



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
NAVAL SURFACE FORCE ATLANTIC
BOX 168, 1751 MORRIS STREET
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511-2808

5800
Ser N01L/043
30 MAR 2016

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b) (6), USN, ltr of 28 Feb 16

From: Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND
CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

1. After careful review, the Investigating Officer's findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, as modified by Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE, are approved.
2. This report and its endorsements will be retained at this command in accordance with reference (a).

(b) (6)

C. W. GRADY

Copy to:
COMPCRON ONE



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, PATROL COASTAL SQUADRON ONE
PSC 851 BOX 920
FPO AE 09834-0010

5830
Ser N00/026
3 Mar 16

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b) (6) ltr, dtd 28 Feb 16

From: Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE
To: Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND
CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

Ref: (j) COMNAVSURFLANT INST 3504.1B of 11 Dec 12.

- Encl: (42) Voluntary Statement and Privacy Act Statement of (b) (6)
(b) (6), dtd 1 Mar 16
(43) Voluntary Statement and Privacy Act Statement of (b) (6)
(b) (6), dtd 1 Mar 16
(44) MICRO SNAP Organizational Maintenance Management
System Screen Shot
(45) Planned Maintenance System (PMS) Card M-1R
(46) Quarter 16 Week 9 - 8/31/15 Maintenance Record Sheet
(47) USS TYPHOON PC-5 HALON LOG
(48) (b) (6) email to (b) (6)
(49) Voluntary Statement and Privacy Act Statement of (b) (6)
(b) (6), dtd 1 Mar 16
(50) Voluntary Statement and Privacy Act Statement of (b) (6)
(b) (6), dtd 1 Mar 16
(51) NSTM 233 Diesel Engines
(52) 2 Nov 2007 ACN to NSTM 233
(53) PCRON ONE (b) (6) summary report of USS
TYPHOON underway days for February 2016
(54) Voluntary Statement and Privacy Act Statement of (b) (6)
(b) (6), dtd 1 Mar 16
(55) CNO CHARGE OF COMMAND signed by LCDR Daley, dtd 4 Nov
15
(56) Department of Defense DEOMI Organizational Climate
Survey (DEOCS) Report ICO USS TYPHOON, dtd 17 Aug 15
(57) Voluntary Statement and Privacy Act Statement of (b) (6)
(b) (6) dtd 3 Mar 16

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

1. I have thoroughly reviewed the subject investigation. I concur with the Investigating Officer's findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, as modified below.

2. Findings of fact (FF).

a. Add FF 98 to read, "LCDR Daley failed to report degradation of USS TYPHOON's RHIB for more than one month to either his ADCON or OPCON Commanders. [Refs (h), (f), Encls (42), (43), (57)]"

b. Add FF 99 to read, "USS TYPHOON operated from Jul 15 to Feb 16 with a Halon Fire Suppression System in Main Engine Room #2 well below minimum pressure in violation of Planned Maintenance System (PMS) requirements. [Encls (44), (45), (46), (47), (48), (49), (50)]"

c. Add FF 100 to read, "LCDR Daley failed to report the Main Engine room #2 Halon Fire Suppression System degradation to either his OPCON or ADCON Commanders. [Refs (h), (f), Encls (44), (45), (46), (47), (48), (49), (50), (57)]"

d. Add FF 101 to read, "USS TYPHOON operated underway with #1 Ships Service Diesel Generator (SSDG) and #3 Gear Box degraded without reporting degradation to either the OPCON or ADCON Commanders. [Refs (h), (f), Encls (42), (50), (51), (52), (53), (57)]"

e. Add FF 102 to read, "Due to low halon bottle pressure, USS TYPHOON was not safe to operate her main engines or #2 SSDG in Main Engine Room #2 from Jul 15 to Fe 16. [Ref (j), Encls (44), (45), (46), (47), (48), (49), (50)]"

f. Add FF 103 to read, "USS TYPHOON was not safe to operate her #1 SSDG in Main Engine Room #1 19-22 Feb 16 due to lube oil leakage. [Encls (42), (50), (51), (52)]"

g. Add FF 104 to read, "USS TYPHOON did not meet minimum engineering equipment to be underway 19-22 Feb 2016 due to MER #2 not having adequate halon pressure and #1 SSDG's lube oil leakage. [Ref (j), Encls (42), (50), (51), (52), (53)]"

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

h. Add FF 105 to read, "USS TYPHOON experienced a significant decline in command climate survey results for Organizational Effectiveness and Equal Opportunity/Equal Employment Opportunity/Fair Treatment Factors from the 17 Aug 15 survey to the 16 Feb 16 survey. [Encls (2), (56)]"

3. Opinions.

a. Add Opinion 20 to read, "LCDR Daley has repeatedly failed to report USS TYPHOON's material condition and mission degrading failures to either his OPCON or ADCON Commanders. [FFs (98-104)]"

b. Add Opinion 21 to read, "LCDR Daley has operated USS TYPHOON at sea in violation of Navy requirements and subjected his crew to unnecessary risk of harm. [FFs (99), (100), (102-104)]"

c. Add Opinion 22 to read, "LCDR Daley has created a negative command climate onboard USS TYPHOON due to a failure to use the chain of command, perception of showing favoritism, failure to trust and engage his khaki leadership team, and micro-management. [FFs (14-15), (20-27), (29-33), (54-61), (106)]"

d. Add Opinion 23 to read, "LCDR Daley's behavior while on liberty in Jebel Ali demonstrated questionable judgment including imprudent use of alcohol and surprisingly close association with enlisted crew members. [Encls (8), (33), (54), (56)]"

4. I intend to take the following actions with regard to the recommendations.

a. Recommendation 1: Due to LCDR Daley's poor performance as a Commanding Officer and his multiple lapses of personal integrity, I have lost all confidence in his ability to continue leading his crew. Therefore, I will formally relieve LCDR Daley of command of USS TYPHOON (PC 5) and submit a Detachment for Cause request.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

b. Recommendation 2: I will take LCDR Daley to Commodore's mast.

c. Recommendation 3: PCRON ONE will schedule medical and chaplain services to assess USS TYPHOON's crew stress levels and provide training on stress management.

d. Recommendation 4: I do not intend to take any other crewmember of USS TYPHOON to NJP. My staff and I will provide training to (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), and (b) (6) on 3M and underway requirements.

e. Recommendation 5: PCRON Training and Assessment Teams will conduct a Patrol Coastal Ship In The Spotlight assessment on USS TYPHOON to assess the ship's operational readiness and assist the crew where required.

5. My point of contact for this matter is (b) (6), and he can be reached at (b) (6).

(b) (6)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
Bldg 831 R/PCRON N1 Admin

2. DATE
01 Mar 2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6)
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

(b) (6)
1. What date did you report onboard USS TYPHOON?
24 OCT 2015

2. Do you recall if the RHIB was operational?
NO, WHEN I CHECKED ABOARD TYPHOON THE RHIB WAS NOT FULLY OPERATIONAL.

3. On what date was the USS TYPHOON's #1 SSDG drip rate exceeded?
ON OR AROUND THE END OF NOVEMBER IT WAS DISCOVERED THE DRIP RATE WAS EXCEEDED AFTER THE STARTUP OF 1 SSDG BUT AFTER WARM UP THE SSDG LEAK DECREASED TO A HIGH RATE SEPAGE. IT WAS DISCOVERED ON OR AROUND 11 FEB 16 THE EXCEEDED LEAK RATE WAS UNCONTROLLED. THE HEAD GASKET HAVE ALWAYS LEAKED SINCE I BEEN ON BOARD BUT WAS CONFIRMED BY THE DEJ IN JAN 16.

4. On what date was the USS TYPHOON's #3 gearbox drip rate exceeded?
EARLY TO MID JAN (b) (6)

(b) (6)
Print Name

(b) (6) 1 MAR 16
Signature/Date

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
Bldg 831 R/PCRON NI Admin

2. DATE
01 Mar 2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6)
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

(b) (6) 1. What date did you report TAD to the USS TYPHOON?
30 NOV 2015 TO 07 JAN 2016

2. When was the RHIB on the USS TYPHOON CASREP'd?

I CAN'T RECALL THE ACTUAL DATE BUT I THINK ITS
(BETWEEN) DEC 12 AND SWAPPED WITH A LOANER
RHIB FROM ELD ON THE 13TH
THERE WAS AN INITIAL CASREP EARLIER DOWNGRADING
CAPABILITY THE WEEK BEFORE - WHEN I FOUND OUT
THE RHIB WAS NOT OPERATING WITH FULL POWER WHEN
WE LOWERED THE RHIB IN THE WATER ON MY FIRST WEEK.
A FEW OF THE CREW MENTIONED TO ME (b) (6) AND
(b) (6) THAT THEY HAVE PERFORMED VARIOUS TROUBLE
SHOOTING AND MAINTENANCE BEFORE HAND. WE PERFORMED
MORE TROUBLESHOOTING AND MAINTENANCE ON THE RHIB BUT
BAD WEATHER / SEA STATE PREVENTED US FROM TESTING RIGHT
AWAY - WHEN WE FINALLY TESTED IT IN THE WATER AND IT
FAILED AGAIN TO GO TO FULL THROTTLE, CO TASKED MYSELF AND
(b) (6) (SENIOR ENLISTED) TO RIDE AND EVALUATE THE PERFORMANCE
OF THE RHIB OURSELVES AND THAT'S WHEN WE FINALLY
CONVINCE THE CO THAT WE CANNOT MEET ANY VBSS TASKING
DUE TO ONLY SLOW SPEED AVAILABLE ON RHIB. CASREP WAS
UPDATED ON THE 12th AND WE SWAPPED WITH ANOTHER ELD
LOANER RHIB ON THE 13TH. (b) (6)

3. When do you think (b) (6) and (b) (6) performed
the troubleshooting they stated they had done?
I am assuming a month before either in Nov or late
October (b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6) 01 MAR 2016
Print Name Signature/Date

(b) (6)

USN PC RON BAHRAIN

From: (b) (6) USS TYPHOON (PC-5) (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 3:28 PM
To: (b) (6) USN PC RON BAHRAIN
Subject: FW: Mloc's Halon

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6) USS TYPHOON (PC-5)
Sent: Sunday, January 31, 2016 7:23 AM
To: (b) (6) USS TYPHOON (PC-5)
Subject: Mloc's Halon

*Newly reported (b) (6)
(one of one billet on a PC)*

(b) (6),

Good morning Sir. FYI, while conduction MLOC checks (PMS check 5553/026 M-1R) on the Halon system in Aft Engine Room the following discrepancies were discovered and documented.

