

11 Feb 13

On 10 Feb 13, (b) (6) [REDACTED] was asked for additional information regarding an alleged DUI that occurred in 2011. [REDACTED] provided the following information on 10 Feb 13, which I certify is true to the best of my knowledge:

I got in touch with [REDACTED] at NOSC Earle [REDACTED]. He is the security manager and he had some amplifying information on [REDACTED]'s status. Back in October of 2011, [REDACTED] made the appropriate entries into JPAS regarding [REDACTED] DUI back in June of 2011 ([REDACTED] had started the investigation process to get a security clearance). While still attached to Det Bravo, [REDACTED] submitted a chit to transfer to the IRR. It was apparently approved because by November of 2011, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was officially transferred to NOSC Earle. Since he was in "500 status" and officially in the IRR, the NOSC was unable to take him to Captain's Mast.

[REDACTED] 10 Feb 13
USN

Enclosure (6)

Building 150, the building I worked out of. [REDACTED] works in building 150, and eight others. Other people did come in and use it often and it was always available. A group of us also bought some of the additional equipment. Bumper plates, etc. - they cost about \$1,000.00 - bought it from a [REDACTED] at MSRON 11 who had bought it with his own money (that is what he said). Several Chiefs and interested personnel including full time staff here at Jebel Ali compound, and I pooled our money. Our intention was just to give people additional assets for conducting PT not available in the MWR facility and to increase morale. [REDACTED] got permission from the compound to install the frame work that are here with the weight equipment in JEB Ali. I have legal questions about 1149'ing the equipment that was purchased with govt funds and how to dispose of the equipment we bought. I belong to cross-fit gym back home, Crossfit Hampton Roads, but is no way associated with our extra equipment and facilities. Supply Dept worked the money-side. Det Alpha was not moved out of the space because of the weight equipment and in fact was given more space within the compound that was more conducive to the working environment and has nothing to do with the other. The only space they were moved from was the space that was designated for Supply.

I never dated a 3rd Class at NAVELSG. I dated a Chief who worked there for a period of 1 year. She is an ISC. She has since transferred.

I worked in the CESE department, [REDACTED] was placed in charge of the BMF for the work up period and inspections, leading to our deployment. I got along with Ruela fine over the last year. I blew out my calf at RAVEN school, in Sep 13, and was on LIMDU/Light Duty for 30 days and was not allowed to do any underway evolutions or additional Raven Training until I was cleared medically. The boats were pulled down from the outlying detachments for three months prior to ULTRA. The expectation was not that Williamsburg would maintain the boats, but that the Dets would work on the boats. I did not touch the boats during those three months, other than to do Depot-level repairs and to provide subject matter expert guidance and Chief level over view of personnel while they were at the compound.

The SELRES have never been treated differently that of the FTS. Policy was they both were to follow the same plan of the week, plan of the day, etc. It took a little prodding to get the SELRES to participate in PT. I do not know why the SELRES came away with that perception.

There was an amazing amount of maintenance done prior to ULTRA I and they were as ready to go as they could be. It is not true that only two boats were ready to go for ULTRA.

We had issues with Det E getting their stuff done on time and doing what they were supposed to do. Det E was supposed to do the work. There should be a moving order indicating this. [REDACTED] was big on moving orders.

Trailer missing a wheel: The trailer was missing a wheel and saw the trailer missing a wheel being backed into the shop upon our arrival. The boat was already launched when we arrived. The back left wheel was completely off the trailer. This was in Annapolis. I got the feeling the

wheel had been off for awhile. I also saw that they had just launched the boat. There are serious safety issues with moving a trailer with a missing wheel. The proper way to do it would have been to jack up the trailer and replace the wheel.

CAPT Hunter properly shut down operations whenever safety issues arose.

During the ULTRA I, we barely passed the 3M inspection. Lack of maintenance, spotchecks, and Khaki involvement within the boat department as a whole etc. was the main reason for the problems. It did not seem like G2 was going to budge on changing the dates of the inspection so we did what we could to fix our discrepancies.

CAPT Hunter wanted to make unit cohesiveness greater and that is why I think he chose the COA to move the boats to MSRON 12 and maintenance performed in Williamsburg.

I think [REDACTED] was sent home during ULTRA I because he was making decisions against the CO's directive and had made numerous comments that he knew people outside of the command at much higher pay grades that could back him up with his decisions. [REDACTED] made the same statements often.

CPO 365: ever since I have been at MSRON 12, CPO 365 has been occurring with MSRON 12 (through integration with NAVELSG). It was put out at quarters during 2012. CPO 365 is still being done now in UAE.

I have been with MSORN 12 since June 2010 - CDBs have been a regular occurrence since I have been here.

[REDACTED] failed her last PFA, and I am not sure if she failed the one before it but have reason to believe that she has simply by her interest in FEP here locally in Jebel Ali.

I do not understand what happened with [REDACTED]. I do not know which of his personnel were in play or not in play.

I was not part of the Chiefs Mess that requested to be underway with Weapons in Oct/Nov 12.

CAPT Hunter was very clear that maintenance/boats (BMF concept) was to be separate from other departments.

How many Chiefs are in Jeb Ali, approximately? 22 or so are here.

[REDACTED] and I get along with each other as friends. She is very professional.

One thing I do think should be shut down: [REDACTED] seems like he is trying to set up things to get our [REDACTED] in trouble; he calls people, talks to junior personnel, and has created our morale issue.

I have never seen any racial discrimination here, sexual discrimination, or religious discrimination in the command. Religious accommodation is hard because of the liberty policy. There is a lot of anti-sexual discrimination training.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[Redacted Signature]

2 FEB 13
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[Redacted Signature]

2 Feb 13
Date

and I came to help. There was an inaccurate picture Seaward Security and some Comms issues. CAPT Hunter asked me to stop helping the watch officers a few times. I said something related to the issues and CAPT Hunter told me to get out of the watch area - "go away."

I do not believe COs should make people struggle to the point where they begin to doubt themselves, lose confidence, etc. You do not succeed in CAPT Hunter's world - you survive. He gives very few compliments.

CAPT Hunter has never PT'ed with us. I have never seen him PT or do the P&T

I have never heard him threaten anybody in the context FITREPs (i.e. "if you do this, I will ruin your career" - I have never heard that). During mid-term counseling, he said I needed to work on listening and other things - very little positive feedback. I have no idea where I stand as an officer and will be surprised how I end up at the end of the report cycle.

