil twilight. I thought arriving around civil twilight was a reasonable n, especially if the boat delayed arrival by 10 or 15 minutes. However, I asked my team to push for later arrival because it met CAPT (b)(6) desires.

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (35)
4 of 33

[illegible] and asked for an update on the GEORGIA towed array plan. CAPT (b)(6) sent me four emails that pertained to the issue (enclosures 6 thru 9). From these emails I understood that the request to conduct the TRE without the towed array had been denied and that there was still confusion over the exact plan to get the towed array swapped. Additionally, I received a verbal report from CAPT (b)(6) that the request to move the return to port an hour later had been denied. In parallel, I directed my squadron ANAV contact the Kings Bay pilots to determine if the pilots were comfortable with GEORGIA's scheduled 0730 arrival time. My ANAV reported that the pilots were comfortable with the planned arrival time.

Subsequently, CAPT (b)(6) contacted me by phone around 0930 that morning to inquire about the TA swap plan. I told him that he would be pulling in to swap the towed array and that the 0730 mooring time remained as planned. I also told him that I had contacted the Kings Bay pilots and that they were comfortable with the plan. CAPT (b)(6) told me he felt the plan was executable.

I advised that if he felt uncomfortable he should just "slow things down" and that I was not going to be concerned if he arrived late to the warping wharf. He continued to be frustrated with the fact that he needed to return to sea on Wednesday and that the plan would have a negative impact on crew morale. He urged me to push to keep the GEORGIA in port until Friday so the crew could spend Thanksgiving at home. I told him I would consider looking at options to keep him in port until Friday. As I left the phone call, I felt we had agreed that the early morning arrival was executable and that the next issue that CAPT (b) (6) wanted addressed was his desire to remain in port for the holiday.

After completing the phone call with CAPT (b)(6) , my staff briefed me on the various options associated with the towed array swap. In short, there was no good plan available if the swap was unsuccessful on Wednesday because there were no good mooring options available for GEORGIA that would support a Friday underway. (enclosure 10) Based on these facts, I called CAPT (b)(6) at CSL N7 to propose that if the swap was unsuccessful, I planned to send GEORGIA back to sea on Wednesday without the array and that we should modify the upcoming TRE agenda accordingly if needed. CAPT (b)(6) called me back about 30 minutes later to say that my proposal had been approved by CSL N7. I subsequently sent an email to the CSL N3, N4 and N7 stating my intentions. CAPT (b)(6) responded and concurred with my proposal. (enclosure 11)

never proposed to CSL that GEORGIA remain in port through Friday because I had made previous rguments about the downsides to a lengthy stay in Kings Bay (enclosure 12) and I felt the ship needed o maximize at-sea training days, even though it would be unpopular with the crew and the Captain. I ent an email to CAPT (b)(6) at the end of the work day to explain to him that I had not fought for him o remain in port through Friday. He responded later that evening to my email. (enclosure 13)

APT (b)(6) called me at about 0715 on Wednesday morning to report that he had collided with a buoy round the pilot pickup point. I subsequently received an email from him at 1304 that afternoon nclosure 14) that spelled out in detail his objections to the towed array swap plan. He stated that he ad sent the email the previous day and that a LAN malfunction prevented delivery.

ENCLOSURE (35)
5 of 37

(b)(6)

Rank/Name: CDRE (b)(6)
Role: ISIC

Q. Were you satisfied with COMSUBLANT N3 response to Force Protection asset availability in PCAN?

- Since the request was denied almost immediately, it was clear to me that there was not much room for negotiation on the topic. The N3 had contacted me by phone very shortly after I sent the email and explained that force protection assets in PCAN were very limited and were used primarily for DASO operations and Submarine Command Course operations.

Q. What was your response to the three reasons given by CAPT (b)(6) on why he did not want to execute the rip as scheduled (as you listed in your statement).

- All requests were relevant because they were the CO's requests, they were all reasonable to look at.

Q. In your opinion, if you were the CO, would you be absolutely against a sunrise arrival.

- No. I didn't think it was too risky based on my own navigation experience. Also, the CO had direct control of mitigation for his primary concern – arriving later. He could have arrived at Fort Clinch 30 minutes later than he actually did. This arrival time would have been about 15 minutes after civil twilight and it would have been dramatically lighter outside. When we spoke on the phone the day before arrival, I had advised him to "slow things down" as he saw fit and I let him know I was not concerned with an on-time arrival at the pier.

Q. Was the CO's desire to keep the ship home during Thanksgiving considered?

This desire was considered but not the driving factor. I weighed the competing elements of ship's need for experience at sea, crew morale along with berthing availability. There was no easily viable plan to berth the GEO over Thanksgiving and get her back underway on Friday. The only possible plan would have been to keep her in until Monday.

Q. If SWFLANT could have supported a Friday underway would you have considered it?

Cannot say for sure, but it would have opened up another option.

Q. Did you take the opportunity to discuss with CAPT (b)(6) about conducting the TRE without the towed array since the plan was to leave without it if a one day turn around could not be accomplished?

No. I understood that the TRE team wanted to make a reasonable attempt to get the Towed Array repaired and would conduct the TRE with the towed array if it could not be repaired.

(b)(6) 12/14/15

EXHIBIT (35)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO < (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil>
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 16:26
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: PCAN ~~(S)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CDRE,

I think it is important to make a convincing argument for GEORGIA visit to PCAN 24 – 28 November to (b)(1)↑ 5a (b)(1)↑ 5a Although it may not carry much water, I offered the possibility to my crew a reward for completing the large amount of corrective maintenance, pms, retests, cleaning the ship, performing well on PORSE, and getting to sea in October. This visit will go a long way toward my effort to build crew morale early in my tour as we have had to push hard to succeed thus far. There are also many benefits to this mission:

1) Practice piloting into a port not our home port. Allows for Navigation and Force Protection drills. Officer qualifications.

2) Additional Rx S/U and S/D will greatly assist in close out of provisional qualifications (due 31 Dec).

3) It is an ideal location for our required (b)(1)↑ 5a drill (away from homeport).

4) Proficiency of PCAN pilot and port operations with Trident class. It will be nearly a year before the next OHIO visit. I am told this is an NOTU/SSP priority.

5) Practice liberty as a mission. Remaining in a deployed posture vice returning to homeport. Greatly reduces lost time to surface/enter/exit/submerge and return to operational posture.

6) This rare opportunity would benefit Cape Canaveral Area Navy League and Submarine League promotion of the Sub Force (tours). In addition, they would host our Sailors for Thanksgiving.

I am aware of the additional work for TRF and Coast Guard requirements but I think it is worth fighting through those obstacles. I am confident that our team will perform well during the visit and satisfactorily on TRE. If we can't make it work, I would like to pursue a short return to Kings Bay but that would have more disadvantages than benefits.

Very Respectfully, (b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ (35)
7 of 33

~~SECRET~~

Captain (b)(6), USN

Commanding Officer

USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 729B)

KILL THE BASTARDS!

DERIVED FROM:

DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 15:14
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Cc: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
Subject: (U) Towed Array Replacement on GEORGIA

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

(b)(6),

I prefer GEORGIA pull into PCAN for towed array replacement as opposed to Kings Bay.

I understand you are limited by force protection assets for PCAN port visits, so I wanted to provide my reasoning:

1) (b)(1)1 5a

. Once again, I know that is not a completely rational argument, but I like the idea of pulling into a remote port, completing the necessary, underway limiting items and then leaving.

2) Pulling into PCAN provides some practical, experience building experiences for this crew that has limited underway time. (piloting in a port other than Kings Bay, practice overseas liberty policy, fix accident drill in a port away from home)

V/R,

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CAPT (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM:
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (35)
9 of 33

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 15:57
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO'
Subject: RE: (U) PCAN (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO [mailto: (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 10:09 AM
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: RE: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CDRE,
All good with me. (b)(1)1 5a

/R (b)(6)

Captain (b)(6) USN
Commanding Officer
USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 729B)
KILL THE BASTARDS!

---Original Message---
From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore [mailto: (b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 8:11 AM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Subject: RE: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (35)
10 of 33

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)† 5a

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO [mailto: (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 8:48 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: RE: (U) PCAN (6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CDRE,

(b)(1)† 5a

(b)(1)† 5a

(b)(6)

Captain (b)(6) , USN
Commanding Officer
USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 729B)
KILL THE BASTARDS!

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore [mailto: (b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 3:22 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Subject: RE: (b)(1)† 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

think all of your arguments are valid and we are pursuing (b)(1)† 5a

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (35) 2

However, I don't think I could make a good argument for staying until the 28th. I think it would be a shorter stay in order to preserve your at-sea operational days – probably 24-26 November.

R/

(b)(6)

——Original Message——
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO [mailto: (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:26 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 18, 00 - Commodore
Subject: FOAN (S)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CDRE,

(b)(1)1.5a

(b)(1)1.5a

1)
qu

2)

3) (b)(1)1.5a

4)

5)

)

(b)(1)1.5a

(b)(1)1.5a

ry Respectfully, (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (36)
12 of 30

3

[redacted], USN

Commanding Officer

USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 729B)

KILL THE BASTARDS!

CLASSIFIED BY: CAPT (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: SECRET

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: SECRET

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: SECRET

(b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Wednesday, November 18, 2015 16:00
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: Thurs
Signed By: (b)(6) @navy.mil

CDRE,

1. TYCOM SOC Rep reports GEO got u/w with 3 SOC admin issues. (Non-ships force) ICERT continuing with permission. Critique when RTP.

2. Still working COB issue. Getting some pushback from FORCE. Manageable here. CSS20 working behind scenes. Not helpful.

3. No word yet on TA date for GEO. I will call CSL N3 tomorrow for resolution.

4. Calming folks here wrt ORM Board. Talked to CAPT (b)(6). He re-iterates OP5 is not bargainable. I told him A-21 will not be forum for ORM Board. Current plan has 4 days of cushion. We can't ask for OP5 deviations just because the CO wants more cushion to underway date. (b) (6) is confident in ability to execute on time. I will be at A-21 and will evaluate need for ORM Board.

5. CO GEO(G) just submitted travel request to take his CHOP, WEPS, NAV along with him to Naples. I told him previous COs went by themselves. He should be prepared to do same. I will check [illegible] tomorrow that he goes alone.

6. No major issues with MATOP.

7. No issues from CSL Ops Brief.

R,

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (35)
14 of 37

(b)(6) [illegible] - Commodore

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 15:54
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: Thurs
Signed By: (b)(6) @navy.mil

CDRE,

Small bites so you can read it all.

1. PAO/Reporter made BSP and onboard.

2. COA1 for COB looks good. GRU Co5 says COA2 requires ADM (b)(6) concurrence.

ENCLOSURE (35)
15 of 33

(b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 15:57
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: Thurs2
Signed By: (b)(6) @navy.mil

3. GEO FLTA Wed. Will probably require u/w after dark. Submitted divers request to dive early. CSL (b) (6) informed.

4. MAR EKMS Sat, CYBER Sat. NSTM Tagout Issue (electrical, aft drain pump). JTG concurs with continue crit test plan. Going well.

EID 03[illegible]/35)
16 of 32

(b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 15:59
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: Thur3
Signed By: (b)(6) @navy.mil

FORCE is onboard with COA1. He is working funding so we can get barracks room. CMDCM will be there when notice is made.
Waiting on official notice chain to execute.
CSS20 already squewking about next COB assignment.

Vr,

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (35)
17 of 22

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 7:53
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: FW: (U) GEO EHW Support

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

fysa

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:41 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: RE: (U) GEO EHW Support

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Understand. Let me know when you want me to have Admiral (b) (6) give CAPT (b)(6) a call to help him coordinate better.

v/r (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: (U) GEO EHW Support

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

N3/N3A,

(b)(6)

(b)(1) 5a

CAPT (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (35)
18 of 33

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 7:53
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: FW: (U) GEO Repair
Signed By: (b)(6) @NAVY.SMIL.MIL

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

fysa

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:53 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I prefer to have GEO remain at sea. The issue is with the TRE Team's insistence that you have a working TA. I will engage and see if we can overcome their objection...if we can: 1. Are you okay doing the TRE without a TA? 2. Is (b) (6) okay with that? 3. What moves do you need between now and the TRE?

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
SUBLANT N3A
Deputy Director for Operations
(b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.(smil.)mil

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:06 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir (b)(6),

ving Waivers will likely not be approved. We are hanging our hat on the ability of TRF personnel snagging the array om the TA barge.

Any consideration for leaving the boat at sea and replacing array during avail? The crew that has the boat now is not the deploying crew. Do TWP/TRE without array.

VR,
CAPT (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 7:41 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4A
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3; (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N44; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N42; (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I was under the impression that we already had a waiver to dive GEO for their array swapout...did I get that confused with BSE? Either way, can you please check on this? I'd like to get GEO back on schedule and getting her turned around in a single day is a part of that plan.

(b) (6)

(b)(6)
SUBLANT N3A
Deputy Director for Operations
(b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.(smil.)mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2015 4:29 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Subject: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir,

There exists a large probability that GEO will not make same day u/w . Approval of diver ops waiver is not anticipated and the TA swap personnel do not think they can capture the array to offload without diver support.

Array cannot be captured without divers, GEO TA offload and onload occurs day 3 with u/w that evening.

ENCLOSURE (35) 2
20 of 27

More info as it becomes available.

V/r,

CAPT (b)(6)
ACTING CSS16
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J0
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 7:52
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: FW: (U) GEO Repair
Signed By: (b)(6) @NAVY.SMIL.MIL

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

fysa

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 3:18 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(b)(6)

I was not able to get N7 buy-in on a TRE without a TA.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
SUBLANT N3A
Deputy Director for Operations
(b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.(smil.)mil

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 1:06 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(b)(6)

. I am ok with boat remaining at sea.

I spoke with CDRE (b)(6) this morning. After riding boat, he is comfortable with doing TRE w/o array.

ie CS516 Sonarman is onboard and concurs. Of note, I spent my deployment with this crew operating w/o TA.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

ENCLOSURE (35)1

We can do TA tracking and other stuff in trainers. In fact, we do this for CTEs.

3. Just need water for boat to get to TRE ----. Days u/w are invaluable.

Vr,

(b)(6)

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:53 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I prefer to have GEO remain at sea. The issue is with the TRE Team's insistence that you have a working TA. I will engage and see if we can overcome their objection...If we can: 1. Are you okay doing the TRE without a TA? 2. Is (b)(6) okay with that? 3. What moves do you need between now and the TRE?

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
SUBLANT N3A
Deputy Director for Operations
(b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.(smil.)mil

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:06 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Mr (b)(6)

Diving Waivers will likely not be approved. We are hanging our hat on the ability of TRF personnel snagging the array from the TA barge.

Any consideration for leaving the boat at sea and replacing array during avail? The crew that has the boat now is not the deploying crew. Do TWP/TRE without array.

VR,
CAPT (b)(6)

EXHIBIT (35)
23 of 33

-----Original Message-----
From (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 7:41 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4A
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3; (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N44; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N42; (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I was under the impression that we already had a waiver to dive GEO for their array swapout...did I get that confused with BSE? Either way, can you please check on this? I'd like to get GEO back on schedule and getting her turned around in a single day is a part of that plan.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
SUBLANT N3A
Deputy Director for Operations
(b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.(smil.)mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2015 4:29 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Subject: (U) GEO Repair

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

3,

Here exists a large probability that GEO will not make same day u/w . Approval of diver ops waiver is not anticipated and the TA swap personnel do not think they can capture the array to offload without diver support.

Array cannot be captured without divers, GEO TA offload and onload occurs day 3 with u/w that evening.

More info as it becomes available.

CPT (b)(6)

EXHIBIT (35)
24 of 32

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 7:54
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: FW: (U) GEO EHW Support
Signed By: (b)(6) @NAVY.SMIL.MIL

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

fysa

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:38 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore; (b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBRON SIXTEEN, OPS; (b)(6) CAPT; (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer; (b)(6) CDR NSSC KB GA (CO), N00; (b)(6) CDR COMSUBLANT; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT N31; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N35/37; (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36; (b)(6) CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4A
Subject: RE: (U) GEO EHW Support

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) -

What the heck is going on in Kings Bay? As we discussed, keeping (b)(1)1.5a and the (b)(1)1.5a on Wednesday. If that cannot be completed on Wednesday to get her [illegible] underway, I expect support until she is underway. It doesn't excite me that no one will work on Thanksgiving but I suppose I can understand. Friday is not a federal holiday and I see no reason why I can't get services to finish array replacement and get her underway.

Please engage and let me know the state of play.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
SUBLANT N3A
Deputy Director for Operations
(b) (6)
(b)(6) @navy.(smil.)mil

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3

~~SECRET~~

(35)
25 of 33

~~SECRET~~

Cc: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBROW 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: (U) GEO EHW Support

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

N3/N3A,

Just received call from CAPT (b)(6) SWFLANT CO. Due to (b)(1)1 5a , he (b)(1)1 5a (b)(1)1 5a until the extended holiday is complete.

CSS16 is working with CSS20 and TRF to re-examine mooring options if the array cannot be replaced at the Wharfing pier. More to follow.

Vr,

CAPT (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1 5a
DERIVED FROM:
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(35)

2

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, JOS
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 7:52
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Sked

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

COS,

I have talked at length with (b)(6) He will not budge on Fri. He will not call in people off leave.

RI is doing slip ring cutting on EDG. She still has some steaming retests to do also. We risk missing her underway date also if work does not get done.

We are still working with TRF to see if we can go outboard a CSS20 unit. They said originally they could not do TA outboard but some staff here think it is possible.

More to follow.

Vr,

(b)(6)

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 5:56 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, JOS
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Sked

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

What diesel maintenance is RHODE ISLAND doing – no way to put it back together to move her?

I can call (b)(6) and discuss the Friday issue to support the ship – should do that before VADM makes a call to SSP. For my SA, have you already talked with (b)(6) ?

r/r (b)(6)

----Original Message----
From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, JOS
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 5:30 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01
Subject: (U) GEO Sked

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(35)
27 of 27

~~SECRET~~

CoS,

Fysa

GEO is scheduled to rtp Wed for (b)(1)1 5a

There currently exists no pier space other than EHW that has services. CSL desires a one day turnaround.

Plan is to bring her in to Warping Wharf and place (b)(1)1 5a behind her. Personnel will then attempt to (b)(1)1 5a small boat and bring to (b)(1)1 5a for offload. If we use divers, we have to s/d.

SWFLANT has agreed to bring GEO into EHW for s/d if we . This will entail a delay of several hours. N4 is working waiver to dive less than 24hrs

(b)(1)1 5a

I engaged today with CSL N3 and N7 to get permission to execute TRE (b)(1)1 5a . N3A concurred, N7/TRE Team did not. This crew will not deploy immediately. They return after TRE and go to AHPTP. The CDRE and I recommended executing the TRE w/o array. Boat stays at sea gaining operational experience vice waiting at pier for u/w.

(b)(1)1 5a move to open pier space. Refit two is unavailable due to lack of the permanent inboard oil boom. SUBASE will not release pier for use.

After speaking with CSL N3A, it looks like the decision whether to keep GEO here if unsuccessful non-diver array capture procedure fails will not be made until Wed. CSL N3 offered to have VADM (b) (6) call SWFLANT CO and "Inquire" about lack of support for Friday u/w.

More to follow as sked evolves.

Vr,

(b)(6)

CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1 5a
DERIVED FROM.
DECLASSIFY ON:

CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1 5a
DERIVED FROM
DECLASSIFY ON:

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1 5a

~~SECRET~~

35

24 0522

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore

From: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO < (b)(6) @georgia-blue.navy.smil.mil>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 20:54
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: RE: (U) TA Repair ~~(C)~~

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CDRE,
Copy all. We intend to drive hard to accomplish this mission.

Warmest Regards and Very Respectfully, (b)(6)

Captain (b)(6) , USN
Commanding Officer
USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN 729B)
KILL THE BASTARDS!

~~----~~Original Message~~----~~
From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore [mailto: (b)(6) @navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 5:38 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE CO
Subject: (U) TA Repair

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6)

I wanted to let you know that I did not go forward with an argument to CSL for you to stay in Kings Bay until Friday. I re-read my earlier email with CSL N3 -- I really made a strong argument for you to not pull into Kings Bay. As we discussed on the phone, I really didn't feel I could try to undo that previous argument.

I know you are disappointed with this outcome -- I hope we can get the (b)(1)1 5a done and get you back to sea tomorrow.

R/

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

CLASSIFIED BY: CAPT (b)(6)
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT (35)
29 of 32

CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore

From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 13:55
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Cc: (b)(6) CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4A; (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N70A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer
Subject: RE: (U) GEORGIA Towed Array Plan

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Thanks (b)(6) we are all on the same sheet of music.

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 12:47 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Cc: (b)(6) CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N4A; (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N70A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBGRU 10, N01; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN; (b)(6) CAPT USS GEORGIA SSGN 729 BLUE, J05; (b)(6) CDR NNPI-NSSC Kings Bay GA, Commanding Officer
Subject: (U) GEORGIA Towed Array Plan

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

N-Heads,

If we are unable to swap out GEORGIA's (b)(1)1.5a on Wednesday, I intend to send her back to sea that same day (b)(1)1.5a . If necessary, we would then work with the TRE team to modify the in port portion of the TRE as appropriate because of the lack of a (b)(1)1.5a .

I don't want GEORGIA to remain in port through Friday because she will miss valuable at-sea time. She has good momentum going now and a lengthy stay in port would be detrimental.

With that said, we do have a pretty good plan to (b)(1)1.5a using a small boat that does not require diver support.

V/R,

(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6)
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1 5a
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2015 15:14
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N3
Cc: (b)(6) CIV COMSUBLANT, N3A; (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
Subject: (U) Towed Array Replacement on GEORGIA

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6)

I prefer GEORGIA pull into PCAN for towed array replacement as opposed to Kings Bay.

I understand you are limited by force protection assets for PCAN port visits, so I wanted to provide my reasoning:

1) (b)(1)1 5a

2) . . . . . (b)(1)1 5a

V/R,

(b)(6)

APT (b)(6)
ommander, Submarine Squadron 16
(b) (6)

ASSIFIED BY: CAPT (b)(6)
ERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
ECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

ssification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT (35) 1

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

DERIVED FROM: (b)(1) 1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1) 1.5a

november 25, 2015

I was assigned to the arrival of USS Georgia from sea on 25 November 2015. The ship was scheduled for a 0630 arrival time at Fort Clinch pilot pickup. I was on station in the vicinity of buoy 2: onboard C-Tractor 4 at 0530 awaiting arrival. Normally once contacted by the inbound unit that they are at the Jetties we will easy out to buoy 19 to allow more time for transfer, especially on the flood tide.

At approximately 0610-0615 (early) the tug captain noticed the unit, already between buoys 19 and 2 approaching our location. At this point we had not yet been contacted VIA VHF radio from the unit, s the Tug Captain initiated communication for the pilot transfer. The vessel indicated they would like a port side transfer and the tug made its approach to drop me off.

When I was about ¾'s of the way up the trunk to the bridge I heard someone say, "You're going to hit that buoy". I then heard the order, "Right full rudder, ahead full".

When I got up on the Con buoy 23 was approximately 30 ft off the port bow and the vessel was full ahead with right full rudder in order to avoid the buoy. The wind and current was on the STBD side of the vessel setting them towards the buoy. Once the buoy was clear of the bow the Captain shifted his rudder to avoid hitting the buoy with his stern. The wind and current was too strong for the stern to overcome and buoy 23 struck Georgia on her port quarter and slid down her side and off the stern.

Once buoy 23 was clear of the stern the vessel had substantial headway from the full ahead bell used t avoid the buoy. The vessel was proceeding across the channel towards shoal water. I told the Captain we need to go emergency back full, which he did. I told C-Tractor 4 to come around the bow and standby to push on the STBD bow. The vessels headway checked up when it was approximately half a ship length outside the channel on the red side. I do not believe the vessel grounded anytime while it was outside the channel. As the vessel got sternway I had C-Tractor 4 come in on the STBD bow and push her fair into the channel with a full bell.

Once fair in the channel the ship rang up turns for 12 knots and proceeded to ETNV Wharf with no further incident.

This statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Captain (b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (3
1 of 1

On 27 November 2015, Captain (b)(6) gave a verbal statement to the investigation officer, Captain (b)(6) (b)(6) USN. Captain (b)(6) said he never thought of calling th GEORGIA to cancel the pilot transfer. He stated that the pilot transfer could have occurred during the turn and with no problems up to a speed of nine knots.

Captain (b)(6) stated that once he reached the bridge, he thought all of the orders given by Captain (b)(6) were correct t maximize the ability of the GEORGIA to avoid an allision with buoy 23, specifically the order for All Ahead Full, Right Full Rudder. Captain (b)(6) agreed that by this time the ship was too close to the buoy to order All Back Emergency and avoid the allision. He stated that All Back Emergency would have had to have been ordered earlier in the turn basin to have worked. If it had been ordered, Captain (b)(6) stated the tug would have been able to get the GEORGIA back on track and completed the inbound without incident.

Captain (b)(6) stated that once the GEORGIA recovered from the allision, the rest of the inbound occurred without incident and with a normal and professional battle rhythm from all personnel on aboard USS GEORGIA.

ENCLOSURE (37)
1 of 1

ENGINEER'S BELL BOOK - ALL VESSELS

SHIP NAME: USS GEORGIA

SHIPTYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	ZONE	SHEET SERIAL	SHAFT NUMBERS	CLASS	HAND.	#COUNTER TURNOVERS (THIS SHAFT)	DAILY - ENGINE OR SHAFT TURN COUNTER READING
SSGN	0729	15	11	25	R	01	0001			00	346161

Record of all BELLS and ORDERS received regarding movement of propellers this date.

En route from SEA to KINGS BAY Clocks set back or ahead ____ hrs. ____ min. at ____

(1) TIME	(2) SIGNAL	(3) R.P.M.	(4) PITCH SET
0000			
0003			
[illegible]			
0351			
0520	(b)(1)1.5a		
0351			
[illegible]			
0434			
0435			
0456			
0441			
	(b)(6)		
0452			
0463	(b)(1)1.5a		
[illegible]			
0516			
0552			
0532			
0543			
0613	(b)(1)1.5a		
0614			
0615			
0617			
0618			
0620			
0621			

(1) TIME	(2) SIGNAL	(3) R.P.M.	(4) PITCH SET
0622			
0623			
0624			
0626			
0627	(b)(1)1.5a		
0628			
0630			
0631			
0631			
0634			
0635			
0637			
0640			
0658			
0703	(b)(1)1.5a		
0705			
0706			
0713			
0713			
0715			

(1) TIME	(2) SIGNAL	(3) R.P.M.	(4) PITCH SET
	(b)(6)		
	(b)(1)1.5a		
	(b)(6)		
	(b)(6)		

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

S/N 0116-LF-128-0003

ENCLOSURE (39)

KB 11/25 and 12/6

ENCL 21
1 OF 1

(PILOTIN G K NGS BAY INBOU ND AND OUTBOUND)	
OOD	WEPS
JOOD	LT
PHON TALKER	LTJG
LOOKOUT	LTJG
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR	LT
PROPULSION PLANT SUPERVISOR	ENG
EOOW	PER SECTION WATCHBILL (LTJG)
CONTACT MANAGER	LTJG
NAVIGATOR	NAV
ANAV	ANAV
SCOPE OPERATOR	ETC
EARING RECORDER	ET1
MOW	ET2
ECK LOG RECORDER	ET3
ATHOMETER	ET3
ADAR	ET2
JRUNO	ET3

NAV
SWE
COC

ETC CLOSURE (40)

Weather History for KFHB - November, 2015

November

25

2015

View
Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Daily | Weekly | Monthly | Custom

	Actual	Average (KJAX)	Record (KJAX)
Temperature			
Mean Temperature	72 °F	68 °F	
Max Temperature	77 °F	71 °F	86 °F (1992)
Min Temperature	66 °F	48 °F	31 °F (1970)
Degree Days			
Heating Degree Days	0	7	
Month to date heating degree days		110	
Since 1 July heating degree days		135	
Cooling Degree Days	6	1	
Month to date cooling degree days		54	
Year to date cooling degree days		2837	
Growing Degree Days	22 (Base 50)		
Moisture			
Dew Point	69 °F		
Average Humidity	87		
Maximum Humidity	93		
Minimum Humidity	47		


ENCLOSURE (41)
1 of 9

	Actual	Average (KJAX)	Record (KJAX)
Precipitation			
Precipitation	0.00 in	0.07 in	1.89 in (2014)
Month to date precipitation		1.74	
Year to date precipitation		49.22	
Snow			
Snow	0.00 in	0.00 in	0.00 in (2001)
Month to date snowfall		0.0	
Since 1 July snowfall		0.0	
Since 1 September snowfall		0.0	
Snow Depth			
Sea Level Pressure			
Sea Level Pressure	30.37 in		
Wind			
Wind Speed	16 mph (NE)		
Max Wind Speed	22 mph		
Max Gust Speed	29 mph		
Visibility	9 miles		
Events			

T = Trace of Precipitation, MM = Missing Value Source: NWS Daily Summary

Daily Weather History Graph

ENCLOSURE (4)
2 of 9



report this ad | why ads?

