DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MARITIME EXPEDITIONARY SECURITY SQUADRON ONE TWO DET "C"
NAVAL STATION ANNAPOLIS
236 HALLIGAN ROAD
ANNAPOLIS, MD 21402

22 Aug 11

From: Officer-in-Charge, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron Twelve, Boat Detachment Charlie
To: Commanding Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron Twelve

Via: Boat Department Head, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron Twelve

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT ON DETACHMENTS CHARLIE PLAN OF ACTIONS AND MILESTONES

1. Timelines and Reporting:

a. An initial assessment for Safety, Weapons and HAZMAT programs were conducted during the May drill weekend. An after action report labeled plan of action has been posted on the Squadron portal under DET C. Safety Assessment was completed by [redacted] Weapons by [redacted] and HAZMET by [redacted]. These assessments are continually reviewed and updated.

[redacted] reviewed the Weapons department on 9 Aug 2011, and reported no problems with DET C weapons program.

b. An initial assessment for CESE, Boats and 3M was conducted by Squadron personnel during the June drill weekend. DEC C has conducted Monthly Material Inspections of all boats and CESE in accordance with COMMAREXSECGRUTWO INST 3340.1 and 4590.1. These inspections were performed in May, June and July and will continue on a monthly basis. Two Kilos were submitted for deficiencies. We have identified Work Center Supervisor for all work centers. These three sailors are taking full responsibility for these programs. We have split the unit into operators and maintainers because of deficiencies identified. Det C is fully within standards for all work centers.

c. An initial assessment for training was completed during the June drill weekend. DET C received an assist from [redacted] who identified DET C areas of responsibility. [redacted] has completed our review and an after action report labeled plan of action has been posted on the Squadron Portal under DET C. Training jackets have been created for all personnel. DET C continues to struggle with IT issues and input into ASM is proceeding slowly.

At the present time, DET C has no communication assets and is working with Squadron personnel to determine our areas of responsibility.

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d. DET C created A POAM notebook which is updated monthly.

e. [redacted] has been on site for both the July and August maintainer drill weekends.

2. Milestones:

Administration:

a. During the April drill weekend all DET C personnel were instructed on and reviewed the MAREXSECRON TWELVE standing orders dated 05 Jun 10.

b. During the May drill weekend all sailors involved in the March Boat Launch were retrained on Launch and Recovery using the DET C Launch and recovery Memorandum for the Record.

c. DET C will provide classroom and hands on training to all DET C personnel and will implement Standard Operating Procedures and Pre-Planned responses once they are vetted and approved by Squadron.

d. Review of DET C personnel qualifications and documenting training in ASM is ongoing and is further described in the DET C tracking notebook under training. DET C continues to have connectivity issue at their present location.

e. Short range training plan has been developed and submitted to training. Plan is updated on a monthly basis and submitted to N7.

f. PowerPoint from DET C for underway evolutions has been submitted to the Chain of Command for CO's review and approval. Underway Patrol briefs have been submitted to the Chain of Command for CO's review and approval.

3. Training:

a. Command Safety assessment of the March Launch and Recovery is complete. A Memorandum-For-the-Record was complied to outline the proper procedure for launch and recovery of Patrol Craft. DET C personnel attended classroom training in April and participated in launch and recovery evolutions during Squadron AT.

b. DET C conducted an all hands safety review during the May drill weekend. Topics covered included roles of the Safety Officer and risk mitigation. This training was also provided to DET B during the June drill weekend.

c. Operational Training is ongoing for all Patrol Leaders and above.

4. DET C has had site visit from the Commanding Officer and the Command Master Chief in May 2011. [redacted] performed a get-well inspection in June and July 2011 and was onboard for the maintainer August drill weekend.

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MARITIME EXPEDITIONARY SECURITY SQUADRON TWELVE
113 SANDA AVE
WILLIAMSBURG VA 23185-5830

27 Aug 12

From: Commanding Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron TWELVE
To: [redacted]

Subj: LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

Ref: (a) MILPERSMAN 1611-010
(b) MILPERSMAN 1611-020

1. This letter of instruction is issued per references (a) and (b) to discuss specific measures required to improve your performance as the Office in Charge of Maritime Expeditionary Squadron TWELVE [redacted].

2. Since your assumption of duty as the detachment Office in Charge in December 2011, there have been several instances where you have exceeded your authority, exercised poor judgment Operational Risk Management regarding working hours and have not utilized the chain of command effectively both within the detachment as well as your own chain of command to me. As I discussed with you first during our April 2012 ULTRA-B field exercise and then again on 4 August 2012 at Baltimore NOSC, you are not meeting the expectations I have of an Office in Charge. Specific observations include:

a. You have taken it upon yourself to exceed your authority with regard to Sailor liberty. Specifically, during ULTRA you authorized a Sailor in your detachment to take 96 hours when you knew you did not have that authority. Second, you specifically ordered a Sailor that was performing active duty at the headquarters to return to the detachment to perform a drill weekend even though you were provided guidance from both the Chief Staff Officer and the Deputy Commander that this was not to be allowed.

b. You have not demonstrated sufficient understanding and execution of proper Operational Risk Management. Specifically you held members of the detachment until approximately 2200 on a Sunday evening without regard to the distance members had to travel to return home. There were several members that lived a significant distance from the NOSC and I find it inexcusable that once this was brought to your attention, you did not factor this into your actions. That no Sailor was injured is due in no part your actions.

c. You have not effectively utilized your chain of command. I find it intolerable that you have routinely bypassed your Chief's mess and directly tasked junior Sailors and have effectively reduced your Chiefs effectiveness in dealing with routine matters. That you issued a page 13 firing one Senior Enlisted Advisor and then not explaining it to the Sailors does not make sense. Then to place that same member subordinate to a more junior Chief Petty Officer as their assistant demonstrates a lack of respect for the chain of command.

3. To function effectively as the Officer in Charge of one of my detachments you must become more aware of Operational Risk Management, proper liberty authority and develop a more effective working relationship with your chain of command. You are directed to accomplish the following by 31 DEC 12.

a. By 15 October 2012 you will review and personally conduct training for your detachment personnel on the Travel Risk Planning System and ensure that

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the detachment personnel are registered in the system and the appropriate supervisory hierarchy is in place for those members not mobilized.

b. You will establish normal working hours during drill weekends and if for some reason you require your Sailors to work past the published hours, you will personally call my Chief Staff Officer or Executive Officer and explain the circumstances and your ORM plan.

c. You are to complete the following NKO Course by October 1, 2012: CPPD-ORM-DYCRM-1.0, CPPD-ORM-LRMI-1.0, CPPD-ORM-MYR-1.0 Active and CPPD-ORM-MYTR-1.0.

d. During the October drill weekend you will conduct an ORM GMT at your detachment and record the results in FLTMPS.

e. By 30 September, you will provide a list of names and dates to the Executive Officer of any member within your detachment that was kept past 1700 on a Sunday of a drill weekend who lives greater than 50 miles from the drill site did incur lodging costs at their own expense that Sunday evening this past fiscal year. For any member that did incur such a cost, you are to research with the NOSC on how that Sailor is to be reimbursed per proper CNRF instruction and provide a POA&M on how to the Navy will reimburse the Sailor for this cost.

e. You are directed to attend at the earliest opportunity the Naval Reserve Unit Commanding Officer's (NRUMS) COI. If you have already attended this class, you are to repeat the course.

4. This letter is designed to aid you in correcting deficiencies in your performance as [redacted]. The entire chain of command is available to assist you in any way possible. We want and need your success.

D. P. Hunter

7 Sep 12

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: [redacted]

To: Commanding Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron TWELVE

Subj: LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

1. I acknowledge receipt of subject LOI. I have read and understand its contents. I appreciate your trust and confidence and will work to meet your expectations in the future.

[redacted]

WITNESS STATEMENT

[redacted]

Name | Rank/Rate | SSN

MSRON 12 | [redacted]

Command | Department/Division

Jeb Ali

Location for next 30 days | Phone

I, [redacted], make the following statement:

I feel like me going to MAST for what I did a few months ago, although what I did was wrong, was an excessive consequence. Hearing from the [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] that E-6 would be my terminal pay grade during my 2 hour long DRB has given me absolutely no reason to work beyond the absolute minimum and has encouraged me to go to the IRR upon completion of this mobilization. I have continuously seen people do things worse than what I have done and not have suffered nearly the same consequences. I elected an open MAST, mainly so the entire command could watch the way that I was mistreated. It was the first time I went to NJP in my 8 years of service, and I have no reason to believe that I won't be going again during this mobilization.

Command Climate: My perception is that morale is low, in spite of what senior leadership and distinguished visitors openly say. I form this opinion based on talking too many of my peers and superiors. I think all O-4s and below at this command are afraid to go to the CAPT with anything for fear of being made to feel inferior. He is, in my opinion, Machiavellian. Usually something bad happens; it is because of someone else's bad leadership. There is "accountability" here - somebody is always blamed for something that goes wrong, but nothing is ever fixed. I have no motivation to excel or get better, just maintain, because there is no benefit to my division or self for performing just fear of reprisal if mistakes are made. My biggest problem with the command, in general, is that the enlisted khaki have no authority - they cannot run watch-bills, etc without over whelming amounts of micromanagement from the upper chain of command. They limit the E-7's to doing what should be E-6 work.

I am an A-CFL. Here we do the PRT, however the MWR gym does not have calibrated equipment for alternate cardio events. MWR has limited weight equipment, but we also have a separate workout area that I utilize which has some better equipment. I do not know anything about CAPT Hunter's PFAs. I have never conducted them - I am responsible more my own Det personnel - Det Bravo. According PFA instruction, all personnel, to be mobilized, have to pass your most recent PFA. A PFA failure can only be mobilized after this with an Ech II waiver. I know that there are a number of personnel here who should not be because they failed the PFA.