We have gotten to the point now, when he comes to Fuj, Chiefs and wardroom meet to ensure they share information about what CAPT Hunter said to them.

I can never get on the right footing with him - never sure what he wants.

Always seems like CAPT Hunter is worried about me becoming the "Boat Commanding Officer" - he is very concerned about a misperception emerging about who is in charge. Decision rights are constantly removed.

Liberty policy: Personally, I cannot stand the liberty policy. I cannot go meet my LCDRs easily or go across the street to get food or ATM money. I think NAVCENT has withdrawn the policy as of a few weeks ago - but not sure if that applies only to Bahrain, as my XO told me was the case.

Around mid-Dec, CAPT Hunter visited the command and said that Chiefs were angry at [redacted] because of the [redacted] incident. He also said that a Chief had said he was not confident in my ability to command. The Chiefs' mess denied saying either. According to CAPT Hunter, it was [redacted].

CAPT Hunter will often say "I didn't say that" when things are not right. I do not trust CAPT Hunter and prefer not to be alone with him ever.

I feel that FTS were treated better than SELRES prior to deployment (did not have to work as many hours), but there is equal treatment since there has been deployment.

CAPT Hunter has a tendency to talk and interrupt - not listen.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

0 AC
[Redacted]

1 FEB 07 3
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[Redacted]

1 FEB 13
Date

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: [Redacted] Rank/Rate: [Redacted]
Activity: USW Unit: MSRON 12
Telephone number: _____

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Article 92, Dereliction of duty, and that:

[Redacted] I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[Redacted] I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:
[Redacted] I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

[Redacted] [Redacted]
(Member signature/date)

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the following statement:

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

WITNESS STATEMENT

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Name Rank/Rate SSN
MSRON 12 Commander 56.7.2, Fuj Det
Command Department/Division
Fujairah [REDACTED]
Location for next 30 days Phone

I, [REDACTED], hereby make the following statement:

Regarding Hurricane Sandy: I did say that you need to get your GMT and medical issues completed before they could take liberty. At the time it was related to their ability to go on their 96-hour liberty prior to deployment. I also told a group of CPOs in khaki call to get a list together of all personnel affected. I admit that it was confusing to those who heard it. I said that because at the Department Head meeting the GMTs, etc., had to be done before they went on liberty, but it was a separate issue from emergency leave. I was told to tell sailors, by the XO, that if they went home, it would possibly affect their 96-hour liberty. The idea, I believe, was to make sure people really needed to go home and just get an extra liberty. When I got the list of people affected, I personally talked to each person who needed to go home. About 10 people did go home, but not immediately (they waited about a week, at their own choice, because they could not get there anyway) no loss of liberty occurred.

In October 2012, I did say to the boat department they should not screw up my liberty, and if you screw up my 96-hour liberty after this ULTRA, I will hold them accountable. I should not have said that. I was trying to motivate them to do a good job so we could finish the exercise, but in hindsight, I should have used better terminology. I was sorry for this, and I told the Boat Department Chief's Mess and Officers, as a group, that I was sorry. I did that the very next day.

I have been here since Dec 2011. I presented COAs to the CO regarding the getting boats ready for ULTRA. One was maintain them at the Det, another was to put them in layup in Williamsburg, and other was to put them in Williamsburg out of layup. Field Service Teams (FST) (contractors) who work for [REDACTED] were to come out and maintain them with the third COA, the one the CO picked. That COA counted on assistance from DET Bravo, but they did not assist as planned. The FST did not do the daily grind of checks, just big things, and so the boats were not immediately ready for ULTRA 1 in April.

I do not think it was smart to schedule 3M during ULTRA I. We did pass the 3M. But because of it, we could not work on the boats as much as we wanted and the training was not as useful based on inspection effort and stress. However, that was the CAPT Hunter's decision.

I did not appreciate [REDACTED] an FTS. He was disruptive, arrogant, and not a good worker. The SELRES in our department worked together much better. That said, the FTS I did have were important. Although there was conflict between FTS and SLERES, it was just something I had to deal with a leader.

Fuel Spills: early 2012, Feb/Mar, there was a 150 gallon oil spill that happened in Williamsburg, before ULTRA, and nobody was alerted because there was nobody there to alert. Later that day, the command found about it. Base Environmental got involved and reported it. The spill happened when they de-fueling the boats. I was not there at the time. Out Boat Det personnel there were on ADT funds. I know that a [REDACTED] (in Jeb Ali) was present at the time. I believe they did an investigation - CSO was running the show on that matter. I know that nobody went to NJP for it, but I am not sure if something written occurred. After that, CAPT Hunter implemented a policy that somebody specifically in charge has to be identified.

Another spill: During a refuel after PMS check, there was a 5 gallon spill, right as we were coming on AT in April 2012 for ULTRA 1. I found out about it from the CO. He told me it was handled and all proper procedures were followed. He said that it was reported.

The OIC of Det Charlie was very insistent that a sailor on orders, ADT funding, [REDACTED] I believe, to go to a function at the NOSC even though he was in Williamsburg. [REDACTED], was told that the sailor would drive up to the NOSC and would then have to come back. [REDACTED] was ordered to be back at MSRON 12 at a certain time, but [REDACTED] did not made aware. The OIC then had the sailor waiting 3 or 4 hours to handle another Det C matter, and the sailor left. The Det C OIC wanted to give a Page 13 to the sailor, but MSRON 12 ensured that did not happen. The Annapolis OIC later received an LOI for keeping his sailors too late on drill weekends. [REDACTED] did an investigation on the issue.

I do recall passport and other issues with admin requirements during the mobilization process - delays in delivery, photos were wrong. Passports always take awhile to handle, in my experience - govt passports are not easy to take care of.

Regarding ULTRA/FEP guidance in 2012, I do not think not reading the Chief's in to the guidance preparation was improper. However, I am aware that my Chiefs felt offended by it - they complained to the CO about it.

The only thing I know about career development boards was that they had to be rushed to be in Green before the end of the year.

In Sep 12, I recall a Dept Head meeting in which [REDACTED] was citing an instruction he had just researched, but it was not the right answer for CAPT Hunter. CAPT Hunter yelled at him, saying something to the effect - "I said do it not go check instructions."