Search for Another Location

Airport or City:

KFHB

Submit

Trip Planner

Search our weather history database for the weather conditions in past years. The results will help you decide how hot, cold, wet, or windy it might be!

Date:

November

25

Submit

report this ad | why ads?

Astronomy

ENCLOSURE (41
3 of 9

Nov. 25, 2015	Rise	Set
Actual Time	7:00 AM EST	5:25 PM EST
Civil Twilight	6:34 AM EST	6:51 PM EST
Nautical Twilight	6:04 AM EST	7:20 PM EST
Astronomical Twilight	5:36 AM EST	7:49 PM EST
Moon	5:36 PM EST (11/25)	6:28 AM EST (11/25)
Length of Visible Light	11h 16m	
Length of Day	10h 24m	

Full, 100% of the Moon is Illuminated

Nov 25	Nov 25	Dec 3	Dec 11	Dec 18
Full	Full	Last Quarter	New	First Quarter

report this ad | why ads?

Hourly Weather History & Observations

Time (EST)	Temp.	Dew Point	Humidity	Pressure	Visibility	Wind Dir	Wind Speed	Gust Speed	Precip	Events	Conditions
12:16 AM	68.0 °F	57.2 °F	66%	30.32 in	10.0 mi	ENE	16.1 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
12:35 AM	68.0 °F	57.2 °F	66%	30.32 in	10.0 mi	ENE	16.1 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Overcast
12:55 AM	68.0 °F	57.2 °F	66%	30.32 in	10.0 mi	NE	13.8 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Overcast
1:15 AM	68.0 °F	57.2 °F	66%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	13.8 mph	26.7 mph	N/A		Overcast
1:35 AM	68.0 °F	57.2 °F	66%	30.32 in	10.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
1:55 AM	68.2 °F	57.2 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	19.6 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
2:15 AM	68.2 °F	57.2 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	19.6 mph	26.5mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
2:35 AM	68.2 °F	57.2 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
2:55 AM	68.0 °F	57.2 °F	66%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	20.7 mph	26.3 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
3:15 AM	68.0 °F	57.2 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	-			Overcast

ENCLOSURE (4)
4 of 9

Time (EST)	Temp.	Dew Point	Humidity	Pressure	Visibility	Wind Dir	Wind Speed	Gust Speed	Precip	Events	Conditi
3:35 AM	69.2 °F	67.2 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Overcas
3:55 AM	69.0 °F	67.2 °F	68%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
4:15 AM	69.0 °F	67.2 °F	68%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
4:35 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
4:55 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.30 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.1 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
5:15 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Clear
5:35 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.1 mph	24.2 mph	N/A		Clear
5:55 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.32 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.1 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
6:15 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NNE	16.1 mph	24.2 mph	N/A		Clear
6:35 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.31 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
6:55 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.32 in	10.0 mi	NNE	13.8 mph	18.4 mph	N/A		Clear
7:15 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.33 in	10.0 mi	NE	11.5 mph	17.3 mph	N/A		Clear
7:35 AM	69.0 °F	69.0 °F	73%	30.34 in	10.0 mi	NE	8.1 mph	18.1 mph	N/A		Clear
7:55 AM	69.8 °F	69.8 °F	68%	30.35 in	10.0 mi	ENE	5.8 mph	-	N/A		Clear
8:15 AM	71.6 °F	67.2 °F	60%	30.36 in	10.0 mi	East	5.8 mph	-	N/A		Clear
8:35 AM	71.6 °F	68.4 °F	67%	30.37 in	10.0 mi	ESE	9.2 mph	-	N/A		Clear
8:55 AM	73.4 °F	68.4 °F	53%	30.38 in	10.0 mi	East	8.1 mph	-	N/A		Clear
9:15 AM	73.4 °F	67.2 °F	57%	30.38 in	10.0 mi	East	10.4 mph	-	N/A		Clear
9:35 AM	73.4 °F	67.2 °F	57%	30.39 in	10.0 mi	East	9.2 mph	-	N/A		Clear
9:55 AM	75.2 °F	67.2 °F	53%	30.40 in	10.0 mi	East	11.5 mph	-	N/A		Clear
10:15 AM	75.2 °F	67.2 °F	53%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	East	13.8 mph	-	N/A		Clear

ENCLOSURE (41)
5 of 9

Time (EST)	Temp.	Dew Point	Humidity	Pressure	Visibility	Wind Dir	Wind Speed	Gust Speed	Precip	Events	Conditions
10:35 AM	76.2 °F	67.2 °F	53%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	East	13.8 mph	-	N/A		Clear
10:55 AM	77.0 °F	67.2 °F	50%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	East	12.7 mph	18.8 mph	N/A		Clear
11:15 AM	77.0 °F	66.4 °F	47%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	East	18.1 mph	-	N/A		Clear
11:35 AM	77.0 °F	66.0 °F	54%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	East	13.8 mph	-	N/A		Clear
11:55 AM	77.0 °F	67.2 °F	50%	30.40 in	10.0 mi	ENE	18.1 mph	-	N/A		Clear
12:15 PM	77.0 °F	67.2 °F	50%	30.40 in	10.0 mi	ENE	18.1 mph	-	N/A		Clear
12:35 PM	77.0 °F	67.2 °F	50%	30.39 in	10.0 mi	ENE	17.3 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
12:55 PM	77.0 °F	66.0 °F	54%	30.39 in	10.0 mi	ENE	15.0 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
1:15 PM	77.0 °F	66.0 °F	54%	30.38 in	10.0 mi	ENE	15.0 mph	-	N/A		Clear
1:35 PM	77.0 °F	66.0 °F	54%	30.38 in	10.0 mi	ENE	18.1 mph	28.7 mph	N/A		Clear
1:55 PM	76.2 °F	66.0 °F	57%	30.37 in	10.0 mi	ENE	13.8 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
2:15 PM	77.0 °F	66.0 °F	54%	30.37 in	10.0 mi	ENE	17.3 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Clear
2:35 PM	76.2 °F	67.2 °F	53%	30.37 in	10.0 mi	ENE	16.0 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
2:55 PM	73.4 °F	66.0 °F	61%	30.36 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
3:15 PM	73.4 °F	66.0 °F	66%	30.36 in	10.0 mi	NE	15.0 mph	24.2 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
3:35 PM	71.6 °F	66.0 °F	69%	30.36 in	7.0 mi	NE	19.6 mph	26.8 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
3:55 PM	71.6 °F	66.0 °F	69%	30.36 in	10.0 mi	NE	21.9 mph	28.8 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
4:15 PM	71.6 °F	66.0 °F	69%	30.36 in	7.0 mi	NE	18.4 mph	24.2 mph	N/A		Clear
4:35 PM	69.8 °F	66.0 °F	73%	30.36 in	7.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	24.2 mph	N/A		Clear
4:55 PM	69.8 °F	66.0 °F	73%	30.36 in	7.0 mi	NE	16.1 mph	25.3 mph	N/A		Clear
5:15 PM	69.8 °F	66.0 °F	73%	30.36 in	7.0 mi	NE	18.4 mph	24.2 mph	N/A		Clear

ENCLOSURE (41)
6 of 9

Time (EST)	Temp.	Dew Point	Humidity	Pressure	Visibility	Wind Dir	Wind Speed	Gust Speed	Precip	Events	Condition
6:35 PM	69.8 °F	60.8 °F	73%	30.39 in	7.0 mi	NE	18.1 mph	28.8 mph	N/A		Clear
6:55 PM	69.0 °F	60.8 °F	76%	30.40 in	10.0 mi	NE	19.1 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Clear
7:15 PM	69.0 °F	60.8 °F	76%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
7:35 PM	69.0 °F	60.8 °F	76%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	NE	16.1 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
7:55 PM	69.0 °F	60.8 °F	76%	30.41 in	10.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	25.3 mph	N/A		Clear
8:15 PM	68.8 °F	62.6 °F	83%	30.42 in	7.0 mi	NE	12.7 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
8:35 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.42 in	7.0 mi	NE	19.4 mph	28.8 mph	N/A		Overcast
8:55 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.42 in	7.0 mi	NE	16.1 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
9:15 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.42 in	7.0 mi	NE	17.3 mph	21.9 mph	N/A		Clear
9:35 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.42 in	7.0 mi	NE	19.8 mph	27.6 mph	N/A		Clear
9:55 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.42 in	7.0 mi	NE	16.1 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
10:15 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.43 in	7.0 mi	NE	13.8 mph	20.7 mph	N/A		Scattered Clouds
10:35 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	83%	30.43 in	7.0 mi	NNE	12.7 mph	19.6 mph	N/A		Clear
10:55 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.43 in	7.0 mi	NE	16.0 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Mostly Cloudy
11:15 PM	69.8 °F	62.6 °F	78%	30.43 in	10.0 mi	ENE	16.0 mph	-	N/A		Overcast
11:35 PM	69.8 °F	69.0 °F	68%	30.43 in	10.0 mi	ENE	16.4 mph	27.6 mph	N/A		Overcast
11:55 PM	69.8 °F	69.0 °F	68%	30.43 in	10.0 mi	ENE	16.6 mph	23.0 mph	N/A		Overcast
12:15 PM	71.6 °F	69.0 °F	64%	30.43 in	10.0 mi	ENE	10.4 mph	-	N/A		Overcast
12:35 PM	69.8 °F	60.8 °F	73%	30.43 in	10.0 mi	ENE	6.9 mph	-	N/A		Overcast
12:55 PM	69.8 °F	60.8 °F	73%	30.43 in	10.0 mi	NE	9.2 mph	-	N/A		Overcast

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ENCLOSURE (41)
7 of 9

Sun and Moon Data for One Day

U.S. Naval Observatory
Astronomical Applications Department


Fernandina Beach, Nassau County, FL (Longitude W81° 27', Latitude N30° 40')

Wednesday, November 25, 2015 Eastern Standard Time

Sun	
Begin civil twilight	6:34 a.m.
Sunrise	7:00 a.m.
Sun transit	12:13 p.m.
Sunset	5:25 p.m.
End civil twilight	5:51 p.m.
Moon	
Moonrise	4:46 p.m. on preceding day
Moon transit	11:34 p.m. on preceding day
Moonset	6:26 a.m.
Moonrise	5:37 p.m.

Phase of the Moon on November 25, 2015: Full Moon at 5:44 p.m. (local standard time)

ENCLOSURE (41)
8 of 9



Back to form

ENCLOSURE (41)
9 of 9

Station	Depth	Latitude	Longitude	Min Before Flood Spd	Min Before Flood Dir	Flood Spd	Flood Dir	Min Before Ebb Spd	Min Before Ebb Dir	Ebb Spd	Ebb Dir
St. Marys River											
south jetty (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=south+jetty&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=16&fdr=%2D16&fdm=16&stbeh=%2D04&stbem=56&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=27&fdr=0.3&stbr=0.8&fdrvgd=341&stbbvgd=110&footnote=)	8d	30° 42.42'	81° 32.03'	0.8	030	0.8	341	0.1	226	1.0	110
. . . do. (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=16&fdr=%2D16&fdm=02&stbeh=%2D04&stbem=54&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=33&fdr=0.3&stbr=0.6&fdrvgd=329&stbbvgd=112&footnote=)	18d	30° 42.42'	81° 32.82'	0.4	033	0.7	329	0.3	226	1.0	112
. . . do. (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=16&fdr=%2D06&fdm=56&stbeh=%2D06&stbem=46&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=32&fdr=0.3&stbr=0.5&fdrvgd=313&stbbvgd=114&footnote=)	34d	30° 42.41'	81° 32.82'	0.2	034	0.6	313	0.2	223	1.2	114
ST. MARYS RIVER ENTRANCE (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance)	8d	30° 42.48'	81° 29.68'	0.1	183	2.3	272	-	-	2.0	093
. . . do. (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=04&fdr=%2D04&fdm=30&stbeh=%2D04&stbem=01&stbbh=%2D04&stbbm=02&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.8&fdrvgd=272&stbbvgd=093&footnote=)	25d	30° 42.48'	81° 29.68'	-	-	2.2	272	-	-	2.0	093
. . . do. (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=06&fdr=%2D06&fdm=01&stbeh=%2D04&stbem=01&stbbh=%2D04&stbbm=02&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.7&fdrvgd=271&stbbvgd=092&footnote=)	42d	30° 42.48'	81° 29.68'	0.1	002	1.8	271	-	-	2.0	092
Fort Clinch, 0.3 n.mi. N of (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=Fort+Clinch,+0.3+n.mi.+N+of&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=36&fdr=%2D06&fdm=14&stbeh=%2D06&stbem=23&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=33&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.8&fdrvgd=275&stbbvgd=087&footnote=)	60d	30° 42.35'	81° 27.14'	0.2	220	1.3	271	0.1	269	1.6	087
Quarantine Reach, 0.4nm W of Fort Clinch (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=Quarantine+Reach,+0.4nm+W+of+Fort+Clinch&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=06&fdr=%2D06&fdm=19&stbeh=%2D06&stbem=27&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=06&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.8&fdrvgd=235&stbbvgd=034&footnote=)	7d	30° 42.28'	81° 27.72'	0.1	307	1.2	235	0.1	318	1.7	034
. . . do. (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=06&fdr=%2D04&fdm=02&stbeh=%2D06&stbem=18&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=14&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.8&fdrvgd=232&stbbvgd=047&footnote=)	27d	30° 42.28'	81° 27.72'	-	-	1.2	232	-	-	1.4	047
. . . do. (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=11&fdr=%2D04&fdm=13&stbeh=%2D06&stbem=12&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=21&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.4&fdrvgd=228&stbbvgd=089&footnote=)	48d	30° 42.28'	81° 27.72'	-	-	1.1	228	-	-	1.2	089
Fort Clinch, 1.1 n.mi. NW of (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=Fort+Clinch,+1.1+n.mi.+NW+of&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=01&fdr=%2D06&fdm=01&stbeh=%2D04&stbem=15&stbbh=%2D06&stbbm=18&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.7&fdrvgd=308&stbbvgd=133&footnote=)	14d	30° 42.84'	81° 28.38'	0.1	344	1.3	308	0.1	087	1.8	133
. . . do. (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=13&fdr=%2D02&fdm=02&stbeh=%2D04&stbem=02&stbbh=%2D04&stbbm=06&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.5&fdrvgd=319&stbbvgd=122&footnote=)	30d	30° 42.84'	81° 28.38'	0.1	016	1.1	316	0.1	032	1.3	122
Cumberland Island, Range B Channel (/pst_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstn=Cumberland+Island,+Range+B+Channel&stbfr=%2D06&stbfm=16&fdr=%2D06&fdm=36&stbeh=%2D06&stbem=06&stbbh=%2D04&stbbm=06&fdr=0.8&stbr=0.7&fdrvgd=310&stbbvgd=170&footnote=)	23d	30° 43.83'	81° 29.64'	-	-	1.2	309	-	-	1.0	170

ENCLOSURE (42)
1 of 4


Drum Point Island, Range D Channel (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=Drum+Point+Island,+Range+D+Channel&stbfr=%2D0&stbfm=0&stbfd=%3D0&fdr=11&stbeh=%2B0&stbem=02&stbbh=%2D0&stbbm=03&fdr=0.6&stbbr=0.6&flowgd=350&stbbwgd=170&footnote=)	12d	30° 48.54'	81° 26.13'	0.1	169	1.1	350	0.1	164	1.0	170
. . . do. (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=,+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D0&stbfm=10&stbfd=%2D0&stbfm=34&stbeh=%2D0&stbem=06&stbbh=%2D0&stbbm=08&fdr=0.4&stbbr=0.6&flowgd=361&stbbwgd=170&footnote=)	22d	30° 48.54'	81° 26.13'	0.2	180	0.8	351	0.1	118	1.3	170
Kings Bay, Lower Turning Basin (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=Kings+Bay,+Lower+Turning+Basin&stbfr=%2D0&stbfm=03&stbfd=%2B0&fdr=38&stbeh=%2D0&stbem=18&stbbh=%2D1&stbbm=04&fdr=0.1&stbbr=0.1&flowgd=307&stbbwgd=127&footnote=)	14d	30° 47.84'	81° 30.48'	0.1	282	0.3	357	0.1	216	0.3	127
Stafford Island, west of (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=Stafford+Island,+west+of&stbfr=%2D0&stbfm=26&stbfd=%2D0&stbeh=%2D0&stbem=27&stbbh=%2D1&stbbm=01&fdr=0.6&stbbr=0.6&flowgd=0&stbbwgd=180&footnote=)	-	30° 48.6'	81° 26.8'	-	-	1.3	000	-	-	1.3	180
Old Fernandina, Amelia River, Old Town Reach (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=Old+Fernandina,+Amelia+River,+Old+Town+Reach&stbfr=%2D0&stbfm=03&fdr=%2B0&fdr=20&stbeh=%2B0&stbem=03&stbbh=%2D0&stbbm=06&fdr=0.7&stbbr=0.6&flowgd=186&stbbwgd=018&footnote=)	4d	30° 41.16'	81° 27.01'	-	-	1.0	180	-	-	1.0	018
. . . do. (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=,+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D0&stbfm=06&fdr=%2B0&fdr=28&stbeh=%2B0&stbem=04&stbbh=%2D0&stbbm=03&fdr=0.6&stbbr=0.6&flowgd=186&stbbwgd=018&footnote=)	14d	30° 41.16'	81° 27.01'	-	-	1.4	180	-	-	1.4	018
. . . do. (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=,+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2D0&stbfm=12&fdr=%2B0&fdr=31&stbeh=%2B0&stbem=06&stbbh=%2D0&stbbm=03&fdr=0.5&stbbr=0.5&flowgd=183&stbbwgd=010&footnote=)	24d	30° 41.16'	81° 27.64'	-	-	1.2	183	-	-	1.2	010
Fernandina Beach, City Front Reach, Amelia River (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=Fernandina+Beach,+City+Front+Reach,+Amelia+River&stbfr=%2B0&stbfm=34&fdr=%2D0&fdm=11&stbeh=%2D0&stbem=12&stbbh=%2B0&stbbm=30&fdr=0.4&stbbr=0.4&flowgd=240&stbbwgd=088&footnote=)	8d	30° 40.21'	81° 28.07'	-	-	0.8	240	-	-	1.0	088
. . . do. (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=,+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2B0&stbfm=29&fdr=%2D0&fdm=06&stbeh=%2D0&stbem=08&stbbh=%2B0&stbbm=33&fdr=0.3&stbbr=0.4&flowgd=234&stbbwgd=083&footnote=)	11d	30° 40.21'	81° 28.07'	-	-	0.8	230	-	-	1.0	083
. . . do. (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=,+,+,+do.&stbfr=%2B0&stbfm=29&fdr=%2D0&fdm=03&stbeh=%2D0&stbem=07&stbbh=%2B0&stbbm=34&fdr=0.3&stbbr=0.3&flowgd=234&stbbwgd=078&footnote=)	23d	30° 40.21'	81° 28.07'	-	-	0.8	230	0.1	146	0.8	089
Kingsley Creek, highway bridge (/get_predc.shtml?year=2015&stn=1102+St. Marys River Entrance&secstr=Kingsley+Creek,+highway+bridge&stbfr=%2B1&stbfm=48&fdr=%2B1&fdm=17&stbeh=%2B0&stbem=53&stbbh=%2B1&stbbm=25&fdr=0.5&stbbr=0.6&flowgd=150&stbbwgd=330&footnote=)	-	30° 37.7'	81° 30.1'	-	-	1.1	150	-	-	1.0	330

Information	Products	Programs	Partners	
About CO-OPS (/about.html)	PORTS (/ports.html)	Mapping and Charting Support (/mapping.html)	Hydrographic Survey Support (/hydro.html)	Revised: 10/15/2013
Disclaimers (/disclaimers.html)	OFS (/models.html)	Maritime Services (/maritime.html)	Marsh Restoration (/marsh.html)	NOAA (http://www.noaa.gov) / National Ocean Service (http://oceanservice.noaa.gov)
Contact Us (/contact.html)	Tide Predictions (/tide_predictions.html)	COASTAL (/coastal.html)	GoMOOS (/gomoos.html)	Web site owner: Center for Operational Oceanographic Products and Services
Privacy Policy (/privacy.html)	Currents (/ctdata/StationList?type=Current+Data&filter=all&sort=dist.html)		TCOON (/tcoon.html)	
	More about products... (/products.html)	More about programs... (/programs.html)		

ENCLOSURE (42)
2 of 4

St. Marys Entrance, North Jetty, Georgia Tide Chart

Requested time: 2015-11-25 Wed 12:00 AM EST



Content was blocked because it was not signed by a valid security certificate.

For more information, see "About Certificate Errors" in Internet Explorer Help.

Save this tide table: subscribe or download


Search

Google

St. Marys Entrance, North Jetty, Georgia
30.7200° N, 81.4450° W

2015-11-25	Wed	1:11 AM	EST	-1.2 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-25	Wed	7:00 AM	EST	Sunrise	
2015-11-25	Wed	7:17 AM	EST	7.5 feet	High Tide
2015-11-25	Wed	1:52 PM	EST	-0.8 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-25	Wed	5:24 PM	EST	Sunset	
2015-11-25	Wed	5:44 PM	EST	Full Moon	
2015-11-25	Wed	7:40 PM	EST	6.4 feet	High Tide
2015-11-26	Thu	2:01 AM	EST	-1.2 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-26	Thu	7:01 AM	EST	Sunrise	
2015-11-26	Thu	8:00 AM	EST	7.5 feet	High Tide
2015-11-26	Thu	2:42 PM	EST	-0.8 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-26	Thu	5:24 PM	EST	Sunset	
2015-11-26	Thu	8:31 PM	EST	6.4 feet	High Tide
2015-11-27	Fri	2:50 AM	EST	-1.1 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-27	Fri	7:02 AM	EST	Sunrise	
2015-11-27	Fri	8:50 AM	EST	7.4 feet	High Tide
2015-11-27	Fri	3:31 PM	EST	-0.6 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-27	Fri	5:24 PM	EST	Sunset	
2015-11-27	Fri	9:22 PM	EST	6.2 feet	High Tide
2015-11-28	Sat	3:30 AM	EST	-0.8 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-28	Sat	7:02 AM	EST	Sunrise	
2015-11-28	Sat	9:48 AM	EST	7.1 feet	High Tide
2015-11-28	Sat	4:18 PM	EST	-0.3 feet	Low Tide
2015-11-28	Sat	5:24 PM	EST	Sunset	
2015-11-28	Sat	10:11 PM	EST	6.0 feet	High Tide
2015-11-29	Sun	4:26 AM	EST	-0.4 feet	Low Tide

ENCLOSURE (42)
3 of 4



Air Temp Wind Speed Water Temp Visibility

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For more Information, see "About Certificate Errors" in Internet Explorer Help.

Time Control

Year: 2015 Month: 11 Day: 25 Go

Tide Calendars

One month
One year

Content was blocked because it was not signed by a valid security certificate.

For more information, see "About Certificate Errors" in Internet Explorer Help.

NOT FOR NAVIGATION

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ENCLOSURE (42)
4 of 4

Submarines (Command) Qualification Card

(b)(6)

Content Version: 3.0.5b - July 2014

Start Date: 24-Sep-2015 Estimated Completion Date: 28-Sep-2017 Status: 5% complete

Prerequisites

none

Knowledge

AR04 - Arctic Communications

Demonstrate knowledge of Arctic communications. This demonstration could include under-ice floating wire antenna employment and VLF, polar EHF, Iridium operations, or other equivalent circuits.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

CC04.01 - EKMS Policy and Procedures

Demonstrate knowledge of EKMS policies and procedures. This demonstration could include receipt, transfer, routine destruction, inventories, verification of reserve holdings, user representative registration, common account data entry or updates, KP rekey and platform changeover procedures, LCMS database daily and monthly backups, DTD operations (including audit trails and receipt of electronic key), ordering and accountability of electronic keying material, and reporting requirements.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

CC29Q - Message Requirements

Demonstrate the knowledge required to draft, edit and interpret messages (e.g., ZUZZ, SUBS, CASREP, SITREP, OPREP-3, etc.). This demonstration could include knowledge of references, routing requirements, and timelines (if applicable).

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

ISR37Q - Satellite Vulnerability

Demonstrate knowledge of satellite vulnerability. This demonstration should include types of vulnerability and resources used to determine windows or areas of vulnerability.

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CO Date

IT02 - Network Security

Demonstrate knowledge of security requirements for Department of Defense information systems. This demonstration may include spillage procedures, the Information assurance vulnerability alert (IAVA) process for SUBLAN and SWFTS networks, cifest and server side security, network security tools, and other security concepts (e.g., authentication, encryption, typical vulnerabilities, etc.).

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CO Date

LS01.01 - Financial Management

Demonstrate knowledge of the Navy financial system and operating target (OPTAR). This demonstration could include fund code assignments, reporting

ENCLOSURE (43)
1 of 28

requirements, posting and validating summary filed order expenditure difference listings (SPOEDL), and end-of-year closeout.

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CO Date

LS27Q - Supply Management

Demonstrate knowledge of submarine supply management. This demonstration could include financial management procedures (e.g., operating target (OPTAR), end-of-year closeout, etc.), inventory management (e.g., Q-in-use, MAM's, DLR's, etc.), logistics procedures (e.g., repair parts and consumables, inventories, COSAL, etc), and HAZMAT control and management.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

LS28Q - Material Management

Demonstrate knowledge of submarine material management. This demonstration could include knowledge of equipment status logs (ESL) or other shipboard tracking processes (e.g., OOC log, instrument log, etc.), consolidated ship's maintenance project (CSMP) or equivalent, logistics required to support preventative and corrective maintenance, relationships and agreements with intermediate and depot level activities, and work coordination and authorization processes.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

NP19Q - Advanced Navigation Topics

Demonstrate knowledge of advanced navigational topics. This demonstration could include JTAAs, BULLPENs, NOTACKs, coordinated strike group operations, maritime claims and maritime law.

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CO Date

SOF01 - SOF Missions

Demonstrate knowledge of planning and executing common SOF missions. This demonstration could include surfaced CRRC launch and recovery, communications, rendezvous techniques, infil/exfil platforms, employment of lockout chamber/trunk (SSGN/VA class only), etc.

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CO Date

ST24Q - Missile and Launcher Casualties

Demonstrate knowledge of missile and launcher casualties on own ship and the consequences of casualties on other firing units. This demonstration could include immediate actions, supplemental actions, and the recoverability of the missile or launcher.

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CO Date

YN01 - Ship's Office Management

Demonstrate knowledge of ship's office management. This demonstration could include plan of the day or week development and routing, processing of sensitive correspondence, file and directive management, customer service, etc.