How can MSRON 12 improve command climate? One thing that could be done would be to empower the Junior Officers and Chief with more authority.

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I have not seen any racial discrimination in the command. I have females given almost preferential treatment to avoid allegations of sexual discrimination. The command makes sufficient efforts of religious accommodation. I have heard repeatedly that [redacted] has had inappropriate relations with [redacted], but never witnessed anything.

In Jan 12 to Apr 12, my junior personnel were unwilling to go down to Williamsburg (unwilling to take orders) to work on boats because they did not like the way they had been treated by the FTS staff in the past. FTS and SELRES had different expectations about working hours, etc. FTS would leave work at 1500 - SELRES would stay until 1700 and later because there was still work to be done. I personally never had issues with the FTS staff, but many of my junior personnel did and it was hard to get bodies to go down to Williamsburg from Det B.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[redacted]

3 Feb 13
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[redacted]

3 Feb 13
Date

WITNESS STATEMENT

[redacted]

Name Rank/Rate SSN

MSRON 12 [redacted]

Command Department/Division

Fujairah [redacted]

Location for next 30 days Phone

I, [redacted], hereby make the following statement:

CAPT Hunter: He is a bully, leads by intimidation, a liar, gives terrible guidance, he is manipulative, likes to pitch your word against his, likes to have one on one conversations. Once, CAPT Hunter had given the order to, during FEP, in Oct 12, debrief the crews after fight/force use. We did so. The next day, CAPT Hunter told me to bring up the crew, but then CAPT Hunter, when they were brought up, denied giving the order. An [redacted] had written down CO's order and CAPT Hunter admitted he was wrong, but then pulled me and [redacted] aside and told us not to challenge him.

[redacted]: About a month ago, he asked a question to the CAPT at an All-Hands call, regarding pay issues emerging from a crew swap from Fuj to Jeb Ali. CAPT Hunter "flame-sprayed" the E-4, for several minutes. He was yelling. He did not use profanity. He said, paraphrasing, "this is not consistent with honor, courage, commitment; this is not about the money; if I here any more of this, I will send you home/I will kick you out of Navy." He was speaking generally, not specifically to [redacted]. The [redacted] was trying to ask about entitlements that differ between the Fuj and Jeb areas.

[redacted] and CAPT Hunter are not on good terms, according to [redacted] On a drive here from Jeb, the two had a five minute conversation and that was all. The CO and CAPT Seeburger also do not get along. CAPT Hunter has a reputation for talking abusively to his XOs. CAPT Seeburger has said he is ready to go home because of CAPT Hunter. It is disgusting the way CAPT Seeburger is treated.

Sailors avoid CAPT

CAPT Hunter does not yell as much as put people down, resulting in leaders feeling demoralized. He blames Chiefs and Officers and tries to pit us against each other. He puts his word against that of the officer. About three weeks ago, [redacted] was talking to OPS and overheard CAPT Hunter talking on the phone to OPS and heard CAPT Hunter say "tell [redacted] I am going to kill him." [redacted] asked, and OPS said - "he was just joking."

CAPT Hunter bullies [redacted], talks to him like he is a child, and has done so in front of other sailors. In FEP/ULTRA, there was instance where [redacted] was the [redacted] and CAPT Hunter asked "what boats

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are up?" I replied that there was one up. [redacted] said the boats were all up. In front of the whole watch team, CAPT Hunter told [redacted] to "go away" like he was a child.

CAPT Hunter does not mentor. Behind closed doors, my understanding is that he ~~boots~~ puts down all the officers. He has stated that the Chiefs are "cowboys." He comes in and says, effectively, "you know nothing, I know everything, and do what I say," even though many of the Chiefs have done ~~them~~ this mission multiple times in the past.

I believe that [redacted] had a nervous breakdown/panic attack because of CAPT Hunter's actions during ULTRA/FEP/ULTRA which resulted in [redacted] not being able to deploy with us.

CAPT Hunter had an all-hands with the Chiefs three weeks ago. He told [redacted] that the Chiefs were out to get me due to [redacted] not being mobilized. Various Chiefs subsequently stated that such statements were never made.

CAPT Hunter should have never been put in the position he is in now.

[redacted]: After his issue with safety, I had to do an EVAL for him. He did some things wrong, but was a great worker. I decided to downgrade his scores, but still recommend him for promotion. Later, [redacted] went to NJP.

I have not heard any specific complaints about religious services or impediments thereto.

Liberty policy: I think it should be changed. The buddy policy is draconian and I attribute that CAPT Hunter.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[redacted] 01 FEB 13
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[redacted] 1 Feb 13
Date

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: [redacted] Rank/Rate: [redacted]
Activity: USN Unit: MSRON
Telephone number: _____

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: ~~Violation of Article 92, Failure to Obey a Lawful Order (Navy Fraternization Policy)~~ UCMJ: Dereliction of Duty - Art. 92 and that:

[redacted]

I have the right to remain silent.
Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

[redacted]

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

[redacted]

I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
I expressly desire to make a statement.
I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

[redacted] [redacted]

Understanding my rights under U.C.M.J. Article 31, I wish to make the following statement:

SEE ATTACHED STATEMENT

WITNESS STATEMENT

[redacted] [redacted]

Name Rank/Rate SSN

MSRON 12 [redacted]

Command Department/Division

Fujairah [redacted]

Location for next 30 days Phone

I, [redacted], hereby make the following statement:

I am OIC of Det Bravo in Earle NJ, Jan 11 to present. As OIC I handle all the EVALs and FITREPs for detachment. I have 3 Chiefs, one Senior Chief. When I first got there, one Chief and one Senior Chief.

[redacted] told me I was missing [redacted] and [redacted], and I have resubmitted both EVALs. Both members were provided a copy after their one on one debrief. I had signed them and debriefed them at the appropriate time in 2012. Neither had complained to me about the EVALs - I just became aware of them from [redacted].

I was never delegated the authority in writing to do EVALs. I have been an O-4 in the job the entire time I have been OIC. MSRON 12 does not do any checks on the Dets regarding EVALs.

I would do the FITREPs for any officers assigned under me. At the Det (before I deployed) I had an O-3 working for me (the AOIC). MSRON 12 would not check on the officer FITREP issues either.

About 2 months out, I request EVAL/FITREP inputs from the personnel to be evaluated. I chop it, create a final copy, debrief, and mail it to PERS. I maintain a hard copy of all EVALs. This tour was my first as a Reporting Senior.

I think the current system is a good one. I do not think MSRON 12 HQ should handle it, because it is important for Det OICs to have control over their personnel, and it would be difficult to rank Det Chiefs a against an HQ Chief.

This past year, I was up for orders - my PRD was for November this year. My entire career, I have been told to always apply for a billet if you are up - it looks bad for your record if you do not apply. I specifically asked [redacted] in March 12 if I needed an extension, and never heard back. In May of '12 the Navy Reserve apply board opened and Captain Hunter during one of our bi-weekly CUB calls stated that Det's A,B,D, and F OIC jobs were on the slate and that we needed to look for a new billet. I put in my dream sheet. The board came and went. I mobilized in August. In Sep '12 the results came out, and I had picked up a command billet in Tampa, FL. The

next Monday, CAPT Hunter asked to talked to me. I saw him - he asked me why I had applied for that job. I explained that it was universal advice to always apply. He asked me if I had read the instruction and said I might not be able to take the billet. I responded that I might talk to COMNAVRESFOR to obtain an exception. Not once did he say congratulations or anything else positive. I later found out that CAPT Hunter had also applied for a job and been accepted - very hypocritical. Along these lines, he also specifically told another LCDR SLERES that she could not apply for a job.

[redacted] was my sailor at Det Bravo. The accident did not occur while drill or on AT. A lot of personnel went to his funeral in the Newport News area. CAPT Hunter was in California at the time, and it was not possible for him to come. He did not call me about it. He seemed sympathetic when I talked to him a month later while drilling in VA. The CSO came [redacted]. I think they should have reached to the Det, asking how our personnel were doing. His name was not mentioned once in a later All Hands by MSRON 12. I do not think NCIS was involved.

During ULTRA I certification in April 2012, nobody was trained and no boats were ready for Nav Check Rides for cert. The reason: MSRON 12 had pulled all to the HQ in Jan of 12 and they stayed there the entire time. Our Det could not train prior to ULTRA, and the boats were not properly kept up and were not ready for the April ULTRA. The result was that the first ULTRA was ineffective, somewhat of a waste of time. MSRON 12 should have had a separate training, done the boats in Annapolis.

In the middle of ULTRA, we had a 3M inspection. We passed, but we could have done better. The CO wanted to do it at ULTRA. It is possible that CAPT Hunter wanted to make us uncomfortable during that ULTRA as a test.

There was definitely a preference on the part of CAPT Hunter for FTS personnel for the deployment. We had proper SELRES to fill those slots. The adverse impact was negative command climate - putting FTS personnel who do not know the mission as well into to positions, resulting on more stress for the SELRES Chiefs.

For the deployment, passports were a joke. Passports had the wrong photos on them and were mailed to the wrong people. They then sent the matter back to the DETs to take care of and they took care of it. The boats were fixed about two weeks into the mobilization - the boats were not ready for the most part because of delays in receiving parts.

In Sep 12 test, he gave the Coxswain test, and, according to my sailors, there was nothing on the test that had nothing to do with Coxswain - it was basically a 3M test. The preparation for the test was useless. Captain Hunter called a Boat Chief's meeting prior to the test and he told all of them that the test would be about navigation, weapons, tactics and seamanship. He never once mentioned 3M being part of the test. I was present for this meeting and wrote down what he told them to study for.