Sep 12: The Coxswain test was crazy. There was a massive curve. The test took all of them by surprise with its difficulty. It had landward weapons

questions and other questions on the fringes of what is relevant to Coxswains. I think the test was unfair if the intent of the test was to determine whether or not somebody deserved to be Coxswain.

In Oct 12: regarding the crypto, they left the crypto on the boat and went to the BMF. While in the BMF, the CRYPTO was locked up and there was delay in reporting. The responsible party was the Coxswain - the others who received LOIs should not have been held responsible, in my opinion.

I do not know whether a message was sent on the alleged negligent discharge.

As far as an issue in ULTRA II with sailors were eating snacks while a boat was refueling, I was in the COs tent when he asked if the sailors off watch were OK with getting fuel. I told the CO that I was fine with the sailors getting a snack at the marina. The CO was angry at me for letting them have the privilege.

On the govt credit cards, there is no more taking of per diem - the government cards has been paid off.

After the certexs - the Chiefs wanted to get underway with Weapons, but they did not have a plan put together. Once they finally put a plan together, it was probably too late in the process. [REDACTED] worked that issue, I was on ADVON at that point and not involved.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[REDACTED]

2/1/2013
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[REDACTED]

2/1/2013
Date

WITNESS STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

Name	Rank/Rate	SSN
MSRON 12	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Command	Department/Division	
Jeb Ali		
Location for next 30 days		Phone

A lot of people don't like the liberty policy, but I understand it is being driven at a higher level. A lot of the officers feel that they are treated poorly, that he has a condescending attitude towards them. His style is leading from behind the desk, a style which some COs do have.

As an example of how he handles things, I had CJO, took over in the morning, something happened where 3 personnel in Bahrain were picked up for a curfew violation, but we did not know a lot about it. I briefed him on what we had. He immediately interrupted "it is not an incident, we don't know yet." He is wound tight. He does interrupt people. But he can do that - he is an O-6. Perhaps a lot of the reservists are just not used to the style.

We had a CHT truck break down in the lane coming in to the ECP. I wanted to ban the truck from entering. We (me and [REDACTED]) went to the CO. He asked a number of questions - can we do this?, can we take money from a vendor?, etc. I responded I would work it - [REDACTED] reacted by freezing.

Perhaps active duty personnel are simply more used to dealing with these types of personalities sometimes. I had a commander in the Army who survived 11 "Congressional" because, although he was a poor leader, he did not do anything illegal.

I have not heard of anything illegal in the command by him or others.

CAPT Seeberger is a good XO, very personable and I think he will be a good leader as he continues to get familiar with the community. He takes advice and it will be a pleasure to work with him in the future if he fleets up after CAPT Hunter completes his tour.

CAPT Hunter does not take advice easily. He gets an idea in his head and that becomes the way something is supposed to be. At my weekly meeting with him yesterday: he does not like Port and Starboard watches, and is concerned about the heat when it gets hot - a reasonable concern by itself. With the people I have now, to do a new watch, nobody will have a day off, and I am fighting an uphill battle to convince him otherwise.

I have not heard of any irregularities with the PRT - I know there was some confusion because some people were told they had to take after deployment, but had already taken it and had to show that it had been entered into the

system. There is an established FEP program and it seems like the people who should be there are on there.

I do not do boat maintenance, but [REDACTED] did have some trouble when he first got over here. They seem to understand there 3M fairly well and are now doing the right reports.

[REDACTED] is not an impressive worker in my experience (looking at how he worked during the April ULTRA), but I heard he was hurt at RAVEN school. I was not at ULTRA II.

I do not recall oil spill incidents.

During April ULTRA, [REDACTED] was only there for the first week. He was vocal to me about things he disagreed with at the command level. He would question why the command was doing things a certain way. This is fine, but I think he was doing the same kind of complaining on the boats, which was a problem.

In the April ULTRA, they missed five rendezvous with HVAs coming in. Reasons varied: Mast head light out on one of the boats, lights out on one of the boats, etc. It could have been mitigated at the time, but maintenance personnel did not appear to have put forth enough effort.

The TRIAD working relationship is strained, and the strain is obvious to me. [REDACTED] has not given up though, he continues to go in and fight for the sailors. I do not see a lot of interaction between the CO and XO.

The XO does not seem to get out and about to the extent that you would expect of an XO.

I do not think the CO needs to be fired from what I have seen him do, although I think he might be a Napoleon-esque. From how he has interacted with me, I do not think he needs to be fired. I think the reservists might work more effectively under a "softer" leadership style - more positive feedback. But I also recognize the reservists have different expectations that active duty, I do not think there should be a requirement for a CO to "coddle" people.

The CO has been much more jovial and "nice" in recent days.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[REDACTED]

2 FEB 13
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[REDACTED]

2 Feb 13
Date



7101 Vorden Parkway
 South Bend, IN 46628-8422
 Phone:(574)287-2345
 800:(800)428-8355
 Customer Service-Ext. 360
 Fax:(574)236-7700

 REPRINT

INVOICE

INVOICE NUMBER	INVOICE DATE	PAGE
C954159	11/05/10	1
PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER		
[REDACTED]		

4

4/27/12
 9:53:59

BILL TO:
 4282988-000
 [REDACTED]

SHIP TO:
 4282988-000
 [REDACTED]

SHIP METHOD: UPS Ground
 BALMD

SHIP-TO PHONE: 757-620-9232

Plan Tean Wave Prcl

ORDER DATE	SALES REP NAME / PHONE EXT.	TERMS	MAKE, MODEL AND YEAR	WHSE CT	OPER. TRPROI
11/04/10	ECOMMERCE ORDERS	PayPal	YOU CHOS		

PART NUMBER	QTY ORDERED	QTY SHIPPED	DESCRIPTION	UNIT PRICE	EXTENSION	LOC
87QR7KM2RWL 36575	4	4	LT285/70R17 BF MT TAKM2 RWL DH 36575 121/118Q D FIND WARRANTY DETAILS @ WWW.TIRERACK.COM/BFG1	225.00	900.00	
REGCARDR REGISTRATION	1	1	TIRE REGISTRATION CARD -RETAIL RETAIL CUSTOMER FITMENT: CUSTOMER ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE ON VEHICLE. Subtotal Freight Charge PayPal PAYMENT	N/C 1016.24-	900.00 116.24	
			Total Payment		1016.24-	
<p>You may register your BF Goodrich Tires Online @ http://www.tirerack.com/bfgoodrichregistration</p>						
Total Amount Due					\$.00	
Payable in U.S. Funds						
Weight	240					

Enclosure (10)

The Tire Rack Return/Refund Policy

If you need to return or exchange an item, please call 1-800-428-8355 (ext. 360, customer service) for a Return Authorization Number. We accept returns within 30 days of delivery. All merchandise must be new.