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CO Date

YN02.01 - Personnel Management

Demonstrate knowledge of Navy personnel management programs. This demonstration could include fitness reports, indoctrination, EDVR, ODCR, awards, transfers, and NEC management.

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CO Date
2 of 28

Skills

ASA04Q - ASW Approach and Attack

Demonstrate the ability to conduct ASW approach and attack as the Approach Officer.

Note: Session 1 of 2.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

ASA04Q - ASW Approach and Attack

Demonstrate the ability to conduct ASW approach and attack as the Approach Officer.

Note: Session 2 of 2.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

AST12Q - Passive Tracking

Demonstrate the ability to passively track a submarine as OOD without violating a tactical control metric. Specifically, no MTR or OPORD violations, collisions, or counter-detections.

Note: Session 1 of 2.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

AST13Q - Passive Tracking

Demonstrate the ability to passively track a submarine as OOD without violating a tactical control metric. Specifically, no MTR or OPORD violations, collisions, or counter-detections.

Note: Session 2 of 2.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

DC14Q - Fire

Demonstrate the ability to combat a fire while standing the designated watch. This demonstration could include a fire of any size, classification, and in spaces applicable to the watchstander.

Note: To be performed while acting as XO.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

DC15Q - Flooding

Demonstrate the ability to combat a flooding casualty while standing the designated watch. This demonstration could include flooding of any size, from any source, and in spaces applicable to the watchstander.

Note: To be performed while acting as XO.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

ISR44Q - ISR Ship positioning

Demonstrate the ability to optimally position the ship in an ISR scenario as OOD. Positioning should be accomplished with due regard for operational constraints, contact management, geographic or other constraints, and mission priorities.

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ENCLOSURE (23)
3 of 28

CO Date

ISR47Q - Ascent to Periscope Depth (PD)

Demonstrate the ability to transition to PD operations from depth as an OOD in an ISR or other applicable mission scenario.

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CO Date

MCM06Q - MCM Track Planning

Demonstrate the ability to plan a transit through possibly mined waters. This demonstration could include threat quantification, ship preparations, and development of sensor search plans.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

SC01.01 - Mooring

Demonstrate the ability to enter a harbor and moor the ship as OOD.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

SC37Q - Underway

Demonstrate the ability to get the ship underway as OOD. This demonstration could include an assisted or unassisted underway, as is appropriate for the ship/ schedule.

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CO Date

SC42Q - Torpedo Evasion

Demonstrate the ability to conn the ship during a simulated torpedo evasion. This demonstration may be conducted in conjunction with any appropriate warfare event (e.g., ASW approach and attack, ASUW approach and attack, strategic launch, etc.).

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

ST25Q - Strike Operations

Demonstrate the ability to conduct a strike as tasked as the Approach Officer. This demonstration could include missile selection, engagement planning, receipt and processing of strike data, (e.g., MDU, firing report, ESP (TTWCS only), and flex targeting (TTWCS only), etc.).

Note: Session 1 of 2.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

ST28Q - Strike Operations

Demonstrate the ability to conduct a strike as tasked as the Approach Officer. This demonstration could include missile selection, engagement planning, receipt and processing of strike data, (e.g., MDU, firing report, ESP (TTWCS only), and flex targeting (TTWCS only), etc.).

Note: Session 2 of 2.

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CO Date

SU28Q - ASUW Approach and Attack

Demonstrate the ability to conduct ASUW approach and attack as the Approach Officer.

Note: Session 1 of 2.

ENCLOSURE (43)
4 of 28

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CO Date

SU28Q - ASUW Approach and Attack

Demonstrate the ability to conduct ASUW approach and attack as the Approach Officer.

Note: Session 2 of 2.

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

Complex Submarine Evolution - CO01

1. Anchoring

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

2. Combat Search and Rescue/Open Ocean BSP

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

3. Submarine Mine Countermeasures

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

4. Naval Special Warfare

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

5. Conventional Weapons Handling

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

6. Strategic Weapons Handling

☑ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ 12-Aug-2015
CO Date

7. Foreign Port AT/FP

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

Under Instruction - CO02

1. Engineer

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

2. Navigator

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature (b) (6) 31-Oct-2015
CO Date

3. Supply Officer

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

4. (Strategic) Weapons Officer

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____ _____
CO Date

ENCLOSURE (43)
5 of 29

5. Executive Officer

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

CO Date

[redacted]

none

[redacted]

none

[redacted]

1. Command Qualification Board

☐ Waiver ☐ Authorized Alternate Signature _____

Squadron Commander Date

[redacted]

Final Interview. At the discretion of the Qualifying officer, the final interview may be combined with other interviews and conducted as a qualification board.

_____

Squadron Commander Date

ENCLOSURE (2/5)
6 of 28

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Proficiency Groups

Proficiency Groups » Officer of the Deck » Ludwig, Joshua

TYCOM - Directed

Skill						
CM02.01	Surfaced Collision Avoidance	☑	06-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017	92%	ABOVE
NP05.02	Navigation While On Mission		04-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017	85%	ABOVE
SCM12.02	Sonar Display Interpretation Range Discrimination	☑	07-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017	83%	ABOVE
SCM16.02	Periscope Employment		06-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017	92%	ABOVE
Knowledge						
CM01.01	Rules of the Road, Maneuvering Char., Reduced Vis.			03-Mar-2017		
CM14	Surfaced Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			03-Mar-2017		
NP17	Navigation Lessons Learned			03-Mar-2017		
SCM08	Submerged Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			03-Mar-2017		
SCM51	Range Discrimination and Contact Triage			03-Mar-2017		

Command - Selected (* Designated Command Selected Capabilities)

Skill						
CM03.02*	In-extremis Maneuvers			03-Mar-2017		
ISR18.01*	ELINT and COMINT Parameter Changes			03-Mar-2017		
NP04.01	Fix Ship's Position			03-Mar-2017		
NP09.02	Fathometer Operations			03-Mar-2017		
NP11.01	Cyclic Ops/Ops, Open-Ocean			03-Mar-2017		
S001.01	Mooring			03-Mar-2017		☑
SC49	Ship Handling - High Speed Operations			03-Mar-2017		
SC50*	Ship Handling - Large Angles and Rudders		07-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017	90%	ABOVE
SC51*	Ship Handling - Emergency Ship Control			03-Mar-2017		
Knowledge						
AR03.01	Arctic Operations			03-Mar-2017		☑
AST03*	Passive Tracking			03-Mar-2017		☑
AST04	Active Tracking			03-Mar-2017		☑
ISR09	ELINT and COMINT Parameters			03-Mar-2017		☑
ISR10	Mission Communication Requirements			03-Mar-2017		☑
MCM01.01	Mine Vulnerabilities			03-Mar-2017		☑
MCM03.01	HF Active in Mine Danger Areas			03-Mar-2017		☑
NP01.01	Open Ocean Navigation			03-Mar-2017		☑
NP02.01	Inertial Navigation			03-Mar-2017		☑

ENCLOSURE (43)
1 of 28

MP07.01*	VHS Operations	03-Mar-2017	
SC14*	Submerged Hydrodynamic Forces	03-Mar-2017	
SC16	Shallow Water Operations	03-Mar-2017	
SCH19	Advanced Periscope Functionality	03-Mar-2017	
ST10.01	Strike Communications	03-Mar-2017	
SU01.01	Torpedo Presets	03-Mar-2017	
SU02.01	Torpedo Casualties	03-Mar-2017	
SU03.01	Threat Parameters	03-Mar-2017	
SU12.01	ES Equipment	03-Mar-2017	
SU17.02	Countermeasures	03-Mar-2017	
TO01.01*	Environmental Data	03-Mar-2017	
TS01.01	Ship Signature	03-Mar-2017	

Watches

BS24	Individual Watchstanding	10-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	08-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	07-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	01-Nov-2015	03-Mar-2017	75%	AT

Return

ENCLOSURE (43)
4 of 28

200

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Proficiency Groups

Proficiency Groups > Officer of the Deck > Miller, Benjamin O

TYCOM - Directed

Skill						
CH02.01	Surfaced Collision Avoidance	☑	08-Apr-2015	22-Apr-2016	100%	ABOVE
NP05.02	Navigation While On Mission		08-Apr-2015	22-Apr-2016	100%	ABOVE
SCH12.02	Sonar Display Interpretation Range Discrimination	☑	09-Apr-2015	22-Apr-2016	91%	ABOVE
SCH16.02	Periscope Employment		20-Nov-2015	22-Apr-2016	91%	ABOVE
Knowledge						
CH01.01	Rules of the Road, Maneuvering Char., Reduced Vis.			22-Apr-2016		
CH14	Surfaced Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			22-Apr-2016		
NP17	Navigation Lessons Learned			22-Apr-2016		
SCH08	Submerged Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			22-Apr-2016		
SCH51	Range Discrimination and Contact Triage			22-Apr-2016		

Command - Selected (* Designated Command Selected Capabilities)

Skill						
CH03.02*	In-extremis Maneuvers		19-Jun-2015	22-Apr-2016	81%	ABOVE
ISR18.01*	ELINT and COMINT Parameter Changes			22-Apr-2016		
NP04.01	Fix Ship's Position			22-Apr-2016		
NP09.02	Fathometer Operations			22-Apr-2016		
NP11.01	Cyclic Routine, Open-Ocean			22-Apr-2016		
SC01.01	Mooring			22-Apr-2016		☑
SC49	Ship Handling - High Speed Operations			22-Apr-2016		
SC50*	Ship Handling - Large Angles and Rudders			22-Apr-2016		
SC51*	Ship Handling - Emergency Ship Control		10-Nov-2015	22-Apr-2016	90%	ABOVE
Knowledge						
AR03.01	Arctic Operations			22-Apr-2016		☑
AST03*	Passive Tracking			22-Apr-2016		☑
AST04	Active Tracking			22-Apr-2016		☑
ISR09	ELINT and COMINT Parameters			22-Apr-2016		☑
ISR10	Mission Communication Requirements			22-Apr-2016		☑
MCM01.01	Mine Vulnerabilities			22-Apr-2016		☑
MCM03.01	MF Active in Mine Danger Areas			22-Apr-2016		☑
NP01.01	Open Ocean Navigation			22-Apr-2016		☑

ENCLOSURE (43)
9 of 28

NP02.01	Inertial Navigation		22-Apr-2016		
NP07.01*	VMS Operations	06-Aug-2015	22-Apr-2016	85%	ABOVE
SC24*	Submerged Hydrodynamic Forces		22-Apr-2016		
SC16	Shallow Water Operations		22-Apr-2016		
SCM19	Advanced Periscope Functionality		22-Apr-2016		
ST10.01	Strike Communications		22-Apr-2016		
SU01.01	Torpedo Presets		22-Apr-2016		
SU02.01	Torpedo Casualties		22-Apr-2016		
SU03.01	Threat Parameters		22-Apr-2016		
SU12.01	ES Equipment		22-Apr-2016		
SU17.02	Countermeasures		22-Apr-2016		
TO01.01*	Environmental Data		22-Apr-2016		
TS01.01	Ship Signature		22-Apr-2016		

Watches

BS24	Individual Watchstanding	20-Nov-2015	22-Apr-2016	97%	ABOVE
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	08-Nov-2015	22-Apr-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	26-Oct-2015	22-Apr-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	25-Oct-2015	22-Apr-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	07-Aug-2014	22-Apr-2016	83%	ABOVE

Return

1000

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Proficiency Groups

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CD	Title	Ch	Exam Date	Qualification	Score	Grade
Skill						
CM02.01	Surfaced Collision Avoidance	☑	22-May-2015	22-Apr-2016	90%	ABOVE
NP05.02	Navigation While On Mission		20-May-2015	22-Apr-2016	89%	ABOVE
SCM12.02	Sonar Display Interpretation Range Discrimination	☑	03-Jun-2015	22-Apr-2016	94%	ABOVE
SCM16.02	Periscope Employment		29-Jun-2015	22-Apr-2016	92%	ABOVE
Knowledge						
CM01.01	Rules of the Road, Maneuvering Char., Reduced Vis.			22-Apr-2016		
CM14	Surfaced Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			22-Apr-2016		
NP17	Navigation Lessons Learned			22-Apr-2016		
SCM08	Submerged Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			22-Apr-2016		
SCM51	Range Discrimination and Contact Triage			22-Apr-2016		

Command - Selected (* Designated Command Selected Capabilities)

CD	Title	Ch	Exam Date	Qualification	Score	Grade
Skill						
CM03.02*	In-extremis Maneuvers		02-Nov-2015	22-Apr-2016	90%	ABOVE
ISR18.01*	ELINT and COMINT Parameter Changes		07-Jul-2015	22-Apr-2016	91%	ABOVE
NP04.01	Fix Ship's Position		20-Jun-2015	22-Apr-2016	75%	AT
NP09.02	Fathometer Operations		02-Nov-2015	22-Apr-2016	100%	ABOVE
NP11.02	Cyclic Routine, Open-Ocean		02-Nov-2015	22-Apr-2016	89%	ABOVE
SC01.01	Mooring			22-Apr-2016		☑
SC48*	Ship Handling - High Speed Operations			22-Apr-2016		
SC50*	Ship Handling - Large Angles and Rudders			22-Apr-2016		
SC51*	Ship Handling - Emergency Ship Control			22-Apr-2016		
Knowledge						
AR03.01	Arctic Operations			22-Apr-2016		☑
AST03*	Passive Tracking			22-Apr-2016		☑
AST04	Active Tracking			22-Apr-2016		☑
ISR09	ELINT and COMINT Parameters			22-Apr-2016		☑
ISR10	Mission Communication Requirements			22-Apr-2016		☑
MCM01.01	Mine Vulnerabilities			22-Apr-2016		☑

ENCLOSURE (43)
11 of 28

MCH03.01	HF Active in Mine Danger Areas		22-Apr-2016			☑
NP01.81	Open Ocean Navigation		22-Apr-2016			☑
NP02.81	Inertial Navigation		22-Apr-2016			☑
NP07.01*	VMS Operations	06-Aug-2015	22-Apr-2016	80%	ABOVE	
SC14*	Submerged Hydrodynamic Forces		22-Apr-2016			☑
SC16	Shallow Water Operations		22-Apr-2016			☑
SCN19	Advanced Periscope Functionality		22-Apr-2016			☑
ST10.01	Strike Communications		22-Apr-2016			☑
SU01.01	Torpedo Presets		22-Apr-2016			☑
SU02.01	Torpedo Casualties		22-Apr-2016			☑
SU03.01	Threat Parameters		22-Apr-2016			☑
SU12.01	ES Equipment		22-Apr-2016			☑
SU17.02	Countermeasures		22-Apr-2016			☑
TD01.01*	Environmental Data		22-Apr-2016			☑
TS01.01	Ship Signature		22-Apr-2016			☑

Watches

CD	Title	Exam Date	Proficiency Achieved		
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	27-Oct-2015	22-Apr-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	26-Oct-2015	22-Apr-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	25-Oct-2015	22-Apr-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	24-Jul-2015	22-Apr-2016	79%	AT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	03-Apr-2015	22-Apr-2016		SAT

Return

ENCLOSURE (43)
12 of 28

ANAV

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Proficiency Groups

TYCOM - Directed

Skill						
NP05.02	Navigation While On Mission	☑	15-Nov-2015	15-Nov-2016	88%	ABOVE
Knowledge						
CM14	Surfaced Collision and Allision Lessons Learned		04-Nov-2015	15-Nov-2016	93%	ABOVE
NP17	Navigation Lessons Learned			15-Nov-2016		
SCM08	Submerged Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			15-Nov-2016		

Command - Selected (* Designated Command Selected Capabilities)

Skill						
NP09.02	Fathometer Operations		02-Nov-2015	15-Nov-2016	95%	ABOVE
Knowledge						
CM01.01*	Rules of the Road, Maneuvering Char., Reduced Vis.		24-Aug-2015	15-Nov-2016	90%	ABOVE
CM05	Maneuvering Board and ARPA			15-Nov-2016		☑
Watches						
BS24	Individual Watchstanding		03-Nov-2015	15-Nov-2016	94%	ABOVE

Return

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Proficiency Groups

Proficiency Groups » QMOW » Eberle, John A

TYCOM - Directed

CD	Title	Critical	Exam Date	Proficiency Anniversary		
S Skill						
NP04.01	Fix Ship's Position		16-Jan-2015	26-Nov-2015	75%	AT
NP05.02	Navigation While On Mission	☑	20-Aug-2015	26-Nov-2015	76%	AT
NP09.02	Fathometer Operations		01-Nov-2015	26-Nov-2015	80%	ABOVE
NP11.01	Cyclic Routine, Open-Ocean		01-Nov-2015	26-Nov-2015	79%	AT
NP15.01	Inertial Navigation		26-Oct-2015	26-Nov-2015	83%	ABOVE
K Knowledge						
CM14	Surfaced Collision and Allision Lessons Learned		22-Oct-2015	26-Nov-2015	72%	AT
NP01.01	Open Ocean Navigation		04-Nov-2015	26-Nov-2015	83%	ABOVE
NP17	Navigation Lessons Learned		22-Oct-2015	26-Nov-2015	72%	AT
SCM08	Submerged Collision and Allision Lessons Learned		22-Oct-2015	26-Nov-2015	75%	AT

Command - Selected (* Designated Command Selected Capabilities)

CD	Title	Critical	Exam Date	Proficiency Anniversary		
S Skill						
NP18	Cyclic Routine, Piloting		08-Oct-2015	26-Nov-2015	81%	ABOVE
K Knowledge						
CM01.01	Rules of the Road, Maneuvering Char., Reduced Vis.		24-Aug-2015	26-Nov-2015	78%	AT
NP02.01	Inertial Navigation		26-Oct-2015	26-Nov-2015	75%	AT
NP06.01	Navigation Charts		14-Sep-2015	26-Nov-2015	76%	AT
NP07.01*	VMS Operations		14-Aug-2015	26-Nov-2015	90%	ABOVE
NP08.01*	Fathometer Modes		14-Sep-2015	26-Nov-2015	78%	AT

Watches

CD	Title	Critical	Exam Date	Proficiency Anniversary		
BS24	Individual Watchstanding		01-Nov-2015	26-Nov-2015	80%	ABOVE
BS24	Individual Watchstanding		16-Jan-2015	26-Nov-2015		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding		03-Sep-	26-Nov-2015		SAT

ENCLOSURE (43)
14 of 28



8524	Individual Watchstanding	2014 27-Aug-2014	26-Nov-2015	SAT	

Return

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Proficiency

Proficiency Groups

Proficiency Groups » Officer of the Deck » Pybus, Adana

TYCOH - Directed

		Critical	Exam Date	Proficiency Anniversary		
Skill						
CM02.01	Surfaced Collision Avoidance	☑	06-Nov-2015	07-Nov-2016	77%	AT
NP05.02	Navigation While On Mission		19-Nov-2015	07-Nov-2016	91%	ABOVE
SCM12.02	Sonar Display Interpretation Range Discrimination	☑		07-Nov-2016		
SCM16.01	Periscope Employment		21-Nov-2015	07-Nov-2016	85%	ABOVE
Knowledge						
CM01.01	Rules of the Road, Maneuvering Char., Reduced Vis.			07-Nov-2016		
CM14	Surfaced Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			07-Nov-2016		
NP17	Navigation Lessons Learned			07-Nov-2016		
SCM08	Submerged Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			07-Nov-2016		
SCM51	Range Discrimination and Contact Triage			07-Nov-2016		

Command - Selected (* Designated Command Selected Capabilities)

		Critical	Exam Date	Proficiency Anniversary		
Skill						
CM03.02*	In-extremis Maneuvers			07-Nov-2016		
ISR18.01*	ELINT and COMINT Parameter Changes			07-Nov-2016		
NP04.01	Fix Ship's Position			07-Nov-2016		
NP09.02	Fathometer Operations			07-Nov-2016		
NP11.01	Cyclic Routine, Open-Ocean			07-Nov-2016		
SC01.01	Mooring			07-Nov-2016		☑
SC49	Ship Handling - High Speed Operations			07-Nov-2016		
SCS0*	Ship Handling - Large Angles and Rudders			07-Nov-2016		
SCS1*	Ship Handling - Emergency Ship Control			07-Nov-2016		
Knowledge						
AR03.01	Arctic Operations			07-Nov-2016		☑
AST03*	Passive Tracking			07-Nov-2016		☑
AST04*	Active Tracking			07-Nov-2016		☑
ISR09	ELINT and COMINT Parameters			07-Nov-2016		☑
ISR10	Mission Communication Requirements			07-Nov-2016		☑
MCM01.01	Mine Vulnerabilities			07-Nov-2016		☑
MCM03.01	HF Active in Mine Danger Areas			07-Nov-2016		☑
NP01.01	Open Ocean Navigation			07-Nov-2016		☑
NP02.01	Inertial Navigation			07-Nov-2016		☑
			06-Aug-			

ENCLOSURE (43)
16 of 28

MP07.01*	VNS Operations	2015	07-Nov-2016	84% ABOVE	
SC14*	Submerged Hydrodynamic Forces		07-Nov-2016		☑
SC36	Shallow Water Operations		07-Nov-2016		☑
SCM19	Advanced Periscope Functionality		07-Nov-2016		☑
ST10.01	Strike Communications		07-Nov-2016		☑
SU01.01	Torpedo Presets		07-Nov-2016		☑
SU03.01	Torpedo Casualties		07-Nov-2016		☑
SU03.01	Threat Parameters		07-Nov-2016		☑
SU12.01	ES Equipment		07-Nov-2016		☑
SU17.02	Countermeasures		07-Nov-2016		☑
TQ01.01*	Environmental Data		07-Nov-2016		☑
TS01.01	Ship Signature		07-Nov-2016		☑

Watches

CID	Title	Date			
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	21-Nov-2015	07-Nov-2016	90% ABOVE	
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	20-Nov-2015	07-Nov-2016	SAT	
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	19-Nov-2015	07-Nov-2016	SAT	
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	07-Nov-2015	07-Nov-2016	SAT	

Return

ENCLOSURE (43)
17 of 28

Lookout

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Proficiency Groups

Proficiency Groups » Officer of the Deck » Nester, Alexander D

TYCOM - Directed

		Critical	Exam Date	Proficiency Anniversary		
B Skill						
CM02.01	Surfaced Collision Avoidance	☑	06-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	83%	ABOVE
NP05.02	Navigation While On Mission		06-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	86%	ABOVE
SCM12.02	Sonar Display Interpretation Range Discrimination	☑	07-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	80%	ABOVE
SCM16.02	Periscope Employment		03-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	82%	ABOVE
B Knowledge						
CM01.01	Rules of the Road, Maneuvering Char., Reduced Vis.			28-Sep-2016		
CM14	Surfaced Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			28-Sep-2016		
NP17	Navigation Lessons Learned			28-Sep-2016		
SCM08	Submerged Collision and Allision Lessons Learned			28-Sep-2016		
SCM51	Range Discrimination and Contact Triage			28-Sep-2016		

Command - Selected (* Designated Command Selected Capabilities)

		Critical	Exam Date	Proficiency Anniversary		
B Skill						
CM03.02*	In-extremis Maneuvers		02-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	79%	AT
ISR18.01*	ELINT and COMINT Parameter Changes		10-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	80%	ABOVE
NP04.01	Fix Ship's Position			28-Sep-2016		
NP09.02	Fathometer Operations		30-Jun-2015	28-Sep-2016	83%	ABOVE
NP11.01	Cyclic Routine, Open-Ocean		07-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	93%	ABOVE
SC01.01	Mooring			28-Sep-2016		☑
SC49	Ship Handling - High Speed Operations		10-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	80%	ABOVE
SC50*	Ship Handling - Large Angles and Rudders		06-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	90%	ABOVE
SC51*	Ship Handling - Emergency Ship Control		06-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	85%	ABOVE
B Knowledge						
AR03.01	Arctic Operations			28-Sep-2016		☑
AST03*	Passive Tracking			28-Sep-2016		☑
AST04	Active Tracking			28-Sep-2016		☑
ISR09	ELINT and COMINT Parameters			28-Sep-2016		☑
ISR10	Mission Communication Requirements			28-Sep-2016		☑

ENCLOSURE (43)
18 of 28

MCM01.01	Mine Vulnerabilities		28-Sep-2016			☑
MCM03.01	HF Active in Mine Danger Areas		28-Sep-2016			☑
NP01.01	Open Ocean Navigation		28-Sep-2016			☑
NP02.01	Inertial Navigation		28-Sep-2016			☑
NP07.01*	VHS Operations	06-Aug-2015	28-Sep-2016	83%	ABOVE	
SC14*	Submerged Hydrodynamic Forces		28-Sep-2016			☑
SC16	Shallow Water Operations		28-Sep-2016			☑
SC19	Advanced Periscope Functionality		28-Sep-2016			☑
ST09.01	Strike Communications		28-Sep-2016			☑
SU01.01	Torpedo Presets		28-Sep-2016			☑
SU02.01	Torpedo Casualties		28-Sep-2016			☑
SU03.01	Threat Parameters		28-Sep-2016			☑
SU12.01	ES Equipment		28-Sep-2016			☑
SU17.02	Countermeasures		28-Sep-2016			☑
TO01.01*	Environmental Data		28-Sep-2016			☑
TS01.01	Ship Signature		28-Sep-2016			☑

Watches

BS24	Individual Watchstanding	07-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016	90%	ABOVE
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	06-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	02-Nov-2015	28-Sep-2016		SAT
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	30-Jun-2015	28-Sep-2016	87%	ABOVE
BS24	Individual Watchstanding	17-Jun-2015	28-Sep-2016		SAT

Return

ENCLOSURE (43)
19 of 28

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VMS9 Cert

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FM COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
TO COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA
COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
USS GEORGIA BLUE
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMSUBRON SIXTEEN/NOV/001//
SUBJ/USS GEORGIA (BLUE)(SSGN-729) ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION FINAL CERTIFICATION//
REF/A/CSLCSPINST 3530.8A/-//
REF/B/CSLCSPINST C3120.26A/-//
REF/C/MSG/COMSUBRON SIXTEEN/171403ZAUG15//
NARR/REF A IS ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION CERTIFICATION INSTRUCTION. REF B IS SUBMARINE OPERATIONS MANUAL. REF C IS USS GEORGIA (BLUE) PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION.//
POC/ (b)(6) /LCDR/COMSUBRON SIXTEEN/TEL:912-573- (b)(6) //
RMKS/1. PER REF A, COMSUBRON SIXTEEN COMPLETED A SUCCESSFUL AT-SEA EVALUATION OF ALL PHASES OF NAVIGATION ONBOARD USS GEORGIA (BLUE) (SSGN-729). USS GEORGIA (BLUE) IS CERTIFIED TO NAVIGATE WITH VMS 9.3 REV A AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF NAVIGATION.//
BT
#0001

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ENCLOSURE (4H)
1 of 22

GEO_VMS

PATUZYUW RUCBKMB0001 2291403-UUUU--RUCBKMC.
ZNR UUUUU
R 171403Z AUG 15
FM COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
TO COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA
COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
USS GEORGIA BLUE
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/CSS-16/-/001//
SUBJ/USS GEORGIA BLUE (SSGN-729) ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION//
REF/A/CSLCSPINST 3530.8A/-//
REF/B/CSLCSPINST C3120.26A/-//
NARR/REF A IS ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION CERTIFICATION INSTRUCTION. REF B IS SUBMARINE OPERATIONS MANUAL.//
POC/ (b)(6) /LCDR/CSS-16/TEL: (b) (6)
RMKS/1. PER REF A, USS GEORGIA (BLUE) (SSGN-729) IS AUTHORIZED TO UTILIZE THE BPS-15H WITH VOYAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (VMS) VER. 9.3 WITH PROCEDURES DELINEATED IN REF B CHAPTER 1 AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF NAVIGATION.
2. THIS AUTHORIZATION APPLIES ONLY TO THE FIRST UNDERWAY FOLLOWING THE INPORT CERTIFICATION. THIS UNDERWAY PERIOD WILL BE USED BY THE ISIC TO COMPLETE AN AT-SEA CREW EVALUATION. UPON SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF AN AT-SEA EVALUATION, A FINAL CERTIFICATION MESSAGE WILL BE SENT TO THE SHIP AND IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO SUBSEQUENT ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION.//
BT
#0001
NNNN

ENCLOSURE (44)
2 of 22

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Team Groups

Team Groups » Candidates » Matchard » Exam Detail | Training Toolbox | Standard Scenario | Checklist

Piloting Party

14.01 Piloting

Demonstrate the ability to safely navigate the ship in a piloting scenario.