The first week of ULTRA, weapons were loaded off, they had to take the boat back to CAX for maintenance and left radios on the boat (The land transit

had to be done quickly because there is a tight time-window in VA for driving with certain tonnages on roads. As soon as we got back, [redacted] found the radio while inspecting the craft and took possession of it and locked it in a safe in the maintenance office. Later that day, he took back to the ToC. I was SSWO prior to the incident (watch was stood down before the boat went dry for transit), but received an LOI. Four LOIs total were issued. Patrol leader [redacted] and Coxswain that turned over the boat [redacted] and [redacted]

I heard that in October 2012, CO was putting a lot of pressure on [redacted] about the boats. The CO believed they were failing. [redacted] did say something about "don't ruin my liberty." I believe he said something stupid, but he sincerely apologized for it.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[redacted]

1 FEB 13
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[redacted]

1 FEB 13
Date

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SUBJ/OPREP-3, USMTF,2011/COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE/004 MSGID/OPREP-3, USMTF,2011/COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE/004// REF/A/ DESC: INITIAL VOICE REPORT TO MESG TWO CDO/COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE/131235LNOV2011// FLAGWORD/NAVY BLUE// TIMELOC/120300LNOV2011/QUEENS, NY/INIT// GENTEXT/INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND DETAILS/ 1. INCIDENT: NON-HOSTILE DEATH (MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT) 2. DATE OF INCIDENT: 12NOV2011 3. TIME OF ICIDENT: 0300L 4. LOCATION OF INCIDENT: QUEENS, NY 5. SUSPECT OR ALLEGED OFFENDER: N/A 6. GENDER: N/A 7. AGE: N/A 8. RACE: N/A 9. WEAPON: N/A 10. FIREARM SPECS: N/A 11. ALCOHOL/DRUG: UNKOWN 12. VICTIM OR COMPLAINANT: E-5 13. GENDER: MALE 14. AGE: 28 15. RACE: AFRICAN AMERICAN 16. NAVCRIMINVSERV NOTIFIED: N/A 17. FAMILY ADVOCACY REP NOTIFIED: N/A 18. SUMMARY/BRIEF DESRIPTION OF INCIDENT: MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT RELATED FATALITY. SVM CRASHED INTO THE REAR END OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IN QUEENS, NY AT APPROXIMATELY 0300L. SVM WAS TRANSPORTED BY AMBULANCE TO A LOCAL HOSPITAL WHERE HE WAS PRONOUNCED DEAD. MEMBER'S MOST RECENT DEPLOYMENT DATA IS CURRENTLY UNAVAILABLE. SVM IS A MEMBER OF THE US NAVAL RESERVES AND WAS NOT IN A DUTY STATUS (NOT ON ACTIVE DUTY OR INACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING) AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT.
19. TYPE/MODEL OF MOTORCYCLE INVOLVED: N/A 20. USE OF PPE: N/A 21. VALID MOTORCYCLE LICENSE OR PERMIT: N/A 22. MOTORCYCLE SAFETY COURSES AND DATES ATTENDED: N/A 23. MISHAP REPORT TO FOLLOW.
24. MEDIA INTEREST: NOT ANTICIPATED.
25. COMMAND POC: [redacted]
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----OFFICIAL INFORMATION DISPATCH FOLLOWS----- OTTUZYUW RHOIAAA0001 3172038-UUUU--RHSSSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
O 131800Z NOV 11

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TO COMMAREXSECGRU TWO PORTSMOUTH VA
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CHINFO WASHINGTON DC
INFO COMNECC LITTLE CREEK VA
CNIC WASHINGTON DC
COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA
NAVOPSPTCEN EARLE COLTS NECK NJ
NAVREG MIDLANT RCC NORFOLK VA
COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE
BT
UNCLAS
SUBJ/MSGID/OPRE-3, USMTF,2011/COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE/004// MSGID/OPRE-3, USMTF,2011/COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE/004// REF/A/ DESC: INITIAL VOICE REPORT TO MESG TWO CDO/COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE/131235LNOV2011// FLAGWORD/NAVY UNIT SITREP// TIMELOC/120300LNOV2011/QUEENS, NY/INIT// GENTEXT/INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION AND DETAILS/ 1. INCIDENT: NON-HOSTILE DEATH (MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT) 2. DATE OF INCIDENT: 12NOV2011 3. TIME OF ICIDENT: 0300L 4. LOCATION OF INCIDENT: QUEENS, NY 5. SUSPECT OR ALLEGED OFFENDER: N/A 6. GENDER: N/A 7. AGE: N/A 8. RACE: N/A 9. WEAPON: N/A 10. FIREARM SPECS: N/A 11. ALCOHOL/DRUG: UNKOWN 12. VICTIM OR COMPLAINANT: E-5 13. GENDER: MALE 14. AGE: 28 15. RACE: AFRICAN AMERICAN 16. NAVCRIMINVSERV NOTIFIED: N/A 17. INSTALLATION FAMILY ADVOCACY REP NOTIFIED: N/A 18. SUMMARY/BRIEF DESRIPTION OF INCIDENT: MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT RELATED FATALITY. SVM CRASHED INTO THE REAR END OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IN QUEENS, NY AT APPROXIMATELY 0300L. SVM WAS TRANSPORTED BY AMBULANCE TO A LOCAL HOSPITAL WHERE HE WAS PRONOUNCED DEAD. MEMBER'S MOST RECENT DEPLOYMENT DATA IS CURRENTLY UNAVAILABLE. SVM IS A MEMBER OF THE US NAVAL RESERVES AND WAS NOT IN A DUTY STATUS (NOT ON ACTIVE DUTY OR INACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING) AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT.
19. TYPE/MODEL OF MOTORCYCLE INVOLVED: N/A 20. USE OF PPE: N/A 21. VALID MOTORCYCLE LICENSE OR PERMIT: N/A 22. MOTORCYCLE SAFETY COURSES AND DATES ATTENDED: N/A 23. MISHAP REPORT TO FOLLOW.
24. MEDIA INTEREST: NOT ANTICIPATED.
25. COMMAND POC: [redacted]
BT
#0001
NNNN
<DmdsSubject>
MSGID/OPRE-3, USMTF,2011/COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE/004// </DmdsSubject>
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UNCLASSIFIED//

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW [redacted]

At 1030, EST on 10 Feb 13 a phone interview with [redacted] was conducted. The below is a summary of the interview and is accurate to the best of my knowledge.

I am LNO in Bahrain, from MSRON 12. I have been with MSRON 12 for 2.5 years, since MSRON 12 stood up. I have been in the Navy for 25 years I have been with MSRON 12. I am FTS.

CAPT Hunter: He is very knowledgeable, a stickler for details. He comes off short. He is one of those people who, as your discussing things with him, he seems very impatient. He always seems like he already knows and wants you to get to the point. He does not tolerate it if somebody does not follow the rules. I think he handled the [redacted] situation properly - the [redacted] left camp and gave authorization to people to leave camp when he should not have. I do not think he is belittling. He asks the tough questions. He is stern and raises his voice at times. I have never heard him swear.

[redacted]: I do not recall the particular topic that he was looking up. The CO was short with and questioned why [redacted] was wasting time researching and not doing what he had been told to do. In my opinion, he did not use derogatory language towards [redacted].

I was the training officer during the ULTRA and FEPs. They could have went better. A lot things went well. There was a tremendous amount of improvement over the training. People worked very hard. It was challenging in that certain personnel had to be out of play at times to take care personal/admin matters. I have been in this community since 2000 - there always challenges in bringing different personnel together and making them cohesiveness. For ULTRA I, it was particularly challenging, having a 3M and ULTRA at the same time. I understand that times are compressed and money is tight, and for various reasons the 3M inspections had to be done during ULTRA, but it was particularly challenging - Group TWO said it had to be during that timeframe.

Yes, there are maintenance challenges with the boats at remote Dets - it is hard for reservists given the amount of time they work, to do it. All of the Dets have the challenge. I agreed that pulling the boats from the Dets in Jan '12 was a good thing to do - I thought that they ultimately had better 3M and use because they were Cheatham. Practically, the Dets had to spend significant time getting through mobilization checklists during that time. There was not much actual training lost that would have occurred on drill weekends during that time.

During the pre-mob/mob periods, admin was a challenge, but it is always a challenge in these situations. For passports, some people had what they were supposed to have had, and others did not. The challenges were not unusual in my experience.

In March of 2012, there was a crew serve weapons shoot in Ft. Dix in 2012. I do recall some issues with berthing and funding for traveling with that trip. Funding for reserve exercises like this, and for orders, is always month to month with Group and NECC, and funding is always last minute. Often we would get the orders through, and then go to the ISIC for funding. In the end, everything was paid for like it was supposed to be, to the best of my knowledge. Reservist funding is always a challenge because it of its month-to-month nature.

The mobilization process, overall, was fair. The DET OICs provided input. Most of it was based on qualification levels. There were cases when people were put on the list because a Chief or somebody had said they were qualified, but it turned out they were not - but that was an exception - I remember the CO bringing up, as we approached mobilization, that he thought maybe a certain person was qualified and should not be on the list.

In my opinion, [redacted]. I was very impressed with him - he would have the hard conversations with officers, but was always respectful, and always took care of his sailors. I know he did a lot to try to mold a geographically and professionally diverse Chief's Mess together.

CAPT Seeberger: He is a competent officer, but he does not have a lot experience in MESF and is learning. He knows programs and admin very well. He is a good officer.

I have never heard of him pitting groups or personnel against each other. He did have concerns that the Chiefs and Officers were not working together, and did bring it up publicly, but I do not think he pitting them against each other.

I would say that Chiefs had sufficient input in the ULTRA/FEP process. Not every Chief did have input, but Chiefs as part of the Command Training Team did have such input. Chiefs developed lesson topics, resources that were going to be used, etc. ULTRA/FEP are cookie cutter events given what is written in the Training instruction and the guidance given by TEU. Inputs from all Chiefs and Officers is not required - there is not a lot that would be changed. I listened to any idea that was brought up.

During our drill weekends, the command did have PT, and I know that through Sep, we continued to have command PT. After mobilization, it was divided into Departments. Most Departments did it 3 days a week. We held it as consistently as we could given the challenges of the training schedule. I am not sure if CAPT Hunter participated in PT.