Please complete the return check list (at right) to ensure that no shipping damage will occur.

RETURN FOR REFUND

Credit amount will be calculated as follows:

TIRES: Credit less all freight charges incurred.

WHEELS: Credit less all freight charges incurred. Wheels cannot have had tire mounted; please test fit wheels prior to mounting tires.

WHEEL & TIRE PACKAGE: Credit less \$60 labor charge for dismount and less all freight charges incurred.

SPECIAL ORDER ITEMS: Special order items are not returnable.

Credits will be issued to the credit card used on the order. If payment received was cash or check, we will refund by check to the billing address.

SHIPPING & DAMAGE CLAIMS

Please inspect your shipment immediately upon receipt. If your shipment has arrived damaged, please contact The Tire Rack customer service department at 1-800-428-8355, ext 360, right away. Return and reshipment will be scheduled. The merchandise should be new and completely repackaged in the original packaging material for the return and inspection. All original packaging material must be returned along with the damaged merchandise. Your credit depends upon these steps being followed carefully.

MANUFACTURER'S WARRANTIES

Merchandise covered by a manufacturer's warranty is sold with the warranty by the manufacturer extended to the purchaser. We will be happy to assist in obtaining fulfillment of a manufacturer's warranty. Other than applicable manufacturer's warranties, there are no warranties, express or implied, including any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

YOUR COMMENTS ARE IMPORTANT, PLEASE TELL US WHY YOU ARE RETURNING MERCHANDISE. _____

Return Check List

TIRES ONLY

- Original strapping is completely intact. (If not, ship tires individually, do not tape together.)
- Each tire (even when strapped to another tire) is clearly labeled with your return address and The Tire Rack's address.
- Packing slip with Return Authorization Number is taped securely on tire.

WHEELS ONLY

- Remove lug nuts/bolts from box.
- Secure center cap on wheel, or insert center cap in separate bag, and tape bag securely.
- If returning 2 wheels, must have protective cardboard between the wheels.
- The wheel must be well secured and protected in the box. Any styrofoam packing received with the shipment must be reused in the same way. If it is broken, please call for new packaging material.
- Wheel must have a foam sheet pad protecting the face of the wheel from cardboard chafing.
- Remove any staples that are not fully closed from the box.
- The wheel must be double-boxed. (2 boxes)
- The boxes are not damaged. If damaged, please call customer service for packaging material.
- Insure package for the proper value.
- Packing slip with Return Authorization Number is taped securely on package.

TIRE & WHEEL PACKAGES

- Call 1-800-428-8355 (ext. 360, customer service) for new packaging material and instructions.
- Follow instructions carefully; your credit depends on the condition of the merchandise upon receipt at The Tire Rack.
- Insure package for proper value.
- Packing slip with Return Authorization Number is taped securely on package.

TIRE RACK
.com

• South Bend, IN 46628-8422

1. PLACE

MSRON 12

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

2. DATE

5 FEB 13

I, [REDACTED], MSRON 12, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] Investigating Officer. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of:

-----NO FURTHER STATEMENTS THIS PAGE-----

I have been in the Navy almost 13 years. I have been with MSRON 12 since February 2010. I am FTS.

Around April or May of 2011, I travelled to Det Charlie in Annapolis, MD, to address various maintenance issues. At the time, MSRON 12 HQ N43 elements were going there every 3 or 4 months. We were doing repairs on a trailer, and we saw a different trailer parked with the boat on it, and I noticed it had a missing wheel. My first thought was "why is the wheel off." I believe [REDACTED] talked to somebody about it when he saw it. A few hours later, we saw it in front of the building – it had clearly moved. In my opinion as an EN and 3MA, it is a safety concern to move a trailer without a wheel, because of the load distribution. There is a small chance it could have caused a fracture throughout the trailer chassis, but I am not aware of that trailer being damaged because Det C had improperly moved. I believe [REDACTED] talked to the Det C Boat personnel about it being moved thereafter. I know that at the time all the Dets were still getting used to conforming to the new 3M system in place at the time (I believe maintenance before was done off the Seabee-style system). Again, the wheel was off – it was not a flat tire – the rim was off – I personally saw it.

The boats were moved from Det B, and all the Dets, in early 2012. There was not correct maintenance being done by the Dets, and the plan was to bring Det personnel in on orders. There was lack of use of the boats leading up to ULTRA I. Various Det personnel were flown in from all the Dets to do maintenance on all the boats. I think that some of the Dets that MSRON 12 HQ elements was going to do maintenance, but I am not sure how that word was put out. In my opinion [REDACTED] was not an outstanding worker, but I believe [REDACTED] was a "by the book" person. We were able to get the boats ready for ULTRA I once we had all the parts. The boat Dets were responsible for the boats, not MSRON 12 HQ – they come ask us if they needed help. They did indeed come to us a lot and ask for help. In the month prior to ULTRA there was a lack of personnel from the Dets to complete maintenance.

I never heard of [REDACTED] being treated unfairly.

Command climate goes up and down – usually when the SELRES are here, it goes down. I do not have much of an opinion on the leadership TRIAD – I do not see them too often. I have not heard any rumors about sexual discrimination. I have not heard any concerns about racial discrimination.

We passed the 3M G2 inspection during ULTRA, but did not do too great. Practically, shifting the 3M inspection outside of the AT period of ULTRA I would have resulted in SELRES not being available for the inspection.

At first they were not sure if FTS personnel would be taken to UAE. Then they said they were taking them – and as a result, I extended beyond my PRD for a year to go. When I extended, I had been told there was a 50/50 chance I would go (so I knew there was a possibility I would not go). I am surprised MSRON 12 took all of the Chiefs, leaving none back. In the end, a lot of Blue-shirts were left here. I have no idea whether or not there were any hookups in regards to who made the deployment.

My EVALs have been done on time over the three cycles I have been here (although always at the end of the reporting period).