Critical: ☑ Periodicity:12 months Difficulty:Intermediate

Team Score: 71% Exam Date:31-Oct-2015 Monitored By: CSS-16 Re-exam: ☐

☐ Follow Up? Phase: Check Ride Comments:

#	Attribute	Score
1	No significant risk of collision or grounding not driven by the scenario (e.g., no instances of last-minute maneuvering, extended periods without fix information in restricted waters, safety soundings due to deviation from track, etc.). *	2
2	Understands and executes Nav Plan, including COSOEs and local regulations (e.g., traffic lanes, separation schemes, speed limits). *	2
3	Complies with communications requirements including local regulations (e.g., required reports to harbor control or vessel traffic system, monitoring of [illegible] bridge-to-bridge channels, etc.). *	1
4	Bridge team employs available sensors, navigational equipment, and observer's eye to [illegible] ship per the approved track.	2
5	Piloting party understands and anticipates major track milestones (e.g., bring on pilot, bring on tugs, send line handlers topside, etc.). *	2
6	Piloting party and control room manning are IAW current doctrine. Specifically, additional personnel are not added to address individual knowledge or skill deficiencies. *	2
7	Noise level does not contribute to poor communications or confusion among piloting party members or other control room watchstanders. *	2
8	Navigator selects most accurate primary and backup fix sources. *	2
9	Order of round minimizes effect of ship's motion on fix accuracy (e.g., observes NAVAIDS off the beam first for bearings, last for ranges).	2
10	Takes appropriate actions for failure to obtain a fix or erroneous fixes (e.g., take another fix, recommend slowing, troubleshooting, switch to another source, etc.).	2
11	Compares primary and backup fix sources IAW current doctrine and smoothly transitions from one fix source to another, if required. *	1
12	Navigator routinely employs the periscope, radar, and other applicable sensors to evaluate proximity to hazards, assess contact situation, and evaluate nav aids. *	1
13	Ensures tracks are clear prior to course changes. *	2
14	Adjusts turn bearings or ranges for cross-track error and marks turns on time based on advance and transfer. *	2
15	Actions for reduced visibility are IAW current doctrine.	
16	Actions for safety soundings IAW current doctrine.	2
17	Avoids excessive reports to the bridge. *	2
18	Anticipates and adjusts for set and drift such that cross track error is minimized. *	1
19	Recognizes opportunities to reassure VBS. *	1

* required

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ENCLOSURE (44)
3 of 22



1	No significant risk of collision or grounding not driven by the scenario (e.g., no instances of in-extremis maneuvering, extended periods without fix information in restricted waters, safety soundings due to deviation from track, etc.). *	2
2	Understands and executes Nav Plan, including COSORs and local regulations (e.g., traffic lanes, separation schemes, speed limits). *	2
3	Complies with communications requirements including local regulations (e.g., required reports to harbor control or vessel traffic system, monitoring of local bridge to bridge channels, etc.). *	2
4	Bridge team employs available sensors, navigational equipment, and lookout's eyes to con the ship per the approved track.	3
5	Piloting party understands and anticipates major track milestones (e.g., bring on pilot, bring on tugs, send line handler topside, etc.). *	2
6	Piloting party and control room manning are IAW current doctrine. Specifically, additional personnel are not added to address individual knowledge or skill deficiencies. *	2
7	Noise level does not contribute to poor communication or confusion among piloting party members or other control room watchstanders. *	2
8	Navigator selects most accurate primary and backup fix sources. *	2
9	Order of round sextantizes effect of ship's motion on fix accuracy (e.g., observes NAVAIDS off the beam first for bearings, last for ranges).	2
10	Takes appropriate actions for failure to obtain a fix or erroneous fixes (e.g., take another fix, recommend slowing, troubleshooting, switch to another source, etc.).	na
11	Compares primary and backup fix sources IAW current doctrine and smoothly transitions from one fix source to another, if required. *	2
12	Navigator routinely employs the periscope, radar, and other applicable sensors to evaluate proximity to hazards, assess contact situation, and evaluate new info. *	2
13	Ensures tracks are clear prior to course changes. *	2
14	Adjusts t[illegible] for cross-track[illegible]r and rudder turns on time based on advance and transfer. *	2
15	Actions for reduced visibility are IAW current doctrine.	na
16	Actions for safety soundings IAW current doctrine.	2
17	Avoids excessive reports to the bridge. *	2
18	Anticipates and adjusts for set and drift such that cross track error is minimized. *	2
19	Recognizes opportunities to maneuver VBE. *	2

** * required

1: All aspects demonstrated, no deficiencies noted.
2: Most aspects demonstrated, only minor deficiencies were noted.
3: Some aspects demonstrated, numerous or major deficiencies, unsatisfactory.
4: Few or no aspects were demonstrated.

Team Brooks

Team Brooks » Detail Historical Exam for MP14.01 (Piloting Party)

Team

(Piloting Party

MP14.01 Piloting

Demonstrate the ability to safely navigate the ship in a piloting scenario.

Critical: ☑ Periodicity: 12 months Difficulty: 2

Exam Date: 05-Oct-2015 Due Date: 04-Oct-2016 Score: 80% Monitored By: CO Re-exam: ☐

Phase: MPTP-Basic Comments: Crew conducted intermediate PCAN inbound and outbound scenario.

#	Attribute	Score**
1	No significant risk of collision or grounding not driven by the scenario (e.g., no instances of in-extremis maneuvering, extended periods without fix information in restricted waters, safety soundings due to deviation from track, etc.). *	3
2	Understands and executes Nav Plan, including CONOPs and local regulations (e.g., traffic lanes, separation schemes, speed limits). *	2
3	Complies with communications requirements including local regulations (e.g., required reports to harbor control or vessel traffic system, monitoring of local bridge to bridge channels, etc.). *	2
4	Bridge team employs available sensors, navigational equipment, and seaman's eye to con the ship per the approved track.	3
5	Piloting party understands and anticipates major track milestones (e.g., brief on pilot, bring on tugs, send line handlers topside, etc.). *	2
6	Piloting party and control room manning are IAW current doctrine. Specifically, additional personnel are not added to address individual knowledge or skill deficiencies. *	3
7	Noise level does not contribute to poor communications or confusion among piloting party members or other control room watchstanders. *	2
8	Navigator selects most accurate primary and backup fix sources. *	2
9	Order of round minimizes effect of ship's motion on fix accuracy (e.g., observes NAVAIDS off the beam first for [illegible]).	2
10	Takes appropriate actions for failure to obtain a fix or erroneous fixes (e.g., take another fix, recommend slowing, troubleshooting, switch to another source, etc.).	3
11	Computes primary and backup fix sources IAW current doctrine and smoothly transitions from one fix source to another, if required. *	2
12	Navigator routinely employs the periscope, radar, and other applicable sensors to evaluate proximity to hazards, assess contact situation, and evaluate nav aids. *	2
13	Ensures tracks are clear prior to course changes. *	1
14	Adjusts turn bearings or ranges for cross-track error and marks turns on time based on advance and transfer. *	2
15	Actions for reduced visibility are IAW current doctrine.	na
16	Actions for safety soundings IAW current doctrine.	na
17	Avoids excessive reports to the bridge. *	1
18	Anticipates and adjusts for set and drift such that cross track error is minimized. *	2
19	Recognizes opportunities to measure VDE. *	2

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* required

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ENCLOSURE (44)
5 of 22

Team Scores

Team Scores » Detail History Exam for HP14.01 (Piloting Party)

Team

Piloting Party

HP14.01 Piloting

Demonstrate the ability to safely navigate the ship in a piloting scenario.

Critical: ☑ Periodicity: 12 months Difficulty: 2

Exam Date: 18-Sep-2015 Date Due: 18-Sep-2016 Score: 77% Monitored By: CSS-16 Deploy Re-exam: ☐

Phase: HPTP-Basic Comments: Scope changing navaids without NAV/ANAV Concurring, I/C with OOD not informing NAV about holding a turn late. Not slowing fast enough for the pilot transfer

#	Attribute	Score
1	No significant risk of collision or grounding not driven by the scenario (e.g., no instances of in-extremis maneuvering, extended periods without fix information in restricted waters, safety soundings due to deviation from track, etc.). *	2
2	Understands and executes Nav Plan, including COSOIs and local regulations (e.g., traffic lanes, separation schemes, speed limits). *	3
3	Complies with communications requirements including local regulations (e.g., required reports to harbor control or vessel traffic system, monitoring of local bridge to bridge channels, etc.). *	2
4	Bridge team employs available sensors, navigational equipment, and eyeball eye to con the ship per the approved track.	3
5	Piloting party understands and anticipates major track milestones (e.g., bring on pilot, bring on tugs, send line handlers topside, etc.). *	2
6	Piloting party and control room manning are IAW current doctrine. Specifically, additional personnel are not added to address individual knowledge or skill deficiencies. *	3
7	Noise level does not contribute to poor communications or confusion among piloting party members or other control room watchstanders. *	2
8	Navigator selects most accurate primary and backup fix sources. *	1
9	Order of round minimizes effect of ship's motion on fix accuracy (e.g., observes NAVAIDS off the beam first for bearings, last for ranges).	2
10	Takes appropriate actions for failure to obtain a fix or erroneous fixes (e.g., take another fix, recommend slowing, troubleshooting, switch to another source, etc.).	2
11	Compares primary and backup fix sources IAW current doctrine and smoothly transitions from one fix source to another, if required. *	2
12	Navigator routinely employs the periscope, radar, and other applicable sensors to evaluate proximity to hazards, assess contact situation, and evaluate nav aids. *	1
13	Ensures tracks are clear prior to course changes. *	2
14	Adjusts turn bearings or ranges for cross-track error and marks turns on time based on advance and transfer. *	2
15	Actions for reduced visibility are IAW current doctrine.	3
16	Actions for safety soundings IAW current doctrine.	3
17	Avoids excessive reports to the bridge. *	2
18	Anticipates and adjusts for set and drift such that cross track error is minimized. *	2
19	Recognizes opportunities to reassess VBE. *	2

* required

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ENCLOSURE (44)
6 of 22

Training Session Detail

USS Georgia (Blue) Session ID: 2183211 Date: 18SEP2015 Time: 0800-1200 POC Phone: (b)(6) (b) (6)

Status: Completed Trainer: SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Trainer Mode: VMS 9.3

Location: Kings Bay Inbound/Outbound
Target Group: Piloting Party
Difficulty Level: Intermediate
Training Type: Responsive Training
Instructor Intervention: Level I - Minimal Intervention
Instructor Involvement: Low - No Instructor written or TSU feedback required
Special Request: Team Building for Piloting Party Outbound/Inbound Kings Bay CMEX IVO Drum Island for Outbound C-152 S-8kt CMEX IVO Buoys 17-18 for Inboound C-268 S-12kt
Training Goals: Request Kings Bay In/Out scenarios for development of Piloting Party. Individual CTQS Attribute: Cyclic Routine, Piloting - NP18 Team Attribute: Piloting - NP14.01

Completion Data

Primary Mission Area	Performance	Grade(0-100)
null	N/A	0

Secondary Mission Area
Primary Core Competency
Secondary Core Competency

Instructor: ET2 (b) (6) **Evaluator:** ETC (b)(6) **Senior Member:** CO
Start Time: 0800 **Stop Time:** 1100
If actual time was less than scheduled time select reason: Completed Training Early
Was ISIC monitoring the training? No
Did Training Group complete its prerequisites? yes
Trainer Performance: Full Ready
Session graded? no
Comments on Trainer's Performance: FULL READY. OOD - WEPS / PHONE TALKER - ENS (b)(6) / JOOD - LT (b)(6) / LOOKOUT - LSSN / HELMSMAN - LS3 (b)(6) / CONTROL RM SUP - LT (b)(6) / CONTACT MANAGER - LTJG (b)(6) / NAVIGATOR - FNAV / ANAV - ANAV / SCOPE OP - ETC (b)(6) / BEARING REC - ET1 (b)(6) / QMOW - ET2 (b)(6) / DECK LOG REC - ET3 (b)(6) / FATHOMETER - ET3 (b)(6) / RADAR - ET2 (b)(6) / FURUNO - ET3 (b)(6) / MK-43 GUNNER - MMFN (b)(6) /
Comments on Training Group Performance: Squadron evaluated FNAV. See Squadron comments for FNAV. Crew conducted (2) Outbound Kings Bay Piloting scenarios with comments below: NP14.01 (INTERMIDIATE) 1st scenario - 80% NP18 (INTERMIDIATE) 1ST scenario - 78% NP14.01 (INTERMIDIATE) 2nd scenario - SEE SQUADRON GRADES. NP18 (INTERMIDIATE) 2ND scenario - SEE SQUADRON GRADES. Major Comments: C/T ROR Rule 6/19 - No discussion of safe speed during reduced visibility. Minor Comments: C/T SOM 1.2.7.4- Scope, QMOW, Radar continue to struggle with reporting gain and loss of NAVAIDS. C/T IC Manual - Several reports conducted by the team were lost due to the piloting team talking over each other. Noise level is improved but still needs work. C/T SOM 1.2.7.4 - The piloting party continues to struggle passing key reports i.e. buoys in line, distance to the turn and shift of set/drift. Recommendations: Recommend the Navigator utilizes abbreviated communications during reports to the Bridge, specifically Mark the turn (visually) reports. Current level of proficiency is AT STANDARDS.

ENCLOSURE (4)
7 of 22

Training Session Detail

USS Georgia (Blue) Session ID: 2282229 Date: 11AUG2015 Time: 0800-1200 POC Phone: (b) (6)
(b)(6)
Status: Completed Trainer: SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Trainer Mode: VMS 9.3

Location: Kings Bay Inbound/Outbound
Target Group: Surfaced Watchsection
Difficulty Level: Intermediate
Training Type: Responsive Training
Instructor Intervention: Level I - Minimal Intervention
Instructor Involvement: Medium - Instructor assessment and TSU + verbal feedback on performance and goal achievement required
Special Request: CSS-16 VMS 9.3 certification and ready for sea check. Surface contact management evaluation by CSS-16 starting IVO STM. Two watch section rotation for CSS-16 evaluation.
Training Goals: CM13.01, CM11.

Completion Data

Primary Mission Area	Performance	Grade(0-100)
null	N/A	0

Secondary Mission Area
Primary Core Competency
Secondary Core Competency
Force Protection: FP

Instructor: ETC (b) (6) **Evaluator:** ETC (b)(6) **Senior Member:** XO
Start Time: 0800 **Stop Time:** 1200
If actual time was less than scheduled time select reason: N/A
Was ISIC monitoring the training? Yes, SQN DEP
Did Training Group complete its prerequisites? yes
Trainer Performance: Full Ready
Session graded? no
Comments on Trainer's Performance:
Comments on Training Group Performance:

ENCLOSURE (4)
6 of 22

Training Session Detail

USS Georgia (Blue) **Session ID:** 2176840 **Date:** 10AUG2015 **Time:** 1200-1600 **POC Phone:** (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Status: Completed **Trainer:** SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Trainer Mode: VMS 9.3

Location: Kings Bay Inbound/Outbound
Target Group: Surfaced Watchsection
Difficulty Level: Intermediate
Training Type: Responsive Training
Instructor Intervention: Level I - Minimal Intervention
Instructor Involvement: Low - No Instructor written or TSU feedback required
Special Request: CSS-16 VMS 9.3 certification and ready for sea check. Kingbay Inbound starting on the 268 leg. Kingsbay Outbound starting on the 152 leg. Surface contact management evaluation by CSS-16 starting IVO STM. First watch section starting after the Kingsbay Outbound piloting.
Training Goals: Piloting NP 10.01, NP 14.01 Surface Contact Management CM13.01, CM11.

Completion Data

Primary Mission Area	Performance	Grade(0-100)
null	N/A	0

Secondary Mission Area
Primary Core Competency
Secondary Core Competency

Instructor: ET1 (b) (6) **Evaluator:** CSS-16 **Senior Member:** CO

Start Time: 1200 **Stop Time:** 1600
If actual time was less than scheduled time select reason:
Was ISIC monitoring the training? No
Did Training Group complete its prerequisites? yes
Trainer Performance: Reduced Capability
Session graded? no
Comments on Trainer's Performance: First scenario the bridge was stuck in zoom lost training time trainer had to be restarted. Upon setup of the second scenario the trainer froze and would not go into run. Contractor support came in and the trainer had to be restarted. During the third scenario the commercial radar cycled on and off with no instructor/student intervention limited training impact.
Comments on Training Group Performance: See CSS-16 comments.

ENCLOSURE (44)
9 of 22

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SUBMARINE SQUADRON 16
1050 USS GEORGIA AVENUE
KINGS BAY, GA 31547

3500
Ser N00/S012
19 Aug 15

From: Commander, Submarine Squadron 16
To: Commander, Submarine Group 10

Subj: USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE) BASIC HOMEPORT TRAINING PERIOD (HPTP) REPORT (U)

Ref: (a) COMSUBGRUNINE/COMSUBGRUTENINST 1500.1D series (U)
(b) COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPACINST 3500.3 series (U)

Encl: (1) Basic HPTP Core Competencies Comments
(2) Mission Area Comments

1. (U) USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE)(GEO(B)) successfully completed a Basic HPTP from April 2015 to August 2015 and is certified for underway operations.

2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.5a (b)(1)1.5a

a. At Standards

b. At Standards

c. (b)(1)1.5a At Standards

d. At Standards

e. At Standards

3. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.5a

a. (b)(1)1.5a

b. (b)(1)1.5a

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (44)
10 of 22

Subj: USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE), BASIC HOMEPORT TRAINING PERIOD (HPTP) REPORT (U)

(b)(1)1 5a

4. ~~(S)~~ Recommendations.

(b)(1)1 5a

a. Operational Planning.

(b)(1)1 5a

b. Defense In Depth.

(b)(1)1 5a

c. Managing Transitions.

(b)(1)1 5a

d. Consistent Reporting.

(b)(1)1 5a

ENCLOSURE (94)
11 of 22

Subj: USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)(BLUE), BASIC HOMEPORT TRAINING PERIOD (HPTP) REPORT (U)

5. ~~(S)~~ GEO (B) (b)(1)(1.5a

(b)(6)

Copy to:
USS GEORGIA (BLUE)

ENCLOSURE (44)
12 of 22

Basic HPTP Comments

Mission Area/Core Competency

1. ~~(S)~~ Piloting.

NP14.01-4	[A Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
NP14.01-10	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
NP14.01-18	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
NP14.01-19	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
NP14.01-6	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
NP14.01-7	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
NP14.01-15	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a

2. ~~(S)~~ Surfaced Contact Management

CM13.01-7	[A Level] Contacts c	(b)(1)1 5a
CM13.01-9	[A Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
CM13.01-3	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a

CM13.01-2 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

CM13.01-4 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

CM13.01-6 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

CM13.01-6 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

3. (S) Submerged Contact Management

SCM07-4 [A Level]
analyze th
assumed t

(b)(1) 1.5a

ISR34-10 [B Level]
was not ac
PREQ). (/

(b)(1) 1.5a

ISR34-10 [B Level]
correct loc

(b)(1) 1.5a

ISR34-14 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

ISR34-14 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

SCM17.03-3 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

a.

SCM12.02-1 [B Level]

(b)(1) 1.5a

ENCLOSURE (44)
14 of 22

SCM12.02-6 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM12.02-15 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM30-5 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM30-5 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM30-5 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

b.

SCM05-4: 1 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM05-4: 1 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM05-11: 1 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM06-6 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

SCM06-6 [B Level]

(b)(1)1 5a

ENCLOSURE (44)
15 of 22

SCM06-4 [A Level] ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 1.5a

c. (b)(1) 1.5a

SCM16.02-12 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

SCM16.02-8 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

d.

ISR18.01-1 [A Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

ISR18.01-7 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

ISR18.01-9 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

4.

SC05.02-3 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

SC05.02-6 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

SC05.02-6 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

SC05.02-13 [B Level] (b)(1) 1.5a

ENCLOSURE (44)
16 of 22

SC05.02-90	[A Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
SC05.02-160	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
SC05.02-150	[B Level] off depths	(b)(1)1 5a
SC09.01-4	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
SC09.01-4	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
SC11.01-7	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
SC11.01-8	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
SC11.01-9	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a
SC11.01-12	[B Level]	(b)(1)1 5a

ENCLOSURE (44)
17 of 22

Mission Area and Core Competencies Comments

Mission Area/Core Competency		
1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.5a		
CM03.02-12	[A Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
NP13-6	[B Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
NP13-12	[B Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
NP13-10	[B Level] COSO ne	(b)(1)1.5a
2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.5a		
AST02.02-1	[B Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
AST02.02-2	[B Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
AST02.02-4	[A Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
AST02.02-8	[B Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
AST02.02-16	[B Level]	(b)(1)1.5a
AST02.02-16	[B Level]	(b)(1)1.5a

3. ~~(S)~~ Watch (b)(1)1 Sa ormality

BS13-5 [B Level] (b)(1)1 Sa

BS13-5 [B Level] (b)(1)1.5a

BS13-5 [B Level] (b)(1)1 Sa

BS13-5 [B Level] (b)(1)1 Sa

4. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 Sa

CC22.02-5 [B Level] (b)(1)1 Sa

CC22.02-5 [B Level] (b)(1)1 Sa

5. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1 Sa

TO02.03-12 [B Level] (b)(1)1 Sa

ENCLOSURE (4)
19 OF 22

Trainer Scheduling & Utilization (TSU)

Welcome (b)(6)

- Schedule
- Search Sessions
- Training Center Details
- SMART Archive
- Help
- Logout
- TSU v3.2

Monthly Schedule

View Monthly Schedule View by Week Reset

Training Center: TTF Kings Bay

Name:Type SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Month SEP Year 2015

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
	1 West Virginia (Blue) Wyoming (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	2 Wyoming (Blue) Wyoming (Blue) Formal Course Call TC to Sched	3 Wyoming (Blue) Wyoming (Blue) Formal Course Call TC to Sched	4 Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
7 Holiday Holiday Holiday Holiday	8 Call TC to Sched Alaska (Gold) Formal Course Formal Course	9 Wyoming (Blue) Wyoming (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	10 Wyoming (Blue) Wyoming (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	11 Wyoming (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
14 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	15 JO-1 Georgia (Gold) JO-1 Call TC to Sched	16 JO-1 Georgia (Gold) JO-1 Call TC to Sched	17 JO-1 Georgia (Gold) JO-1 Call TC to Sched	18 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
21 Georgia (Gold) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	22 Georgia (Gold) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	23 Georgia (Gold) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	24 Georgia (Gold) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	25 Georgia (Gold) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
28 Alaska (Blue) Alaska (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	29 Alaska (Blue) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	30 Georgia (Gold) Alaska (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched		

ENCLOSURE (4)
20 of 22

Trainer Scheduling & Utilization (TSU)

Welcome (b)(6)

- Schedule
- Search Sessions
- Training Center Details
- SMART Archive
- Help
- Logout
- TSU v3.2

Monthly Schedule

View Monthly Schedule View by Week Reset

Training Center: TTF Kings Bay

Name:Type SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Month: NOV

Year: 2015

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
3 Alaska (Gold) Alaska (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	4 Alaska (Gold) Bridge Resource Management Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	5 Bridge Resource Management Bridge Resource Management Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	6 Wyoming (Blue) Alaska (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	7 Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
10 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	11 Georgia (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	12 Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	13 Florida-Gold Florida-Gold Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	14 Alaska (Gold) Florida-Gold Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
17 Rhode Island (Blue) Georgia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	18 Rhode Island (Blue) Rhode Island (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	19 West Virginia (Blue) West Virginia (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	20 Reserved West Virginia (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	21 West Virginia (Blue) Rhode Island (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
24 Alaska (Gold) Rhode Island (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	25 Rhode Island (Blue) Rhode Island (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	26 Rhode Island (Blue) Rhode Island (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	27 Trainer OOC Trainer OOC Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	28 Trainer OOC Trainer OOC Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
31 Wyoming (Blue) Wyoming (Blue) Call TC to Sched Formal Course				

ENCLOSURE (44)
2 of 2

Trainer Scheduling & Utilization (TSU)

Welcome (b)(6)

- Schedule
- Search Sessions
- Training Center Details
- SMART Archive
- Help
- Logout
- TSU v3.2

Monthly Schedule

View Monthly Schedule View by Week Reset

Training Center: TTF Kings Bay

Name:Type: SPAN : Submarine Piloting and Navigation Team Trainer (2000)

Month: JUL

Year: 2015

* Sessions are archived through 23-JUN-15 Monday	Pending Tuesday	Requested	Approved Wednesday	Completed	PDT Sessions Thursday	ET Nov 2015 (UTC-05:00) Friday
			1 West Virginia (Gold) West Virginia (Gold) Formal Course Call TC to Sched		2 West Virginia (Gold) West Virginia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	3 Holiday Holiday Holiday Holiday
6 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	7 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	8 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	9 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance		10 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	10 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance
13 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	14 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	15 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	16 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance		17 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance	17 Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance Sched Maintenance
20 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	21 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Blue) IO-1 IO-1	22 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Gold) IO-1 IO-1	23 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Blue) IO-1 IO-1		24 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	24 Georgia (Blue) Georgia (Blue) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched
27 West Virginia (Gold) West Virginia (Gold) Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	28 Bridge Resource Management Bridge Resource Management Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	29 Bridge Resource Management Florida-Gold Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	30 Florida-Gold Florida-Gold Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched		31 Florida-Gold Florida-Gold Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched	31 Florida-Gold Florida-Gold Call TC to Sched Call TC to Sched

ENCLOSURE (44)
22 of 22

DATE: 24NOV15 RED SOUNDING: 16 Fm

ANAV: ETNG (b)(6) YELLOW SOUNDING: 32 Fm

TIME (GT)	SOUNDING	KEEL DEPTH	TWD	CWD	MODE	REMARKS
2043	212Fm	6Fm	218Fm	225Fm	NSS	✓
2046	PROPERLY RECEIVED BY		ET² CB	(b)(6) ET	P	(b)(6) (b) (6)
	REMARKS	THIS WORK	(b)(6)	ET²		
2052	217Fm	6Fm	223Fm	225Fm	NSS	✓
2101	208Fm	6Fm	214Fm	220Fm	NSS	✓
2115	197Fm	6Fm	203Fm	200Fm	NSS	15min echos ✓
2120	SHELF EDGE	R-60FT	F-20FT	SURFACE ✓	SLOPE	TS.
2130	183Fm	6Fm	189Fm	190Fm	NSS	✓
2145	179Fm	6Fm	185Fm	190Fm	NSS	✓
2200	136Fm	6Fm	142Fm	150Fm	NSS	✓
2215	75Fm	~~8Fm~~ 6Fm	81Fm	80Fm	NSS	✓ SHIFTED SCALE
2230	226FT	36FT	262FT	270FT	NSS	✓
2245	146FT	36FT	182FT	170FT	NSS	✓
~~2300~~ 2300	118FT	36FT	154FT	146FT	NSS	✓
~~2315~~ 2315	121FT	36FT	157FT	140FT	NSS	✓
~~2330~~ 2330	115FT	36FT	141FT	150FT	NSS	✓
~~2345~~ 2345	105FT	36FT	141FT	152FT	NSS	✓
~~2400~~ 2400	103FT	36FT	139FT	146FT	NSS	✓
0015	PROPERLY RECEIVED BY		ET¹ WORK	(b)(6)		ETC (b)(6)
(b) (6) 0030						
0045	98FT	36FT	134FT	120FT	NSS	✓
0100	86FT	36FT	122FT	118FT	NSS	✓
0115	84FT	36FT	122FT	118FT	NSS	✓
0130	75FT	36FT	111FT	120FT	NSS	✓
0145	75FT	36FT	111FT	101FT	NSS	✓

ENCLOSURE (4)
1 of 6

DATE: 24 Aug 19 — RED SOUNDING: 11.5 fm

ARMY: E33 (b)(6) — YELLOW SOUNDING: 32 fm

TIME (b) (6)	SOUNDING	KOBE DEPTH	TWD	CWD	MODE	REMARKS
1751	23fm	4/fm	227fm	28fm		
1800	232fm	4/fm	223	284fm		
1810	237fm	4/fm	278fm	28fm		
1819	227fm	4/fm	264fm	270fm		
1828	226fm	4/fm	267fm	270fm		
1830	PASSING ENTRANCE BUOY					(b)(6)
1837						
1926				(b)(6)		(b)(6)
				(b)(6)	(b) (6)	(b)(6)
1931						
1945						
1949						
1958						
2001						
2006	PASSING TO STARBOARD					
2009						
2014						
2019						
2025						
2034						

ENCLOSURE (45)
2 of 6

DATE: 25 Nov 15 RED SOUNDING: 10FT

ANAV: ETVC (b)(6) YELLOW SOUNDING: 20FT

TIME	SOUNDING	KEEL DEPTH	TWD	CWD	MODE	REMARKS
0130	67FT	36FT	103FT	89FT	NSD	
0145	65FT	36FT	101FT	95FT	NSD	
0200	68FT	36FT	104FT	95FT	NSD	
0215	75FT	36FT	111FT	101FT	NSD	
0230	6" 75FT	36FT	111FT	101FT	NSD	
~~0245~~						
0239	72FT	36FT	108FT	101FT	NSD	
0245	71FT	36FT	107FT	101FT	NSD	
0300	52FT	36FT	115FT	101FT	NSD	
0315	47FT	36FT	83FT	71FT	NSD	
0330	53FT	36FT	89FT	80FT	NSD	
0345	48FT	36FT	84FT	76FT	NSD	
0352	FACTFILE (b) (6) BY ET 3 (b)(6) (b) (6)					
0400	51FT	37FT	88FT	78FT	NSS	✓
0415	42FT	37FT	79FT	78FT	NSS	✓
0423	SHIFT TO 4 MINUTE INTERVALS					
0424	39FT	37FT	76FT	78FT	NSS	✓
0433	40FT	~~36FT~~ 37FT	75FT	76FT	NSS	✓
0442	37FT	34FT	67FT	62FT	NSS	✓
0447	PREVIOUSLY RECORDED BY ET3 AT 0352 AS FACTFILE (b)(6)					
	FACTFILE RELIEVED ET3 (b)(6) IS FAITHFUL STEEL (b)(6)					
0451	37FT	36FT	73FT	54FT	NSS	ACQUIRE TITAN EXPECTED
0500	RELIEVED BY ET3		(b)(6)	FAITHFUL STEEL		(b)(6)
0500	RELIEVED BY ET3 (b)(6) AS DEPTHSOUNDER					(b)(6)
0506	35FT	35FT	70FT	72FT	NSS	✓

ENCLOSURE (45)
3 of 10.