Halon bottles low:

Halon bottle 6 (50265D) 300 psi @ 60 Deg. F.

Halon bottle 7 (KF-10717AA) 400 psi @ 60 Deg. F.

Min. bottle pressure at 60 Deg. F. is 525 PSI.

Please let me know if if you have any questions.

V/r,

(b) (6)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
Bldg 831R/PCRON N1 Admin

2. DATE
01 Mar 2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6),
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

(b) (6) ON OR ABOUT 20 JUL 2015 WHILE TAD TO USS TYPHOON AS THE (b) (6), I DISCOVERED THAT 2 HALON BOTTLES IN AFT ENG RM WERE BELOW PMS STANDARDS IAD MIP 555/026 MRC M-1. THE BOTTLE PRESSURE WAS BELOW THE MINIMUM AS REQUIRED PER THE PMS CARD. THE (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6) AND COMMANDING OFFICER, LCDR DALEY WERE ALL NOTIFIED AND A JOB WAS PLACED IN MICRO SNAP ON OR ABOUT 30 JUL 2015 AND THE HALON BOTTLES WERE PLACED ON ORDER. (b) (6)

W/ETP
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

(b) (6)
Print Name
(b) (6) imarib
Signature/Date

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
Bldg 831 R/PCRON NI Admin

2. DATE
01-Mar-2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6),
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

- (b) (6) 1. On what date was the USS TYPHOON's #1 SSDG drip rate exceeded?
ON OR ABOUT 21 FEB 16, I NOTICED THE CO OF LEAKS ON NR1 S5TG. THE CONCERN WAS THE KNOWN HEAD GASKET LEAKING DURING 21 JAN 2016 - 23 JAN 2016 OEE. I WANTED TO CASHED THEM BUT - (b) (6)
- (b) (6) 2. On what date was the USS TYPHOON's #3 gearbox drip rate exceeded?
SEE ON OR ABOUT JAN 11, 2016 TYPHOON GOT UNDERWAY. THE LEAK RATE HAD ALREADY EXCEED THE LIMIT BUT NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN. THIS ISSUE WAS ON COMP AND THE (b) (6) BEFORE I MENTION ALL THE ITEM TO ME.
- (b) (6) 3. Prior to 19 Feb did you have a conversation with LSI Fuller about items you were leaving on the pier (specifically washer/dryer and Halon bottles)?
ON OR ABOUT 16 FEB 2016, I SPoke WITH (b) (6) ONLY ABOUT THE REMOVE OF TWO HALON BOTTLE, THAT I EXCHANGED OUT BECAUSE THEY WERE BELOW MIN. SINCE OCT 2015. THE COMP SHOW THAT DATE. ALL THAT OTHER STUFF ON THE PIER WAS NOT DISCUSS WITH (b) (6)
- (b) (6) 4. If so, did you tell LCDR Daley that you did?
I God is my witness, on or about 19 FEB 2016, THE ONLY ITEM I SPOICE TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER WAS TWO HALON BOTTLE OF THE PIER, THAT I DISCUSS WITH (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Print Name

(b) (6) *21 March 16*

Signature/Date

(b) (6)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
Bldg 831 R/PCRON N1 Admin

2. DATE
01 Mar 2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6)
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

cont..... NOTHING WAS EVER DONE OR SENT OFF SHIP TO N4. THE CO WAS THE ONLY ONE RECEIVING THE INPUT LIST FROM N4, SO I HAD NO WAY OF SUBMITTING UPDATE OR KNOWING THAT THIS EMAIL EXISTED.

ON OR ABOUT 9 JAN 2016, THE CO WAS MADE KNOWN THE TWO HAZARD BOTTLE IN THE AFTER ENG WAS BELOW MICAL PRESS 700, AND 400 HAZ. I ASK TO CASREP THIS UNIT BECAUSE I DIDN'T HAVE A WAY TO COMBAT AFIRE IF NEEDED. DURING THE TIME COMMANDING OFFICER GOING ON LEAVE I REQUESTED TO CASREP AGAIN BUT I WAS TOLD TO GET ONE OR TWO OFF OF USS THUNDERBOLT SINCE THEY WERE ON YARDS AFTER THAT THE CO WENT ON LEAVE. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Print Name

(b) (6)

01 MAR 16

Signature/Date

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

USN PCRON

From: (b) (6) USN PCRON1 BAHRAIN
Sent: Wednesday, March 02, 2016 9:06 AM
To: (b) (6) USN PCRON
Cc: (b) (6) USN PC RON BAHRAIN
Subject: RE: Information requested

CDRE (b) (6),

As per your direction, below are the dates TYP was underway in FEB 2016:

01-03 Feb
19-22 Feb

Let me know soonest if you require any further information.

V/r

(b) (6)

"Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged information protected under the Privacy Act of 1974). If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. "

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
Bldg 831 R/PCRON NI Admin

2. DATE
01 Mar 2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6),
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

(b) (6) 1. Please discuss the events during the bus ride while on liberty in Jebel Ali.

We got on the bus to ride back from the Seafarers Center after drinking. LCDR Daley, (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), and a few others were in the van. Inappropriate conversations were had involving discussions in of a sexual nature. I don't recall exact specifics of the conversation. (b) (6)

2. How was LCDR Daley's behavior prior to getting on the bus?

He had quite a bit to drink, but was able to compose himself pretty well. The majority of his time at the bar was spent talking to expats.

3. How many enlisted/officers were on the bus?

3 officers, LCDR Daley, (b) (6), and myself. I am not 100% certain (b) (6) was there but I am pretty sure he was. There were approx 3 or 4 enlisted, including (b) (6) and (b) (6)

4. Did you hear LCDR Daley participate in any conversation while on the bus that was inappropriate?

Yes as discussed in question 1.

5. What was the nature of the conversation and who was it with?

Sexual in nature, no one specific but it went back and forth between him and a lot of the enlisted. I believe it was a ~~there was a lot of~~ (b) (6) (b) (6) was involved in the conversation more than others.

6. Is there anything else about LCDR Daley's behavior not previously discussed that you would like to mention?

No. (b) (6)

Nothing Else

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
Print Name

(b) (6) 1 MAR 16
Signature/Date



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

1001 THE NAVAL OFFICE BUILDING
3000 ARMY PENNSYLVANIA
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

5370
Ser N00/100107
8 Nov 11

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICERS

Subj: THE CHARGE OF COMMAND

Ref: (a) U.S. Code Title 10 and Title 50
(b) Navy Regulations Chapters 8 through 11
(c) Navy Standard Organization and Regulations Manual
(SORM) Chapter 3

1. Command is the foundation upon which our Navy rests. Authority, responsibility, and accountability are three essential principles which are the heart and soul of Command. Effective command is at risk if any of these principles are lacking or out of balance. Further, a Commanding Officer's authority must be commensurate with his or her responsibility and accountability. This immutable truth has been the very foundation of our Navy since 1775.
2. As a prospective Commanding Officer, you have been identified as worthy of Command. You are to be entrusted with all of the authorities commensurate with your responsibilities. The decision to select you for Command was not made lightly; you were selected based on your demonstrated successful past performance and a determination by Senior Officers who have served in Command that you have the capacity to command, to accomplish the missions assigned and to uphold the standards of our Navy. This selection is an indication of the trust placed in you.
3. Just as Navy purposefully and deliberately selected you for Command, so too must you accept the extraordinary responsibility of Command with full regard for its consequences. It is the duty of every Commanding Officer to understand his or her authorities and responsibilities, prior to assuming Command.
4. While certain authorities and responsibilities will be specific to your command, there are some which are universal to all Commanding Officers; they are rooted in law, regulation,

Subj: THE CHARGE OF COMMAND

doctrine, and Navy tradition. The key laws and regulations that both empower and bind Commanding Officers are detailed in references (a) through (c).

5. Included as a part of your responsibilities is the charge that you will be held accountable to the highest standards of personal and professional conduct. The requirement for exemplary conduct by a Commanding Officer was included in the establishment of our Navy; Article I of the "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies of North America," from 1775 stated:

"The Commanders of all ships and vessels belonging to the thirteen United Colonies are strictly required to show themselves a good example of honor and virtue to their officers and men."

Today, the requirement for exemplary conduct of Commanding Officers is mandated by law. Title 10 Section 5947 of US Code states:

"All Commanding Officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge."

* It is your responsibility to meet the highest standards of personal and professional conduct at all times. Indeed, meeting these standards of conduct is as critical as meeting our high standards of material, personnel, and operational readiness.

6. There are two accountability standards that we use to measure officers in Command. The first is the standard for measuring criminal behavior. This standard belongs to the

Subj: THE CHARGE OF COMMAND

* courts and uses rules of evidence and procedure to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether a violation of a specific criminal code has occurred. The second accountability standard is trust. Our Navy's decentralized command and control structure is built on trust. Without trust, we cannot delegate authority. Without authority, we cannot fulfill our responsibilities. Therefore, without the delegation of authority, we simply cannot effectively operate our Navy. Trust is a fundamental building block of our command and control structure and our ability to achieve mission success.

7. As a Commanding Officer, you must build trust with those Officers and Sailors under your command. You build trust through your character and in your actions which demonstrate professional competence, judgment, good sense, and respect for those you lead. This trust can only be built through personal interaction on a daily basis at every level in your chain-of-command. Human interaction remains the dominant factor in leading Sailors; do not fall prey to the belief that a variety of contact through electronic media can substitute in a meaningful way for the direct contact afforded by daily Quarters, Officer's Call or similar "face-to-face" leadership opportunities.

8. Once built, that trust is sustained by personal accountability - accountability to those same standards to which you hold those you lead. When trust and accountability are institutionalized in the routine of a command, the result is long-term success. When accountability is not enforced, the command and control structure, which is held together by trust, falls apart and the command eventually fails. Sustaining trust is what makes accountability critical to command. The Wall Street Journal captured this very well in an editorial column some years ago:

"It is cruel, this accountability of good and well-intentioned men. But the choice is that or an end to responsibility and finally, as the cruel sea has taught, an end to the confidence and trust in the men who lead, for men will no longer trust leaders who feel themselves beyond accountability for what they do. And when men lose confidence and trust in those who lead, order disintegrates into chaos and purposeful ships into uncontrollable derelicts." - Hobson's Choice Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1952

Subj: THE CHARGE OF COMMAND

9. A Commanding Officer must possess professional competence, intelligent good sense, the "nicest sense of personal honor" and meet our high standards of personal conduct and leadership. Our Navy has determined that you possess these attributes, and therefore, has entrusted you with the privilege and immense responsibility of Command. I congratulate you on this singular achievement and charge you to conduct yourself everyday in a manner worthy of the responsibility you have been given.