[REDACTED] did, in late 2011/early 2012, ask for some help (volunteers) to help him move stuff from his house. I do not see a problem with it because we are a small command when not mobilized. I do not who asked him to help move. I do not think any money was offered for it.

The first fuel spill: around May 2012, they (Boat Det personnel here on orders helping) defueled the boats and did not keep a watchful eye on it and came out into the ground. I think the spill was 50 to 100 gallons. They should

1. PLACE

MSRON 12

2. DATE

5 FEB 13

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

have come in and told us and we would have told the Fire Dept. However, the Det did not notify anybody. A SITREP should have been sent (I am not sure if one was). Base environmental came by two days after and were angry because it had not been properly reported. Base environmental stops by regularly. I do not know if an investigation done - I was not questioned about it (and they likely would have talked to me if an investigation had been done). There were no FTS personnel there at the time.

A second fuel spill Sep/Oct 12, the hose clamp came off (perhaps after it was kicked and pressure built up). About 50 gallons of Diesel fuel spilled. [REDACTED], FTS, came in and had found that the hose clamp had come off and fuel was leaking everywhere. He did the right thing - shut it down, came in and told us, and Base environmental was notified - this occurred around midnight. I do not know if a SITREP went out or not, but it is standard for these things. [REDACTED] is told and he makes calls to the CDO/HQ. I was not interviewed about that spill either. Did not seem like there was an official investigation. I believe a [REDACTED], an Investigating Office, contacted me about this one.

It is accurate that in Aug 12, 1 out of 11 boats was operational, and that after 4 weeks 7 out of 11 were operational. [REDACTED] was a part of that but by no means was it due to special efforts by him.

The command let people go to New Jersey after Hurricane Sandy hit. I believe sailors were given special liberty, and I think it was handled correctly.

No Further Statement

The above statement consists of ⁵ page(s), prepared by [REDACTED] I have initialed any corrections I wish to make and the statement is ~~true~~ and complete to the best of my knowledge.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized to administer oaths, this 5th day of February 2013, onboard MSRON 12 Bldg 113: [REDACTED]

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: [REDACTED] Rank/Rate: [REDACTED]
Activity: MSRON 12 Unit: MSRON 12
Telephone number: [REDACTED]

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Art. 92 - Dereliction Duty
Art. 134 - Prejudice to Good Order
+ Discipline/Disorderly Conduct

[REDACTED]

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[REDACTED]

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

[REDACTED]

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the following statement:

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

WITNESS STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

Name	Rank/Rate	SSN
MSRON 12	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Command	Department/Division	
Jeb Ali	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Location for next 30 days	Phone	

My relationship with CAPT Hunter is that of a [REDACTED], I work to support him. When we first came out here, we had a good relationship that we had built. However, my relationship with him has become strained since we deployed, like night and day. CAPT Hunter is under a lot stress as a leader, and so am I - after a while, when I would go into his office, he would sometimes shout "what!" to me, or "what do you want?" I did not appreciate that. The XO was present sometimes. When I asked CAPT Hunter what had changed over the last two months, he mentioned it was related to an IG that had been filed against me regarding comments I made at a Career Development Board.

On one drive with the CO to Fuj recently, we spent the first five minutes talking, and then CAPT Hunter put his headphones in and did not speak to me the rest of the way.

CAPT Hunter is undermining when he goes directly to the Chiefs and discusses adverse personnel issues with them, or otherwise gets involved in the minute details of their affairs.

I believe that CAPT Hunter overly meddles in DRB and does not listen to our recommendations. The XO will listen, but the CO does not. I believe that for certain types of liberty offenses, they can and should be handled at a lower level and sailors be given a chance to correct deficiencies. When sailors have liberty incidents, CAPT Hunter will accuse me and the Chief's mess of leadership failure, but unfortunately young sailors tend to have occasional liberty issues - "sailors are going to be sailors." For these reasons, I am reluctant to bring certain issues to DRB.

Over the last three days, since the IGs have come up, CAPT Hunter has become much nicer. Over the last seven days, at least three or four times, CAPT Hunter has said that "either me or you is getting fired." Then he said "its not going to you, it is going to me." I told him that if you are going to get fire, it is my responsibility as well.

Recently, [REDACTED] visited the command, and it seemed as if, CAPT Hunter did not want me in the room when he spoke to [REDACTED]. On follow on conversation with [REDACTED] it seemed like CAPT Hunter put a lot of ownership regarding on going problems on my plate and [REDACTED] fully supported him saying I need to get my Mess engaged and working hand in hand with the Wardroom.

CAPT Hunter's style of leadership: if you pit people against each other, the harder they will work.

We had a junior officer mentoring meeting recently. [REDACTED] spent 30 minutes complaining about CAPT Hunter. She was very negative, and I did not see that as appropriate on her part. That said, I have told CAPT Hunter that whenever she walks in the room, he looks ready to confront her - nine time out of ten he will give her something to complain about.

I don't care how good an Officer or Chief is, CAPT Hunter will always find something wrong with them. When he talks about officers, he will go through every one and tell them why they "suck."

The TRIAD is broken. About ten days ago, I approached him, and in front of the whole mess, he said "what!" I responded "why would I want to talk to you, you will not listen to me." CAPT Hunter's failure to listen and interrupting of others comments, it is humiliating.

CAPT Hunter puts Chiefs on the water because he wants to them to be fully engaged and knowledgeable - I think that is fine.

CAPT Hunter does not like to be challenged even he knows he is wrong. Back stateside, we could laugh with each other some, but that is gone now.

I'm not aware of CAPT Seeberger being ordered to get his Coxswain qual. There are certain requirements to be an LNO, and thus the XO might be required to get the qualification, but for PL which is required for LNO. Not sure why the XO would have been directed to obtain a Coxswain qual.

CAPT Hunter also recently said, after he said he might be fired, he said "there is no way they will fleet-up CAPT Seeberger - be careful what you wish for." The person who comes out here may be much more difficult.

CAPT Hunter has made a lot threats. A couple weeks ago, he was frustrated, and for no particular reason, threatened me, threatening to send the issue involving [REDACTED] and my comments to him to NECC.

By far, this is the worst command I have ever served with in my career. He does not have control of his officers. [REDACTED] in particular does not like him and has a list of issues against CAPT Hunter.