DATE: 29 April 15

ANAV: E76 (b)(6)

RED SOUNDING: 4 FT

YELLOW SOUNDING: 6 FT

TIME	SOUNDING	KEEL DEPTH	TWD	DWD	MOOR	REMARKS
0306	36FT	36FT	72FT	65FT		
0508	34FT	36FT	10FT	65FT		
0511	35FT	36FT	71FT	66FT		
0512	35FT	36FT	71FT	54FT		
0516	31FT	(b) (6)	66FT	66FT		
0519	36FT	36FT	66FT	51FT		
0522	25FT	36FT	61FT	61FT		
0525	26FT	37FT	63FT	49FT		
0528	24FT	36FT	60FT	47FT		
0531	25FT	36FT	61FT	46FT		
0534	26FT	36FT	62FT	47FT		
0537	27FT	36FT	61FT	48FT		
0538	27FT	36FT	63FT	48FT		
0542	26FT	36FT	64FT	(b) (6)		
0544	27FT	36FT	63FT	48FT		
0547	25FT	36FT	63FT	48FT		
0550	26FT	36FT	64FT	48FT		
0553	29FT	37FT	66FT	48FT		
0603	46FT	37FT	83FT	48FT		
0606	81FT	36FT	87FT	48 FT		
0610	44FT	36FT	75FT	48FT		
0612	54FT	36FT	96FT	48FT		
0615	35FT	(b) (6)	71FT	48FT		
0618	50FT	36FT	80FT	48FT		
0620	52FT	36FT	87FT	48FT		

ENCLOSURE (15)

DATE: 23NOV13

ANAV: ETVG (b)(6)

RED SOUNDING: 4FT

YELLOW SOUNDING: 6FT

TIME (Z)	SOUNDING	REEL DEPTH	TWD	CWD	MODE	REMARKS
0623	52 FT	36FT	88FT	40FT	MS	X
0625	47FT	36FT	76FT	40 FT	MS	X
0634						LOSS OF SOUNDINGS
0633	REGAIN	SOUNDING				
0636	23 FT	36FT	59FT	40FT	MS	X
0638	48FT	36FT	84FT	40FT	MS	X
0640	46FT	36FT	82FT	40FT	MS	X
0643	35FT	36FT	71FT	46FT	MS	X
0644	28FT	36FT	64FT	40FT	MS	X
0646	28FT	36FT	64FT	40FT	MS	X
0647	28FT	36FT	64FT	40FT	MS	X
0649	30FT	36FT	66FT	40FT	MS	X
0650	28FT	36FT	64FT	40FT	MS	X
0653	27FT	36FT	63FT	40FT	MS	X
0656	28FT	36FT	64FT	40FT	MS	X
0657	26FT	36FT	62FT	40FT	MS	X
0659	27FT	36FT	63FT	40FT	MS	X
0702	29FT	36FT	65FT	40FT	MS	X
0704	33FT	36FT	69FT	40FT	MS	X
0705	40FT	36FT	76FT	40FT	MS	X
0707	44FT	36FT	80FT	40FT	MS	X
0710	31FT	36FT	67FT	40FT	MS	X
0713	45FT	36FT	81FT	40FT	MS	X
0715	LOSS OF	SOUNDING	@ 4 FT	WAVY		
0717	REGAIN	SOUNDING				

ENCLOSURE (46)
5 of 6

DATE: 23 NOV 15

ANAV: ERIK (DK)

RED SOUNDING: 4 FT

YELLOW SOUNDING: 9 FT

TIME (Z)	SOUNDING	WEL DEPTH	TWD	CWD	MODE	
0317	47FT	36FT	83FT	40FT	~S	Y
TRUE						

GUNNERY BOOK
DESIGN 3330/3 (7-74)

R-UA
Y-GA

RECORD GYRO BEARINGS

RACE Kingsbay Inbound

GYRO ERROR - ⊘
VBE - ⊘
TE - ⊘

DEPTH
38FT
40FT
39FT
40FT

DATE TIME		STM	AIL	STM	OFFSET	DEPTH
0604						36FT
0607						36FT
0610						35FT
0613		313.1	268.3		8 STYLE OFF	35FT
0616						31FT
0619				313.3 / 4000yds	2 DEG R 121	30FT
0622	ENTF	STM	AIL	STM	OFFSET	29FT
0625				323.4 / 1100yds	8 STYLE OFF	26FT
0628						24FT
0631	ENTF	STM	AIL			
	268.50	018.9	265.5		SOUTH 214	25FT
0633					DEPTHING REQUIRED	26FT
0635						
0636	268⊘	688.9	254.6	OFFSET 200yds 209	DEPTHING REQUIRED	27FT
0639						27FT
0642	268.⊘	688.⊘	252.9	6 HYDROS		28FT
0644	267.9	252.2	688.4		24 HYDROS	27FT
0647						29FT

ENCLOSURE (46)

STANDARD BEARING BOOK
OPNAV FORM 3530/2 (7-74)

Q-4FT
Y-6FT

RECORD GYRO BEARINGS

PLACE KINGSBAY INBOUND

GYRO ERROR -1°
VBE-0
TBE-0

DATE TIME	ENTF	AIL	STM		OPNAV	DEPTH
0650	267.9		088.4		REJECT -	28FT
~~0650~~						
0652	268.0	247.9	088.2		16knots	29FT
0655					DISPERTION CHANGED -	49FT
0658	268.0	241.7	088.1			45FT
~~0700~~						
0701					16knots 093	49FT
0704	268.0	234.1	088.1			48FT
0707						51FT
0710	268.1	217.7	088.0			47FT
0713	268.1	204.6			16knots	35FT
0716	ASF	ENTF	BN			
0719						50FT
0722	158.1	268.4				
6725					DISPERTION CHANGED	52FT
6728						41FT
0728 (b) (6)	LOSS OF	MILITARY	GPS			44FT
OT						

ENCLOSURE 4(d)
2 of 5

STANDARD NAVIGATION BOOK
OPNAV 1530/7 (7-74)

R-4FT
V-6FT

RECORD GYRO BEARINGS

KINGSBAY INBOUND
RACE

GYRO ERROR -1°
VBE:
TBE:

DATE TIME	AL	LTA	AIR	UNIT	COURSE	DEPTH
0736	293.4	190.0	117.3			28FT
0733	294.4		114.4	181.9		LOST OF SIGHT
0736	TR	AR	LTA			
	275.8	294.3	355.1		DEEPER THAN CHARTED	47FT
0739	AF	LTA				53FT
	301.3	086.6				
0741	ASR	A			DEEPER THAN CHARTED	46FT
	288.7	331.0				
0742	BR	A2R				
	050.7	324.4				
0742	350.6	317.4			DEEPER THAN CHARTED	46FT
0743	DIR	BR	LTB			
	004.3	343.6	041.8		DEEPER THAN CHARTED	28FT
0746	DIR	LTB	LTC			
	004.8	147.0	314.9			28FT
0747	004.1	163.3	293.0		DEEPER THAN CHARTED	28FT
0749	004.4	170.6	261.6			30FT

ENCLOSURE (46)
3 OF 5

STANDARD BEARING BOOK
OPNAV FORM 3530/7 (7-74)

R-4r
Y-Cor

RECORD GYRO BEARINGS

KINGSBAY INBOUND
PLACE

GYRO BEARS d
VERT
BOTH

DATE TIME	DR	DIR	LTD		OFFSET	
~~0150~~ 0153	351.4	008.0	338.6		T	28F
0753	351.6	063.7	328.6		T	27F
0756	352.0	148.9	293.8		DEEP DRAW CHANGED	28F
0757	ER	DR	LTD			
	352.3	356.8	239.6		16 pole lock	26F
0759	ER	DR	LTD			
	332.1	006.7	189.9		DEEP DRAW CHANGED.	27F
0800	353.0	671.2	169.9			29F
~~0805~~	ER	LT48	Tower South			43F
	3555	313.8	293.1			
0805	621.5	317.3	292.4			40F
~~0805~~	LT53	LT48	ER			
~~0805~~						
0808	304.7	330.0	076.9		DEEP DRAW CHANGED	44
0811	305.3	060.8	100.4		22 pole lock	30F
0814	309.3	110.5	113.0			48
0817						49
~~0820~~						32
0825						3

ENCLOSURE (4b)
4 of 5

STANDARD BEARING BOOK
ONLAY FORM 2330/7 (7-54)

D-4 FT
V-GYRO

RECORD GYRO BEARINGS

PLACE KINGMAN CHANNEL GYRO ERROR -Φ

VBE-Φ
TBE-Δ

DATE TIME						DEPTH
0810						LOST SOUNDING
0827						
0830						LOST SOUNDING
0833	SHIPS IS MOORED. SECURE PILOTING PARTY.					

ENCLOSURE (46)
5 OF 5

COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPACINST C3120.26A ACN 2-4
15 May 15

TAB 2 TO APPENDIX A

VMS 9.3 PILOTING PREPARATIONS CHECKLIST

UNCLASSIFIED

ELECTRONIC PILOTING PREPARATIONS CHECKLIST VMS 9.3 (SHEET 1 OF 5)

PORT: KINGS BAY, GEORGIA ETD/ETA [illegible]

1. Planning Publications (Sailing Directions, Coast Pilot, Fleet Guide, Light List, etc.)

Pub Title	Corrected to NTM	Developer	Applied
FG 940	2015	(b)(6)	
KINGS BAY/CANAVERAL SPTS	13/4337 MAY 15		(b)(6)
KINGS BAY PROTECTIVE PIER 940	19/5032 NOV 15		

2. Digital Nautical Charts

Library #	ED #	VDU to NTM	DEV	IND RVW	(b) (6)
DNC 15	36	39/15	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b) (6)
TOO2 15	4	11/14			

3. Individual Libraries Manually Updated

Library #	Last LNTM	DEV	IND RVW

4. Chart Portfolio Created

	Date	Initials	Date
DEV	[illegible]	(b)(6)	11/19/2015
IND RVW	[illegible]	(b)(6)	11/19/2015 11/20/15
CO approval			11/24/15

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (47)
1 of 6



UNCLASSIFIED

ELECTRONIC PLOTTING PREPARATION AND EXECUTIVE TO LETTER

5. Manual Chart Update

5(a) Create manual chart update

NOTE

Objects shall be in accordance with the chart specification and shall be drawn to YELLOW

AREA

Objects

5.a.1.	Speed limit changes		
5.a.2.	12 nm from land		
5.a.3.	13 nm from land		
5.a.4.	10 nm from shoal water		
5.a.5.	Select and label (name) visual NAVAIDs		
5.a.6.	Select and label (name) radar NAVAIDs		
5.a.7.	Select man-made or natural ranges.(1)		
5.a.8.	Points where currents are computed	N/A	N/A
5.a.9.	NAVHAZARDs within assigned waters annotated with keep out area		
5.a.10.	Danger bearings- label as greater than (NGT) or no less than (NLT) on danger side	N/A	N/A
5.a.11.	Danger ranges label NGT or NLT on danger side	N/A	N/A
5.a.12.	COSOEs label with red and yellow soundings and maximum speed		


Note

Annotation [illegible] only be displayed [illegible]

Keel Shoal Water

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (47)
2 of 6



ENCLOSURE (47)
3 of 6

UNCLASSIFIED

ELECTRONIC PILOTING PREPARATION CHECKLIST VMS [illegible] SHEET [illegible] OF [illegible]

7. Route/PIM Plan Preparation		
	Note	
	Action	
7.a.	Track determined from Fleet Guide, Sailing Directions, Coast Pilots, etc.	
7.b.	Track allows for channel width, anticipated currents, and anticipated traffic patterns.	
7.c.	Track does not cross danger bearings and ranges.	
7.d.	Select OFF TRACK LIMIT to provide ample maneuvering room in open waters or utilize the entire channel. OFF TRACK LIMIT must also cover any anticipated "pull over" areas (e.g., anchorages, turning basis, etc). (2)	
7.e.	Use rudder angle (15°/20° Rudder) for every waypoint. (3)	
7.f.	Select NAVAIDs for turn bearings and ranges. (4)	
7.g.	Verify the correct ETA or ETD is entered.	
7.h.	Enter critical points corresponding to mariner object reporting lines to provide redundant operator notification of important events.	
7.i.	Planned speed entered for each leg of voyage piloting plan.	
7.j.	Select display safety region	

8. Route/PIM Plan Added to NAVPLAN		
	[illegible]	[illegible]
DEV	[illegible]	11/[illegible]
IND	[illegible]	11/14/2015 11/16/15
CO	[illegible]	11/24/15

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (47)
4 of 6

COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPACINST C3120.26A ACN 2-4
15 May 13

UNCLASSIFIED

ELECTRONIC PLOTTING PREPARATION CHECKLIST (SHEET 2 OF 2)

7. Route/PIM Plan Preparation

7.a.	Track determined from Fleet Guide, Sailing Directions, Coast Pilots, etc.	
7.b.	Track allows for channel width, anticipated currents, and anticipated traffic patterns.	
7.c.	Track does not cross danger bearings and ranges.	
7.d.	Select OFF TRACK LIMIT to provide ample maneuvering room in open waters or utilize the entire channel. OFF TRACK LIMIT must also cover any anticipated "pull over" areas (e.g., anchorages, turning basis, etc). (3)	
7.e.	Use rudder angle (15°/20° Rudder) for every waypoint. (3)	
7.f.	Select NAVAIDs for turn bearings and ranges. (3)	
7.g.	Verify the correct ETA or ETD is entered.	
7.h.	Enter critical points corresponding to mariner object reporting lines to provide redundant operator notification of important events.	
7.i.	Planned speed entered for each leg of voyage pilotting plan.	
7.j.	Select display safety region	

8. Route/PIM Plan Added to NAVPLAN

DEPARTURE	ETD	11/24/15
END POINT	mode/date	11/24/15 11/24/15
CONTACT		

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (47)
5 of 6

ELECTRONIC PLOTTING PREPARATION		UNCLASSIFIED (when filled)
9. NAVPLAN CREATION		
Action		
9.a. The start and end times are appropriate. (Normally allow 2 hours prior to voyage plan start and 4 hours after completion.)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
9.b. All required Routes/PIM plans, charts and layers included.	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
9.c. NAVPLAN description adequate, if required.	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
9.d. NAVPLAN notes adequate, if required.	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
10. NAVPLAN Approval	Name	
	Name	Signature / Date
DEV	[illegible]	11/19/2015
2ND RVW	[illegible]	11/19/2015 10/20/15
CO Approval		11/20/15
11. GPS Waypoints Entered		DEV / 2ND RVW
11.a. Enter and verify waypoint list		(b)(6)
11.b. Waypoints entered and verified		
Military		
Commercial		
Navigator Approval	Signature	Date:
12. NAVPLAN loaded		DEV / 2ND RVW
12.a. Approved NAVPLAN is verified fully loaded and ready for use.		(b)(6)

Notes:

5. If not preprinted on chart, label ranges to nearest 0.1°.
6. VMS utilizes the OFF TRACK LIMIT entered width when validating a voyage plan for dangers.
7. For turns using other than "15 degree (20 degree for VA class)" ship specific advance and transfer tables must be referenced to determine turn point, steady point, and slide bar characteristics.
8. The optimum turn bearing NAVAID is as close as possible to the beam at the turn point, and if possible on the inside elbow of the turn. The optimum turn range NAVAID is a prominent object ahead or astern (preferably ahead) of the ship at the turn point.
9. If additional ROUTE/PIM plan is required for NAVPLAN, create a new Route/PIM Plan Preparation for each individual ROUTE/PIM plan.

ENCLOSURE (47)
6 OF 6

KINGSBAY INBOUND 8.3

NAME	COURSE	DISTANCE	SPEED	TIME	TO	BEARING	TR	RANGE	NAVAIDS
1	288,	6.42 NM	12		BN	319.7	EF	1620 YDS	DIS, DIR, LT C
2	304	2760 YDS	12	6:54	LT A	030.5	AF	2400 YDS	DF, DR, LTD
3	302	387 YDS	12	:58	LT A	086.5	A1F	1760 YDS	EF, ER, DR
4	301	880 YDS	12	2:19	A1R	290.4	A2F	1800 YDS	LTA, A1F, A1R, A2F A2R
5	358	1020 YDS	12	2:35	A2R	315.4	BF	1000 YDS	LT 58-62
6	004	2420 YDS	12	6:04	LT C	260.2	DIS	920 YDS	DIS, DIR, LT C
7	354	2620 YDS	12	6:34	LT D	295.8	DF	600 YDS	DF, DR, LTD
8	332	1940 YDS	8	6:54	DR	067.5	EF	620 YDS	EF, ER, DR
9	295	1480 YDS	6	9:16	LT 45	018.1	SOUTH TOWER	515 YDS	LTA, A1F, A1R, A2F A2R
10	308	1380 YDS	6	8:33					LT 58-62
11	317	1300 YDS	8	6:28					

ANAV: _____ NAV

FQ: OWING CALL SIGNS:

KINGS Y: CHANNEL 73.

TRANSITING SUBMARINE - EVENT (NUMBER)

SVS - OSCAR NUMBER, OSCAR 1 (BLACKPOWDER) AND OSCAR 2 (WESTWIND)

PATCOM - EAGLE LEADER

USCG SCREENING VESSELS

33' - EAGLE (NUMBER)

64 - RAPTOR (NUMBER)

KINGS - RED TAIL


USN SEAL BOATS - FLOT (LEADER),(NUMBER)

ENCLOSURE (48)

1 of 1

11/25/2015





ENCLOSURE (4)
1 of 28

REFERENCES

- KINGS BAY CHANNEL STATUS MESSGAGE 01-15
- KINGS BAY MOVEMENT MESSAGE 48-15
- FLEET GUIDE 940

Time Line (Local)

- Surface 24th 2000
- Transit to STM 2000-0545
- Station Man. Watch – 0445
- STM/Buoys 1 and 2-0545/0555
- Tugs/Pilot (Fort Clinch)– 0645
- Twilight-0634, Sunrise-0700
- Warping Wharf-0730
- EHW1 Sill Time-0800
- Moor-0830

ENCLOSURE (49)
2 of 28

Weather

- Hi:73° F
- Mostly Cloudy
- Wind Speeds- Inport-10-15kts, Seaward-15-20kts from NE
- Waves- Inport less than 2ft, Sea Coastal 4-6ft , Seaward 6-8ft from the NE
- Coastal Showers possible
- Vis: 7NM, limited 3-5kyds in rain.

Weather



ENCLOSURE (49)
3 of 28

Communications

- Working Channels -13/16/73
  - USS Georgia- Kilo 1
- Kings Bay Port Ops – VHF 73
- Tugs (C Tractor #) – VHF 73
- Force Protection-VHF 77
  - Patcom-Eagle Leader
  - USN Jet Boats – Jet (leader)(number)
  - Submarine-US Submarine

Bridge Rig/Mast Alignment

- Bridge Equipment (full):
  - Bridge Suit Case
  - HDU
  - Bridge Bag
  - Windahield
  - Bridge Steps
  - Furuno
- Mast alignment
  - MFM #2 – BTB
  - AIS Whip – AIS
  - HDR – EHF
  - #2 Scope – GPS
  - #1 Scope
  - All masts lowered below scope optics prior to maneuvering watch

ENCLC... .
4 of 28

Threat Summary

TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL:
Low
CRIMINAL THREAT LEVEL:
Low
DISSIDENT THREAT LEVEL:
Not Established
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT LEVEL:
Low
FPCON: ALPHA w/ amplifying measures
4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10

ARMED WATCHSTANDERS

- Bridge:
  - Machine Gunner - MK-48 (III), LA/PD-9 Mounted
- Topside
  - ATTWO- 9mm(I)
  - POOD - 9mm(I)
  - Rifleman - M-4 (III) and 9mm(I)
- Below decks:
  - Machine Gunner, Bottom Port LOC, MK-48 (IV)
  - Rifleman, BMC, M-4 (IV)

ENCLOSURE (49)
5 of 28


Force Protection


- Threat levels
- FPCON
- Armed watchstanders
- Force protection/exclusion zones

Naval Vessel Exclusion Zone
100 yds or less

- "Vessel on my [port/starboard beam/bow etc], you are entering a naval vessel exclusion zone. Reverse course immediately, I say again, reverse course immediately. If you do not comply, you may be subject to arrest and prosecution, or defensive measures, including use of deadly force."

ENCLOSURE (9)
6 of 28





ENCLOSURE (49)
7 of 28



Naval Vessel Protection Zone
500 yds - 100yds


- "Vessel on my [port/starboard beam/bow etc], you are approaching a U.S. Naval Vessel. There is a Naval Vessel protection zone in force around this vessel. You are advised to operate at the minimum safe speed and to maintain a safe course. Alter course [to port/starboard] [and slow your speed]. I say again, alter course [to port/starboard] [and slow your speed]. If you do not comply, you may be subject to arrest or other enforcement action."



COB

- Topside watchbill and uniform
- Topside access plan
- Safety aspects


ENCLOSURE (4a)
8 of 28




Navigation


- Primary/Backup fix source
  - GPS
  - Visual/Comp Lop
  - RADAR/Range LOP
  - FURUNO
- Fix interval 3 Minutes
- Red Sounding 4ft
- Yellow Sounding 6ft
- Tripwires
  - 25 yards XTE in the channel
  - 5 ° crab angle speed up to AAF


ENCLOSURE (49)
9 of 28







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10 of 28






ENCLOSURE (49)
11 of 28






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12 of 28







Turn to 302

ENCLOSURE (49)
13 of 28







ENCLOSURE (7/9)
14 of 28






ENCLOSURE (19)
15 of 28







ENCLOSURE (49)
16 of 28

11/25/2015







ENCLOSURE (49) 17
17 of 28







ENCLOSURE (4/9)
18 of 28







ENCLOSURE (49)
19 of 28







ENCLOSURE (49)
20 of 28






ENCLOSURE (49)
31 of 28







ENCLOSURE (49)
22 of 28






ENCLOSURE (49)
23 of 28





EXCLOSURE (4)
24 of 28





ENCLOSURE (49)
25 of 28



Risks/Mitigation

• Man OVBD	• Certify to pride watchstanders, take actions IAW CP, call patrol craft to recover
• Small craft COC	• Utilize force protection vessels and assess if threat
• Loss of propulsion or rudder casualty	• Shift to EPM or local control of rudder, use speed to stay in channel call tugs for assistance. Practiced during fast cruise.
• Red/Yellow Sounding in channel	• Verify position in channel by ranges , if off track greater than 30yds, steer to regain center of channel

ENCLOSURE (49)
26 of 28 25

Lessons Learned

- Will lose soundings when tugs come along side.
- Alpha Range is off. On track is 10 yards to the left of range.
- Drum Island Rear range difficult to see due to tree growth.
- BN is missing its marker board.
- Alpha Rear, Bravo Front and Delta Front lights extinguished
- Tide height may change some visual cues for turns

Goals

- Situational awareness for the team.
- Everybody in the party owns the Trip wires.
- Confirming the picture out the scope with VMS.
- Calling next course clear on each turn.
- Calling buoys inline on each turn.
- Watch for and look ahead for current shifts.

ENCLOSURE (49)
27 of 28




EXHIBIT (49)
28 of 28

OTTUZYUW RUCORGP0073 3291238-UUUU--RHMCSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
O 2512382 NOV 15
FM USS GEORGIA
TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA
COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA
COMSUBGRU TEN
COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
INFO ONI WASHINGTON DC
CHINFO WASHINGTON DC
USS GEORGIA
USS GEORGIA OFFCREW
BT
UNCLAS
PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//08//
SECINFO/U/-//
MSGID/OPREP-3/USMTP,2007/USS GEORGIA/001//
REF/A/DESC:VOICE REPORT/USS GEORGIA/25123ZNOV2015//
NARR/USS GEORGIA INITIAL VOICE REPORT//
PLAGWORD/NAVY BLUE/-//
TIMELOC/251129ZNOV2015/KINGS BAY CHANNEL/GMT//
GENTEXT/INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND DETAILS/1. INCIDENT: GEO
COLLIDED WITH BUOY 23 INBOUND TO KINGS BAY, GA.
2. DATE OF INCIDENT: 25NOV2015
3. TIME OF INCIDENT: 0629L
4. LOCATION OF INCIDENT, NORTH OF PORT CLINCH ALONG THE SOUTHERN
EDGE OF THE KINGS BAY CHANNEL.
5. INCIDENT: SHORTLY AFTER CONDUCTING PILOT TRANSFER, GEO WAS SET TO
THE SOUTHWEST OUT OF THE CHANNEL (SET AND DRIFT 3.9 KNOTS BRG 270)
AND ATTEMPTED TO AGGRESSIVELY REGAIN CENTER OF CHANNEL AND COLLIDED
WITH BUOY 23 ON THE PORT SIDE IVO THE ER LET.
6. POC: (b)(6) (b)(6) @NAVY.MIL/.
BT
#0073

ENCLOSURE (50)
1 of 1

Date: 5/AUG/15 Page: [illegible]

...neering Log – Nuclear [illegible]
...s 9 37 [illegible] EGN 729 REV (DRAFT)

*SS DDG 89 A (E&GN729)

...e aboute from: (b)(1) Sa To: Time Zone: E

INSTRUCTIONS: The Engineering Log shall be maintained in accordance with Article 0728 of Navy ...gulations, NAVSEA ...84 EGN-81 Major(C)-1789(2), S9086-CZ-STM-000/C-090, OPNAVINST 3120.32. Fuel, water and lube oil data shall be ...corded in the Engineering Daily Report (Fuel and Water Report). Average hourly speed in revolutions and knots is ...ntained in the Engineer's Bell Book. Table 1, 2, and 3 shall be filled in at 0000 hours. Major equipment out of ...mmission or other abnormal plant conditions shall be entered in the remarks section. Table 4 shall be filled in at 2400 ...sing as taken from the Engineer's Bell Book and Navigator's Log. The Engineer Officer shall review daily and the ...mmanding Officer monthly and upon relief. Disposition LAW NAVSEA S9086-CZ-STM-000/CH-090.