(b) (6)

Subj: THE CHARGE OF COMMAND

9. A Commanding Officer must possess professional competence, intelligent good sense, the "nicest sense of personal honor" and meet our high standards of personal conduct and leadership. Our Navy has determined that you possess these attributes, and therefore, has entrusted you with the privilege and immense responsibility of Command. I congratulate you on this singular achievement and charge you to conduct yourself everyday in a manner worthy of the responsibility you have been given.

(b) (6)

"I have read and understand the responsibilities and expectations of those selected and assigned to Command; per CNO's Memorandum for All Prospective Commanding Officers 5370 Ser N00/100107 of 8 Nov 11 Subject: The Charge of Command."

(b) (6)

J. M. DALEY, LCDR, USN
Commanding Officer, USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

4 NOV 15
Date

(b) (6)

Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE

4 NOV 15
Date



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, PATROL COASTAL SQUADRON ONE
PSC 851 BOX 920
FPO AE 09834-0010

5354
N00
27 Sep 15

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on USS TYPHOON (PC 5) ltr 5354 Ser TYP/15-126
of 27 Sep 15

From: Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE
To: Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic

Subj: COMMAND CLIMATE ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR
USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

1. Forwarded. I do not concur with the Commanding Officer's assessment. Leadership onboard USS TYPHOON has had challenges communicating information down to the deck plates. My triad sat down with all the (b) (6) from USS TYPHOON on 28 September 2015 and thoroughly reviewed the CMEQ Survey comments. We collectively discovered the issue to be poor communication to junior Sailors vice PCRON ONE support. Every (b) (6) (total of 6) from TYPHOON stated that they receive good support. The two statements in the CMEQ survey emphasized in the CO's letter are from one disgruntled Sailor.

2. I will continue to work with CO and SEA to ensure they communicate with my staff and me and are explaining to their crews the decisions they make with my support teams.

(b) (6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 COMMANDING OFFICER
 USS TYPHOON (PC 5)
 FPO AE 09508-1904

IN 09015 00000 000

5354
 TYP/15-126
 27 Sep 15

From: Commanding Officer USS Typhoon PC-5
 To: Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic
 Via:

Subj: COMMAND CLIMATE ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 FOR USS TYPHOON PC-5

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5354.1F

1. USS TYPHOON PC-5 completed a Command Climate Assessment in accordance with reference (a). The purpose of the climate assessment is to determine the "health" and mission readiness of the unit. This was accomplished by utilizing the triangulation method as defined in enclosure (1) of reference (a).

2. The Command Assessment Team members administered a DEOMI Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS) from 21JUL15 to 15AUG15. Records review, interviews/observations, and focus groups were conducted from 20AUG15 to 17SEP15 on behalf of LCDR Daley. The significant findings included:

- a) Lack of enough PCRON Support
- b) Inconsistent Schedule
- c) Poor Planning/Stress

3. Reason for command assessment:

<u>Initial</u>	Update	Annual	Directed	Other
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4. Command demographics included: 28 total number of personnel assigned, 16 total number of personnel surveyed, and 22 total number of personnel interviewed.

Amer. Indian Alaskan Native	Asian	Black or African American	Native Hawaiian/P I	White	Hispanic	Other
%0	%6.25	%12.50	%12.50	%31.25	%0	%12.50
Minority	Majority	# of Women	# of Men	# of Officers	# of Enlisted	# of Civilian
%56.25	%18.75	%0	%100	%12.50	%87.50	%0

5. Areas of strength identified:

- a) Organizational Effectiveness internally
- b) Equal Opportunity/Fair treatment

6. Areas of concern identified:

- a) Organizational Effectiveness externally
- b) Inconsistent schedule disturbing planning
- c) Stress

7. Conclusions/Summary

Overall the results from the survey were fairly positive. However the areas of concern were addressed with focus groups. As I gathered information from these sessions a picture began to be painted.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

8. Recommendations

Since the survey was administered and information was collected from focus groups PCROM has

(b) (5)

Other

items that can be taken into consideration in the future:

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

J.M. Daley

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE

Bldg 831R/PCRON ONE N1 Admin

2. DATE

03 Mar 2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6)
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of

1. What is your job at PCRON ONE?

I AM ONE OF THE (b) (6) FOR PCRON ONE. ONE OF MY COLLATERAL DUTIES IS THE CASREP COORDINATOR. I TOOK OVER CASREP COORDINATOR ON (b) (6). I TRACK ALL CASREPS FOR ALL TEN PATROL CRAFTS.

2. When did you report to PCRON ONE?

I REPORTED TO PCRON ONE ON (b) (6).

3. Is there a record of a USS TYPHOON casualty report for their RHIB in the last 6 months, or #1 SSDG or #3 Gearbox in the last three months?

THERE IS A RECORD OF USS TYPHOON CASUALTY REPORTS FOR THEIR RHIB IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS THE FOLLOWING ARE CASREPS SUBMITTED BY THE USS TYPHOON CONCERNING THE RHIB IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS:

- RHIB 15038 CAT 2
INITIAL - 06DEC15
CLEARED ON - 06JAN16
- RHIB 00L 16005 CAT 3
INITIAL - 21FEB16
STILL ACTIVE

THE FOLLOWING RECORD IS CASUALTY REPORTS USS TYPHOON HAS SUBMITTED CONCERNING #1 SSDG AND #3 GEARBOX IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS:

- NR 1 SSDG 00L 15040 CAT 2
INITIAL - 19DEC15
CLEARED ON - 22DEC15 JWS

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
Bldg 831R/PCRON ONE NI Admin
2. DATE
03 Mar 2016

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6)
whom I know to be PCRON ONE Legal Officer

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of
cont...

- NR 3 MPDE GEARBOX DEG 16004 CAT 2
INITIAL - 12 FEB 16
STILL ACTIVE
- NR 1 SSDG DEGRADED 16006 CAT 2
INITIAL - 22 FEB 16
STILL ACTIVE

SUNDAY THRU THURSDAY I UPDATE MY CASREP TRACKER EVERY MORNING TO INCLUDE: INITIAL CASREPS, UPDATED CASREPS, AND CASCORDS TO COMPLETED CASREPS. THE TRACKER IS SAVED ON THE SIPR SHAREDRIVE. I GATHER THE INFORMATION FOR THE TRACKER FROM MESSAGE TRAFFIC. THESE ARE ALL THE CASREPS I HAVE TRACKED FOR THE USS TYPHOON CONCERNING THE RHIB IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS AND # 1 SSDG AND # 3 GEARBOX IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS. JAS

N FET P
(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Print Name

(b) (6)

Signature/Date

From: (b) (6), USN
To: Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON
USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F
(b) Administrative Organization of the Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy of 01 Feb 16
(c) 241522Z JAN 2016 COMFIFTHFLT OPGEN SUPP Addendum Jan 2016 (NOTAL) (S)
(d) PCRONONEINST 3502.3 of 15 Apr 15
(e) PCRONONEINST 3500.1 of 08 Oct 13
(f) PCRONONEINST 3040.1A of 25 Sep 15
(g) Uniform Code of Military Justice (2012 ed.)
(h) US Navy Regulations, 1990 Change 1
(i) OPNAVINST 3500.34G of 15 May 14

Encl: (1) (b) (6), ltr 5830 Ser N00/024 of 23 Feb 16
(2) Department of Defense DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) Report ICO USS
TYPHOON, of 16 Feb 16
(3) USS TYPHOON (PC-5) Muster Report Template, provided by LCDR Daley to (b) (6) on 24 Feb
2016, marked up by (b) (6)
(4) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 24 Feb 16
(5) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 24 Feb 16
(6) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 24 Feb 16
(7) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 24 Feb 16
(8) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 24 Feb 16
(9) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(10) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(11) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(12) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(13) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(14) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(15) Suspect's Rights Acknowledgement/Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(16) Suspect's Rights Acknowledgement/Statement of (b) (6) of 24 Feb 16
(17) Suspect's Rights Acknowledgement/Statement of LCDR Jeremiah Daley of 24 Feb 16
(18) Suspect's Rights Acknowledgement/Statement of LCDR Jeremiah Daley of 25 Feb 16
(19) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(20) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 26 Feb 16
(21) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 22 Feb 16
(22) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(23) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(24) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
(25) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 26 Feb 16
(26) Email Chain "Items left on the pier" between LCDR Daley, (b) (6), (b) (6) of 19
Feb 16 and 21 Feb 16
(27) Underway Watchbill of 19 Feb 2016
(28) Inport Duty Section 3 of 4 of Watchbill of 25 Feb 2016
(29) Inport Duty Section 4 of 4 of Watchbill of 26 Feb 2016
(30) ASM Online Report "Qualifications / Certifications / Licenses / Medical by Person" of 24 Feb 16
(31) Memo for the File: Summary of Verbal Comments Made During Interview with (b) (6) of
24 Feb 16
(32) Memo for the File: Summary of Verbal Comments Made During Interview with (b) (6)
(b) (6) of 24 Feb 16

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON
USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

- (33) Memo for the File: Summary of Verbal Comments Made During Interview with (b) (6) of 25 Feb 16
- (34) Memo for the File: Summary of Verbal Comments Made During Interview with (b) (6) of 24 Feb 16
- (35) (b) (6) ltr 5830 Ser N00/025 of 27 Feb 16
- (36) Voluntary Statement of (b) (6) of 27 Feb 16
- (37) Memorandum: DEOCS Focus Group with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) of 17 Feb 2018
- (38) Memorandum: DEOCS Focus Group with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) of 18 Feb 2018
- (39) Memorandum: DEOCS Focus Group with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) of 18 Feb 2018
- (40) PCRON ONE Medical Report Bi-Weekly Binnacle of 10 Feb 16 (Redacted)
- (41) Memo for the File: Summary of Phone Conversation with (b) (6) on 28 Feb 2016