Regarding [REDACTED], I made a poor choice to have [REDACTED] approach her about a perception that she was having an inappropriate relationship with an [REDACTED]. Turns out there was nothing going on, but I counseled both them and told them to be careful about perceptions. Later there was something going on regarding [REDACTED]'s hair color - I never said anything about your hair color. At the gym one day, I told her it had come to my attention that she thought I said something about her hair and that I did not like her, and I assured her none of that was true. [REDACTED] supported the two of them separating (putting her in Jeb) - CAPT Hunter was not part of the decision in port locations for either of these members. I never heard CAPT Hunter make any comments about [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] being a couple.

There was a rumor about [REDACTED] making a comment about not wanting women in Fuj, but I did hear that.

I have never heard anything about [REDACTED] and a DUI.

CAPT Hunter tends to hold onto paperwork and I am not always read into certain things.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] do not like each other - they have served together before. [REDACTED] is a significant complainer, always bringing up problems. When we were having problems with [REDACTED], [REDACTED] was LIMDU, on light duty, and had Achilles problems. [REDACTED] was not aware of that, nor should have known of the medical issues.

There was a tire off on a trailer - basically there was no wheel on an axle. CAPT Hunter was angry - he thought it was a significant safety issue to move the trailer and told sailors not to. I think CAPT Hunter did the right thing on that issue.

I was not on a gun shoot in Fort Dix. I heard that there were some berthing issues with a gun-shoot at the NOSC and possible pay issues in March 2012 - but pay issues under those circumstances (pre-mob) are handled by the NOSC. Pre-mob, many administrative issues go back to the NOSC.

There were two fuel spills over the last year. I remember there being a large spill in May 2012, during ULTRA/FEP, environmental was made aware. The small one was a few gallons in October 2012. On the former one, there was an investigation, but I am not sure where it is.

Usually CAPT Hunter will err on the side of reporting things, not hide them.

The DETs are responsible, pre-mob, for their Career Development Boards. After mobilization, I have taken on hundreds of new sailors, and it is a challenge.

[REDACTED]: I always try to keep everybody laughing. Towards the end of a CDB, I told [REDACTED] who I know is of Indian descent, I asked him if had an arranged marriage, he said "no," and then he mentioned she was flying to London, and I said "she is not a terrorist right?" I meant it as a joke and he did not seem offended at the time. In the hotel, later, I told him that it had been brought to my attention that I offended you, and apologized. He accepted my apology. If CAPT Hunter ever approached him, it would have been on his own. Sep/Oct 12.

[REDACTED]: CAPT Hunter, until the day he brought him to NJP, said he was still willing to bring him out to UAE. However, he was a poor leader. He messed up in April 2012 - he was part of CTT and said some false things. In August, he was in the wrong clothes in UAE (for a UAE visit - should have had a long sleeve shirt on - during Ramadan). But CAPT Hunter wanted to give him a chance to recover. I do not think CAPT Hunter was ever out to

get him. He gave him multiple chances. He clearly left base when he was not authorized.

There was a Department Head meeting and he did get angry at [REDACTED]. He raised his voice towards him. He did slam it down. But he was frustrated. He justifiably expects a certain level of expertise with his officers and some are better than others. That said, he does it in a demeaning way. I do not remember if I specifically recommended that the CO apologize to [REDACTED].

To my knowledge, [REDACTED] only had one PRT failure and thus was eligible for deployment.

I am not aware that [REDACTED] received help from sailors regarding moving goods to a new house of his. I think if sailors did so, it would have been because they wanted to help.

[REDACTED] I like him as a person. However, he does not follow through on things. Administratively, matters get stuck at his level. My understanding is that he has received LOIs from the CO for these kinds of issues. He curses too much despite being told by the CO not to do so. Compared to other CSO's I've been affiliated with, he is not as good. I think he generates good products when he can focus on one thing. I am not sure if he is CO material.

CAPT Seeberger: He is 180 degrees from CAPT Hunter. He wants to trust everybody - he trusts people too much. He is more of a coddler. Sometimes I think he undermines the CO's directions a little. However, I think CAPT Seeberger would be a good CO once he gets a little tougher and learns our community.

PT wake-up call. CAPT Hunter did not support me on that issue, although it was popular. CAPT Hunter said it "makes me look like a piece of shit." It is unclear why he said this. The CO has not made one of the wake-up calls.

I did say to a sailor, but I am sure to which sailor, I said something to the effect of "I like my coffee black, like my women." I regret saying that. I am not sure if I said it to [REDACTED].

GTFO: In the past, on CDBs, I would say that, and in my office, but I have stopped. I have realized that it is inappropriate to do and do not say it anymore.

[REDACTED] was on the boat, regarding the negligent discharge, and went to NJP the next day.

There is a lot of complaining about the watch-bill. It was revised more than 40 times. The CO was not privy to these 40 versions.

Religious programs: I do feel that access to religious services is sufficient. There is transportation assistance to religious of services. I saw Johal this week, and he has been able to go recently.

I do not remember saying "do you like salty nuts" to anyone.

During Hurricane Sandy, CAPT Hunter never said that he would take away a pre-planned 96-hour liberty for personnel who needed to go home for Sandy. Immediately as Hurricane Sandy hit, CAPT Hunter put out that accountability and mustering was top priority. He expected the Chiefs to take care of it, and the officers, and they did not, they were not proactive enough. In the end, everybody was accounted for.

I have never told any sailors to come drink with me in my room or offered alcohol to any enlisted in my room. I might have a whole Department over. There was a rumor a few weeks ago that I was having an affair with [REDACTED]. Of course, I can see there might be a favoritism perception, so it has stopped. She does not come over alone anymore. Since we have been here, she has come over alone to my place about three times. To some extent, what some might consider "frat" is impossible to avoid here because of the liberty policy requiring a "liberty buddy" at all times, this refers to eating out in town.