...BLE 1

...ard Status as of 0000

...ascribed ...persons ...similar ...ssure C ...ertain ...ould be ...ndition ...may vi ...ow Dy ...

(b)(1) Sa

...BLE 2

...BLE 3 DRAFT Fwd ___ ° ___ ' ___ " Aft ___ ° ___ ' ___ "

...LE 4 Engine Miles Steamed previous 24 Hours. (Bell Book) 234 Miles Steamed (NAVI) ___

...ared By: Commanding Officer ___ Engineer Officer ___

...VED FROM DOE-DOD ...CLASSIFICATION GUIDE CG-RN-1 REVISION 3 DATED FEBRUARY 1996. RESTRICTED DATA ...DOCUMENT CONTAINS CLASSIFIED DATA AS DEFINED IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954. UNAUTHORIZED ...DISCLOSURE SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS.

ENCLOSURE (51)

~~SECRET~~ ~~RESTRICTED~~ DATA

Date 7/5/15 Page 1577


0000
0095
0099
0135
0198
0255
0425
0480
0497
0997
0555
0749
0911
0944
1097
1107
1500
1529
1525
1575
1600

~~SECRET~~ ~~RESTRICTED~~ DATA

ENCLOSURE (51)
2 of 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL — RESTRICTED DATA~~

Date 12/4/75 Page 12982



ENCLOSURE (5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL — RESTRICTED DATA~~

3 of 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729/BLUE)
UNIT 100041 BOX 1
FPO AA 34091

24 Nov 15

COMMANDING OFFICER'S TEMPORARY STANDING ORDER 34-15

OPERATION OF ENHANCED CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT/SECONDARY CONTROL UNIT WITH SYSTEM FAULT INDICATIONS

Ref: (a) SSM OI Volume 6 Part 3 OI 631-4 Ring laser gyro navigation operation

1. Purpose. To provide instructions for operation of the ECDU/SCDU with constant fault indications.

2. Discussion. Fault code 373, 610, and 611 are constant fault alarm indications on the ECDU/SCDU during normal at sea operations. Fault code 373 is caused by no level arm data from GPS, when in receipt of GPS data. Fault code 610 and 611 are transmission and timeout of NTDS Port F1 for Fire Control. NTDS Port F1 is reserved as a backup transmission path for navigation data to fire control if the NDTS Port A1 Super Channel data is lost. Ship has consulted with WR Systems about the issues associated with these faults. These faults do not have any impacts on RLGN operations.

3. Action. Each hour, the QMOW/NAVSUP will check the alarm status panel at the ECDU/SCDU fault codes. The QMOW/NAVSUP will operate per ref (a) for any fault code not listed above.

4. Cancellation. This temporary standing order remains in effect until further notice.

Copy to:
COSO

ENCLOSURE (54)
1 of 1

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
SSBN	729	15	11	2	25

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS	PHASE

0400	1200	2000
L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____
L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____

LEGEND
1-CELESTIAL
2-ELECTRONIC
3-VISUAL
4-D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CRS	SPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
01[illegible]		(b)(1)1.5a			
01[illegible]					PREPARE TO SURFACE
0109	(b)(1)1 5a				
0112			(b)(1)1 5a		
0112		(b)(1)1 5a			
0117	(b)(1)1 5a				
0118					(b)(1)1 5a
011[illegible]					(b)(1)1 5a
01[illegible]1					(b)(1)1 5a
0121					(b)(1)1 5a
0122	(b)(1)1 5a				
0122					SURFACED THE [illegible]
0122	(b)(1)1 5a				
0123					(b)(1)1 5a
01[illegible]					START THE BLOWERS (b)(1)1 5a
0123					STARTED THE BLOWERS (b)(1)1 5a
013[illegible]					(b)(1)1 5a
0132					(b)(1)1 5a
01[illegible]7			R4		
01[illegible]8				36	
014[illegible]	LEEW 345				
01[illegible]8		345			
01[illegible]8					SECURED THE [illegible]ED PILOTING PARTY.
01[illegible]8					SECURED THE NAV SUPERVISOR
0201					OOD REVIEWED VMS
0201					(b)(1)1 5a
0201					(b)(1)1 5a
0205					[illegible] OF THE BLOWERS (b)(1)1 5a
0212					(b)(1)1 5a
02[illegible]3					THE OOD HAS SHIFTED HIS WATCH TO THE BRIDGE
0213					[illegible]OD (b)(6) HAS THE DECK AND CONN

ENCLOSURE (55)

REPORT SYMBOL
OPNAV 3100-10

~~SECRET~~ 1 of 11
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SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY			CLASS	MARK
D A	SSGN	726	1a	11	Z	28	E		

TISS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

TIME	ORDER	CRS	SPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
0213					
/					BY LTJG (b)(6)
0218	(b)(1)1 5a				
0229					(b)(1)1 5a
0229			(b)(1)1 5a		
0231					SHIFT (b)(1)1.5a
/					(b)(1)1 5a
0256	(b)(1)1 5a				
0256		b)(1)1 5a			
0303					HOURLY CHECK SAT.
0304					(b)(1)1 5a
0304					OOD RELIEVED
0329	(b)(1)1 5a				
0330		b)(1)1 5a			
0402					(b)(1)1 5a
0403					OOD REVIEWED WATCH.
0403					HOURLY CHECK SAT.
0405	(b)(1)1.5a				
0405	(b)(1)1 5a				
0407	(b)(1)1 5a				
0408		b)(1)1 5a			
0421			b)(1)1 5a		
0426	(b)(1)1 5a				
0427	(b)(1)1 5a				
0427		b)(1)1 5a			
0438	(b)(1)1 5a				
0440	(b)(1)1.5a				
0454		b)(1)1 5a			
0454	(b)(1)1.5a				
0459	(b)(1)1.5a				
0459		b)(1)1 5a			

ENCLOSURE (5)
2 OF 11

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DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

SAN 01 07 LF 0310486

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
D A	SSGN	726	15	11	2	15	E

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS: S

0000	1200	2400
L _____ BY ____	L _____ BY ____	L _____ BY ____
L _____ BY ____	L _____ BY ____	L _____ BY ____

METHOD
1-CELESTIAL
2-ELECTRONIC
3-VISUAL
4-D.R.

TIME	ORDER	DSE	RPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
0400	(b)(1)1 5a				
0500					OOD REVIEWED WMS
0500					HOURLY HEADING CHECK SAT.
0501					(b)(1)1 5a
0503			(b)(1)1 5a		
0503	(b)(1)1 5a				
0504	(b)(1)1 5a				
0506	(b)(1)1 5a				
0506		(b)(1)1 5a			
0510	(b)(1)1 5a				
0513		(b)(1)1 5a			
0513	(b)(1)1 5a				
0516		(b)(1)1 5a			
0517					PROPERLY RELIEVED AS OMOW BY ET1 (b)(6)
0520			(b)(1)1 5a		
0530					LCOR (b)(1)1 5a IS COC. [25 Nov 2015 05:52 Z]
0530					STATIONED THE COC. [25 Nov 2015 05:52 Z]
0545					LT (b)(6) HAS THE DECK AND CONN.
0548					
/					RELIEVED BY LTJG (b)(6)
0600					(b)(1)1 5a
0601					(b)(1)1 5a
0601					OOD REVIEWED WMS
0604	(b)(1)1 5a				
0606		(b)(1)1 5a			
0634					(b)(1)1 5a
/					[illegible]
0635					(b)(1)1 5a
0642					(b)(1)1 5a
0643					(b)(1)1 5a
0645					(b)(1)1 5a

REPORT SYMBOL
OPNAV 3100-10

Page 3 of 11

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ENCLOSURE (55)
3 of 11

SN 0107 LF 0310495

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET-~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DAY
D A	SSGN	726	15	11	2	25	E

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS: [illegible]
NUMBER: 1 of 1

0700 ZONE TIME	1200 ZONE TIME	2000 ZONE TIME	LEGEND
VRAU L _____ BY _____ L _____ BY _____	1200 L _____ BY _____ L _____ BY _____	2000 L _____ BY _____ L _____ BY _____	1: CELESTIAL 2-ELECTRONIC 3-VISUAL 4-D.R.

TIME	ORDER	COG	SPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
0700					COMPASS CHECK SAT.
0700					OOD REVIEWED WMS
0700					(b)(1)1 5a
0703					(b)(1)1 5a
/					(b)(1)1 5a
0800					(b)(3) [25 Nov 2015 0800 Z]
0801					OOD REVIEWED WMS
0801					(b)(1)1 5a
0811					(b)(1)1 5a
0827	(b)(1)1 5a				
0828					(b)
0828		b)(1)1 5a			
0851	(b)(1)1 5a				
0853	(b)(1)1 5a				
0858			(b)(1)1 5		
0858		b)(1)1 5a			
0900					OOD REVIEWED WMS
0900					(b)(1)1 5a
0901					(b)(1)1 5a
09[illegible]					LT (b)(6) HAS THE DECK AND CONN
091[illegible]					
/					SIGNED BY LT (b)(6)
[illegible]19					COMPLETED PUMPING (b)(1)1 [illegible]
[illegible]					STATIONED THE ACCOMPANYING PILOTING PARTY.
0920					STATIONED THE NAV BUR[illegible]SOF.
0920					ETC T (b)(6) IS THE NAV BU[illegible]IS
0928	ALL STOP				
0930	ABT.				25 Nov 2015 09:37 Z
0937	AA2.				
0937	MTR.				
0938					

SPORT SYMBOL
PNAV 3100-10

Page
ENCLOSURE (55)
4 of 11

~~SECRET~~
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DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

S/N 0107 LF 0010468

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET SECRET

	SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	MO	DAY	YR	
D A	SSGN	729	15	11	2	25 E

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

ZONE	ZONE	ZONE
L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____
λ ____ BY ____	λ ____ BY ____	λ ____ BY ____

LEGEND
1-CELESTIAL
2-ELECTRONIC
3-D.R.

TIME	COURSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
0840	(b)(1)1.5a			
0842		(b)(1)1.5a		
0844				THE OOD ON THE BRIDGE. [25 Nov 201 10:44 Z]
0849				CROSSED (b)(1)1.5a
0850	(b)(1)1.5a			
0855	(b)(1)1.5a			
0858				PROPERLY RELIEVED AS OMOW BY STC (b)(6)
0858	(b)(1)1.5a			
0859				(b)(1)1.5a
1001	(b)(1)1.5a			
1002		(b)(1)1.5a		
1007				PROPERLY RELIEVED AS OMOW BY STC (b)(6)
1007				STATIONED THE PILOTING PARTY.
1017				STATIONED THE MANEUVERING WATCH.
1017				VISUAL TO COMMERCIAL (b)(1)1.5a
				(b)(1)1.5a
1019	(b)(1)1.5a			
1022				(b)(1)1.5a
1028				(b)(1)1.5a
1029	(b)(1)1.5a			
1029		(b)(1)1.5a		
1029				(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN.
1030	(b)(1)1.5a			
1030				(b)(1)1.5a THE TURN.
1031	(b)(1)1.5a			
1031	(b)(1)1.5a			
1031	(b)(1)1.5a			
1032		(b)(1)1.5a		
1033	(b)(1)1.5a			
1034				VISUAL TO COMMERCIAL (b)(1)1.5a

ENCLOSURE (55)

SECRET
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DECLASSIFY ON: 20[illegible] REVIEW

SN 0107 LF 0310488

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DOW
SSBN	729	15	11	2	25

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS: D A
FLEET: E
FORCE: 3

0000	1200	2000
L BY	L BY	L BY
A BY	A BY	A BY

VERIFIED BY: 1-CELESTIAL 2-ELECTRONIC 3-DR

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1034					(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN
1036					LT (b)(6) HAS THE DECK AND CONN
1035					
/					RELIEVED BY LT (b)(6)
1035					LT (b)(6) IS THE NAV SUPERVISOR
1038					(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN
1038	(b)(1)1.5a				
1038		(b)(1)1.5a			[25 Nov 2015 10:44 Z]
1040					VISUAL TO COMMERCIAL (b)(1)1.5a
1043					NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE
1044		(b)(1)1.5a			
1048	(b)(1)1.5a				
1047					VISUAL TO COMMERCIAL (b)(1)1.5a
1047					VISUAL TO LUNG (b)(1)1.5a
1048					NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE
1049	(b)(1)1.5a				
1050			(b)(1)1.5a		
1052	(b)(1)1.5a				
1052		(b)(1)1.5a			
1054					VISUAL TO COMMERCIAL (b)(1)1.5a
1056					NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE
1058	(b)(1)1.5a				
1059	(b)(1)1.5a				
1101					NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE
1102	(b)(1)1.5a				
1104	(b)(1)1.5a				
1104		(b)(1)1.5a			
1105	(b)(1)1.5a				
1108		(b)(1)1.5a			
1108					PASSED BUOY 8 (b)(1)1.5a
1108	(b)(1)1.5a				

ENCLOSURE (55)

(b)(6)

DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

SSN 0107 LF 0310496

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY			CLASS	HANDLE
D A	SSGN	726	16	11	Z	25	E	USS GEORGIA FROM KINGS BAY GA TO KINGS BAY GA	S

POSITION 0800 ZONE TIME	POSITION 1200 ZONE TIME	POSITION 2000 ZONE TIME	METHOD 1-CELESTIAL 2-ELECTRONIC 3-VISUAL 4-D.R.
L ____ BY ____ L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____ L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____ L ____ BY ____	

TIME	ORDER	CRS	SPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1110					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1.5a
1111	(b)(1)1.5a				
1112					PRIMARY FIX SOURCE IS VISUAL
1113					(b)(1)1.5a
~~1113~~					~~PASSED BUOY(S)~~ (b)(1)1.5a
1113					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1.5a 25 Nov 2015
1					11:15 ZJ
1114	(b)(1)1.5a				
1116	(b)(1)1.5a				
1115					REGAINED MILITARY (b)(1)1.5a
1115					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1.5a
1116	(b)(1)1.5a				
1116					SHIFT PRIMARY FIX SOURCE TO COMMERCIAL (b)(1)1.5a
1117					SHIFT BACKUP FIX SOURCE TO VISUAL
1117	(b)(1)1.5a				
1118					[redacted]TOR TO THE SCOPE
1118	(b)(1)1.5a				
1119		(b)(1)1.5a			
1119	(b)(1)1.5a				
1120	(b)(1)1.5a				
1121	(b)(1)1.5a				
1121	(b)(1)1.5a				
1122	(b)(1)1.5a				
1122	(b)(1)1.5a				
1123					(b)(1)1.5a
1123	(b)(1)1.5a				
1123	(b)(1)1.5a				
1125	(b)(1)1.5a				
1[redacted]					NAV RECONNAISSANCE (b)(1)1.5a
1128	(b)(1)1.5a				
1[redacted]					C TRACTOR 4 CAME ALONGSIDE SSBN FOR PILOT TRANSFER

REPORT SYMBOL
OPNAV 3100-10

ENCLOSURE (55)
7 OF 11

SECRET
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

NAVPERS 0107 LF 03[illegible]0498

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DD
D A SSBN	729	18	11	2	29

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS: E

0000	1200	2000
L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____
A ____ BY ____	A ____ BY ____	A ____ BY ____

1 GRAND
1 CELESTIAL
4 ELECTRONIC
3 ANNUAL
4 CUR.

TIME	COURSE	SPEED	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1[illegible]0				OMOW (b)(1)1.5a [25 Nov 201[illegible] 11:34 Z]
11[illegible]	(b)(1)1.5a			
1127				[illegible] (b)(1)1.5a [25 No[illegible] 20[illegible] 1222 Z]
1127				NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE
1128	(b)(1)1.5a			
1128	(b)(1)1.5a			
11[illegible]				THE PILOT IS ON THE BRIDGE
1129	(b)(1)1.5a			
1129	(b)(1)1.5a			
1[illegible]				NAV [illegible] (b)(1)1.5a[illegible] Nov 2018 [illegible] Z]
1129	(b)(1)1.5a			
1129	(b)(1)1.5a			
1[illegible]0	(b)(1)1.5a			
1[illegible]1	(b)(1)1.5a			
1131	(b)(1)1.5a			
11[illegible]	(b)(1)1.5a			
1133	(b)(1)1.5a			
11[illegible]	(b)(1)1.5a			
1135	(b)(1)1.5a			
1136				C TRACTOR 4 CAMS ALONGSIDE PORT.
1136	(b)(1)1.5a			
1137	(b)(1)1.5a			
1[illegible]37	(b)(1)1.5a			
1137	(b)(1)1.5a			
1137	(b)(1)1.5a			
[illegible]	(b)(1)1.5a			
1[illegible]		(b)(1)1.5a		
1138	(b)(1)1.5a			
1139	(b)(1)1.5a			
1140				PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1.5a
1141	(b)(1)1.5a			

REPORT SYMBOL
OPNAV 3100.6

ENCLOSURE (55)

~~SECRET~~
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

SN 0107 LP 0310496

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DATE	DAY
SSGN	729	15	11	2	25

D A E

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS: 6 FORCE:

POSITION (GMT) ZONE TIME	POSITION (GMT) ZONE TIME	POSITION (GMT) ZONE TIME	LEGEND
L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	1-CELESTIAL
λ ____ BY ____	λ ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	2-ELECTRONIC
			3-VISUAL
			4-D.R.

TIME	ORDER	COG	SPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1141	(b)(1)1 5a				
1141			(b)(1)1 5a		[25 Nov 2015 11:47 Z]
1142		(b)(1)1 5a			
1142					(b)(1)1 5a TO THE TURN.
1142					(b)(1)1 5a THE TURN.
1143	(b)(1)1 5a				
1143	(b)(1)1 5a				
1144					NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE.
1144					REGAINED (b)(1)1 5a [25 Nov 2015 12:04 Z]
1144		(b)(1)1 5a			
1144					(b)(1)1 5a TO THE TURN.
1145					(b)(1)1 5a TO THE TURN.
1145					(b)(1)1 5a THE TURN.
1145	(b)(1)1 5a				
1145					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1 5a
1146		(b)(1)1 5a			
1146					(b)(1)1 5a TO THE TURN.
1149	(b)(1)1 5a				
1149					(b)(1)1 5a TO THE TURN.
1149		(b)(1)1 5a			[25 Nov 2015 11:50 Z]
1150					(b)(1)1 5a TO THE TURN.
1150					(b)(1)1 5a TO THE TURN.
1151	(b)(1)1 5a				
1152		(b)(1)1 5a			
1152	(b)(1)1 5a				
1152	(b)(1)1 5a				
1152			(b)(1)1 5a		
1152					NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE.
1153	(b)(1)1 5a				
1153					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1 5a
1153		(b)(1)1 5a			

REPORT SYMBOL
OPNAV 3120-10

Page 9 of 11

~~SECRET~~
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DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

ENCLOSURE (55)

S/N 0107 LF 0310498

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

D	A	SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	E
		SSGN	729	18	11	2	29

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS: S | FORCE:

0000	1200	2000	LEGEND
L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	1-CELESTIAL
L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	L ____ BY ____	2-ELECTRONIC
			3-VISUAL
			4-D.R.

TIME	ORDER	CSE	SPD	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1154	(b)(1)1.5a				
1154					(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN.
1154		(b)(1)1.5a			
1154	(b)(1)1.5a				
1154		(b)(1)1.5a			
1155	(b)(1)1.5a				
1156	(b)(1)1.5a				
1158					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1.5a
1159		(b)(1)1.5a			
1159					(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN.
1157					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1.5a
1159					(b)(1)1.5a THE TURN.
1159	(b)(1)1.5a				
1159					PASSED BUOY(S) (b)(1)1.5a
1159		(b)(1)1.5a			
1159	(b)(1)1.5a				
1200	(b)(1)1.5a				
1200		(b)(1)1.5a			
1200	(b)(1)1.5a				
1200		(b)(1)1.5a			
1200					NAVIGATOR TO THE SCOPE.
1200		(b)(1)1.5a			
1201					(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN.
1201	(b)(1)1.5a				
1202					
1202					(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN.
1202		(b)(1)1.5a			
1202					(b)(1)1.5a TO THE TURN.
1203					C TRACTOR 2 CAME ALONGSIDE STBD.
1204					(b)(1)1.5a THE TURN.
1206	(b)(1)1.5a				
1206	(b)(1)1.5a				

NAVPERS 3103-10

ENCLOSURE (55)
10 of 11

DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

NSN 0107 LF 0310466

SHIPS DECK LOG SHEET ~~SECRET~~

D/A	SHIP TYPE	HULL NUMBER	YEAR	MONTH	ZONE	DAY
D	SSGN	729	15	11	Z	25

USS GEORGIA
FROM KINGS BAY GA
TO KINGS BAY GA

CLASS: E | HANGE: [illegible]

POSITION 0000	ZONE	TIME
L _____		BY ____
λ _____		BY ____

POSITION 1200	ZONE	TIME
L _____		BY ____
λ _____		BY ____

POSITION 2000	ZONE	TIME
L _____		BY ____
λ _____		BY ____

UPGRAD
1- GE/ASTRO
2-ELECTRONIC
3-VISUAL
4-O.R.

TIME	ORDER	C&S	RPO	DEPTH	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1[illegible]	(b)(1)1.5a				
1[illegible]	(b)(1)1.5a				
1206	(b)(1)1.5a				
1208					SECURITY BARRIER IS OPEN.
1208	(b)(1)1.5a				
1207	(b)(1)1.5a				
1207	(b)(1)1.5a				
1209					MARKED SUNRISE.
1210	(b)(1)1.5a				
1211					C TRACTOR 3 MADE UP TO THE PORT SIDE. [28 Nov 2015 12:12 Z]
1211					PASSING THROUGH THE SECURITY BARRIER.
1212					C TRACTOR 3 CAST OFF.
1214					VISUAL TO DR OFFSET (b)(1)1.5a
1214					C TRACTOR 3 CAME ALONGSIDE AFT STBD.
1215	(b)(1)1.5a				
1216	(b)(1)1.5a				
1216	(b)(1)1.5a				
1218					SOUNDING LOST ON PRIMARY FATHOMETER.
1218					SOUNDING REGAINED ON PRIMARY FATHOMETER.
1230					THE SHIP IS MOORED.
1[illegible]					C TRACTOR 2 CAME ALONGSIDE FWD STBD.
1233					C TRACTOR 4 CAME ALONGSIDE STBD.
1238					C TRACTOR 2 CAST OFF.
1[illegible]					C TRACTOR 4 CAST OFF.
1240					C TRACTOR 4 DROPPING BROW.
1241					SECURED THE MANEUVERING WATCH.
					NO FURTHER ENTRIES THIS PAGE

REPORT SYMBOL
OPNAV 3100-10

ENCLOSURE (1) (55)
11 of 11

~~SECRET~~
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON: MANUAL REVIEW

(b)(6) ETCS (SS/DV) COMSUBRON-16, Navigation

From: COMCOGARD SECTOR JACKSONVILLE FL <postmaster@oix.navy.mil>
Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2015 14:12
To: CSS4_GENERAL_MESSAGES; NSSCKB, CDO; NSSC_IN_NORMAL; (b)(6) LT NSSC Kings Bay GA, N6; (b)(6) ITSC IAM, N6; (b)(6) CDR NSSC KB GA (CO), N00; (b)(6) LT NSSC KB (N01), Executive Officer; (b)(6) (b)(6) LCDR SLF Norfolk, Executive Officer; (b)(6) CDR NSSC Kings Bay, CO; (b)(6) ETCM NSSC KB (Admin), N1 (CMC); NGA NAVSAFETY WASHINGTON DC; CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL; CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
Cc: UWDC_NWLN_TAG_ALL; nrfk_nssc_dmds; CSP, Command Email; CSP, Command Email; (b) (6) MD; COMSUBGRU EIGHT REP NORTHWOOD UK; COMSUBGRU EIGHT REP NORTHWOOD UK; COMSUBGRU SEVEN; FLENUMMETOCCEN DATA MONTEREY CA; TTFKB_Radio; TRF.MESSAGING; SUBSCOL NREMS; NSSC_NWLN_STAFFMSGS; NOOC_STNS_MESSAGES; NCTSJAX_MSGS; Message Traffic; NAVY_GSM; FLEWEACEN Norfolk, Messaging; Message Traffic (ATGM); MESSAGES_TRAFFIC; KNGS.MSG; MESSAGE_TFC; UNCLAS MSG's; DMDS CUSFFC; Current Month Message Traffic; css20.messages; CSS16_MESSAGES; CSS-20_Messages; CSS11_CDO Message Traffic; CSG9OIX; CSDS12_NWLN_STAFF; COMSUBLANT N62MSGS; COMSUBLANT N62MSGS; COMSUBLANT N62MSGS; COMSUBGRU TEN; CNMOC_STNS_NOAC_MESSAGES; M_CNI SE MYPT ADMIN DMS; BCT.NewLondon1; DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC; USCGC SHRIKE; USCGC SAWFISH; USCGC OAK; USCGC MARIA BRAY; USCGC JOSHUA APPLEBY; USCGC HUDSON; USCGC HAMMER; USCGC DIAMONDBACK; COMCOGARD SECTOR MIAMI FL; COMCOGARD SECTOR JACKSONVILLE FL; COMCOGARD SECTOR CHARLESTON SC; COGARD STA PORT CANAVERAL FL; COGARD STA PONCE DE LEON INLET FL; COGARD STA MAYPORT FL; COGARD MARITIME FORCE PROTECTION UNIT KINGS BAY GA; COGARD ANT PONCE DE LEON FL; COGARD ANT JACKSONVILLE BEACH FL
Subject: P 261907Z NOV 15 COMCOGARD SECTOR JACKSONVILLE FL SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS
Signed By: postmaster@oix.navy.mil

UNCLASSIFIED//

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----OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS----
PTTUZYUW RHOIAAA0001 3301908-UUUU--RHSSSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 261907Z NOV 15
FM COMCOGARD SECTOR JACKSONVILLE FL
TO CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
NGA NAVSAFETY WASHINGTON DC
NGA NAVSAFETY WASHINGTON DC
INFO USCGC MARIA BRAY
USCGC HAMMER
COGARD STA MAYPORT FL
COGARD STA PORT CANAVERAL FL
COGARD ANT JACKSONVILLE BEACH FL
COGARD ANT PONCE DE LEON FL
COGARD STA PONCE DE LEON INLET FL
COMCOGARD SECTOR CHARLESTON SC

ENCLOSURE (56)
1 of 2

COMCOGARD SECTOR MIAMI FL
CDRUSAED JACKSONVILLE FL
SOPA ADMIN MAYPORT FL
COMAFLOATRAGRU MAYPORT FL
COMSUB GRU TEN
COMSUBRON TWO ZERO
SSBNSLANT
SSNSLANT
SUBASE KINGS BAY GA
COGARD MARITIME FORCE PROTECTION UNIT KINGS BAY GA
USCGC OAK
USCGC SHRIKE
USCGC DIAMONDBACK
USCGC HUDSON
USCGC JOSHUA APPLEBY
USCGC SAWFISH
BT
UNCLAS
SUBJ: SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS
BROADCAST ON VHF-FM UNTIL 030500Z DEC 15
SECTOR JACKSONVILLE BNM 272-15
GEORGIA AND FLORIDA - CUMBERLAND SOUND - FERNANDINA HARBOR TO KINGS BAY
1. CUMBERLAND SOUND LIGHTED BUOY 23 (LLNR 6705) IS MISSING. ALL MARINERS ARE ADVISED TO EXERCISE CAUTION WHILE TRANSITING THE AREA.
2. CANCEL AT TIME//030500Z DEC 15//
BT
#0001
NNNN
<DmdsSecurity>UNCLASSIFIED//</DmdsSecurity>
<DmdsRelease>(b)(6)</DmdsRelease>
UNCLASSIFIED//

ENCLOSURE (56)
2 of 2

~~Look for Classification Marking in Message Body~~

Radio (USS GEORGIA)(SSGN 729)

From: ~~redacted~~ (ssgn)
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2015 3:04 PM
To: Radio (USS GEORGIA)(SSGN 729)
Subject: NGAB SON: 00543, SUBMARINE MOVEMENT MESSAGE FOR KINGS BAY GA, MAYPORT FL AND PORT

QTTSZYUW RUOIAAA7915 323[illegible]4-SSSS--[illegible]ORGP.
ZNY SSSSS
O 191503Z NOV 15 ZDX ZPJ
FM N55C KINGS BAY GA
TO SS[illegible]LANT
[illegible]S GEORGIA
BT
~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~
[illegible]
SECINFO/G/USA//

A.