Preliminary Statement

1. This report completes an investigation conducted pursuant to enclosure (1) and in accordance with reference (a) to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding inappropriate conduct resulting in a negative command climate by LCDR Jeremiah Daley, USN, the Commanding Officer of USS TYPHOON (PC 5). Due to evidence received during the course of this investigation, Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) and training programs were reviewed. Additional witness statements were taken on 25 and 26 February 2016 due to suspected interference to the investigation by LCDR Jeremiah Daley.
2. During the course of the investigation, I requested voluntary statements from 13 crew members and three PCRON ONE staff members. Twelve crew members and all three PCRON ONE staff members provided written statements.
3. Additional witness statements were taken on 25 and 26 February due to suspected interference to the investigation by LCDR Jeremiah Daley, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) [Encls (22-25)]
4. LCDR Jeremiah Daley, Commanding Officer, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) exercised his right to remain silent and did not make a verbal or written statement regarding the potential negative climate of his Command. [Encl (18)]
5. The convening authority granted a 24 hour extension to report findings of the investigation. [Encl (35)]
6. The Commanding Officer (CO) of USS TYPHOON is LCDR Jeremiah Daley. He has been the CO since 26 May 15. The Patrol Coastal (PC) Class of ships does not use the "Fleet Up" model where by design the CO was previously the Executive Officer (XO) on the same ship. USS TYPHOON (PC-5) and the entire PC Class do not have an Executive Officer

7. I am currently assigned to (b) (6) (b) (6)
8. (b) (6) provided legal advice throughout this investigation.

Findings of Fact

1. Twenty-seven personnel are currently assigned to USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [Encl (3)]
2. Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE (COMPCRON ONE), (b) (6) is the Administrative Control (ADCON) Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) for USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [Ref (b)]
3. Commander, Destroyer Squadron FIFTY (COMDESRON FIFTY), (b) (6), is the Operational Control (OPCON) Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) for USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [Ref (c)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON
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DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey of 16 Feb 16

4. (b) (6) gave a verbal order on 19 Jan 16 to (b) (6) (PCRON ONE CMEO) to immediately conduct a DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5). This direction was after twice being briefed in January 2016 by (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) about the CO constantly skipping the chain of command even after he and his Deputy Commander (b) (6) had talked to LCDR Daley and advised him to use the chain of command and trust his Department Heads. [Encls (8), (20), (36)]

5. Nineteen of twenty-seven USS TYPHOON (PC-5) crewmembers provided responses to at least a portion of the DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey of 16 Feb 16. [Encls (2)]

6. No respondents reported experiencing or witnessing sexual harassment. [Encl (2)]

7. Sixteen of nineteen (84.21%) respondents reported favorable to "encourage victims to report sexual assault." [Encl (2)]

8. Eleven of nineteen respondents (57.9%) reported unfavorable in response to being asked if their chain of command "promote a unit climate based on "respect and trust."" [Encl (2)]

9. Seven of ten categories regarding Organizational Effectiveness were "appreciably lower than your service's average" when considering all respondents. [Encl (2)]

10. Seven of eight categories with responses regarding Equal Opportunity, Equal Employment Opportunity, Fair Treatment Factors were "appreciably lower than your service's average" when considering all military respondents. [Encl (2)]

11. "Trust in Leadership" received an overall unfavorable rating of 56.14%. [Encl (2)]

12. "Organizational Performance" received an overall favorable rating of 77.63%. [Encl (2)]

13. "Organizational Cohesion" received an overall favorable rating of 84.21%. [Encl (2)]

14. Some crew members feel that

(b) (5)

[Encl (2)]

15. There are (b) (5) comments/complaints in the free text response sections of the DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey about

(b) (5)

16. One survey respondent stated (b) (5) [Encl (2)]

(b) (5)

17. There is a perception by [Encls (2), (8)]

(b) (5)

18. There is a perception by (b) (5) [Encl (2)]

(b) (5)

DEOCS Focus Groups with USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

19. PCRON ONE's Command Managed Equal Opportunity Officer, (b) (6), conducted three focus groups from 17-18 Feb 16 with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) upon receiving the results of the DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey. [Encls (37-39)]

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20. One focus group, consisting of (b) (5), (b) (6) (b) (5)
(b) (5), (b) (6) [Encl (37)]

21. The same focus group (b) (5)
[Encl (37)]

22. The same (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group (b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (37)]

23. A focus group consisting of (b) (5), (b) (6) (b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (38)]

24. The (b) (5), (b) (6) During the
(b) (5), (b) (6) focus group, (b) (5) [Encl (38)]

25. (b) (5), (b) (6) (b) (5)
(b) (5)
[Encl (38)]

26. The (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group (b) (5)
(b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (38)]

27. The (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group (b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (38)]

28. In the (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group (b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (38)]

29. In the (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group, the group (b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (38)]

30. The focus group consisting of (b) (5), (b) (6)
(b) (5) (b) (5), (b) (6) [Encl (39)]

31. The (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group (b) (5)
[Encl (39)]

32. The (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group (b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (39)]

33. The (b) (5), (b) (6) focus group (b) (5)
(b) (5) [Encl (39)]

USS TYPHOON (PC-5) Reporting Material and Personnel Readiness to OPCON ISIC and ADCON ISIC

34. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) is subject to the U.S. Navy Regulations [Ref (g)]

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35. US Navy Regulations (1990) Article 0827 requires a CO to be aware of the progress of any repairs, the status of spares, repair parts and other components, personnel readiness and other factors or conditions that less the effectiveness of his command. [Ref (h)]

36. US Navy Regulations (1990) Article 0827 requires a CO to report to the appropriate superiors when the command effectiveness is lessened appreciably. [Ref (h)]

37. The "appropriate superiors" referenced in Article 0827 with regard to LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) are COMDESRON FIFTY and COMPCRON ONE. [Ref (b), (c)] [FF (3-4)]

38. (b) (6) USS TYPHOON (PC-5) was hospitalized from 07 Feb 16 to 10 Feb 16 at Bahrain Specialist Hospital, including surgery and ten days of convalescent leave starting on 10 Feb 16. [Encl (40)]

39. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) did not inform COMDESRON FIFTY or COMPCRON ONE that (b) (6) was hospitalized. [Encl (20)]

40. The only Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) was degraded to the point of being ineffective due to engine stalls and a max speed of less than eight knots for an undetermined amount of time prior to 27 Nov 15 when (b) (6) arrived onboard to serve temporarily as USS TYPHOON (PC-5) (b) (6) (b) (6) [Encl (19)]

41. On 27 Nov 16, LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) was aware of the requirement for USS TYPHOON (PC-5) to operate in the North Arabian Gulf from 30 Nov 15 to 21 Dec 15. [CTF 55 Scheme of Maneuver Nov 2015 and Dec 2015 / Classified Document available from CTF 55]

42. USS TYPHOON (PC-5) has not used since 29 Dec 2015 the widely accepted method of "Eight o'Clock Reports" to inform the CO and then track material defects until corrected. [Encl (6), (32)]

Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

43. USS TYPHOON (PC-5) personnel must execute the Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) Program in accordance with PCRONONEINST 3502.3 of 15 Apr 15. [Ref (g)]

44. USS TYPHOON (PC-5) personnel must maintain training jackets in accordance with PCRONONEINST 3500.1 of 08 Oct 13. [Ref (g)]

45. USS TYPHOON (PC-5) personnel are required by the UCMJ to adhere to the requirements of OPNAVINST 3500.34G of 15 May 14. [Ref (g)]

46. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) is required to implement and manage the PQS program onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [Ref (i)]

47. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) is required to record the completion of PQS in appropriate training documentation application. [Ref (i)]

48. The appropriate training qualification documentation for Patrol Coastal (PC) Class ships, including USS TYPHOON (PC-5), is Advanced Skills Management (ASM). [Ref (d)]

49. Enclosure (28) is an accurate and true copy provided by (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) of USS TYPHOON (PC-5) underway watchbill of 19 Feb 16 and was approved by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5).

50. Enclosure (28) is an accurate and true copy provided by (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) the inport watchbill of 25 Feb 16 for USS TYPHOON (PC-5) and was approved by (b) (6) (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5), that day's Command Duty Officer (CDO). [Encl (28)]

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51. Enclosure (29) is an accurate and true copy provided by (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) the inport watchbill of 26 Feb 16 for USS TYPHOON (PC-5) and was approved by (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) that day's Command Duty Officer (CDO). [Encl 29]

52. Enclosure (30) is an accurate and true report of Advanced Skills Management ASM Online Report "Qualifications / Certifications / Licenses / Medical by Person" of 24 Feb 16 for USS TYPHOON (PC-5) provided by (b) (6), PCRON ONE. [Encl 30]

53. (b) (6) has no training qualification records in Advanced Skills Management ASM Online Report "Qualifications / Certifications / Licenses / Medical by Person" of 24 Feb 16 for USS TYPHOON (PC-5) [Encl (30)]

Perceptions of Favoritism

54. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) perceives the CO has a few select favorite Sailors. [Encl (5)]

55. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) perceives the crew holds resentment toward the CO and each other due to perceived favoritism by the CO. [Encl (7)]

56. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) perceives there is a "big perception" in the command concerning favoritism toward certain Sailors. [Encl (8)]

57. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) has the perception of favoritism toward a select few. [Encl (11)]

58. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5), states he has witnessed and observed favoritism with the CO. [Encl (13)]

59. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5), states that he is perceived as the CO's favorite by his peers and crew because of the trust the CO holds in his professional ability. [Encl (15)]

60. (b) (6) noted that this perception of favoritism toward him by the CO creates tension amongst the (b) (6) (b) (6), and has affected his ability to lead. [Encls (15), (38)]

61. Others aboard USS TYPHOON perceive that (b) (6) is one of the CO's favorites, and, as such, receives special treatment from the CO. [Encls (37-39)]

62. (b) (6) believes his relationship with the CO to be 100% professional. [Encl (15)]

Perceptions of Fraternization

63. LCDR Daley has been allegedly intoxicated in the presence of his crew. According to (b) (6), LCDR Daley was intoxicated in Jebel Ali, and acted in a disorderly manner while walking back to the ship. (b) (6) further alleged that LCDR Daley slept outside on a bench while inport Jebel Ali. [Encl (8)]

64. (b) (6) said that the CO hosted a party for the 4th of July at his villa in Bahrain which was attended by half to slightly more of the crew, including officers and enlisted, in which alcohol was consumed by the CO. He did not know how much alcohol was consumed by the CO. [Encl (33)]

65. (b) (6) said that (b) (6) hosted a going away party for (b) (6) in the Oct/Nov 2015 time frame, in which the entire crew was invited via an all hands email. About half of the crew attended, including the CO. [Encl (33)]