EVALS:

The only problems with EVALs I have seen result because we are on the Reserve side, and reservists only work one weekend a month. I think they are ranked fairly and the system works well. All EVALs are the responsibility of the OICs of the detachments. I am responsible for HQ EVALs. In HQ, most recent cycle, about 10 or so khakis are responsible. I do not do any checks or oversee any DET EVALs. They do not come up to CAPT Hunter. There have not been many changes to the processes for EVALs since I have been aboard MSRON 12 (aboard since Apr '11). My predecessor did mid-term counseling with all khakis in all Dets, which in my opinion did not make any sense. CAPT Hunter changed that policy, and agree with that decision. The biggest challenge when I came in was timeliness, and we pushed more to make the timeline.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[REDACTED]

1 Feb 2013
Date

Sworn to before me this date
[REDACTED]

1 Feb 2013
Date



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MARITIME EXPEDITIONARY SECURITY SQUADRON TWELVE
113 SANDA AVE
WILLIAMSBURG, VA 23185-5830

5800
N00
10 Mar 11

From: Commanding Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Squadron
TWELVE

To: [REDACTED]

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO IMPROPER LAUNCHING OF PATROL
CRAFT

Ref: (a) JAGMAN

1. This letter appoints you, per reference (a), to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the improper launching of a patrol craft that occurred at the Annapolis, MD on 5 March 2011.

2. Conduct an initial inquiry into the circumstances that caused the improper launch, any resulting damages or injuries to personnel or equipment, and any fault, neglect or responsibility therefore, and recommend appropriate actions to be taken.

3. Report your findings in letter form by 15 March 2011. If you have not done so, please read chapter I of reference (a) in its entirety before conducting your inquiry.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. H. Hunter", is centered below the text.

D. H. HUNTER

Enclosure (13)

6 May 11

From: Boat Department Head, MAREXSECRON TWELVE
To: Commanding Officer, MAREXSECRON TWELVE

Ref: (a) COMMAREXSECGRUTWOINST 3340.1
(b) COMMAREXSECGRUTWOINST 4590.1
(c) COMMAREXSECFORINST 5401.1
(d) COMNAVSURFLANTINST 4790.1F
(e) COMNECCINST 4790.1A

Encl: (1) POAM Timeline
(2) MATE Guide for Training Part B
(3) MATE Guide for Safety Part F
(4) MATE Guide for HAZMAT Part G
(5) MATE Guide for COMMS Part H
(6) MATE Guide for Weapons Part W
(7) MATE Guide for Boats Part X
(8) MATE Guide for CESE Part Z
(9) Administration Effectiveness Review (AER)
(10) Accomplishment Confidence Factor (ACF) Spot Checks Sheet
(11) Current Ship's Maintenance Project Validity (CVF) Checklist and Work Candidate worksheet
(12) Executive Effectiveness Review (EER) Checklist
(13) Executive Effectiveness Review (MPF, SPF, RAF)
(14) Equipment File Validation Verification (EVV)
(15) 3M Assessment Command Total Score

Subj: DETACHMENT C PLAN OF ACTIONS AND MILESTONES

1. Purpose: This Plan of Actions and Milestones (POAM) is a means of systematically self assessing key programs of Detachment C in order to clearly identify deficiencies. Understanding the deficiencies will empower the Detachment leadership to own their corrective processes and in turn lay the ground work for an orderly, safe, and positive training climate in Detachment C.

The enclosures are to be placed in a tracking notebook and used as a living document. This will allow for key members to provide updates to corrective measures and the Chain of Command to verify completion.

Discussion: Leaders need to be attentive to the dynamics they can positively influence. The key elements of command culture that affect command climate are people, relationships, and activities. A lack of awareness of Navy policy or standards causes an undue comfort in a service member's operational capability and can cause an unsafe training environment.

Department and Detachment Leadership must enforce policies and standards governed by Navy regulations (e.g., Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Standard Organization & Regulations of the Navy (SORN), and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)), and ensure practices are consistently applied.

2. Problem Statement: It has been determined that Detachment C is not safe to train or operate due in part to a lack of understanding or knowledge of Navy requirements, expectations, standards of performance, planning or intrusive leadership.
3. Goal: Create a Habit of Thought, Habit of Action. Great units do the basics with a high level of proficiency and as a habit and in the process have the Detachment ready for underway training by August 2011.

Training will be grounded in the basics, which for us means mastery of doing the fundamentals of maintenance, safety, logistics, and critical skills. We will continue to evaluate, remediate, improve and learn something new everyday, all the way from Seaman to Captain.

Above all, we will enjoy what we do here because our time in MAREXSECRON TWELVE is finite. It may not always be fun, but it almost always is rewarding.


4. Directives:
 - a. The Officer in Charge will be responsible for the implementation and tracking of this POAM reporting directly to the Chain of Command as per in Encl (1).
 - b. The timeline for assessments will be strictly adhered to and any support needed outside the Detachment will be coordinated by the Department Head.
 - c. The whole Detachment will be briefed on the POAM process and given the opportunity to take on leadership roles in its implementation regardless of rank or seniority.
5. Timelines and Reporting:
 - a. Initial assessments for Safety, Weapons, and HAZMAT programs will be conducted from 13-15 May with After Action Reports (AAR) due by 27 May. A Commanding Officer will be provided by 24 June.
 - b. Initial assessments for CESE, Boats, and 3M programs will be conducted from 3-5 June with AAR due by 17 June. A report to the Commanding Officer will be provided by 30 June.
 - c. Initial assessments for Training and Communications programs will be conducted from 8-10 July with AAR due by 27 May. A report to the Commanding Officer will be provided by 26 August.
 - d. Updates will be provided to any corrective actions will be due each drill weekend.
 - e. Inspections will be conducted by the Boat Department Head on 8-10 July and by the Deputy on 5-7 August of all self-assessed programs.

6. Initial Assessment Actions:

- a. Review of all key programs in accordance with Refs c and d.
 - i. Safety program assessment in accordance with enclosure 2
 - ii. Weapons program assessment in accordance with enclosure 5
 - iii. Hazmat program assessment in accordance with enclosure 3
 - iv. CESE program assessment in accordance with enclosure 7
 - v. Boats program assessment in accordance with enclosure 6
 - vi. 3M program assessment in accordance with enclosure 8-14
 - vii. Training program assessment in accordance with enclosure 1
 - viii. COMMS program assessment in accordance with enclosure 4
- b. After Action Reports for all assessed programs and monthly review of all discrepancies
- c. Monthly Material inspection of all Boats and CESE in accordance with Ref (a) and (b).