I do recall a fuel spill at the BMF, but I do not remember how much fuel was spilled. I was not involved in the fuel spill process.

I do not recall an incident where sailors bought snacks at the marina at ULTRA II while refueling.

I do recall a radio being left on a boat that was pulled out of the water - I do not recall whether the radio had crypto. I was not involved in that incident. I was involved in the details of the alleged negligent discharge on the water that went to NJP. In my opinion, an ND is an ND whether it Is blank or a live round. A loaded weapon is a loaded weapon.

Given any reserve MSRON, there are always challenges in executing all the requirements, special challenges with reservists. I think there have been hiccups, but MSRON 12 has, overall, handled things well.

[redacted] Feb 10, 2013

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE

MSRON 12.

2. DATE

5 February 2013

I, [redacted], **MSRON 12**, make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted] **nvestigating Officer**. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of:

In regards to the mobilization process, it seemed as if some people were mobilized because of some sort of preferential treatment. There were not supposed to be changes to the list of people to be mobilized, but FTS members were being added to the list well after the fact. FTS members were coming in up until November to be put onto the deployment list and this was being approved by the CO for us to hurry these people onto deployment. It appeared to be inconsistent with who would be staying back and who would be going on the deployment to the UAE. PRT failures was an issue, these people were allowed to go on deployment even though this is not supposed to be allowed. [redacted] would push to get a member out the door and on deployment even though there were issues to their deploying, not having all the paperwork in order.

[redacted] (an FTS) is an example. He worked directly for me and I was his LPO, he is now an [redacted] and is in the UAE. He had stated he was dealing with depression and he was taken to Portsmouth for a psychological evaluation. He was later removed from my office, and had been very aggressive towards me. I felt concerned. He was moved from [redacted] it was related to me months later that he was moved because he had threatened me. [redacted] then went on deployment, despite these issues he was still sent forward. His father is an 0-6 in the Army, and speaks with [redacted] I believe that if I was threatened, I should have been informed. It is possible that [redacted] was moved to a different department to try to hide the issue, but it also may have been for my protection. I never knew what was the reason behind his move to N43 Department.

[redacted] could hand walk paperwork/officework directly in CAPT Hunter's office, and the CO would sign it. I would have [redacted] hand walk things to the CO because I knew he would be signed quickly, whereas if I took the paperwork to the CO, it would be rerouted/kicked back.

There is a perception that he is untouchable, that he would be caught sleeping for example and was given a counseling chit. Any issues with [redacted] seemed to be covered up, his depression seemed to be covered up. He once said: "I won't be here tomorrow" [redacted] overheard this, but nothing was done, despite the fact that he informed me and [redacted]. I believe this could have been a suicidal threat. I then texted him that evening to ask if he was okay, he texted back "not really." After that I asked if he was talking to [redacted] about his issues, and [redacted] told me yes.

The CO is unapproachable, I am certainly treated differently by the CO than other petty officers. I am ignored.

I was at a Captain's Call with CAPT Hunter talking to the First Classes, someone asked the question about PT, we were only getting 90 minutes a week for PT. Someone asked, it is 150 minutes a week per the OPNAV instruction, he said it was just a guide.

It was not my job to look at Mob Requirements to see if they were being met, this was [redacted] s responsibility.

In regards to the PRT, if you have two failures and your most recent PFA cycle is a failure, you cannot go on deployment. It was [redacted] s job to screen the PRT results of the service members to make sure they were able to deployment. [redacted] has at least two failures, she had spoken to me about her failures, and she is currently on deployment. There was a perception among the command that sailors with PFA failures were being mobilized to go on deployment.

In regards to first class evals, the most recent cycle, I signed my eval on the 15th. It seemed as if it was done in a timely fashion.

[redacted] s move. I got here in August 2011. A few months after I arrived [redacted] announced that he was moving and asked if anyone would assist. It was on a weekend. He bought pizza for the guys. I know that

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE

MSRON 12

2. DATE

5 Feb 2013

[redacted] (at the time, now [redacted]), [redacted] [redacted]. [redacted] had asked if anyone was willing to help him move. It may have been put out at quarters, but [redacted] put out that he was looking for sailors to help him move. I had seen this before at NOSC Amarillo. I do not know if anyone felt pressured to go help [redacted] I think these sorts of things may be more endemic in the FTS world. There is a thought that this is SELRES, FTS, it isn't the real navy.

I see it all the time that people call each other by their first names. [redacted] used to go out with [redacted] and [redacted], and all be on a first name basis. This was inappropriate, and although I don't think there was anything sexual going on. [redacted] used to sleep in his car when he first got here, then he started staying occasionally with [redacted] in his barracks room. [redacted] also stayed in [redacted]s apartment (a female) at the time. It was common knowledge around the command that he was staying at junior personnel's commands. He was having a lot of financial issues, and was issued a Page-13 telling him to go see a CFS, find a place to live. [redacted] was present with the issuing of the Page-13. There was a lot of concern in regards to his financial issues.

I have not seen the officers and enlisted personnel on a first name basis.

There was a sense of "who are the star players" and they get to go on the deployment. The sailors who "brown-nosed" properly were able to go on deployment.

There is a lot of yelling at MSRON 12, from the Chiefs to the E-6 and below. It is "in your face yelling" that takes place here.

I do not have any LOIs that may have been written by the CO to any officers or chiefs, only the LOI that was issued to [redacted].

I do not have any investigations (PIOs) on file that have been completed at MSRON-12.

----------NO FURTHER STATEMENTS THIS PAGE----------

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY **VOLUNTARY STATEMENT**	1. PLACE MSRON 12 2. DATE 5 Feb 2013

The above statement consists of 2 page(s), prepared by [redacted] I have initialed any corrections I wish to make and the statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge.

[redacted] USN

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized to administer oaths, this 5th day of **February 2013**, onboard MSRON 12 **Bldg 113**:

[redacted] 5 Feb 13
USN

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW YN2 Lukas Love

At 2345 on 9 Feb 13 a phone interview with [redacted] was conducted. The below is a summary of the interview and is accurate to the best of my knowledge.

I have been in the Navy for 3 years, and with MSRON 12 for two years. I am FTS. I work in JEB Ali.

How has the deployment been so far? For me, I love it - it is cakewalk. The location, the money, it is all great. The admin department is not as close-knit as it should be, there are a lot of conflicts between lower enlisted and the Chiefs level. There is a lack of knowledge base on the Chiefs level; too much is delegated to the lower enlisted level, and we are asked to do too much in terms in terms of pay (in my opinion, we need more PS expertise in the department).

I was excited to be on the list for deployment. There would be times they would talk about taking active staff off the list, and I was hoping they would not do that.

I come from a military family - my father is a Colonel in the Army - still active duty. He works out of [redacted]. He has met my old XO, CAPT Spivey, but has never met CAPT Hunter. My dad had no influence at all on me getting mobilized, none whatsoever.

I have a good relationship with [redacted] - very professional, we help each other out whenever needed. My relationship with [redacted] is strained and I do not have much respect for her. She will brush people off when she does not know the answer to a question. My relationship with [redacted] is terrible - she has had it out for me since I showed up on board. She constantly undermines in public. For example, the CSO will ask me to do something, she will hear him and do it herself and turn it in - to make herself look good. She has reorganized the files that I have already organized so that she can understand it. I do not think the CSO trusts her to the same extent he trusts me. She is not very competent.

I recall, maybe several months ago (perhaps longer ago), I volunteered to help [redacted] move his things from one house to another. [redacted] asked people himself - I did not feel obligated to do it. He provided some doughnuts and coffee. He did not give us any money. I did not see anything wrong with helping him - "helping out a shipmate."

Morale in the command, generally: Since liberty restrictions have been lifted, I think it is fine. They have incorporated some MWR trips recently. I think morale is getting better, generally.

[redacted] FEB 13

Enclosure (21)

WITNESS STATEMENT

[redacted]

Name | Rank/Rate | SSN

MSRON 12 | [redacted]

Command | Department/Division

Fujairah

Location for next 30 days | Phone

CAPT Hunter took the PRT on 24 Dec 13. I was not there when it was done. [redacted] administered it, an A-CFL. He ran the PRT. She put the information in PRIMS. He usually scores about a "Good." He usually does the weigh-in right at the end. We do courtesy tapes. He was on the line. He always goes to [redacted] for measurements because I am strict. For taping, there is supposed to be observer present in addition to the person taping, but I am not sure. He did the weigh in around the same time as PRT. I have told [redacted] not to be intimidated by him, and she has replied that "well, he is the CO..." Everybody has always wondered why he does not do PT or the PRT with the command. On one of the recent cycles, [redacted] weighed him and apparently he stated "this is the courtesy measurement."

The mess does not get treated like Chiefs. The officers do not treat us like Chiefs. [redacted] and [redacted] are pretty good about deferring to Chiefs, but not [redacted] - he micro-manages. But we also see him getting hammered from Jeb. I have never seen anyone belittle [redacted]

Females are treated fairly in the command. I do feel that if there was an issue with sexism, sexual assault, etc., I could go to the command and express the issue and it would be addressed. However, in garrison, sometimes there was a feeling sometimes amongst some females ([redacted], e.g.) that they were not given certain jobs because they were female.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[redacted] 1/Feb/13
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[redacted] 1 Feb 13
Date

Enclosure (22)

8 Feb 13

Summary Interview with [redacted]

On 8 Feb 13, at around 2345 EST, a phone interview was conducted with [redacted] of MSRON 12. The results of that interview are below:

When people wanted to volunteer for the mobilization, I provided information and waivers. For a reservist, they have to waive their right to "having 5 years off" from a mobilization and go on mobilization, and some other time-related waivers. The waivers were then sent to CRG-2 for further routing/approval. I also updated the mobilization spreadsheet. I would also monitor orders – when they were popping from the NOSCs. We went off credentials as far as who was mobilized – I looked at their quals they had, their FLTMPs, etc. to evaluate candidates. It was merit-based. From Nov 11 to Feb 12, the mob decisions were made by CAPT Hunter – later it still ran thorough the CO, but [redacted] and [redacted]. FTS never bumped FTS out of any spots. I had instances of SELRES telling me they wanted to go – usually they were not cleared medically, or they did not ask until too late. Elling did kind of get shafted – he wanted to go and he is a good Engineer, and he extended his order to MSRON 12 to go, but leadership wanted more "boat people" and wanted Elling, as a strong leader, to stay back.