B.

2. (U) THIS MESSAGE IS THE AUTHORITY FOR LOCAL MOVEMENTS AND WILL BE ISSUED ON A WEEKLY BASIS. REQUESTS FOR CHANGES TO THIS SCHEDULE WILL BE MADE TO CTF 14/144 VIA YOUR ISIC.
3. (U) ALL TIMES ARE PLUS OR MINUS 15 MIN. SIGNIFICANT UNAPPROVED TIME DIFFERENCES EARLY OR LATE OUTSIDE THE PLUS OR MINUS 15 MIN MAY RESULT IN DISRUPTIONS TO OTHER EVENTS, EXTRA EXPENSE OR NAVIGATIONAL RISK.
4. (C) [illegible]

[illegible]

~~Look for Classification Marking in Message Body~~

ENCLOSURE (57)
1 of 4

TIME IS CONSIDERED WHEN THE BOW OF THE UNIT CROSSES INTO OR OUT OF EHW OR MSF. EHW SILL TIME IS 30 MIN BEFORE UNDERWAY TIME OR AFTER ARRIVAL TIME. MSF SILL TIME WILL BE THE SCHEDULED UNDERWAY OR ARRIVAL TIME.

5. (U) PORT CANAVERAL: UNITS INBOUND FOR ARRIVAL OR BSC WILL ARRIVE IVO BUOYS 3 AND 4 ONE HOUR PRIOR TO EVENT TIME FOR PILOT EMBARK. THE EVENT TIME LISTED BELOW IS ACTUAL PIERSIDE TIME. ANY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING PILOTS OR TUGS SHOULD BE MADE DIRECTLY TO PORT CANAVERAL NOTU PORT OPS VIA PHONE OR VHF RADIO. POC TEL: (b) (6)

6. (U) MAYPORT: UNITS INBOUND FOR ARRIVAL, BSC, OR BSP WILL ARRIVE IVO BUOY STJ 30 MIN PRIOR TO EVENT TIME. THE EVENT TIME LISTED BELOW IS ACTUAL PIERSIDE TIME. UNITS CONDUCTING BSP AT LOCATION 5 WILL ARRIVE IVO BUOY STJ AT THE EVENT TIME LISTED BELOW. ANY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING PILOTS OR TUGS SHOULD BE MADE DIRECTLY TO MAYPORT PORT OPS VIA PHONE OR VHF RADIO. POC TEL: (b) (6)
COAST GUARD ESCORTS WILL BE AT STJ ONE HOUR PRIOR TO BSC OR ARRIVAL TIME AND THIRTY MINUTES PRIOR TO BSP TIME. IN THE EVENT OF ANY DEVIATION FROM THE SCHEDULED EVENT, I.E. EARLY/LATE EVENT EXECUTION, CHANGE IN BSP LOCATION, OR FORCE PROTECTION ESCORTS NOT PRESENT, UNITS SHALL COORDINATE THE DEVIATION WITH MAYPORT OPERATIONS AND USCG FORCE PROTECTION ASSETS VIA VHF.

7. (SNF) SUMMARY: (b)(1)1 5a

8. (SNF) (b)(1)1 5a

DATE	UNIT	EVENT	LOCATION	TIME	RMKS/NOTES
NO SCHEDULED EVENTS					

(b)(1)1 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

(b)(1)1 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

(b)(1)1 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

(b)(1)1 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

(b)(1)1 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

9. ~~(SNF)~~ THE FOLLOWING MOVEMENTS ARE ANTICIPATED FOR THE WEEK OF 30 NOV 15:

DATE	UNIT	EVENT	LOCATION	TIME	RMKS/NOTES
			(b)(1)1 5a		
NO SCHEDULED EVENTS					

(b)(1)1 5a

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

(b)(1)1 5a

ENCLOSURE (57)
2 of 4

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

NO SCHEDULED EVENTS

11. (SHF) NOTE COLUMN:
NOTE 1: DETAILS WILL BE PROMULGATED IN NEXT WEEK'S CONF
12. (C) REQUEST

13. (U) C-TRACTOR CHARACTERISTICS AS FOLLOWS:
A. TRANSFER SIDE:
1. C-TRACTORS 3, 4, 12 AND 13 CONDUCT TRANSFERS ON YOUR PORT SIDE.
2. C-TRACTORS 2 AND 5 CONDUCT TRANSFERS ON YOUR STBD SIDE.
B. ON OCCASION C-TRACTOR ASSIGNMENT MAY CHANGE. IF DESIRED, VERIFY ASSIGNMENT WITH THE NSSC CDO APPROX 4 HRS PRIOR TO EVENT VIA CHAT.
14. (C) FORCE PROTECTION:

FOLLOWING CALL SIGNS:
KINGS BAY: CHANNEL 73.
TRANSITING SUBMARINE - EVENT [NUMBER]

B. IF SEA CONDITIONS PREVENT [illegible] THE ESCORT FROM GETTING TO BUOY.
TH/ST] AND BUOYS 3/4 [illegible], PER REF D, THE COMMAND [illegible] DNO OFFICER MAY

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

ENCLOSURE (57)
3 OF 4

~~Look for Classification Marking in Message Body~~

PROCEED WITH THE SCHEDULED EVOLUTION WITHOUT REQUESTING APPROVAL FROM THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER (CTF 84, 144), PROVIDED THE BELOW ITEMS ARE MET. AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, COMSUBFOR AND SECTOR JAX SHOULD BE INFORMED OF SITUATION VIA SIPR CHAT.
1) NOTIFICATION IS RECEIVED FROM THE ASSIGNED ESCORT THAT IT WILL BE UNABLE TO RENDEZVOUS AS SCHEDULED DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER.
2) THERE IS NO DEGRADATION TO THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PER NCIS THREAT ASSESSMENT OR THE THREAT ASSESSMENT PROVIDED BY LOCAL NAVAL INSTALLATION FOR THE AREA WHERE THE EVOLUTION IS TO OCCUR.
3) THERE IS NO VISUAL DEGRADATION TO THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.
C. OPERATIONAL COMMANDER PERMISSION IS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN EVENT UNESCORTED UNLESS THE CONDITIONS OF REF D ARE MET.
15. (U) KINGS BAY NAVIGATION NOTES AS OF 19 NOV:
A. ALPHA REAR, BRAVO FRONT AND DELTA FRONT LIGHTS ARE CURRENTLY EXTINGUISHED.
B. DRUM POINT ISLAND MIDDLE RANGE IS BARELY VISIBLE DUE TO HEAVY VEGETATION BUILD UP ON THE ISLAND.
C. BEACON SIERRA IS MISSING A DAYBOARD.
16. ~~(S)~~

17. ~~(U)~~
A.

(1)

BT
#7915

ENCLOSURE (57)
4 OF 4

~~Look for Classification Marking in Message Body~~

(b)(6) **CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore**

From: (b)(6) CAPT TRF Kings Bay, 100
Sent: Saturday, November 28, 2015 11:26
To: (b)(6) CAPT COMSUBRON 16, 00 - Commodore
Subject: Fw: SSGN update

As requested.

R/CAPT (b)(6)

---- Original Message ----
From: (b)(6) CIV TRF KINGS BAY, 400
Sent: Friday, November 27, 2015 09:05 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT TRF Kings Bay, 100
Cc: (b)(6) CIV TRF KINGS BAY, 411; (b)(6) CDR TRF Kings Bay, 400; (b)(6) CDR TRF Kings Bay, 300; (b)(6) CIV TRF Kings Bay, 303
Subject: FW: SSGN update

Skipper,

Based on the inspections to date, a summary of the damage is as follows:

1) The STBD EM Log rodmeter was damaged and requires replacement. There are no indications outboard or inboard of any damage to the penetration.
2) The AUTEC Pinger was damaged and requires removal / replacement (depending on upcoming acoustic trial schedule).
3) There is about 500 sq. ft. of non-pressure hull (MBT plating) from the sonar dome to FR25 that is bare metal with an additional 300 sq. ft. of [redacted] paint.
4) Mud and shells are lodged in the MBT flood grates.
5) There is evidence of contact on the port aft side, however, it appears to be mostly just paint removal and no structural damage.
6) The horizontal stabilizer was damaged from contact.
7) There is a gouge in the NPH plating of MBT 6 that has some depth.
8) The propeller has significant damage to the [redacted] of all blades. The divers gear for cleaning the prop is currently OOC, so all inspections were in the as-arrived condition. We were unable to get up-to-date measurements to rule out any blade deflection from the contact.
9) The lower rudder has significant damage (from the NPH extending down about 3 feet), consisting of gouges and dents on the leading edge. There is the potential for damage to the lower rudder bearing, however, inspections required docking.
10) There are unconfirmed reports of ASW/SSW "fouling/silting" and that the ship "lost flow to the prop bearing from somewhere around Fort Clinch until arrival at BHW". Similar reports that flow to the shaft seals was lost for some time until strainers could be shifted.

Historically, we've come to expect that upon docking, there will be additional areas of damage identified that were not visible or readily identifiable by an underwater inspection. Based on the combined damage from the contact with the buoy and (what appears to have been a) grounding, my recommendation is that the ship be docked (prior to getting underway) for further inspections and repairs, including, but not limited to:

1. Prop replacement,

EXHIBIT (63)
1 of 2

2. Visual inspection (and repair, as required) of [illegible]
3. [illegible]ent of STBD rodmeter,
4. Removal/replacement of AUTEC pinger,
5. [illegible] of MBT flood grates,
6. Inspection and repair of control surfaces structural damage,
7. Re-preservation of all disturbed paint,
8. Cleaning and inspection of propeller bearing, and
9. Visual inspection of lower rudder bearing (to the extent possible without lowering the rudder).

V/r,

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (6)
2 OF 2

Transcript of audio recording of file name Open_Mic_25NOV_1100Z-1115Z, time in Zulu

1100:04 Bridge, control, request the gunner to the bridge

1100:11 Control, bridge have him stand by [garbled]

1100:18 Have him stand by, bridge, control aye.

1100:31 Bridge, navigator, hold buoys on the right drawing right, on the left drawing left

1100:34 Navigator, bridge aye

1101:28 Bridge, Navigator recommend 270, hold sat and drift picking up to 2 knots

1101:36 Helm, steer 270

1101:38 Steer 270 Helm aye

1101:59 Bridge helm, steady west

1102:04 Helm Bridge aye

1102:32 Bridge, Navigator, recommend 271, hold the ship opening 25 yards left of track

1102:41 Navigator, Bridge, aye

1102:44 Helm, steer 271

1102:47 Steer 271, Helm aye

1102:54 Bridge, helm, steady 271

1102:56 Helm, bridge aye

1103:44 Control bridge, drain the MC LET

1103:51 Drain the MC LET Bridge, control aye

1104:15 Bridge, Navigator, hold C-tractor 4 visually

1104:24 Helm, steer 270

1104:26 Steer 270 helm aye

1104:33 Bridge helm, steady west

1104:35 Helm, bridge, aye

1105:44 Helm, steer 269

ENCLOSURE (64)
1 of 4

1105:46 Steer 269, Helm aye

1105:48 Navigator, Bridge, that last set of the buoys, we took the red buoy a lot closer than the green one

1105:56 Bridge, Navigator aye, bridge navigator by the range we are center of channel.

1106:00 Navigator Bridge aye

1106:03 Bridge helm steady 269

1106:05 Bridge, navigator request how you see the range

1106:08 "ugh, with my f***ing eyes" (unknown person)

1106:14 Navigator, bridge difficult to make out from the bridge, we appear to be center of channel

1106:43 Bridge, navigator 1000 yard to the jetties, we will be updating you on set and drift as we enter the jetties

1106:49 Navigator bridge aye

1106:52 Bridge control, broke rig for dive to drain the MC LET

1106:55 Control bridge aye

1108:29 Contact manager, bridge secure rotating and radiating on the RADAR

1108:34 Secure rotating and radiating on the RADAR bridge contact manager aye

1108:36 RADAR secure rotating and radiating on the RADAR

1109:07 Bridge navigator, recommend course 270, hold the ship slowly opening to the left

1109:12 Helm steer 270

1109:14 Steer 270 bridge helm aye

1109:29 Bridge helm, steady west

1109:33 Helm bridge aye

1109:41 Control bridge, all hands standing clear, lower the RADAR

1109:45 Lower the RADAR Bridge control aye

1109:52 Bridge navigator, loss of GPS, shifted primary fix source to visual, recommend raising the RADAR to have a backup fix source

1110:03 Navigator bridge aye

ENCLOSURE (64)
2 of 4

1110:06 Control bridge all hands standing clear, raise the RADAR

1110:10 Raise the RADAR bridge control aye

1111:24 Bridge navigator hold buoys on the left drawing left, right drawing right

1111:30 Navigator bridge aye

1111:45 Control bridge all hands are standing clear raise the RADAR

1111:49 Bridge control, unpinning the RADAR

1111:52 Control bridge aye

1111:54 Bridge navigator, passed buoys for All Stop

1112:00 Navigator bridge, say again

1112:03 Bridge navigator, passed the set of buoys where we were to order all stop

1112:07 Helm all stop

1112:09 All stop helm aye

1112:10 Bridge helm, answers all stop

1112:18 Bridge control, raising the RADAR

1112:20 Control bridge aye

1112:32 Bridge control, RADAR is up

1112:35 Control bridge aye

1112:35 Contact manager bridge rotate and radiate on the RADAR

1112:38 Rotate and radiate on the RADAR bridge contact manager aye

1112:40 RADAR rotate and radiate on the RADAR

1113:14 Very well RADAR (contact manager)

1113:31 Helm steer 269

1113:33 Steer 269 bridge helm aye

1113:38 Bridge, navigator regained military GPS, evaluating

1113:43 Navigator bridge aye

ENCLOSURE (64)
3 OF 4

.114:01 Bridge navigator [garbled-possibly "11 kts over ground"] recommend all back 1/3

1114:07 Helm, all back 1/3

1114:09 All back 1/3 bridge helm aye, bridge helm answers all back 1/3, bridge helm [garbled]

1114:14 Helm bridge aye

1114:20 Bridge navigator shifting primary fix source to military GPS, backup to visual

1114:25 Navigator Bridge aye

1114:26 Contact manager, secure rotating and radiating on the RADAR

1114:30 Secure rotating and radiating on the RADAR contact manager bridge aye

1114:31 RADAR secure rotating and radiating on the RADAR

1114:45 Control bridge, all hands standing clear, lower multi-function 2

1114:49 Lower multi-function 2 bridge control aye

ENCLOSURE (64)
4 of 4

Transcript of audio recording of file name Open_Mic_28NOV_1115Z-1130Z, time in ZULU

1115:05 Bridge navigator hold set and drift 2.2 kts at 270

1115:13 Navigator bridge aye

1115:15 Helm all stop

1115:17 All stop bridge helm aye, bridge helm, answers all stop

1115:25 Bridge control multi-function 2 is down

1115:30 Control bridge aye

1115:33 Bridge navigator, 25 yards right of track recommend 267

1115:37 Helm steer course 267 [XO in background "Kilo 1, Kilo 1"]

1115:39 Steer course 267 bridge helm aye

1115:45 Control bridge all hands are standing clear, lower the HDR

1115:48 Lower the HDR bridge control aye

1116:00 Bridge navigator 8.5kts SOG

1116:05 Navigator bridge aye

1116:11 Bridge control, HDR is down

1116:15 Control bridge aye

1116:20 Bridge XO, Mobile contact with C-tractor 4, they are approaching us at 5 kts, ready to come along our portside

1116:27 XO bridge aye

1116:29 Bridge helm steady 267

1116:32 Control bridge send personnel topside

1116:36 Send personnel topside bridge control aye

1116:50 Navigator bridge, report distance to turn

1116:56 Bridge navigator 1200 yards

1117:08 Helm all back 1/3

1117:10 All back 1/3 bridge helm aye, answers all back 1/3

ENCLOSURE (45)
1 of 5

1117:12 Helm bridge aye

1117:33 Bridge navigator set and drift is now 3 knots, 270 SOG 7.5 kts

1117:40 Navigator bridge aye

1117:45 Helm all back 2/3

1117:47 All back 2/3 helm bridge aye, answers all back 2/3

1117:49 Bridge helm aye

1117:51 (unknown person) d***, 3 kt set and drift, that's horrible

1118:06 (Garbled transmissions heard over bridge to bridge) "only the pilot" (garbled transmissions continue) "roger that captain thank you"

1118:57 Helm all stop

1118:59 Bridge Navigator 5.6 kts SOG, 500 yards to the buoys

1119:05 All stop bridge helm aye, answers all stop

1119:14 Helm all back 1/3

1119:16 All back 1/3 bridge helm aye, answers all back 1/3

1119:38 Bridge helm, loss of steerageway

1119:41 Rudder amidships

1119:43 Rudder amidships bridge helm aye

1119:44 Helm all stop

1119:46 All stop bridge helm aye

1119:49 Bridge navigator 15 yards left of track and opening recommend 272

1119:57 Navigator bridge we have lost steerageway

1120:00 Bridge navigator making 4 knots SOG

1120:06 Helm right full rudder

1120:08 Right full rudder bridge helm aye

1120:19 Helm bridge aye

1121:27 Bridge navigator 150 yards to the edge of channel bearing 150

ENCLOSURE (65)
2 of 5

1121:33 Navigator Bridge aye

1121:38 Navigator bridge we are [garbled] the pilot transfer, just bringing the pilot on at which point we'll come up to 2/3'rds regain center of track

1121:47 Bridge navigator aye

1122:48 Bridge helm 260 to the right

1122:50 Helm bridge aye

1122:52 Bridge navigator recommend marking the turn to the right to 294, by the slidebar

1123:00 Helm right full rudder steady 294

1123:03 Right full rudder steady 294 bridge helm aye

1123:06 Bridge helm the rudder is [garbled] full

1123:09 Helm bridge aye

1123:13 Bridge navigator recommend all ahead 1/3

1123:17 Helm all ahead 1/3

1123:19 All ahead 1/3 bridge helm aye, answers all ahead 1/3

1123:23 Helm bridge aye

1123:27 Navigator bridge, the brow is coming across the pilot is coming topside

1123:31 (unknown person) recommend 2/3

1123:33 (unknown probably ANAV) "We need to go 2/3 to regain the channel"

1123:39 Helm all ahead 2/3

1123:42 All ahead 2/3 bridge helm aye, answers all ahead 2/3

1123:45 Bridge navigator concur with all ahead 2/3

1123:47 Helm bridge aye

1123:51 (unknown probably XO) "It would be nice if this guy on the scope would turn around and look at where the rudder was"

1124:00 (unknown person) Laughter

1124:11 Controlbridge all hands standing clear, lower the RADAR

ENCLOSURE (6)
3 of 5

1124:14 Lower the RADAR bridge control aye

1124:17 Bridge navigator recommend coming right to 297

1124:23 Helm right full rudder steady 297

1124:25 Right full rudder steady 297 bridge helm aye, bridge helm, my rudder is right full

1125:00 (unknown person) *Laughter*

1125:10 (unknown person probably ANAV) "We're pushing out of the buoy chain right now"

1125:16 Bridge control Pilot to the bridge

1125:18 Control bridge send him up

1125:24 (unknown person) "yeah we're supposed to be over there"

1125:29 (unknown person) "definitely out of the channel"

1125:33 Bridge XO we have exited the channel to the south, recommend aggressively regaining track

1125:38 Helm right hard rudder steady 300

1125:40 Right hard rudder steady 300 bridge helm aye

1125:44 Helm all ahead full

1125:46 All ahead full bridge helm aye, answers all ahead full

1125:49 Helm bridge aye

1125:58 Helm right hard rudder

1125:59 Right hard rudder bridge helm aye

1126:13 Conn maneuvering, maneuvering answering all ahead full exceeding 20% total power

1126:24 Bridge navigator, buoy's on the left drawing left

1126:42 Helm left hard rudder

1126:43 Left hard rudder bridge helm aye

1126:48 Helm left hard rudder

1126:49 Left hard rudder bridge helm aye

1126:50 (probable XO) "We have to swing the stern away from the buoy, left hard"

ENCLOSURE (65)
4 of 5

1127:00 (multiple people) "oohhh" "we got it" "hit the screw" "there it goes"

1127:09 Helm all stop

1127:10 Helm all back emergency

1127:13 All back emergency bridge helm aye, answers all back emergency

1127:26 Bridge navigator sounding 44 feet

1127:29 Bridge helm passing 330 to the left

1127:35 Bridge navigator hold the ship exiting the channel to the Starboard side

1127:49 Bridge helm passing 320 to the left

1127:53 Yellow sounding

1127:54 Red sounding loss of soundings

1127:56 Bridge navigator loss of soundings

1128:20 Helm rudder amidships

1128:22 Rudder amidships bridge helm aye

1128:25 Bridge maneuvering answer all back emergency [garbled] percent total power

1128:31 Bridge helm rudder amidships

1128:34 Helm bridge aye

1129:06 Helm bridge right full rudder

1129:07 Right full rudder bridge helm aye

1129:16 Bridge helm the rudder is right full

1129:19 Helm bridge aye, helm bridge all stop

1129:22 All stop bridge helm aye, answers all stop

1129:26 Helm bridge aye

ENCLOSURE (45)
5 of 5

Transcript of audio recording of file name Open_Mic_25NOV_1130Z-1145Z, time in Zulu

1130:08 Helm all back 2/3

1130:10 All back 2/3 bridge helm aye, answers all back 2/3

1130:13 Helm bridge aye

1130:18 Bridge helm passing (garbled) to the right

1130:19 Helm bridge aye

1130:39 Helm all stop

1130:41 All stop bridge helm aye, answers all stop

1130:43 Helm bridge aye

1131:51 Helm all ahead 2/3, helm shift your rudder

1131:53 Shift my rudder aye, all ahead 2/3 aye, bridge helm answers all ahead 2/3

1132:10 Bridge helm my rudder is left full

1132:45 Bridge navigator hold center of channel bearing 288

1132:51 Navigator bridge aye

1132:59 Bridge navigator shift primary fix source to visual, backup fix source to commercial GPS

1133:04 Navigator bridge aye

1133:10 Helm all stop

1133:12 All stop helm aye, bridge helm answers all stop

1133:14 Helm bridge aye

1133:19 Bridge helm passing 320 to the left

1134:04 Bridge helm passing 310 to the left

1134:06 Helm rudder amidships

1134:07 Helm all ahead standard

1134:09 Rudder amidships all ahead standard helm aye, answers all ahead standard

1134:12 Helm bridge aye

ENCLOSURE (66)
1 of 1

1134:00 Hard port rudder

1134:21 Left full rudder bridge helm aye

1134:23 Bridge maneuvering (garbled)

1134:31 Maneuvering bridge, make turns for 12 knots


Prop Walk. An explanation of its causes and effect.

Prop walk is also known as, asymmetric blade effect, asymmetric thrust and P-effect. It affects boats, propeller driven aircraft and helicopters. Here we consider the effect on boats.

This paper explains how the propeller shaft angle (the angle between the surface of the water and the shaft) causes the thrust of the up-going and down-going blades to differ, so producing prop walk. The example uses a two bladed propeller; this is for ease of explanation only, the number of blades makes no difference to the effect.


Case 1. A propeller with no shaft angle.

Consider below, a right-handed propeller, in reverse. The propeller blades are scribing the red and blue lines on a cylinder of water. This shows the paths of the red up-going and blue down-going blades during the rotation of the propeller.



The schematic below shows the cylindrical paths of the blades as a flat representation during one rotation.

As can been seen the red and blue paths are of the same length, the blades travel the same distance, therefore the thrust from the up and down blades of the propeller is equal.




The thrust from the port and starboard sides is equal and is line with the propeller shaft; there is no prop walk.



ENCLOSURE (47)
1 of 2


Case 2. A propeller with a shaft angle.

This propeller and shaft have a shaft angle to the water surface. As in Case 1, the propeller blades actoe the red and blue lines on the surface of a cylinder. The lines show the different paths of the up-going and down-going blades.



The schematic below shows the cylindrical paths of the blades as a flat representation during one rotation.

As can been seen the red paths are longer than the blue. This means that the up-going blade on the starboard side travels further than the down-going blade on the port side. This up-going blade travelling further pushes more water towards the bow of the boat, producing more thrust.



The thrust from the starboard side is stronger than the thrust from the port side, therefore prop walk pulls the stern to port.



Prop walk is caused by the angle of the propeller shaft to the water surface; if there is no angle, then there is no prop walk. For an increase in either the diameter or pitch of the propeller the effect is increased.

The effect is present in both forward and reverse gears. In forward gear the forces act to yaw the boat to starboard.

In forward gear the effect is easily overcome by the rudder. In reverse gear the rudder is less effective making prop walk more obvious and difficult to control.

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ENCLOSURE (69)
2 of 2

WITNESS STATEMENT:
Rank/Name: Pilot (b)(6)
Role: Pilot

Q. Where were you loitering?

- We were at west side of buoy 21 @ 0530, we may have drifted a little, but I could see buoy 21 clearly.

Q. What was the bridge to bridge communications lineup?

- Not sure what actual line up was as the tug captain controls that, there were two radios, normally one on 73 other on 16/13 scan.

Q. What stopped the ship after exiting the channel to the northeast?

- The ship was flying across the channel, expected a shudder but didn't feel it. Ship developed steerway immediately at pullout point so I assumed we did not ground.

Q. How did you instruct the tug to assist the ship?

- Ordered the tug to position on the starboard bow to push the ship. Tug went around the bow of the sub from the port side to the starboard side at the sub's DRW point; I didn't want the sub to go through the prop wash.

Q. Did you have any concerns with water depth where the tug was going?

- No the ship drafts 36 feet and the tug only drafts 18 feet so no concern.

Q. Did you see the SUB ID beacon?

- I do not recall seeing the SUB ID beacon. I saw the running lights. I did not notice a white (masthead) light.

Q. Was the tug's radar operating? Did it hold contact on the sub?

- I believe the tug radar was operating. I don't know if it held contact on the sub.