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66. (b) (6) said that he played golf with the CO during a port visit in Jebel Ali and alcohol was consumed by all, including the CO. He remembered (b) (6), (b) (6) and (b) (6) also playing golf with him and the CO that day. [Encl (33)]

67. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) was on liberty during a port call to Jebel Ali with E-6 and junior personnel, to include an E-4. [Encl (33)]

The alleged frequent circumvention of the chain of command by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

68. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) alleges that the CO goes straight to a Sailor vice the chain of command. [Encl (4)]

69. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) alleges that the CO goes straight to a Sailor to give them tasking vice the chain of command. [Encl (5)]

70. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) gave a verbal statement alleging the CO goes straight to (b) (6) often with tasking or to get information regarding Weapons Department, even when he (b) (6) is onboard. [Encl (31)]

71. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) gave a verbal statement alleging the CO goes to (b) (6), a First Class Petty Officer in (b) (6) almost 100% of the time to receive information regarding (b) (6) instead of the (b) (6) [Encl (32)]

72. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) alleges that the CO often goes to junior personnel for information instead of using the chain of command. [Encl (11)]

73. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) alleges that many of the Sailors are demoralized and put off by the constant interaction with the CO. [Encl (7)]

74. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) alleges that the CO has no regard for the chain of command bypassing them many times to talk to junior Sailors on issues that should be addressed to the upper chain of command. [Encl (13)]

Suspected False Statements made by LCDR Daley, CO USS TYPHOON (PC-5) to COMPCRON ONE

75. USS TYPHOON (PC-5) left unauthorized items (halon bottles, washer, and a dryer) on the pier while underway. [Encl (21), (26)]

76. On 19 Feb 16 COMPCRON ONE asked LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) via email what his plan was regarding removal of the the halon bottles and washer/dryer from the pier while the ship was underway. [Encl 26]

77. On 19 Feb 16, LCDR Daley reported to COMPCRON ONE via email that he personally spoke with PCRON ONE staff to make arrangements for the items removed from the pier. [Encl (26)]

78. On 19 Feb 16, at approximately 1222, COMPCRON ONE asked his N4 (b) (6), PCRON ONE) if he had worked out something with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) about the items left on the pier. COMPCRON ONE also directed (b) (6) to verify if any PCRON ONE N4 staff had made the arrangements with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) to have the items removed from the pier. [Encl (21)]

79. On 21 Feb 16, at approximately 0800, (b) (6) determined at his departmental quarters that none of his staff had made arrangements with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) to have the items removed from the pier. [Encl (21)]

80. On 21 Feb 16, shortly after the 0800 departmental quarters, (b) (6) told COMPCRON ONE that none of the PCRON N4 staff had made arrangements with USS TYPHOON (PC-5) to have the items removed from the pier. [Encl (21)]

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81. On 21 Feb 16 (b) (6), N3/5/7 PCRON ONE, asked LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) via email whom he had contacted from PCRON in regard to having the items removed from the pier. [Encl (26)]

82. On 21 Feb 16 LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) responded to the 21 Feb 16 email from (b) (6) (b) (6) and stated that USS TYPHOON (PC-5) (b) (6) had spoken with (b) (6) (N4 Staff, PCRON ONE) to make arrangements to have the items removed from the pier. [Encl 26]

Suspected Attempt to Interfere and/or Obtain Information Regarding this Command Investigation

83. Beginning on 24 Feb 16 at 1014, LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) clearly understood that the Investigating Officer was conducting a Command Investigation into the potential negative command climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5). He was shown the appointment letter and advised of his rights. [Encls (1), (17)]

84. On 24 Feb 16, LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) asked (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5), what he had discussed with the Investigating Officer during the meeting. [Encl (23)]

85. On 25 Feb 16 at approximately 1530, LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) discussed the command investigation with (b) (6) and (b) (6) to include showing his Suspect's Rights Acknowledgement/Statement to (b) (6). [Encls (24-25)]

86. On 25 Feb 16, at approximately 1630, LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) showed his Suspect's Rights Acknowledgement/Statement to (b) (6) (PCRON ONE N1 Staff) and asked him to "text him." [Encl (22)]

87. (b) (6) did not verbally respond to the request or text LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [Encl 22]

88. On 25 Feb 16, after (b) (6) and (b) (6) reported their interactions with the CO, COMPCRON ONE asked LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) if he had been asking his crew about the command investigation. [Encl (20)]

89. On 25 Feb 16, LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) denied to COMPCRON ONE that he had discussed or questioned anyone in the crew of USS TYPHOON (PC-5) regarding the command investigation. [Encl (20)]

Counseling and Mentorship Provided to LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

90. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) received the first of two Letters of Instruction (LOI) in September 2015. Summary of issues addressed include: failure to update OP and ADMIN Commanders on a CAT 4 CASREP while in foreign port, was on tour and then out to dinner while a PCRON ONE Maintenance Team arrived and conducted repairs; failure to take directed action on shaft casualty after arriving inport; failure to enforce maintenance on topside crew served weapons; failure to provide OP Commander SOH transit CONOPs; failure to plan for loss of VBSS mission area due to personnel transfers. [Encl (20)]

91. He received the second of two LOIs in February 2016. Summary of issues address include: failure to report Navigator hospitalization, failure to plan for ordnance loadout prior to going on mission (twice), and failure to meet Urinalysis Program testing requirements. [Encl (20)]

92. He has also received two verbal mentoring sessions from COMPCRON ONE and three verbal mentoring/counseling sessions from Deputy Commander PCRON ONE regarding his frequent circumvention of the chain of command. These sessions also included discussions about command leadership in general. [Encl (41)]

93. (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5), served as a first tour division officer in an (b) (6) under the command of now (b) (6), PCRON ONE and a mentor/mentee relationship exists between (b) (6) and (b) (6). [Encl (20)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON
USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

94. In Oct 15, two different conversations between (b) (6) and (b) (6) concerning LCDR Daley's continued practice of bypassing chain of command was considered by COMPCRON ONE to be an indicator that more needed to be done to mentor LCDR Daley. The Chief Engineer billet was gapped in Nov 15 and offered a method to install a very senior and experienced mentor for LCDR Daley. [Encl (20)]

95. In Nov 15, COMPCRON ONE provided a Master Chief Petty Officer TAD to USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as the temporary Chief Engineer but with the specific tasking to mentor LCDR Daley toward more successful management of his command and leadership shortfalls. [Encl (20)]

96. Additionally, both the Commander and Deputy Commander have asked LCDR Daley a minimum of three times if there was some outside source of stress or personal issue affecting his ability to command the ship. [Encl (20)]

97. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) consistently denied any personal issues affecting his ability to command. [Encl 20]]

Opinions

Negative Command Climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

1. Overall, the 16 February 2016 command climate survey revealed a negative command climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (5), (8-11), (14-15), (20-27), (29-33), (54-61)]

2. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) is the principal factor in the negative command climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (14-15), (20-27) (29-33), (54-55), (58-61),

USS TYPHOON (PC-5) Reporting Material and Personnel Readiness to OPCON ISIC and ADCON ISIC

3. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) understood the requirement to report to COMPCRON ONE and COMDESRON FIFTY the hospitalization of (b) (6), USS TYPHOON (PC-5) and failed to do so. [FF (34-39)]

4. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) understood the requirement to report to COMPCRON ONE and COMDESRON FIFTY that is only RHIB was degraded to the point it could no longer meet mission requirements. [FF (34-37), (40-41)]

Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

5. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) understood the requirements of the Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) program and his responsibility to effectively manage the program. [FF (43-48)]

6. The lack of training qualification documentation contributed to the perception of favoritism toward (b) (6). [FF (53)]

Perceptions of Favoritism

7. There is a wide spread and strong perception onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) of LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) showing favoritism toward (b) (6) [FF (15), (20), (23-24), (30), (54-59), (61)]

8. The perceived favoritism by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) negatively affects (b) (6) (b) (6) ability to lead onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (25), (60)]

9. Regardless if it is actual or perceived favoritism by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) toward a select few, especially toward (b) (6), it is so severe and wide-spread it has resulted in a loss of trust in his ability to command. This loss of trust is not limited to only his Officers and Chief Petty Officers; it extends at a minimum to the E6 level and most likely throughout all paygrades. [FF (15), (20), (23-24), (30), (54-59), (61)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON
USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

Perceptions of Fraternization

10. A perception of fraternization by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) with (b)(6) and junior Sailors exists onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (16), 63-67]]

11. Regardless if it is actual or perceived fraternization by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) it is negatively affecting his ability to command USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (16), 63-67]]

The alleged frequent circumvention of the chain of command by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

12. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) inappropriately and routinely disregards the chain of command when directing the efforts of the crew of USS TYPHOON (PC-5) [FF (8-11), (14), (21), (26), (31), (33), (68-74)]

13. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) inappropriately and routinely disregards the chain of command when gathering information in regards to the readiness of USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (8-11), (14), (21), (26), (31), (33), (68-74)]

14. The inappropriate and routine disregard for the chain of command by LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) has had a significant negative impact on the effectiveness and command climate of USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (8-11), (14), (21), (26), (31), (33), (68-74)]

Suspected False Statements made by LCDR Daley, CO USS TYPHOON (PC-5) to COMPCRON ONE

15. On 19 Feb 16 LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) knowingly made a false statement to (b) (6) (b) (6), COMPCRON ONE in regards to items left on the pier. [FF (75-80)]

16. On 21 Feb 16 LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) knowingly made a false statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) PCRON ONE N3/5/7 in regards to items left on the pier. [FF 81-82)]

17. On 26 Feb 16 LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) knowingly made a false statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) COMPCRON ONE stating that he had not discussed or questioned the crew of USS TYPHOON (PC-5) in regards to this command investigation. [FF (88-89)]

Suspected Attempt to Interfere and/or Obtain Information Regarding this Command Investigation

17. On 24 and 25 Feb 16 LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) wrongfully attempted to gain information regarding the command investigation. [FF (83-86)]

18. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) attempted to interfere with the command investigation and then denied it in order to avoid the possibility of administrative or disciplinary actions by COMPCRON ONE. [FF (83-86), (89)]

Counseling and Mentorship Provided to LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

19. LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) has received more than sufficient amount of counseling and mentorship regarding his negative impact to the effectiveness and command climate of USS TYPHOON (PC-5). [FF (32), (90-92), (95-96)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON
USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