7. Milestones:

- a. Administration
 - i. Review and signing of MAREXSECRON TWELVE Standing Orders
 - ii. Requalification of all sailors involved in the March Boat Launch
 - iii. Implementation of vetted Standard Operating Procedures and Pre-Planned Responses
 - iv. Qualification review of all Detachment personnel in the Detachment and verify qualifications are entered into ASM
 - v. Establish Short Range Training Plan for Detachment C and vet through Training Department
 - vi. First Letter of Instruction from Detachment C for an underway evolution with CO's approval
 - vii. First Patrol Brief with CO's approval
- b. Training
 - i. Command Safety Assessment of the March Launch and Recovery to include an After Action report and Lessons Learned from March Launch and Recovery evolution
 - ii. Conduct a Detachment C all hands Safety Review to include topics on, Roles of the Safety Officer and Risk Mitigation
 - iii. Operational Planning Training for all Patrol Leaders and E-7 and above
- c. Check ups
 - i. Inspections in by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] prior to first underway



17 Apr 11

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Memorandum For the Record ltr Safety Assessment with the launch and recovery of Sea Arks 200/400 Series Patrol Crafts of 27 Mar 11

From: Boat Department Head, MAREXSECRON TWELVE
To: Commanding Officer, MAREXSECRON TWELVE

Subj: SAFETY ASSESSMENT WITH THE LAUNCH AND RECOVERY OF SEA ARKS
200/400 SERIES PATROL CRAFTS

1. I have viewed and concur with the initial safety report.
2. Corrections to references are the following:
 - a. Refs A and B have been cancelled by MESH1 and MESH2 and are now COMMAREXSECFORINST 3340.1 MARITIME EXPEDITIONARY SECURITY FORCE TACTICAL CRAFT INSTRUCTION
 - b. Ref C is OPNAVINST 5100.9E NAVY SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH) PROGRAM MANUAL FOR FORCES AFLOAT





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MARITIME EXPEDITIONARY SECURITY SQUADRON ONE TWO D&T "C"
NAVAL STATION ANNAPOLIS
235 HALLIGAN ROAD
ANNAPOLIS, MD 21402

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

To: Commanding Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron, TWELVE
Via: Boat Department Head, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron, TWELVE
From: Safety Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron, TWELVE
Subj: SAFETY ASSESSMENT WITH THE LAUNCH AND RECOVERY OF SEA ARKS
200/400 SERIES PATROL CRAFTS
Ref: a. COMNCWGRUONE INST 3340.1D
b. COMNCWGRUTWOINST 3340.1C
c. OPNAVINST 5100.19L
d. OPNAVINST 5102.1D

Purpose: To identify safety deficiencies associated with the roles and responsibilities of personnel involved with the launch and recovery of patrol crafts and implement measures to deter or mitigate possible mishaps involving life and property.

Launch and Recovery: Involves the assignment of 10 members all qualified to perform in the safe recovery and launch of the patrol boat. Members under instruction will be implemented to perform as deemed appropriate by the Pier Boss. These assignments include;

- a. **A and B driver:** Both responsible for the launch and recovery process. Prior to the operation, both members must ensure that R-checks or hard cards are fully abided by prior to operation of vehicle and trailer. Additionally, both drivers ensure that all team members are donned with the proper PPE and understand their role before the operation commences.
- b. **Boat Crew {Coxswain, Engineer and qualified Crewmember}:** Boat crew launches with the boat, while the Coxswain is responsible for all functions of the boat, including perform associated pre-underway checks and ensures that his crew understands their role while donned with the pre-scribed PPE.
- c. **Hook-man:** Must be fully donned with the appropriate PPE as this is the most arduous role. Hook-man will don hard hat, gloves, goggles and life vest and dependent on the sea-state, will be secured to a tag-line. Hook-man only takes action when directed by the Coxswain.

- d. **Guide:** The guide who is also donned in the appropriate PPE works directly for the A or B driver. He/she's responsibility is to mark the launch by ensuring the trailer and boat both at the line of embarkation and debarkation. Once set, he will set the chocks to the vehicle and give the A or B driver the thumbs up.
- e. **Safety Officer:** Ensures all personnel are donned with the proper PPE and on the spot to identify any precautionary short falls or safety hazards. Safety Officer ensures that a safety brief is conducted prior to the start of the evolution and is responsible to the Officer in Charge for reporting deficiencies identified.
- f. **Pier Boss:** Should be E7 or above and should be designated in writing. Pier Boss oversees the entire evolution while promoting safety awareness and ensuring all members involved are performing efficiently with their roles. Pier Boss reports all statuses regarding personnel and equipment to the Officer in Charge.
- g. **Corpsman:** Not all detachments are assigned Corpsman. If available, post on sight as part of the emergency response advocate.

Personnel Protective Equipment: Donned appropriately to the position of the team member. For launch and recovery purposes use the table below as a guide for the use of PPE.

	PPE	Hard hat	Gloves	Goggles	Reflective vest	Inflatable vest	Ear plug	Safety line
Roles								
Drivers		X			X			
Boat Crew						X		
Hook man		X	X	X		X		X
Guide		X	X		X	X		
Pier Boss		X			X			
Safety Officer		X			X			
Corpsman		X			X			

Limitations to the launch and Recovery: As per OPNAVINST 3340, the permissible sea state requirement for the launch and recovery of the patrol boats are a sea state of "2". In the event of a small craft advisory or a sea-state higher, permission MUST be granted by the Commanding Officer by his or her discretion or as deem appropriate.

Any deficiency apparent that violates the safe launch or recovery of the crafts, for example, a blown or missing tire to the trailer, MUST be reported to the Commanding Officer pending his approval.

It is advisable that the Commanding Officer outline such authority in the Standing Orders, in order to deter or mitigate conflict concerning the requirements to be followed when faced with situation that goes against normal procedures.

Safety Reporting Procedures: Any deficiency involving a mishap or near miss involving damage and/or injury to life or property will be immediately reported to the Commanding Officer via the Officer in Charge. Additionally, the Safety Officer will initiate a safety SITREP using Enterprise Safety Administration Management System {ESAMS} or Web-enabled Safety System {WESS} and must do so within 24 hours of the incident as outlined in reference "c".

Recommendations: Conduct safety stand-down in order to reinforce the importance of completing 3M requirements. Mandate Leaders to be proactive with overseeing pre-underway and post-underway maintenance by utilizing updated maintenance requirements cards {MRC} and checklist listed in reference "a" and "b". Additionally, ensure all detachment Safety Petty Officer's are briefed on their scope of responsibility before any evolution primarily with the launch and recovery of crafts. Safety Petty Officer will ensure safety briefs are completed and will provide documentation depicting such.