[redacted] gets absolutely no preferential treatment at all because his father is Colonel – and he did not get any preferential treatment for mobilization. One [redacted] had stay back, and that was [redacted] because she had surgery on her feet.

Per the ECRC, and working through NMPS, the rule was that if a sailor did not have three failures in the last four years (two or less), they could deploy. ECRC and NMPS confirmed this. The NOSCs involved also reviewed the mobilization list, ~~were~~ including of the PFA failures, and were OK with it. Note that ECRC checklist changed in Aug/Sep '12, we went off the one in place before that. I had many phone conversations about this issue. We used ECRC checklist 3120/22.

In the beginning of Dec, the XO brought up to [redacted] that he was not happy that CAPT Hunter was the last person to do his PRT – he felt it looked bad. But I am postive that [redacted] never told the XO about CAPT Hunter calling a "do-over" on the 2012 cycle 1 PFA.

[redacted] has only failed two PFAs. She works out hard is trying to improve her eating habits.

[redacted]

Enclosure (22)

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW with [redacted] **13 Feb 13**

ON 13 Feb 13, [redacted] provided the following information regarding the MSRON 12 FEP program:

"The member is automatically enrolled into the FEP program on PRIMS. For FUJ we have 2 ACFL's that are currently conducting the FEP. For the personnel that have failed the BCA, they had BCA taken in the beginning of the new cycle and will continue every 2-3 weeks thereafter. The command has not made it mandatory to have sailors enrolled that are on the "line," however it is highly encouraged for those sailors to attend. The personnel that failed the PRT portion of the PFA are unable to do the "mock" PFA's in the PTU's as per the instruction due to being in this location. The members are able to do the sit-ups, pushups and use the treadmill for the run portion, again due to location. Note that the sailors are not in PTU's, as per guidance of the instruction, but the FEP is being done. INCONUS BM2 [redacted] is running the FEP program. However, when we were back INCONUS those that were on FEP, the reservists, having the allowance to run FEP during the drill weekend was not favored amongst the CO. However, we had put in the schedule every drill weekend at 0630. The turnout was not very good especially since the gym was not open, but the ones that were required to attend, did, but that only consisted of 1 person. In the fall when the other's failed, it was literally right before be left. We were in the field and when we were allowed to PT everyone did. PT was by far the hardest to administer, due to the lack of support from the CO.

I also wanted to add what I provide for the personnel on FEP as well. After the member has signed their page13, I give them a packet of information containing all 6 items of information:

- PT
Simple 5 Day Workout
Day 1 Gym
PRT Preparation Circuit
Sample Circuit (No Equipment)
BCA
Nutrition Resource Guide 2011
Navy Operational Fueling Guide

Though these items can be found on the Navy Personnel Command website, I printed each item, reviewed each item with the sailor and asked if they wanted any additional information. I also have signs hanging around the compound advertising these packets of information for any other person's that are interested as well as teaching sailors the correct way the CFL is to properly tape a person for the BCA."

[redacted]

Enclosure (22)

9 Feb 13

Summary of Interview with [redacted]

On 9 Feb 13, at around 0137 EST, a phone interview was conducted with [redacted] of MSRON 12. The results of that interview are below:

I work in Jeb Ali in Supply. I have been in the Navy 22 years, the vast majority of which reserve time. We have one of the best Departments at MSRON 12.

Command Climate: I personally do not think it is too bad. I feel like leadership is OK. I feel like this is the military, leadership does not have to please people, and the mission is essential. I do not morale is low to the point where it could adversely impact the mission.

I do recall a gun shoot, but I do not recall any pay issues, transportation issues, or berthing issues with a gun shoot in March 2012.

Split pay is mandatory – we key entered vouchers into DTS and took care of split pay for the member, and thereby keeping their GTCC accounts current. [redacted] and I both looked up the rules and are sure that it was legally/instructionally permissible. We had to do it with possibly 100 accounts. We did not take anything from the member was not owed to the card. When the backed up travel claims came in, the members had extra money on their travel cards and we instructed them on how to get a refund.

I get along with [redacted] well. He is an excellent [redacted]. I also get along with [redacted] I do not think I have had dinner with [redacted] one on one – it has been mostly in the company of [redacted] and [redacted] in [redacted]'s place. [redacted] is a great cook and makes some great lamb chops. I trust both [redacted] and [redacted] to the utmost – I am sure there would never be anything going on between.

CAPT Seeberger – he is very personable. He cares about the sailors and what is going on here.

CAPT Hunter: A good guy. He is controlling. He is the CO, and he likes everybody to know that he is the one in charge. He gives his officers, as well as [redacted] the "beatdown" – he is harsh. He is probably making them not be as open with him as they should be. In turn, that hurts the command. His expectations are hard to read by both the Mess and Wardroom – he will say he has given us good guidance, but it does not mean he has received it. He is arrogant and will let you know he is smarter than everybody. He is not "my favorite CO." I have seen him yell at people in Department Head meeting several times. I have also seen him get heated with [redacted], about 6 months ago, but I do not recall what it was about.

Regarding [redacted] in Sep '12, I was the "berthing officer." The issue regarding [redacted] was brought to my attention, [redacted] found [redacted]'s action to be creepy and she wanted to be

Enclosure (23)

moved. We initially wanted her to work try to work out the issue with her roommate. There was an attempt to mediate (I was not a part of that), and her room was moved.

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

MILITARY SUSPECT'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS

Place: MSRON 12

I, [redacted]

have been advised by [redacted]

that I am suspected of Art. 92 – Orders Violation

I have also been advised that:

[redacted] (1) I have the right to remain silent and make no statement at all;
[redacted] (2) Any statement I do make can be used against me in a trail by court-martial or other judicial or administrative Proceeding;
[redacted] (3) I have the right to consult with a lawyer prior to any questioning. This lawyer may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at no cost to the United States, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel at no cost to me, or both;
[redacted] (4) I have the right to have my retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview; and
[redacted] (5) I may terminate this interview at any time, for any reason.

I understand my rights as related to me and as set for above. With that understanding, I have decided that I do not desire to remain silent, consult with a retained or appointed lawyer, or have a lawyer present at this time. I make this decision freely and voluntarily. No threats or promises have been made to me.

Signature: [redacted]

Date & Time: 02FEB13

Witnessed: [redacted]

Date &Time 2 FEB 2013 1815

At this time, I, [redacted]

desire to make the following voluntary statement. This statement is made with an understanding of my rights as set forth above. It is made with no treats or promises having been extended to me.

Enclosure (24)

WITNESS STATEMENT

[redacted]

Name Rank/Rate SSN

MSRON 12 [redacted]

Command Department/Division

Fujairah [redacted]

Location for next 30 days Phone

I have been in the Navy for 17 years on 26 Feb 13. I have been with MSRON 12 since September 26, 2011.

I have heard there are few IGs going on. [redacted], the cap was going to be for last year, but it wound up being 1 Jan 13. The CAP board was held in on or about 10 Dec 12. The original date of her cap was going to be 24 Dec 12. PERS caught it after it was sent up - she was not time in rate eligible. So we shifted the CAP to 1 Jan 13, and it was fine - she was capped from E-5 to E-6. She did not falsify any documents in relation to that process. I participated in the write-up for that.

In my opinion, the command climate is getting sticky. You are talking about a mobilized SELRES folks who are not used to Navy daily life. People are not positive and everybody feeds into negativity.

CAPT Hunter is a good CO in some aspects. His weakness is relating to people on a personal level. CAPT Hunter pushes people hard, but I see why he is pushing people hard, and I think he is a good leader. He tries to push us, and he already knows the answer a lot of times, but that is not necessarily true. The one negative thing is that he says that he does not say something, but in fact he said it. He does not put anybody in harms way.

[redacted] is very new. I have limited experience with him. He is very personable. They may not see eye to eye on quite a few things.

I have mixed feelings about the officers - some of them are trying to make things a little harder than they need to be - fighting things when they do not need to be. A lot of people do not want to take ownership for certain tasks.

In my opinion, we have it a lot better than those on the ship. People need to understand why we are here - not for per diem, but for the mission.

I would never want to sit in CAPT Hunter's seat - he has a very hard job.

Everything is up to date now on the Government travel cards. Per CRG TWO N41 guidance, all government card balances are supposed to be paid in full. The member's here cannot pay off their cards on their own because they have limited computer access. I go in on their behalf and pay of their claims using their per diem - it is a standard process.

I have never felt like there is any religious, racial, or sexual discrimination in the command. I have never heard of any instances of such things in the command.

Weight equipment: The weight equipment was brought out here from the United States. I was not aware there was additional weight equipment purchased from a LT here. I think it could be problems with it.

PT is available to us. We have reasonable accommodations. I have never seen anyone make people do pushups at the command.

[redacted]: he is all over the place. He takes on more than what he can handle. He is disorganized. I know that he has a close relationship with [redacted], although I have never heard him call him by his first name. They have been working together longer than others. I can see possible issues with the two of them making others feel some unfairness.

[redacted]: It was done over a weekend. He asked sailors to help with [redacted]'s moving. It was put out at Quarters. He said that is anybody wants to help out, please meet me at "this time, this place." About five sailors showed up. [redacted] found may have found out about the CSO moving because people come in his office and complain about things and vent to him - senior enlisted included. They discuss personal things. This occurred in roughly winter 2011 to 2012.