Recommendations

1. LCDR Jeremiah Daley should be relieved as Commanding Officer USS TYPHOON (PC-5).
2. LCDR Daley should receive nonjudicial punishment for obstruction of justice (UCMJ Article 134) and false official statements (UCMJ Article 107).
3. Request medical and Chaplain services to assess the individual stress levels onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) and provide the opportunity for medical and Chaplain services to provide follow up care as deemed necessary.
4. I do not recommend administrative or disciplinary action against any other crewmember onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5).
5. PCRON ONE conduct "PC in the Spotlight" review onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) within the next 30 days. Assign mentorship where necessary to apply corrections, focusing on teaching the junior officers and senior enlisted the references in order to manage required programs

(b) (6)

ENCL 1



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, PATROL COASTAL SQUADRON ONE
PSC 851 BOX 920
FPO AE 09834-0010

5830
N00/024
23 Feb 16

From: Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE
To: (b) (6), USN

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION OF USS TYPHOON (PC-5)

Ref: (a) JAGMAN CH II

1. This appoints you, per reference (a), to inquire into the facts and circumstances of a potential negative command climate on USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.
2. Investigate the overall health of USS TYPHOON's (PC-5) command climate. Report your findings in letter form by close of business on 26 February, 2016, unless an extension of time is granted.
3. You may seek legal advice from the U.S. Navy Central Command, Judge Advocate, (b) (6), during the course of your investigation. She can be reached at (b) (6)

(b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS TYPHOON (PC5) (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

I reported to USS TYPHOON PC-5 (b) (6) Previous ship was (b) (6) FROM (b) (6) Information is disseminated throughout the command without due regard for proper chain of command, often times the CO goes straight to a sailor vice working through dept heads. I have not witnessed any evidence of gundecking on board USS TYPHOON. Pass is being used effectively and those standing watch have earned the qualification legitimately. I have been directed to write counseling on junior my sailors approximately 4 times, I feel these counselings were justified and carried out in an appropriate manner. The CO does not show favoritism, he does recognize excellence. I have never witnessed fraternization or anything that would jeopardize good order and discipline. One month out from (b) (6) transfer one of or VBSS team members was had a (b) (6) that required his transfer off ship this dropped us below the minimum requirement for VBSS so an emergent OPHOLD msg had to be released. (b) (6) was notified 1 month out that the OPHOLD was requested. The OPHOLD was not approved until the day before he transferred.

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 124FEB16
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE
 (b) (6) 24FEB2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE
 (b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT (Continuation Page 2 of 2)

(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
FULL NAME	Last 4 SSN	RATE/RANK

USS TYPHOON (PC5)	(b) (6)
COMMAND	DIVISION

The command does an excellent job in reporting material status that affects operational commitment. I understand the requirements of my job as (b) (6) OOD underway and as Command Duty Officer and feel most them capable of executing those duties. TYPHOON meets the requirements necessary to conduct underway operations safely in regards to equipment and qualifications. I have a resounding sense of safety while underway operating at sea.

No further

(b) (6)

No further

ENL 5

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS TYPHOON (PC-5) (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

Reported onboard TYPHOON (b) (6) First Command was (b) (6)
 From (b) (6) to (b) (6) under CO (b) (6)
 (b) (6)

Communication onboard is generally effective. We hold khaki call at 0700 each morning and quarters (with entire department) at 0730. Several times a week we hold khaki call/department head meeting with the CO, time is flexible.

I have not witnessed guesswork or false reports in regards to material condition of equipment.
 (b) (6)

I have not witnessed instances of We have a mostly effective PQS program onboard, though record keeping requires a lot of improvement. We have used interim qualifications in the past due to small crew and difficulty in maintaining watchlists, but have done so 100% per shipboard instruction. I have not witnessed qualifications for any servicemember being delayed for reasons of personal preference or favoritism.

I do believe there is favoritism onboard, but not to a point where other sailors... The CO has a few Sailors onboard that he clearly has higher regard for and will often include them/ask them outside of their roles/jobs/expertise (they become the go-to guys when someone else may be more qualified), and will even go directly to them to give the tasking (bypassing chain of command).

I never witnessed any fraternization or unduly familiar relationships onboard outside what is

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 24 FEB 2016
 SIGN (b) (6) OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) USN, 24 FEB 2016
 SIGN (b) (6) OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

WITNESS STATEMENT (Continuation Page 2 of 2)

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK

USS TYPHOON (PC 5) (b) (6)
COMMAND DIVISION

to be ~~expected~~ expected in a small crew.

I understand exactly my role and job onboard. I don't always feel I can fully meet expectations due to being ~~no~~ ^{(b) (6)} no priority for my superiors, and because of time requirements.

With the exception of a few engineering repairs we need to make, TYPHOON is sufficiently ready to operate safely in port and underway ^{(b) (6)}.

My department has never been pressured to deliberately hide information from PERSON regarding material conditions or equipment readiness.

NOTED FOR FUTURE

(b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS TYPHOON PC 5 (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6) hereby make the following statement
 to (b) (6)
 (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at
 NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential
 negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in
 recent command climate survey.

ON OR ABOUT (b) (6) I REPORTED ONBOARD
 USS TYPHOON PC 5 BAHRAIN.

NO 8-CLOCKS ARE BEING COMPLETED OR HEARD
 SINCE MY ARRIVAL AND NO MAINTENANCE ISSUE
 BEING REPORTED UP SHIP, BECAUSE AT WEEKLY
 MAINTENANCE MEETINGS TYPHOON IS NEVER ADDRESS.

(b) (6) I DO NOT FEEL SAFE DOING THE CURRENT
 MISSION ON USS ~~TYPHOON~~ TYPHOON PC BECAUSE I DON'T
 KNOW WHAT WAS ACTUALLY COMPLETED AND CREW
 MORALE IS DOWN WORST I SEEN IN MY 28 YEAR
 NAVY.

~~Nothing Further~~

The information in the statement above and on the ϕ attached
 page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 24 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF WITNES DATE

(b) (6) 24 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

(b) (6)

ENCL 7

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS TYPHOON (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

The negative climate on TYPHOON stems mostly from lack of use of the chain of command by the CO, micromanagement by the CO, and a perception of favoritism which is due mostly to poor communication. The CO often talks directly to junior sailors regarding work, giving tasking, requesting updates and other regular business which should be handled through the chain of command. The CO often micromanages ordinary tasks, not giving room for empowerment of sailors, leadership to make decisions, or prioritization of tasking. These things have broken down the chain of command and rendered the senior leadership who are supposed to support the CO and the junior sailors, powerless. Many of the Khaki have shut down and ~~and~~ simply do what they need to do to keep things running, but are not able to take charge. Many of the junior sailors are demoralized and put off by the constant interaction with the CO. The receive tasking directly from the CO without regard for what they have already been asked with, what they have going on, or notification of the chain of command. The perception of favoritism has led to many sailors to feel resentment toward the CO and each other. They continue to pull together and accomplish the mission regardless of their feelings, which is a testament to the character of the men onboard TYPHOON. The perception, I believe, is due to certain people's selection for watches or qualifications, while others feel they are not afforded the same opportunity. Communicating down to the sailors who someone was selected over them, or when they can expect to have

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) / 24 FEB 16
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) / 24 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE
 (b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT (Continuation Page $\frac{1}{2}$ of $\frac{1}{2}$)

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK

USS TYPHOON (b) (6)
COMMAND DIVISION

the same opportunity, or what they need to do to succeed could have likely curbed this perception. Though I was not here to see it, I get the impression that there was a culture of an "in crowd" within the last SEA, which also furthered the problem. Overall these issues have created a lack of trust onboard, and though things won't change overnight, they are fixable.

[Redacted area]

(b) (6)

NO FURTHER TEXT

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS TYPHOON (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

I THINK MORAL IS LOW ON THE TYPHOON BUT THE SAILORS ARE HARD WORKERS.
I WITNESSED NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR IN JEBEL ALI, THAT I THINK MADE A BAD PUT A BAD TASTE IN THE CREWS MOUTH AS WELL AS MINE. THE CO WAS INTOXICATED TO THE POINT OF SLEEPING AND ON THE OUTSIDE BENCH AS WELL AS BEING DISORDERLY WHILE WALKING BACK TO SHIP FROM THE TRANSIT BUS.
I FEEL THERE IS A BIG PERCEPTION IN THE COMMAND CONCERNING FAUGHTISM TOWARDS CERTAIN SAILORS.
IN THE PAST AND PRESENT THERE IS PERSONNEL WHO ARE STANDING WATCHS WHO ARE NOT QUALIFIED ON PAPER BUT CAN VERY WELL STAND A SAFE WATCH.
I HAVE NOT SEEN ANYTHING THAT I CAN SAY MAKES HIM A RACIST BUT SOME JUNIOR SAILORS FEEL OTHER WISE.

~~Nothing further~~
 (b) (6)
 (b) (6)

The information in the statement above and on the (b) (6) attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) / 24 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE
 (b) (6) / 24 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE
 (b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS TYPHOON (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

I HAVE BEEN ONBOARD USS TYPHOON SINCE (b) (6) I HAVE SERVED ONBOARD (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6), AND (b) (6) WHILE ONBOARD I HAVE NOT WITNESSED ANY UNORDINARY ACTIONS.

~~(b) (6) AS REQUESTED FURTHER~~

The information in the statement above and on the attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 25 FEB 16
 DATE
 (b) (6) 25 FEB 16
 DATE
 (b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK

USS TYPHOON (b) (6)
COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) Officer who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

TAD FROM (b) (6) SINCE (b) (6)
RECALL IN THE NAVY FOR (b) (6) YEARS AND TAD TO USS TYPHOON UNTIL (b) (6)

~~Nothing further~~

The information in the statement above and on the 2 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 125Feb2016
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) USN 25FEB2016
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

(b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6)

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK

PC-5 (b) (6)
COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) Officer who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

FIRST TOUR - (b) (6) FROM (b) (6) TO (b) (6)
SECOND TOUR - (b) (6) FROM (b) (6) TO (b) (6)
PRESENT TOUR - USS TYPHOON FROM (b) (6)

BROKEN/DEGRADED EQUIPMENT OF COC
COMMS ON BOARD - BROUGHT UP TO ALL LEVELS BUT INFO NEVER LEAVED SHIP UNTIL ITS TOO LATE USUALLY ENDING IN VS PULLING IN EARLY

REPAIRING EQUIPMENT - NEVER FIXED THE RIGHTWAY THE FIRST TIME, ALWAYS TEMP FIX UNTIL EQUIPMENT GET DOWN

EQUAL OP - FAVORITISM ONBOARD TOWARD SELECT FEW, NO APPRECIATION FOR ENG ONBOARD.