Q. How long did you leave the bridge area during the 45 minute wait for the sub to get there?

- Maybe 10 minutes at the most.

ENCLOSURE (7)

1091

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW:
Rank/Name: Mr. (b)(6) and Mr. (b)(6)
Role: Towed Array Repair Personnel
Attachment: 11503 Chartlet Annotated with C Tractor Positioning

As summarized by LCDR (b)(6)

Q. Where did you observe the tug operating in the channel when you were embarked waiting to be transferred to the submarine?

- This was my first time on board the C Tractor so I was very interested in our location; I observed the C Tractor operating near Fort Clinch. I remember the tug operating, shutting down, drifting and repositioning. I was in bridge looking at the GPS.

Note: LCDR (b)(6) annotated on an 11503 Chartlet the position where he believed the tug was operating, to which I agreed.

Q. Did you hear any bridge to bridge communications between the C Tractor and the boat?

- Yes, I heard someone (thought it might be the CAPT) tell the tug that he did not want to embark any passengers or packages, just the pilot.

Q. Did you see the submarine?

- Yes, I told the tug master to be alert for the SUB ID Beacon, 3 flashes with a pause. I saw the beacon and noted that the stern light was not lit after the tug passed.

Q. Did you hear any periods of bridge to bridge noise, such as wind noise, that could have been attempted communications from the submarine?

- No

Q. Do you remember a conversation between the pilot and the tug to assist in repositioning the tug when she drove out of the channel?

- I remember the tug master stating the water was not deep enough in front of the submarine to operate the tug. He waited until the sub was backing out prior to repositioning across the bow the assist with repositioning the ship in the channel.

Q. Where did the tug master and the pilot spend their time during the waiting period?


- The tug master was in the pilot house for most of the time, I believe he stepped out for ~1 minute to use the head. The pilot spent the vast majority of his time in the pilot house or on the bridge wing smoking.

ENCLOSURE (72)

1 of 2


ENCLOSURE (4)

2092




ENCLOSURE (73)
1 of 1

ENCLOSURE (74)
1 of 1



ENCLOSURE (75)
1 of 2



ENCLOSURE (35)
2 of 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG**

From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N70A
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 8:41
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG
Subject: (U) GEO Towed Array vs TRE Phone Discussions

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAPT (b)(6)

(U/~~FOUO~~) Regarding performing repairs to GEO's FLTA prior to the ship's TRE, I spoke on the telephone with CAPT (b)(6) (b)(6) early in October (I don't recall the exact date, it was shortly after GEO's initial CASREP). I also spoke on the phone with CAPT (b)(6) late in the week of 16 November (I believe this was Friday, 20 November). In both of these discussions I stated that I, as TRE Senior Member, desired the ship to have (b)(1)1 5a for the TRE in order to meet the objectives of the inspection and explained my reasons:

- (U/~~FOUO~~) First, the evaluation of the ASW critical mission area would (b)(1)1 5a . Since this inspection was scheduled as a (b)(1)1 5a . Without an (b)(1)1 5a it would be highly unlikely GEO would have been able to (b)(1)1 5a (b)(1)1 5a at ranges sufficient to demonstrate deliberate (b)(1)1 5a and generating contact for reactive (b)(1)1 5a would have required extensive TRE Team intervention to position GEO.

- (U/~~FOUO~~) Second, evaluation of would be (b)(1)1 5a . Several of the scenarios conducted during the TRE for these areas use synthetic contacts inserted using OBT. If no (b)(1)1 5a the (b)(1)1 5a on sensor displays, significantly reducing the complexity and difficulty of those scenarios.

~~(C)~~

(b)(1)1 5a

(U/~~FOUO~~) Following the conversation with CAPT (b)(6) , I conducted an additional, detailed review of the TRE and TWP instructions regarding ASW and relevant ASW A&A CTQS capabilities and standard scenarios with other members of the TRE Team. During this review, we determined that there is nothing in the ASW A&A capability or standard scenario that (b)(1)1 5a , and it would be possible to meet the (b)(1)1 5a certification requirements only with reactive engagements. I directed the TRE Team to begin developing contingency in-port trainer scenarios to (b)(1)1 5a standards and (b)(1)1 5a requirements.

(U/~~FOUO~~) CAPT (b)(6) returned from TDY on Monday, 23 November and I discussed the GEO (b)(1)1 5a issue with him prior to a meeting he was to attend with other members of the CSL staff to discuss the issue. I explained my concerns (outlined above) regarding conducting (b)(6) as well as the results of our review of references for the (b)(1)1 5a . My position expressed during this discussion was that it was possible to (b)(1)1 5a , with an additional in-port trainer session, but I felt the effectiveness of the inspection would be degraded.

(U/~~FOUO~~) I received a phone call from CDRE (b) (6) on Tuesday, 24 November, where he outlined the plan to have GEO return to sea on the afternoon of the 25th, regardless of the (b)(1)1 5a repairs and, in

ENCLOSURE (76)
1 of 2

this event, conduct the (b)(1)1 5a . I told him I would discuss this with CAPT (b)(6) and get back to him. Following this call, I spoke with CAPT (b)(6) as he was departing the office for another event and relayed my conversation with CDRE (b)(6) . CAPT (b)(6) asked me to call CDRE (b) (6) back and inform him CSL N7 concurred with performing the (b)(1)1 5a . If repairs were not successful. I then called CDRE (b)(6) back and relayed CAPT (b)(6) ' position to him.

V/R,

CAPT (b)(6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: ML
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (76)
2 of 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG**

From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7OA
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 13:23
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG
Subject: RE: (U) GEO Towed Array vs TRE Phone Discussions
Signed By: (b)(6) @NAVY.SMIL.MIL

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAPT (b)(6),

(U/FOUO) I have updated my statement (below the cut line) to reflect the fact you were acting COS vice TDY during the week of 16 Nov. I've also added additional clarifying details to the interchanges between me, you, and CDRE (b)(6) on 24 Nov (As I'd stated originally, I spoke to him twice on the phone that day. The first time was between the time he'd left you a voice mail and when you and I had our conversation. The second time was after our conversation and his 1247 email, which was the call I reported in my 1255 email to you). I don't remember whether or not you and I had discussed the option and impacts of performing the (b)(1) 1.5a before Monday (11/23)...it might have happened, but I wouldn't say for certain one way or another.

V/R,
CAPT (b)(6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

****

CAPT (b)(6),

(U/FOUO) Regarding performing repairs to GEO's (b)(1) 1.5a, I spoke on the telephone with CAPT (b)(6) early in October (I don't recall the exact date, it was shortly after GEO's initial CASREP). I also spoke on the phone with CAPT (b)(6) late in the week of 16 November (I believe this was Friday, 20 November). In both of these discussions I stated that I, as TRE Senior Member, desired the ship to have (b)(1) 1.5a in order to meet the objectives of the inspection, and explained my reasons:

- (U/FOUO) First, the evaluation of the ASW critical mission area would be significantly degraded. Since this inspection was scheduled as (b)(1) 1.5a. Without an (b)(1) 1.5a it would be highly unlikely GEO would have been able to (b)(1) 1.5a (b)(1) 1.5a and generating contact for (b)(1) 1.5a Approach and Attack tactics would have required extensive TRE Team intervention to position GEO.

- (U/FOUO) Second, evaluation of Submarine Tracking and Submerged Contact Management would be (b)(1) 1.5a Several of the scenarios conducted during the (b)(1) 1.5a If no actual (b)(1) 1.5a, the simulation will only display the (b)(1) 1.5a significantly reducing the complexity and difficulty of those scenarios.

- (U/FOUO) Third, the (b)(1) 1.5a would have increased risk during the conduct on the inspection, particularly during ISR IVO West Palm Beach and transit of the Northwest Providence Channel, since an important submerged contact (b)(1) 1.5a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (77)[1]
1 of 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U/FOUO) Following the conversation with CAPT (b)(6), I conducted an additional, detailed review of the TRE and TWP instructions regarding ASW and (b)(1)1.5a with other members of the TRE Team. During this review, we determined that there is nothing in the ASW A&A capability or standard scenario that (b)(1)1.5a , and it would be possible to meet the (b)(1)1.5a (b)(6) requirements only with reactive engagements. I directed the TRE Team to begin developing contingency in-port trainer scenarios to (b)(1)1.5a requirements.

(U/FOUO) CAPT (b)(6) had been serving as the acting COS for a portion of the previous week. When he returned to the N7 spaces on Monday, 23 November, I discussed the GEO 1 (b)(1)1.5a issue with him in preparation for a meeting he was to attend with other members of the CSL staff to discuss the issue. I explained my concerns (outlined above) regarding conducting a (b)(1)1.5a as well as the results of our review of references for the (b)(1)1.5a . My position expressed during this discussion was that it was possible to meet the minimum letter of 1 (b)(1)1.5a , with an additional in-port trainer session, but I felt the effectiveness of the (b)(1)1.5a

(U/FOUO) I received a phone call from CDRE (b)(6) in the late morning of Tuesday, 24 November, where he outlined the plan to have GEO return to sea on the afternoon of the 25th, regardless of the (b)(1)1.5a repairs and, in this event, conduct the (b)(1)1.5a (He had attempted to call CAPT (b)(6) first, but got his voice mail hotseat, so then called me.) I told him I would discuss this with CAPT (b)(6) and get back to him. Following this call, I spoke with CAPT (b)(6) as he was briefly in the office between events and relayed my conversation with CDRE (b)(6) . CAPT (b)(6) asked me to call CDRE (b)(6) back and inform him CSL N7 concurred with performing the (b)(1)1.5a . Returning to my desk afterwards, I received an email from CDRE (b)(6) (sent at 1247) outlining the plan he'd discussed with me on the phone. I called CDRE (b)(6) back and relayed CAPT (b)(6) 's position to him, and forwarded CDRE (b)(6) 's email to CAPT (b)(6) with a note informing him I'd relayed his position to CDRE (b)(6)

V/R,

CAPT (b)(6)

****

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 9:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N70A
Subject: RE: (U) GEO (b)(1)1.5a vs TRE Phone Discussions

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) thanks. One thing to mention is that I was not TDY, but was acting COS 17-23 Nov--I was working mainly out of the front office. I also think we had a conversation face to face before then (the week before), similar to the one where I asked you to call CDRE (b)(6) on 23-24 Nov, to reiterate we'd like to have a TA, but would do the TRE without one if it wasn't reasonable to replace. Last thing--I think you called (b)(6) and not other way around. I think I got called by (b)(6) -he left a msg on my voicemail I think, and I asked you to call him back after you and I discussed it. Your email on 24 Nov at 1255 says that--unless it's wrong--you would know.

ENCLOSURE (77)
2 of 4

Let me know if you want the below to be your official statement, or if you wave to research and correct any of the items I mentioned. If I interviewed you, I would update your statement with these clarifications and have you sign it if you agreed, but I do not intend to interview you.

V/r (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 8:41 AM
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG
Subject: (U) (b)(6) vs TRE Phone Discussions

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAPT (b)(6)

(U/FOUO) Regarding performing repairs to GEO's FLTA prior to the ship's TRE, I spoke on the telephone with CAPT (b)(6) early in October (I don't recall the exact date, it was shortly after GEO's initial CASREP). I also spoke on the phone with CAPT (b)(6) late in the week of 16 November (I believe this was Friday, 20 November). In both of these discussions I stated that I, as TRE Senior Member, desired the ship to have (b)(1)1.5a in order to meet the objectives of the inspection and explained my reasons:

- (U/FOUO) First, the evaluation of the ASW critical mission area would be (b)(1)1.5a . Since this inspection was scheduled as (b)(1)1.5a . Without an operable towed array, it would be highly unlikely GEO would have been able to (b)(1)1.5a (b)(1)1.5a at ranges sufficient to demonstrate deliberate (b)(1)1.5a and generating contact for reactive (b)(1)1.5a would have required extensive TRE Team intervention to position GEO.

- (U/FOUO) Second, evaluation of (b)(1)1.5a would be (b)(1)1.5a . Several of the scenarios conducted during the TRE for these areas use synthetic contacts inserted using OBT, if no (b)(1)1.5a the (b)(1)1.5a on sensor displays, significantly reducing the complexity and difficulty of those scenarios.

- (C) Third, the (b)(1)1.5a conduct on the inspection, particularly during (b)(1)1.5a since an important submerged contact management sensor would not be available.

(U/FOUO) Following the conversation with CAPT (b)(6) I conducted an additional, detailed review of the TRE and TWP instructions regarding ASW and relevant ASW A&A CTQS capabilities and standard scenarios with other members of the TRE Team. During this review, we determined that there is nothing in the ASW A&A capability or standard scenario that (b)(1)1.5a , and it would be possible to meet the (b)(1)1.5a certification requirements only with reactive engagements. I directed the TRE Team to begin developing contingency in-port trainer scenarios to (b)(1)1.5a standards and (b)(1)1.5a requirements.

(U/FOUO) CAPT (b)(6) returned from TDY on Monday, 23 November and I discussed the GEO (b)(1)1.5a issue with him prior to a meeting he was to attend with other members of the CSL staff to discuss the issue. I explained my concerns (outlined above) regarding conducting a (b)(1)1.5a , as well as the results of our review of references for the (b)(1)1.5a My position expressed during this discussion was that it was possible to (b)(1)1.5a with an additional in-port trainer session, but I felt the effectiveness of the inspection would be degraded.

(U/~~FOUO~~) I received a phone call from CDRE (b)(6) on Tuesday, 24 November, where he outlined the plan to have GEO return to sea on the afternoon of the 25th, regardless of the (b)(1)1 5a repairs and, in this event, conduct the (b)(1)1 5a I told him I would discuss this with CAPT (b) (6) and get back to him. Following this call, I spoke with CAPT (b)(6) as he was departing the office for another event and relayed my conversation with CDRE (b)(6) CAPT (b)(6) asked me to call CDRE (b)(6) back and inform him CSL N7 concurred with performing the (b)(1)1 5a if repairs were not successful. I then called CDRE (b)(6) back and relayed CAPT (b)(6) ' position to him.

V/R,

CAPT

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: ML
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1.5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (77)
4 of 4

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6) LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG

From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N70A
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2015 15:55
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG
Subject: RE: (U) Statement regarding discussion on 17 Nov
Signed By: (b)(6) @NAVY.SMIL.MIL

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CAPT (b)(6)
Roger, sir. ACK receipt on behalf of CAPT (b)(6) . Thanks.
V/R,
CAPT (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2015 3:40 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N70A; (b)(6) CAPT OPNAV, DNS-2
Cc: (b)(6) CIV NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7A; (b)(6) LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG
Subject: FW: (U) Statement regarding discussion on 17 Nov

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CAPTs (b)(6) / (b)(6) ,

Attached is a voluntary statement from Mr. (b)(6) , CSL N7A (my deputy), who was present at the same 17 Nov meeting that I spoke of during our interview. I asked (b)(6) to draft a statement on his recollection of that group discussion because there is some disparity on what was actually said/heard. If necessary, recommend SIB consider interviewing (b)(6) and any other folks he mentions that were present for that TA discussion.

V/r (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: MIL
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1) 1.5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1) 1.5a

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (78)
1 of 2

Statement by (b)(6)
COMSUBLANT N7A
regarding conversations of 17 November 2015 pertaining to the need for (b)(1)1.5a USS GEORGIA to support upcoming Tactical Readiness Evaluation (TRE)

"On Tuesday, 17 Nov 2015, following the scheduled 1000 intelligence brief a small group stayed behind to discuss the potential COAs and way ahead for USS GEORGIA. Participants in the discussion included (b)(6) (CSL N3A), CAPT (b)(6) (CSL N7), CAPT (b)(6) (CSL N4), possibly (b)(6) (CSL N4A), and me.

The ship did (b)(1)1.5a , and was scheduled for an upcoming TRE. An (b)(1)1.5a in Kings Bay and the ability of the ship to arrive, (b)(1)1.5a , and depart for sea on the same day without a reactor shutdown was germane.

(b)(6) asked if the (b)(1)1.5a . CAPT (b)(6) declared that it was too early to declare if the (b)(1)1.5a – if the ship and shore support team could load an (b)(1)1.5a – then they should (b)(1)1.5a . He also made clear that if it proved not possible or the (b)(1)1.5a

The upshot of this discussion was to pursue (b)(1)1.5a if possible and reasonable."

//s//
(b)(6)
15 Dec 2015

ENCLOSURE (78)
2 of 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **LCDR NNPI-West Virginia (Gold), Executive**

From: (b)(6) CAPT N[illegible]-COMSUBLANT, N7
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2015 10:44
To: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-West Virginia (Gold), Executive
Subject: (U) GEO (b)(1)1.5a vs TRE Phone Discussions
Signed By: (b)(6) @NAVY.SMIL.MIL

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAPT

~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.5a telephone with CAPT (b)(6) (b)(1)1.5a . I also spoke on the phone with (b)(6) (b)(1)1.5a (it [illegible]s was Friday, 20 November) (b)(1)1.5a these discussions (b)(1)1.5a to have one (b)(1)1.5a in order to meet the objectives of the inspection, and explained my reasons:

- (U//FOUO) First, the evaluation of the ASW critical mission area would (b)(6) Since this inspection was scheduled as (b)(1)1.5a Without an (b)(1)1.5a it would be highly unlikely [illegible] would have been able to (b)(1)1.5a (b)(1)1.5a that ranges sufficient to demonstrate deliberate Approach and Attack tactics, and generating contact for reactive (b)(1)1.5a would have required extensive TRE Team intervention to position GEO.

- (U//FOUO) Second, evaluation of (b)(1)1.5a would be (b)(1)1.5a . Several of the scenarios conducted during the TRE for these areas use synthetic contacts inserted using OBT. If (b)(1)1.5a , the (b)(1)1.5a on sensor displays, significantly reducing the complexity and difficulty of those scenarios.

- ~~(C)~~ Third, the (b)(1)1.5a concept on the inspection, particularly during (b)(1)1.5a since an important submerged contact management sensor would not be available.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Following the conversation with CAPT (b)(6) , I conducted an additional, detailed review of the TRE and TWP instructions regarding ASW and relevant ASW A&A CTLs capabilities and standard (b)(1)1.5a scenarios with other members of the TRE Team. During this review, we determined that there is nothing in the ASW A&A capability or standard scenario that (b)(1)1.5a , and it would be possible to meet the (b)(1)1.5a certification requirements only with reactive engagements. I directed the TRE Team to begin developing contingency in-port trainer scenarios to (b)(1)1.5a standards and (b)(1)1.5a requirements.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ CAPT (b)(6) had been serving as the acting COS for a portion of the previous week. When he returned to his N7 spaces on Monday, 23 November, I discussed the GEO (b)(1)1.5a issue with him in Preparation for a meeting he was to attend with other members of the CSL staff to discuss the issue. I explained my concerns (outlined above) regarding conducting a (b)(1)1.5a as well as the results of our review of references for the (b)(1)1.5a My position expressed during this discussion was that it was possible to (b)(1)1.5a (b)(1)1.5a , with an additional in-port trainer session, but I felt the effectiveness of the inspection would be degraded.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (79)
1 of 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U/~~FOUO~~) I received a phone call from CDRE (b)(6) in the late morning of Tuesday, 24 November, where he outlined the plan to have GEO return to sea on the afternoon of the 25th, regardless of the (b)(6) repairs and, in this event, conduct the (b)(1)1 5a (He had attempted to call CAPT (b)(6) first, but got his voice mail instead, so then called me.) I told him I would discuss this with CAPT (b)(6) and get back to him. Following this call, I spoke with CAPT (b)(6) as he was briefly in the office between events and relayed my conversation with CDRE (b)(6) . CAPT (b)(6) asked me to call CDRE (b)(6) back and inform him CSL N7 concurred with performing the (b)(1)1 5a , if repairs were not successful. Returning to my desk afterwards, I received an email from CDRE (b)(6) (sent at 1247) outlining the plan he'd discussed with me on the phone. I called CDRE (b)(6) back and relayed CAPT (b)(6) 's position to him, and forwarded CDRE (b)(6) 's email to CAPT (b)(6) with a note informing him I'd relayed his position to CDRE (b) (6) .

V/R,

CAPT (b)(6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: CSL N7
DERIVED FROM: (b)(1)1 5a
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1)1 5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RTTUZZGW RUOISTA7105 3202056 RUCS-UUUU--RUCSGSr.
RTTUZYUW RUOISTA7105 3202056-[illegible]
ZNR UUUUU
R 161921Z NOV 15 PSN 153601H16
FM COMSUBRON SIXTEEN
TO SUBRON SIXTEEN
BT
UNCLAS
SECINFO/U/-/USA//
MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2008/COMSUBRON SIXTEEN//
SUBJ/UNIT COMMANDER OUT OF AREA ADVISORY//
POC/ (b)(6) ./YNC/UNIT:COMSUBRON SIXTEEN/NAME:KING RAY CA/
TEL:
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. CAPT (b)(6) , COMMANDER, SUBMARINE
SQUADRON 16, WILL BE OUT OF THE LOCAL AREA FROM 171200(LOCAL)
NOVEMBER 2015 UNTIL 241600(LOCAL) NOVEMBER 2015.
2. CAPT (b)(6) , WILL ASSUME THE DUTIES AS ACTING
COMMANDER, SUBMARINE SQUADRON 16 FROM 171200(LOCAL)
NOVEMBER 2015 UNTIL 241600(LOCAL) NOVEMBER 2015.
BT
#7105

NNNN

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (10)
1 of 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(6) **LCDR COMSUBGRU 10, JAG**

Subject: FW: (U) GEO Statement ICO LCDR (b)(6)
Attachments: GEO Background and additional emails.docx

~~Original Message~~
From: (b)(6) LCDR NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N36
Sent: Monday, December 07, 2015 5:23 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT NNPI-COMSUBLANT, N7
Subject: (U) GEO Statement ICO LCDR (b)(6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAPT (b)(6)

I attached a word document with the events from the time we identified we would need to replace GEO's (b)(1)1 5a up to 24 Nov. Below is the last two paragraphs which discusses why 0730 was initially chosen (RE: (U) GEO KBAY movement times) and the request to move the movement back to 0830 (RE: (S) GEO schedule).

- I approved the schedule change on 16 Nov (arrival and underway on 25 Nov). I followed up with CSS-16 ANAV (OPS on GEO at this point I believe) and NSSC OPS to determine the times we were planning for GEO. NSSC ANAV (ETCS (b)(6)) provided TRF timeline inputs for a 0730 arrival and 1600 underway. I sent the movement message inputs for to NSSC KBAY and to CSS-16 OPS and ANAV on 18 Nov. At this point GEO was going to go into EHW for a single day and CSS-16 ANAV emailed that CSS-16 was good with the plan. NSSC and CSS-16 were working out details with SWFLANT at this point.

- On 23 Nov, CSS-16 OPS emailed me about GEO at 1145. This email included the request to move the arrival back to 0830. It also included three COAs for the replacement. I followed up the email with a phone call to the OPS to discuss the arrival time. He stated the boat was concerned about piloting in the dark and wanted a 0830 arrival. He also discussed that if the time wasn't changed the boat would probably come in at 0830 anyway. I discussed the new arrival time with N3A and he did not say yes or no. I emailed the change request to CDR (b)(6) but do not remember a specific conversation with him. I followed up with CSS-16 OPS via email about the change in arrival time at ~1330 with the thought that 1 hrs could make a difference in completing repairs in 1 day. At this point the option to get underway without the (b)(1)1 5a had not been brought up and I was still working on the understanding that they needed to fix the (b)(1)1 5a or they would have possibly been in port for several days. CSS-16 OPS followed up with an email on the moor time with no further feedback or request to continue pursuing a change in time. Additionally, while NSSC and CSS-16 were working on where the GEO would go in KBAY, NSSC recommended the 0730 moor time as well based on repair timelines. I believe this was independent and not influenced by CSL.

V/R,
LCDR (b)(6)
COMSUBLANT
(b) (6)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (83)

CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(1)1 5a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 13526 FR 6.1 (b)(1) 5a
DERIVED:
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(1) 5a

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE (<3>)

Background: I am the Regional Employment Officer (REO) for Kings Bay and Norfolk. I assign/review waterspace for these areas and CSS-6, CSS-16, and CSG-20 boats. I also get approval for current quarter schedule changes for CSS-6 and CSS-16 and review the NSSC Kings Bay movement message and deconflict Kings Bay, Mayport, and Port Canaveral movements if necessary.

- On 6 Nov, CSS-16 proposed a plan to bring GEO back to KBAY after CODT and later in the month to [redacted]. At this point, GEO needed to [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a I called LCDR [redacted] (b)(5) and confirmed that [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a was a viable option. I don't remember pushing this any further up the chain of command at this point because CSS-16 OPS stated they were working on when a [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.5a

- CSS-16 OPS sent an email stating a [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a by 24 Nov and requested to pull into Port Canaveral port from 25-27 Nov. The main driver for Port Canaveral was to avoid losing CODT by minimizing transit time from the Strait of Florida to Kings Bay. Any changes to GEO's schedule were high interest due to her timeline before her deployment and brining any boat in would require briefing N3 chain of command. I informed the N3 chain of command (N3OA, N30, N3A, N3 or some portion of the chain) of the desire to pull into Port Canaveral [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a and between N3 and N4 (not sure on where above me the final decision was made) it was decided the best course of action was to pull into Kings Bay. Additionally, I informed CSS-16 OPS to look into the possibility of [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a and assessed that the earliest GEO could arrive in Kings Bay would be the morning of 25 Nov based on conducting her final REP in the KMOAS on 23 Nov at ~1000L (see RE: (S) GEO FLTA Replacement).

- CSS-16 said they could conduct a [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a and inquired about doing the [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a. I briefed N30 and N3OA and they desired to keep it in Kings Bay. Additionally, I discussed the Mayport option with N3A, he had no real input on Mayport vs Kings Bay. CSS-16 OPS came back via email that CSS-16 was ok with Kings Bay. CSS-16 ANAV submitted a WEBSKED change for GEO to arrive and depart on 25 Nov. I verified with LCDR [redacted] (CSL N4) that [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a was feasible and briefed N30 and N3A on the schedule change. I approved the schedule change on 16 Nov. I followed up with CSS-16 ANAV (OPS on GEO at this point I believe) and NSSC OPS to determine the times we were planning for GEO. NSSC ANAV (NTCS [redacted]) provided TRF timelines inputs for a 0730 arrival and 1630 underway. I sent the movement message inputs for to NSSC KBAY and to CSS-16 OPS and ANAV on 18 Nov. At this point GEO was going to go into [redacted] (b)(1)1.5a and CSS-16 ANAV advised that CSS-16 was good with the plan. NSSC and CSS-16 were working out details with [redacted] at this point.

EXHIBIT 193

3 of 4

- On 23 Nov, CSS-16 OPS emailed me about GEO at 1145. This email included the request to move the arrival back to 0830. It also included three CDAs for the replacement. I followed up the email with a phone call to the OPS to discuss the arrival time. He stated the boat was concerned about piloting in the dark and wanted a 0830 arrival. He also discussed that if the time wasn't changed the boat would probably come in at 0830 anyway. I discussed the new arrival time with NSA and he did not say yes or no. I emailed the change request to CDR [redacted], but do not remember a specific conversation with him. I followed up with CSS-16 OPS via email about the change in arrival time at ~1330 with the thought that (b)(1) 5a [redacted]. At this point the option to get underway (b)(1) 5a had not been brought up and I was still working on the understanding that (b)(1) 5a [redacted]. CSS-16 OPS followed up with an email on the moor time. I did not get any additional input to submit a change request. Additionally, while NSSC and CSS-16 were working on where the GEO would go in KBAY, NSSC recommended the 0730 moor time as well based on repair timeliness. I believe this was independent and not influenced by CSL.

- On 24 Nov, the decision was made to pull GEO in for a day regardless of the success to the repairs. I sent an email summarizing the plan to make sure NSSC OPS, CSS-16 OPS, and I were on the same page.

RE: (U) [redacted]

ENCLOSURE (13)