Chiefs get along about the same way as many Chief's mess. Some people like each other, some do not. There are limited opportunities for mentoring.

Some times [redacted]'s comments can get a little close to the line, and I have not heard rumors about comments he has made, and he has not said anything over the line to me.

I do not think it is inappropriate that people are running to hotlines to complain.

Myself and [redacted] have had dinner in his apartment alone and in restaurants. But [redacted] has had dinner alone with other [redacted] and Chiefs [redacted]. We live the Corral Hotel, me and the [redacted]. [redacted] is on the sixth floor, I am on the first floor. The [redacted] likes to cook, and I do not like to cook. I suppose it could be perceived that it is unfair to other Senior Chiefs that are similarly ranked, but he does have dinner with other Chiefs. Chief Shively and Chief Pace and Chief Caro also live there. There are also blue shirts in the Corral. I have not heard any rumors about us being couple.

I live in Williamsburg and my husband is on the Eisenhower - he also a Senior Chief.

I was here in March in 2012 and I remember a gun shoot. NECC paid for travel costs - I have a receipt - Jerome Stewart may have a copy. It was definitely paid for.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief.

[redacted]

02 FEB 13
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[redacted]

2 Feb 13
Date

PROM_REC	PROM_REC	PROM_REC	PROM_REC	PROM_RECO	PROM_RECOM	DESIGNATI	EMPLID	UIC	OCC_PERIC	OCC_DET	OCC_PROM	OCC_SPECI	REPORT_T	REPORT_T	REPORT_T	BILLET_SUI	REPORTIN	REPORTING_SEN_EP	ACT	TAR	AT_ADSW	INACT	REPORTING_SF_NAME	PERIOD_REPORT_F	PERIOD_REPOR	GRADE_RA	NOT_OBSE	PROMOTIC
0	0	5	6	3	promotable	AW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	4	3	mustPromote			55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	7/9/2011	11/15/2011	YN1	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	mustPromote	EXW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55829	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	8/5/2010	11/15/2010	YN1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	earlyPromote			55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/6/2010	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote	SCW		55834	F	T	F	F	T	F		NA	55834	F	T	F	F	T	[redacted]	3/15/2011	6/21/2011	SW1	F	FROCKED
0	0	5	6	3	promotable			47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable			47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47118	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	4	5	3	promotable	EXW/SW		65892	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	3/16/2010	11/15/2010	EN1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	5	4	earlyPromote	EXW		55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	earlyPromote	EXW		55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	earlyPromote	EXW		31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	1/9/2011	11/15/2011	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	4	4	3	mustPromote	SW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	5/10/2010	11/15/2010	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote	SW		47118	F	F	F	F	T	F		BASIC	47118	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	9/16/2011	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	promotable	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	EN1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	6	4	earlyPromote			55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable			55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote			55858	F	T	T	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	3/2/2010	9/15/2010	LN1	F	SELECTED
0	0	2	2	1	mustPromote			31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/16/2009	11/15/2010	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote			31767	F	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	8/21/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved			55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	10/1/2010	11/15/2010	YN1	F	REGULAR
0	0	4	5	3	earlyPromote	EXW		65892	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote	EXW		65892	F	T	F	F	T	F		NA	65892	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	9/15/2011	OS1	F	FROCKED
0	0	5	6	3	mustPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote			55834	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55834	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	5/26/2011	11/15/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote	FMF		55858	F	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	3/16/2011	6/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved	XW		31767	F	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	1/17/2010	BM1	T	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved			55834	F	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55834	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	7/6/2011	9/22/2011	MA1	T	REGULAR
0	0	6	7	2	earlyPromote	SS		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	ET1	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	mustPromote			47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	ET1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable			55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/6/2010	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	earlyPromote	EXW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	IT1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	1	1	mustPromote	EXW		47117	F	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	9/15/2011	IT1	F	SELECTED
0	0	6	3	2	promotable	SS		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	7/7/2011	11/15/2011	MM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable	SW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47118	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	8/3/2011	11/15/2011	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	4	5	3	mustPromote	EXW/SS		65892	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	EM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable			31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	mustPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47118	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	earlyPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/29/2009	11/15/2010	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	earlyPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47118	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	4	3	promotable	AW		55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	EN1	F	REGULAR
0	0	2	2	1	mustPromote			31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	mustPromote			31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	promotable			47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	7	2	promotable	SW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	4/1/2011	11/15/2011	IC1	F	REGULAR
0	0	2	1	1	promotable	SW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	1/1/2010	11/15/2010	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	6	4	promotable	SW/AW		55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	1/31/2010	11/15/2010	EM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	1	0	mustPromote	AW/SW		55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	4/26/2011	EM2	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	promotable			47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	MM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	7	2	promotable			47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	MM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	4	3	mustPromote	EXW/FMF		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	T	F	F	F	F	[redacted]	12/16/2010	11/15/2011	HM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	4	5	3	promotable	EXW		65892	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	1	0	0	promotable	EXW		65892	F	T	F	F	T	F		NA	65892	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	10/31/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved			31767	F	T	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/4/2010	3/30/2011	EO1	T	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved	EXW/SCW		31767	F	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/4/2009	1/17/2010	EO1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	mustPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	IT1	F	REGULAR
0	0	7	1	1	promotable	SW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	1/1/2010	11/15/2010	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	mustPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/3/2009	11/15/2010	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	2	2	earlyPromote	EXW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	2/1/2011	11/15/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
1	0	2	2	2	significantPro	SS		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/1/2010	11/15/2011	STS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved			31767	F	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	1/17/2010	MA1	T	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable	EXW		31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/6/2010	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	4	5	3	mustPromote	EXW/SW		65892	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/15/2009	11/15/2010	PS1	F	REGULAR
1	0	2	2	2	mustPromote	SW/AW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	PS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	4	3	promotable	SW/AW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	T	F	F	F	F	[redacted]	6/16/2011	11/15/2011	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	4	5	3	mustPromote	AW		65892	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/15/2009	11/15/2010	OS1	F	REGULAR
1	0	2	2	2	mustPromote			55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	IT1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	promotable	NAC		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	CTR1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	6	4	promotable	SW		55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	3/11/2010	11/15/2010	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	mustPromote	SW		55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
1	0	2	2	2	promotable	EXW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/1/2010	11/15/2011	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable			47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47118	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	7/13/2011	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote	EXW/SW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/1/2010	6/9/2011	STG1	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	promotable			47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	MR1	F	REGULAR
0	0	6	7	2	mustPromote			47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	MR1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved			55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	8/7/2010	11/15/2010	IT1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	4	3	earlyPromote	EXW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	IT1	F	REGULAR
0	0	2	2	1	promotable			31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/22/2009	11/15/2010	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable	SW		31767	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	31767	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	GM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	4	3	promotable	AW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55862	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	YN1	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	progressing			47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	MM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	0	notObserved	EXW/SW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	ET1	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	mustPromote	EXW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	8/5/2010	11/15/2010	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote	EXW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	1	6	5	3	earlyPromote	EXW/SW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55819	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	8/4/2010	11/15/2010	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	1	1	earlyPromote	EXW/SW		47117	T	F	T	F	T	F		NA	47117	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	9/15/2011	OS1	F	SELECTED
0	0	6	6	4	mustPromote			55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55842	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	promotable			55858	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55858	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	MA1	F	REGULAR
0	0	7	1	1	earlyPromote			55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	1/1/2010	11/15/2010	CM1	F	REGULAR
1	0	2	2	2	earlyPromote			55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	CM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	4	3	earlyPromote	EXW		55853	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55853	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	LS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	11	12	5	promotable			55834	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55838	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	OS1	F	REGULAR
0	0	0	0	1	earlyPromote	EXW		47117	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	33713	F	T	F	F	F	[redacted]	11/16/2009	8/4/2010	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	mustPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55829	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	12/5/2009	11/15/2010	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	3	3	2	earlyPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	47118	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2010	11/15/2011	BM1	F	REGULAR
0	0	5	6	3	mustPromote	EXW		47118	T	F	F	F	T	F		NA	55829	F	F	F	F	T	[redacted]	11/16/2009	11/15/2010	EN1	F	REGULAR

Enclosure (3)

WITNESS STATEMENT

[redacted]

Name | Rank/Rate | SSN

MSRON 12 [redacted]

Command | Department/Division

Jeb Ali

Location for next 30 days | Phone

I have been with MSRON 12 since July 2010. I have been in the Navy for 19.5 years.

It is not easy here at MSRON 12 right now. Some of the policies which have been set forth are not appreciated at the command, the liberty policy is the main concern. I think the liberty policy should be relaxed, especially since we are spread out in multiple hotels and there is a health and welfare concern. Sailors have difficulty getting to the grocery store, haircuts. It could be perceived that the liberty policy is causing fraternization. I have not personally witnessed any unduly familiar relationships at the command.

If morale does not improve, officers and chiefs are going to really start to shut down. That would have a negative impact on operations. Something has to change. Communication needs to improve, the CO needs to let his officers and chiefs know what he expects.

As a woman, I have not experienced any sexual discrimination at the command. I do know that [redacted] has some concerns, that the CO does not take any interest in her, I do not think this has any sexual discrimination aspect to it.

I am able to approach and talk to the CO. He may contradict himself, but I always go in with printed references, my "ammunition" if you will, so that I can answer his questions. I think some of the other officers are not as prepared, and their relationship with the CO suffers because of it.

I do not think that reservists complain too much, in fact, I feel that the active duty complain more, the FTS in particular. I think that some of the FTS at MSRON 12 do not pull their weight, certainly some in my shop (N1 department). Some of this stems from a lack of knowledge in order to accomplish the duties and responsibilities within Admin. I have a very inexperienced staff and many things do not get done during the month as requested and they have no Khaki departmental representation on a daily basis. I have not heard of any unduly familiar relationship with [redacted], nor have I heard them calling each other by their first name. [redacted] is great operationally, but on the administrative/paperwork department, he is very poor. Certainly in reference to evals and awards. [redacted] moved a [redacted] out of the admin shop into another department, and never informed me of the move until after decisions had already been made.