MANAGEMENT - MICROMANAGE ALL FIELDS OF EVERY DEPT, OFFICER GOES TO JV PERSONAL FOR INFO INSTEAD OF USING COC.

QUALS - LETS CERTAIN PEOPLE ON A FAST TRACK TO TOP QUALS WHILE REDULING OTHERS OP.

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 1 25 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) 1 25 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS TYPHOON (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) Officer who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

REPORTED ONBOARD TYPHOON (b) (6). I BEEN ONBOARD FOR 7 MONTHS AND IT HAS BEEN A ROLLER COASTER. THE FIRST FEW MONTHS WERE KIND OF HARD DUE TO THE FAST PACE AND A LOT OF UNDERWAY. I NOTICED MY JUNIOR GUY (b) (6) WHO WAS ONBOARD 2 MONTHS PRIOR WAS GETTING YELLED AT A LOT, FOR NO REASON AT ALL. I UNDERSTAND WE ALL SLACK OFF SOMETIMES, BUT HE GOT YELLED AT FOR LOCKING A COMPUTER. MOSTLY BY (b) (6) AND BRIG HOUSE. THERE HAS BEEN TIMES WHERE THE CO COULD NOT FIND SOMETHING ON THE BRIDGE, SO HE TOLD ME TO CLEAN THE PILOTHOUSE ON MY OWN, AND I BELIEVE HE SENT (b) (6) TO CHECK ON ME. MANY TIMES THE CO WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE PERSONNEL ON THE BRIDGE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MYSELF, DURING UNDERWAY. I RECEIVED A 3.0 ON MY EVAL FOR TEAMWORK; LEADERSHIP WITH NO EXPLANATION. THERE WAS AN INCIDENT WHERE I DIDN'T RESPOND WHEN SNORPY WAS CALLED AWAY, SO (b) (6) DECIDED TO INFORM THE CO I WAS HORSE PLAYING ON THE MESS DECK, INSTEAD OF REPORTING TO (b) (6) OR DISCUSSING IT WITH ME. SINCE JAN 2017, I FEEL THINGS ARE GETTING BETTER AND MORALE IS SLOWLY GETTING BETTER, BUT I'M NOT SURE IF ITS BECAUSE WE HAVE A CAPED INVESTIGATION GOING ON. BY ACTION AND I AM ON GOOD TERMS, AND WORKING TOGETHER.

~~NOTHING FURTHER (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)~~

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 1 25 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) 1 25 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 PC-5 TYPHOON (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

MY PRIOR COMMAND BEFORE THE TYPHOON WAS (b) (6) (b) (6)
 (b) (6) I'VE BEEN IN THE NAVY FOR A LITTLE OVER (u) (6) YEARS. SINCE REPORTING (SEDT 15) ON BOARD THE TYPHOON I'VE NOTICED THE MORALE OF THE CREW GO DOWN TREMENDOUSLY, THE C.O. DOES NOT HAVE REGARD FOR THE CHAIN OF COMMAND BY PASSING THEM MANY TIMES TALK TO THE JAPANESE SAILORS ON ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE UPPER CHAIN OF COMMAND. I'VE WITNESSED AND OBSERVED FAVORITISM WITH THE C.O., EVEN HEARD OF INDIVIDUALS PROMISED BETTER EVALS FOR EXTENDING; GETTING CERTAIN SCHOOL THIS IS CRUSHING THE MOTIVATION FOR SOME DUE TO THE THE PERCEPTION OF THERE NOT BEING A FAIR PLAYING FIELD. AT TIMES THE C.O. DON'T TRUST CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS FOR NO REASON AT ALL. I'VE HEARD OTHER SAILOR UPDATE THE C.O. ON EQUIPMENT THAT WAS BROKEN, AND FOR SOME REASON HE WOULD NOT TAKE THEIR WORD ON IT, INSTEAD HE WOULD SEEK OF TH OPINION FROM ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL WHEN THEY WOULD SAY THE SAME THING THAT WAS REPORTED BEFORE.

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 125 FEB 16
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE
 (b) (6) 1 25 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK

PC-5 (b) (6)
COMMAND DIVISION

I'VE SEEN THIS HAPPEN REPEATEDLY. I'VE SEEN THE CO DOESN'T LET THE CHAIN OF COMMAND EFFECTIVELY RUN THEIR DEPARTMENT, WHEN THAT IS THEIR JOB. I'VE OBSERVED SAILOR B LINED THRU THEIR QUALIFICATION AND OTHER HAVE TO GO THRU THE WHOLE PROCESS. AND I BELIEVE THAT THEY MAY BE GETTING SINGLED OUT.

I RECEIVED VERBAL COUNSELING FROM THE C.O ON MOUNTING A MAINTENANCE CHECK FROM ONE WEEK TO THE NEXT THAT WAS WITHIN PERIODICITY, WHEN I INFORMED MY COC, I WAS INFORMED THAT MYSELF OR THE COC DON'T MAKE THOSE DECISIONS BY THE CO

I WAS COUNSELLED ON A SITUATION THAT HAPPENED WHEN A VEHICLE HAD BROKE THE RAMP IN ANOTHER DORT WHEN I NEVER SAW WHAT HAPPENED I ONLY HEARD IT I WAS APPROX. 1000FT FROM THE INCIDENT. I FEEL THAT I DID NOTHING WRONG, I TOLD THE OOD ABOUT THE INCIDENT ABOUT 40 MINUTES AFTER IT HAD HAPPENED, DUE TO MY OTHER TASKING.

NO TESTIMONY
(b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)
(b) (6) (b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
FULL NAME	Last 4 SSN	RATE/RANK
USS TYPHOON	WEPS	
COMMAND	DIVISION	

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

I REPORTED ON BOARD USS TYPHOON (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), I HAVE BEEN IN THE NAVY (b) (6), (b) (3) (B) YEARS. I EXTENDED ON BOARD AFTER MAKING A DEAL WITH MY CAPTAIN TO GO TO SIRF A, 30 DAYS OF LEAVE, AND VBSS. THE EXTENSION WAS FOR 3 MONTHS.

NOTHING FURTHER

The information in the statement above and on the Ⓟ attached is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) / 25 FEB 16
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) / 25 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

EMIR

ENCL 15

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT (See JAGMAN 0170)

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b) (6)	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK (b) (6)	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT USS TYALON (PC 5)			DATE OF BIRTH (b) (6)
NAME (INTERVIEWER) (b) (6)	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK (b) (6)	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ORGANIZATION (b) (6)	BILLET (b) (6)		
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW NSA 2 BAHRAIN	TIME 1430	DATE 25 FEB 2016	

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

- (1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s): ART 92 (UCMJ) FRATERNIZATION AND ART 93 (UCMJ) CRUELTY AND MALTRTAMENT (b) (6)
- (2) I have the right to remain silent; ----- (b) (6)
- (3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial, ----- (b) (6)
- (4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; and ----- (b) (6)
- (5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. ----- (b) (6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

- I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, ----- (b) (6)
- (1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent; ----- (b) (6)
- (2) I expressly desire to make a statement; ----- (b) (6)
- (3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning; ----- (b) (6)
- (4) I expressly do not desire to have such lawyer present with me during this interview; and --- (b) (6)

(5) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b) (6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b) (6)	TIME 1430	DATE 25 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b) (6)	TIME 1430	DATE 25 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b) (6)	TIME 1430	DATE 25 FEB 2016

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 2 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b) (6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Reported onboard Typhoon, (b) (6) years in the navy.

(b) (6) was onboard the Typhoon when I reported. He was a troubled sailor that had hygiene issues and had problems taking orders from any of his leadership. I definitely made some leadership mistakes

NOTHING FURTHER
(b) (6) THIS PAGE

WITNESS STATEMENT (Continuation Page 1 of 2)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

FULL NAME

Last 4 SSN

RATE/RANK

USS Typhoon

(b) (6)

COMMAND

DIVISION

in my attempt to assist the sailor to correct his issues but throughout our tenure together I started to make leadership changes and (b) (6) eventually, asked me to be his mentor. I care about junior sailors and even more so for sailors that have struggles that feel I can help them with. I made every effort possible to encourage and lift up (b) (6) during his recent struggle and I wish there could have been something more I could have done to help (b) (6). I am not a bully.

My relationship with my CO is without a shadow of a doubt 100% professional. I do not have a personal relationship with my CO. I am perceived as his favorite by my peers and crew because of the trust that my CO holds in my professional abilities. I was raised (b) (6) and was taught at a very young age that hard work and dedication is what makes success. I have been an EP sailor my entire career and I have only tried my hardest while stationed on the USS Typhoon. I do not feel or believe that I receive special treatment from my CO. I understand how it has been perceived that way from the crew that do not work close to me, but I think my peers and department head that work hard in hand with me know that that perception is incorrect. I've worked hard for my position on the USS Typhoon and I am proud to be trusted to get the job done, especially since most of the jobs I have are out of my pay grade or area of expertise. I am a little insulted that my hard work is being labeled as favoritism.

1143

ENCL 16

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT (See JAGMAN 0170)

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b) (6)	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK (b) (6)	SERVICE (BRANCH) NAVY
ACTIVITY/UNIT USS TYPHOON (PC-5)		DATE OF BIRTH (b) (6)	
NAME (INTERVIEWER) (b) (6)	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK (b) (6)	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ORGANIZATION (b) (6)		BILLET (b) (6)	
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW PCRON HQ, NSA 2 BAHRAIN		TIME 1400	DATE 24 FEB 2016

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s): VCNJ ART 107
FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

- _____ **(b) (6)**
- (2) I have the right to remain silent; ----- **(b) (6)**
- (3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial, ----- **(b) (6)**
- (4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; and ----- **(b) (6)**
- (5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. ----- **(b) (6)**

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, -----

- _____ **(b) (6)**
- (1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent; ----- **(b) (6)**
- (2) I expressly desire to make a statement; ----- **(b) (6)**
- (3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning; ----- **(b) (6)**
- (4) I expressly do not desire to have such lawyer present with me during this interview; and ----- **(b) (6)**

(5) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.-----

(b) (6)

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) (b) (6)	TIME 1408	DATE 24 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER) (b) (6) (b) (6)	TIME 1408	DATE 24 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE (WITNESS) (b) (6)	TIME 1408	DATE 24 FEB 16

The statement which appears on this page (and the following 1 page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b) (6)

24 FEB 2016

SIGNATURE (SUSPECT)

In regards to submitting grades for TORIS T-FOM (ENGINEERING), IT WAS EXPLAINED TO ME THAT THE GRADES WERE INPUT DIFFERENTLY. EACH WARFARE AREA HAS GRADESHEETS, BUT ENGINEERING DOES NOT. THE PETTY OFFICER I RECEIVED AS (b) (6) EXPLAINED TO (b) (6) (b) (6) THE PERIODICITY ISSUE BECAUSE I WAS NOT UNDERSTANDING. THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME DEALING WITH TORIS, SO I WAS HAVING A FEW ISSUES OVERALL (b) (6) DURING THE TURNOVER PROCESS, (b) (6) EXPLAINED HOW THE ENGINEERING GRADES WERE BASED OFF PERIODICITY.