Enclosure (26)

I feel that the FTS are allowed to get away with a lot of things, that there is a lot of hand holding.

I had never seen an LOI before I came to MSRON 12; and there have been at least three issued that I know of. There are jokes in the wardroom that "you have to join the LOI club" and "when are you going to get your LOI."

In regards to the delegation of EVAL authority to the OICs of the detachments, Chief D'Ottavio has not officially moved from the HQ's RUAD to the Det's RUAD. There should have been an official, a set of orders, cut to move him to a different RUAD. Sometimes sailors are moved or transferred from one RUAD to another and it isn't always done properly, but the systems sometimes make it difficult to keep up with.

I had a difference of opinion with CAPT Hunter over the OIC's writing the FITREPs for their subordinates, especially when a Det OIC is a LT and is writing a FITREP on another LT. [redacted] was the AOIC of a Det, but he was acting as an OIC and signed EVALs for Chiefs. However, it is difficult for the HQ to take on the burden of E-7 and above EVALs, but it is my personal opinion that the CO should sign E-7 and above EVALs/FITREPs.

All the Dets are supposed to submit summary sheets of the EVALs/FITREPS, to the HQ, but this is not always happening. It may be that the Dets are not submitting the information, but it also may be that the FTS admin personnel are not properly tracking paperwork. I think the MSRON 12 HQ 5 Chief EVALs for the 2011 Cycle never arrived at PERS-32.

In regards to the CAP packages, the CAP program is a CMC run program. I have no knowledge that anyone was promoted with a PRT failure. There were three sailors capped [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted].

I am on the CAT team and was involved in the command climate survey taken during April 2012. The summary that came out after the fact and hit on the appropriate aspects of the command survey. I don't remember any specific issues in the command climate survey. I did not read through all the written answers to the command climate survey. I do not know of any effort to obscure or change results of the command climate survey in regards to sexual discrimination.

Sailors, myself included, work in their own time on MSRON 12 work, while not drilling or on orders. ATP (additional training periods), there can only be 36 per year for a sailor. It is part of life being a SELRES; especially being in a leadership position. ATPs are allocated by the department, training department [redacted] was the N7 at the time), then the HQ Department Heads and Detachment OICs monitor the usage and request more as needed. These are supposed to be driven at the Department Head and OIC level and it is not guaranteed all Sailors will receive ATPs if there is not a need.

I personally feel that this generation, and sailors who have not been in the Navy very long, feel entitled and don't want to work. A constant theme I

see here at MSRON12 is energy being spent complaining than actually fixing the issue.

CAPT Hunter is not very clear in his guidance sometimes. I don't always agree with his decisions, he will often wait too long to make a decision that it becomes an issue. Something that shouldn't have been an issue becomes an issue as a decision isn't made. The CO is not the best leader. I have had 6 COs in my career, he would not rank in the top 5 of the COs I have ever worked for.

There was one instance when the CO said something to other people about me personally, and he did not approach me about it. The CO told [redacted] that "I'm not sure if she is the AO we need." He didn't talk to me, but disparaged me to [redacted]. This is the only issue I have ever had with CAPT Hunter, but it did take me aback. It eroded my trust in the CO.

CAPT Hunter will say something, or tell someone to do something, and then later he will deny that he ever heard it. One evening, I was serving as CDO and I told him that one of the boats was having an issue. He acknowledged it, and then the next morning during turnover, he became irritated during turnover that there was an issue with one of the boats (the same issue he had been told about the night before), he then denied it and said he never heard about the issue before.

The triad relationship (CO, XO, CMC) is bad. They don't see eye-to-eye on anything. I have heard that he does not accept advice from the triad. [redacted] is a good leader. I have not seen the CO belittle or humiliate the XO or [redacted] publically but there are certainly rumors that that takes place.

I have not heard of any religious accommodation issues. In fact, the CO pushes for religious accommodations to be included in the POW. [redacted] regularly brings up religious opportunities at Khaki calls

[redacted] does not hold the chiefs accountable for their actions. He doesn't stop complaining chiefs necessarily. There are rumors that the Chiefs are complaining to the blue shirts, mainly boat chiefs on the water. I think fellow officers may be doing similar complaining to junior personnel.

In the summertime, before mobilization, CAPT Hunter had put out that he did not want people working past 1700 if possible.

I have never heard of people doing push-ups as a disciplinary measure. It appears that discipline is handled fairly at the command.

I have never heard of anyone being forcibly forced to shave. I know of 3 or 4 people who have no shave chits.

When the sailor died during the motorcycle incident, I do not know of any issues or concerns with this issue.

The entire command's individual (GTCC) travel card bill (to ensure that no one was delinquent), was paid with per diem. Some people had accumulated large balances on the GTCC due to paper travel claims not being liquidated in a timely fashion, so the balances were paid with per diem payments after being in the UAE. It says is the DoDFMR that it is acceptable to do this.

The AUG/SEP fuel spill caused the CO to put in place procedures at the time to mitigate future fuel spills. The CO had to personally approve any fueling, to include vehicles, Igets, light trucks, boats.

I remember the CO once raised his voice at [redacted] during a meeting. He occasionally raises his voice, bangs his hand on the table. From my perspective, he yells about 5%.

[redacted]'s move, [redacted] never complained about moving someone's house.

[redacted] never mentioned to me [redacted] saying anything inappropriate to her.

The sailors get enough PT time.

I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to my knowledge or belief

[redacted] 02 FEB 2013
Date

Sworn to before me this date.

[redacted] 2 Feb 2013
Date

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDING OFFICER
MARITIME EXPEDITIONARY SECURITY SQUADRON TWELVE
113 SANDA AVE
WILLIAMSBURG, VA 23185

20 Apr 12

From: Commanding Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron TWELVE

To: [redacted]

Subj: DISMISSAL FROM ANNUAL TRAINING

Ref: (a) BUPERSINST 1001.39F
(b) NROWS 3172932/0 SDN:N4711712RT248886 dtd 19MAR2012

1. Your orders for annual training to Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron TWELVE are hereby terminated effective immediately.

2. Based on the incidents of 19-20 April and my observation of your performance and conduct, I have lost confidence in your abilities to safely execute your duties as a senior member of my Command Training Team. Effective immediately, your letter of designation for such position is terminated and is the basis for the termination of your annual training at this command.

3. Your qualification as a Patrol Leader and Coxswain for any craft assigned to this command or its detachments is also withdrawn.

4. In accordance with reference (a), the time spent at this command under reference (b) is declared satisfactory.

D. P. Hunter

Copy to:
OIC, MAREXSECRON TWELVE DET B
CO, NOSC Earle, NJ

Enclosure (27)

09FEB2013

FROM: [redacted]

TO: [redacted]

SUBJ: NARRATIVE IRT OIL SPILL 13 MAR 2012

1. My understanding of the event was while boat detachment members were in the process of fueling a 34ft PB on the Friday prior to discovery (approx 9 Mar 2012), an indeterminate amount of fuel splashed onto the asphalt of the BLDG 150 compound. Members on scene did not seek N43 assistance and attempted to clean up the area utilizing a dispersant. The dispersant was not used appropriately and remained with the fuel on the pavement where it was made mobile by rainfall that occurred over the weekend. The oil/dispersant followed the natural slope of the pavement and went into a runoff ditch, killing the grass and contaminating the soil underneath. Base environmental discovered the spill and MAREXSECRON TWELVE personnel began clean-up proceedings. Per message released and assessment from Base Environmental, spill did not progress outside of the compound. Clean up was assessed as effective.

[redacted]

Enclosure (28)

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 16:34
To: [redacted]
MAREXSECRON TWELVE, N6
Subject: FW: MESSAGE

Here is the message approved by CO to go out in place of unit sitrep. V/R [redacted]

IMMEDIATE
O 131801Z MAR 12
FM COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE
TO COMNAVREG MIDLANT NORFOLK VA
COMMAREXSECGRU TWO
COMNECC LITTLE CREEK VA
WPNSTA YORKTOWN VA
INFO NAVFAC MIDLANT NORFOLK VA//EV//
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N45//
CNIC WASHINGTON DC//N45//
CHINFO WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//
COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//00C//
NFESC PORT HUENEME CA//424//
NOLSC DC FT BELVOIR VA//JJJ//
NAVJAG WASHINGTON DC//11//
NAVSURFWARCENCARDIV PHILADELPHIA PA//923//
COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE
BT
UNCLAS//N05090//
SUBJ: OIL SPILL REPORT, MAREXSECRON TWELVE
MSGID/GENADMIN/MAREXSECRON TWELVE//
RMKS/
1. LOCAL TIME AND DATE SPILL
    A. OCCURRED: 091400LMAR2012
    B. DISCOVERED: 121430LMAR2012
2. COMMAND ORIGINATING SPILL: MAREXSECRON TWELVE
3. SPILL LOCATION: NWS YORKTOWN - CHEATHAM ANNEX BLDG 150 COMPOUND
4. VOLUME SPILLED IN GALLONS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT FROM NWS YORKTOWN ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER 20 GALLONS. FOLLOW ON ASSESSMENT INDICATES LESSER BUT UNK AMOUNT.
5. TYPE OF OIL SPILLED: F-76 DIESEL FUEL MARINE
6. OPERATION UNDER WAY WHEN SPILL
    A. OCCURRED: POST MAINTENANCE REFUELING OF PATROL CRAFT
    B. DISCOVERED: NORMAL INSPECTION OF FACILITIES
7. SPILL CAUSE: ASSESSED AS MONITORING ERROR
8. SPILL DESCRIPTION AND MOVEMENT:
    A. POINT OF ORIGINATION 4 YARD DIAMETER, 100 PER CENT COVERAGE, DISCOLORED PAVEMENT, SLIGHT TO NO ODOR
    B. SPILL MOVEMENT: 50 X 2 YARDS INTO DRAINAGE DITCH, COVERAGE: VARIOUS, MODERATE ODOR
9. SPILL ENVIRONMENT: CLEAR, CALM, 55 DEG (F)
10. AREAS DAMAGED OR THREATENED: DRAINAGE DITCH AROUND COMPOUND. CLOSEST ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN IS PENNIMAN LAKE. NO EVIDENCE SUGGESTS SPILL MADE IT PAST THE DRAINAGE DITCH.
11. TELEPHONIC REPORT TO NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER WAS NOT MADE DUE TO LIMITED IMPACT OF SPILL AND NO THREAT TO NAVIGABLE WATER
12. SAMPLES TAKEN: UNKNOWN

Enclosure (29)

13. CONTAINMENT METHOD USED: NOT APPLICABLE.
14. SPILL REMOVAL METHOD USED: OIL ABSORBANT CHIPS USED ON POINT OF ORIGINATION BY MAREXSECRON TWELVE. GRASS/SOIL REMOVAL FROM DRAINAGE DITCH CONDUCTED BY NAVFAC NORFOLK VA. ALL CONTAMINANTS CONTAINERIZED AND REMOVED FOR DISPOSAL BY NAVFAC NORFOLK VA.
15. VOLUME OF OIL RECOVERED IN GALLONS: UNKNOWN
16. PARTIES PERFORMING SPILL REMOVAL: NAVFAC NORFOLK VA, MAREXSECRON TWELVE, NWS YORKTOWN
17. FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL REGULATORY ACTIVITY DURING THIS INCIDENT: NWS YORKTOWN ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER HAS CONFERRED WITH FEDERAL/STATE AGENCIES.
18. ASSISTANCE REQUIRED/ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY OF MISHAP IS BEING CONDUCTED BY MAREXSECRON TWELVE.
19. LESSONS LEARNED: IMMEDIATE REPORTING OF EVENT WOULD HAVE GREATLY MITIGATED IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. FUELING EVOLUTION NOT ADEQUATELY SUPERVISED AND APPROPRIATE SPILL PRECAUTIONS/BARRIERS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY IN PLACE.
20. COST OF RECOVERY: 5K FOR SOIL REMOVAL BY NAVFAC.
21. ACTIVITY CONTACT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [redacted]

BT
NNNN

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 16:22
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: MESSAGE
Signed By: david.p.hunter@navy.mil

CSO,

Looks good. I approve.

Wr.

[redacted]

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY-PRIVACY SENSITIVE: Any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may result in civil and/or criminal penalties~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tue 03/13/2012 12:55
To: Hunter, David P CAPT MAREXSECRON TWELVE, N00
Subject: FW: MESSAGE

Sir-

The SME's are good with the fields generated. I have indicated 20 gals as it was the initial assessment and it is what the Environmental Officer has briefed to the SME's at REG MIDLANT Environmental. That said, I have reflected the following changes to the message:

Subject line change to reflect: SUBJ: OIL SPILL REPORT, MAREXSECRON TWELVE

Para 4 changed to reflect the following: INITIAL ASSESSMENT FROM NWS YORKTOWN ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER 20 GALLONS. FOLLOW ON ASSESSMENT INDICATES LESSER BUT UNK AMOUNT.

Para 10 changed to reflect your comments.

Para 14 changed to reflect the following: OIL ABSORBANT CHIPS USED ON POINT OF ORIGINATION BY MAREXSECRON TWELVE. GRASS/SOIL REMOVAL FROM DRAINAGE DITCH CONDUCTED BY NAVFAC NORFOLK VA. ALL CONTAMINANTS CONTAINERIZED AND REMOVED FOR DISPOSAL BY NAVFAC NORFOLK VA.

V/R
[redacted]

Enclosure (30)

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: Hunter, David P CAPT MAREXSECRON TWELVE, N00
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 15:35
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: MESSAGE

Okay.

1. We do not know it was 20 gals, so why are we saying that?
2. Para 10 should be changed to DRAINAGE DITCH AROUND COMPOUND. CLOSEST ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN IS PENNIMAN LAKE. NO EVIDENCE SUGGESTS SPILL MADE IT PAST THE DRAINAGE DITCH.
3. Para 14 needs more clarity. Which NAVFAC and what about the work from MSRON-12 Sailors?

Let me know what the SMEs state.

Thanks.

Wr/

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tue 03/13/2012 12:28
To: Hunter, David P CAPT MAREXSECRON TWELVE, N00
Subject: RE: MESSAGE

Not yet sir. As this was the first message I've seen of this type, I wanted the SME's to evaluate the message to make sure it made sense.

V/R

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: Hunter, David P CAPT MAREXSECRON TWELVE, N00
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 15:28
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: MESSAGE

Did this already get sent?

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tue 03/13/2012 12:21
To: Hunter, David P CAPT MAREXSECRON TWELVE, N00; Reed, [redacted]
Commander
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: MESSAGE

Sir-

Per guidance from MESG-2 N43 and CSO, we were asked to research reporting IAW 5090.1C Navy Environmental and Natural Resources Program Manual, specifically Appendix H: Oil Spill Report. Per the guidance of [redacted] a navy unit sitrep is not required, but the following report is. I have modified our unit sitrep to indicate the situation as we know it. The only place for conjecture is in line 19 lessons learned.

V/R
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 15:08
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE
131801Z MAR 12
FM MAREXSECRON TWELVE
TO COMNAVREG MIDLANT NORFOLK VA
MAREXSECGRU TWO
COMNECC LITTLE CREEK VA
WPNSTA YORKTOWN VA
INFO NAVFAC MIDLANT NORFOLK VA//EV//
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N45//
CNIC WASHINGTON DC//N45//
CHINFO WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//
COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//00C//
NFESC PORT HUENEME CA//424//
NOLSC DC FT BELVOIR VA//JJJ//
NAVJAG WASHINGTON DC//11//
NAVSURFWARCENCARDIV PHILADELPHIA PA//923//

[redacted]

COMMAREXSECRON TWELVE
BT
UNCLAS//N05090//
SUBJ: OIL SPILL REPORT, MAREXSECRON TWELVE
MSGID/GENADMIN/MAREXSECRON TWELVE//
RMKS/
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12. SAMPLES TAKEN: UNKNOWN
13. CONTAINMENT METHOD USED: NOT APPLICABLE.
14. SPILL REMOVAL METHOD USED: OIL ABSORBANT CHIPS USED ON POINT OF ORIGINATION BY MAREXSECRON TWELVE. GRASS/SOIL REMOVAL FROM DRAINAGE DITCH CONDUCTED BY NAVFAC NORFOLK VA. ALL CONTAMINANTS CONTAINERIZED AND REMOVED FOR DISPOSAL BY NAVFAC NORFOLK VA.
15. VOLUME OF OIL RECOVERED IN GALLONS: UNK
16. PARTIES PERFORMING SPILL REMOVAL: NAVFAC NORFOLK VA, MAREXSECRON TWELVE, NWS YORKTOWN
17. FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL REGULATORY ACTIVITY DURING THIS INCIDENT: NWS YORKTOWN ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER HAS CONFERRED WITH FEDERAL/STATE AGENCIES.
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20. COST OF RECOVERY: 5K FOR SOIL REMOVAL BY NAVFAC.
21. ACTIVITY CONTACT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [redacted]
BT
NNNN

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MARITIME EXPEDITIONARY SECURITY SQUADRON TWELVE
113 SANDA AVE
WILLIAMSBURG VA 23185-5630

Canc frp: Oct 13

COMMAREXSECRONTWELVENOTE 9261
N43
25 Oct 12

COMMAREXSECRONTWELVE NOTICE 9261

From: Commanding Officer, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron TWELVE

Subj: FUELING STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) UTILIZING FUEL PUMP IN BLDG 150 COMPOUND

Ref: (a) COMMAREXSECRONTWELVEINST 5090.1

1. Purpose. Safety is the responsibility to all hands and risk management must be implemented at all times. Fuel operations will be conducted by competent personnel in designated areas. Fueling operations shall not be commenced until granted by the Commanding Officer (CO).

2. Assumption of Duty. Prior to commencing fueling operations, one of the designated personnel as listed below must be on station. The Command Duty Officer (CDO) must be contacted in order to obtain permission from the CO or in the CO's absence, the Executive Officer (XO) or Chief Staff Officer (CSO).

3. The following personnel are authorized to supervise fuel operations:

a. [redacted]

b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

d. [redacted]

e. [redacted]

f. [redacted]

g. [redacted]

h. [redacted]

i. [redacted]

4. Fueling Safety Procedures. The following safety items must be followed while conducting fuel operations:

a. Transfer from bulk tank to portable tank: A serviceable fire extinguisher and suitable spill kit must be within 50 feet of fueling area. If dispensing fuel from fuel pump, ensure pump is grounded.

b. Check for leaks and ensure that all valves and components are in closed position and secured. Both original dispersing tank and destination tank will be secured. When transferring fuel, make regular visual checks to prevent spillage. After completion of transfer ensure all valves are closed and components are secured. Sound tank and document after usage, wipe up any droplets or residual moisture even if deemed not to be fuel, and dispose of by double bag policy. Immediately report any spillage to command hazmat coordinator.

c. **Note**: Should a spillage occur, immediately stop transfer from source. If possible, within a safe manner, contain spillage. Immediately contact the Fire Department and Base Environmental Representative followed by immediate contact of the [redacted], who shall then contact the CO, XO and CSO. The appropriate reports shall then be sent up via the chain of command.

5. Cancellation Contingency. This notice is cancelled upon receipt of a new COMMAREXSECRONTWELVE 9261 bearing the same subject.

[redacted]

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