NO FURTHER ENTRIES THIS PAGE

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

24 FEB 2016

WITNESS STATEMENT (Continuation Page 1 of 1)

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK

USS TYPHOON (b) (6)
COMMAND DIVISION

EVERY TIME A GRADE WAS DUE FOR SUBMISSION, ENGINEERING, WAS TO REPORT THE PERCENTAGE THEY HAD COMPLETE. THE PERIODICITY AND EXPIRATION DATE DID NOT MATCH, SO I ASKED ABOUT THAT. HE ADDED THAT THE SYSTEM REQUIRED MONTHLY UPDATES, I ASKED IF THE DRILL HAD 100% COMPLETION, "DO I CONTINUE TO REPORT THAT MONTHLY?" HE REPLIED WITH YES. I REPLACED HIM AS TORIS MANAGER IN NOVEMBER 2010. ENGINEERING HAD SOME DRILLS COMING UP, SO INFORMED THE NEW MPA ONCE HE ARRIVED. HE^{NEW} LIKE ME, HE WAS NOT USE TO TORIS. I EXPLAINED TO HIM AS IT WAS EXPLAINED TO ME, LATER ON IN NOVEMBER, WE HAD A TRAINING MEETING WITH ALL DEPARTMENT HEADS IN ATTENDANCE. CONFUSION AROSE AGAIN ABOUT THE PERIODICITIES. (b) (6)

(b) (6) EXPLAINED IT THE SAME WAY (b) (6) EXPLAINED. I ADDED THE SAME INFO AND THE CAPTAIN AGREED. SINCE (b) (6) AND THE CAPTAIN WERE ON THE SAME PAGE, MY DOUBT ABOUT ~~THE~~ THE GRADING SHOWED (b) (6) WENT AWAY. WHILE UNDERWAY, WE RAN ALL THE NECESSARY ENGINEERING DRILLS. I WAS GIVEN THE PERCENTAGE AND UPDATED IT UPON RECEIPT. ~~IT~~ (b) (6) UNTIL EACH PERIODICITY WAS MET, I REPORTED 100% BECAUSE OF HOW IT WAS EXPLAINED TO ME UP UNTIL RECENTLY, I DID NOT HAVE DOUBTS. (b) (6) (CURRENT (b) (6)) HAD QUESTIONS AS TO HOW I REPORTED ENGINEERING GRADES. I EXPLAINED IT TO HIM, BUT HE WANTED MORE CLARIFICATIONS. WE AGREED TO SIT DOWN AND GO THROUGH TORIS AS I UPDATED IT.

* THE (b) (6) STATED ABOVE IS (b) (6)

~~NO FURTHER ENTRIES THIS PAGE
(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
24 FEB 2010~~

ENT 17

ENCL 17

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT (See JAGMAN 0170)

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) DALEY, JEREMIAH	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK O-4/CDR	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT OSS TYPHOON PC 5	DATE OF BIRTH (b) (6)		
NAME (INTERVIEWER) (b) (6)	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK (b) (6)	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ORGANIZATION (b) (6)	BILLET (b) (6)		
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ	TIME 1017	DATE 24 FEB 2016	

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

(1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):

1. UCMJ ART. 92. FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER OR REGULATION

- 1.a Article 1165 – Fraternization Prohibited.
- 1.b Article 0820 – Welfare of Personnel
- 2.c Article 0827 – Effectiveness for Service

2. UCMJ ART. 107. FALSE STATEMENTS

3. UCMJ ART. 133. CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN

(b) (6)

(2) I have the right to remain silent; ----- (b) (6)

(3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial, ----- (b) (6)

(4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; and ----- (b) (6)

(5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. ----- (b) (6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, -----

- (1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent; -----
- (2) I expressly desire to make a statement; -----
- (3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning; -----
- (4) I expressly do not desire to have such lawyer present with me during this interview; and ---
- (5) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.-----

SIGNATURE	(b) (6)	TIME 1013K5 24 FEB 2016	DATE 24 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE (IN)	(b) (6)	TIME 1014	DATE 24 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE (W/)	(b) (6)	TIME 1014	DATE 24 Feb 2016

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ___ page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)

~~No STATEMENT AT THIS TIME~~

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

SUSPECT'S RIGHTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/STATEMENT (See JAGMAN 0170)

FULL NAME (ACCUSED/SUSPECT) DALEY, JEREMIAH	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK OY/LCDR	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ACTIVITY/UNIT USS TYPHOON PC 5	DATE OF BIRTH (b) (6)		
NAME (INTERVIEWER) (b) (6)	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK (b) (6)	SERVICE (BRANCH) USN
ORGANIZATION (b) (6)	BILLET (b) (6)		
LOCATION OF INTERVIEW NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ	TIME 1639	DATE 25 FEB 2016	

RIGHTS

I certify and acknowledge by my signature and initials set forth below that, before the interviewer requested a statement from me, he warned me that:

- (1) I am suspected of having committed the following offense(s):
 - 1. UCMJ ART. 92. FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER OR REGULATION
 - 1.a Article 1165 – Fraternalization Prohibited.
 - 1.b Article 0820 – Welfare of Personnel
 - 2.c Article 0827 – Effectiveness for Service
 - 2. UCMJ ART. 107. FALSE STATEMENTS
 - 3. UCMJ ART. 133. CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN

- (2) I have the right to remain silent; ----- (b) (6)
- (3) Any statement I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial, ----- (b) (6)
- (4) I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both; and ----- (b) (6)
- (5) I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. ----- (b) (6)

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that, -----

Empty rectangular box for signature.

- (1) I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent; -----
- (2) I expressly desire to make a statement; -----
- (3) I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning; -----
- (4) I expressly do not desire to have such lawyer present with me during this interview; and ---
- (5) This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.-----

SIGNATURE (ACCUSED/SUSPECT)	(b) (6)	TIME 1644 hrs.	DATE 25 FEB 2016
SIGNATURE (INTERVIEWER)	(b) (6)	TIME 1644	DATE 25 FEB 2016
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	TIME 1644	DATE 25 FEB 2016

(b) (6)

The statement which appears on this page (and the following ___ page(s), all of which are signed by me), is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

SIGNATURE (b) (6) ED/SUSPECT

No Statement

(b) (6)

ENCL 19

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 (b) (6), (b) (3) (B) (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at (b) (6)

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

I WAS TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED AS (b) (6) ON USS TYPHOON FROM (b) (6) TO (b) (6)

- IN REGARDS TO TYPHOONS (INVESTIGATION) COMMAND CLIMATE, WITH THE SIZE OF CREW & CHIP WHERE THE CO CAN BASICALLY LISTEN TO EVERYTHING THATS GOING ON AND HAVE INPUTS ON ALMOST ANYTHING THAT HE HEARS - I THINK THAT THE CREW WAS NOT A CUSTOMER TO THAT HAVING THE CO IN ALL OR A LOT OF THEIR BUSINESS.

- IN REGARDS TO ISSUE ON RHIB, I WAS NOT AWARE THAT THEY HAD ISSUES WITH IT UNTIL WE BROUGHT IT DOWN TO THE WATER. AFTER TALKING TO THE CREW, (b) (6) AND (b) (6) (b) (6) THAT THEY HAVE SEEN ISSUES WITH IT BEFORE. SO I TALKED TO THE CO ABOUT MAINTENANCE & TROUBLESHOOTING I PLAN ON DOING WITH THIS RHIB. AFTER PERFORMING MAINTENANCE, BAD WEATHER PREVENTED ME FROM TESTING RHIB IN THE WATER UNTIL A FEW DAY LATER - IN KNS. THE RESULT WAS STILL THE SAME THAT THE RHIB FAILED TO RUN FULL SPEED. MORE TROUBLESHOOTING WAS PERFORMED THEN WE WERE ABLE TO TEST/RUN RHIB OUT TO SEA AGAIN - WITH ME AND (b) (6) RIDING IT FOR EVALUATION - SAME RESULT AS LAST TIME. THEN I RECOMMENDED TO BORROW A LOANER RHIB FROM PCRON BRD AND TURN OVER TYPHOON RHIB

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) / 21 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE
 (b) (6) / 25 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

WITNESS STATEMENT (Continuation Page 1 of 1)

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 (b) (6) (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

to ORD for Troubleshooting/TESTING.
 - myself and (b) (6), and (b) (6) voiced our concern
 about if we actually do VBSS evolution and our guys
 will have to breakaway from contact boat and our current
 RHIB will be unable to drive away. Thus my
 recommendation to borrow a RHIB from ORD to finish
 the fall patrol. I recommended CAT 3 until we
 got the new RHIB and it was then downgraded
 to CAT 2 afterwards.

Notable Further

05 11 13

ENCL 20

WITNESS STATEMENT

FULL NAME	Last 4 SSN	RATE/RANK
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
COMMAND PCRON ONE	DIVISION N00	

I, (b) (6) hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at (b) (6) (b) (6)

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

LCDR Jeremiah Daley took command of USS TYPHOON in June of 2015. He had a rough start and my Deputy Commander (b) (6) and I talked with him several times during his first two months. It seemed to (b) (6) and I that LCDR Daily was distracted and just was not focused on his duties as CO. (b) (6) and I both asked him multiple times if there was an outside distraction or something bothering him and he said there was not.

After three months I felt things were to the point that he needed a wake-up call and issued an LOI in SEP 15 for: Failure to update OP and ADMIN Commanders on a CAT 4 CASREP while in foreign port, was on tour and then out to dinner while a PCRON ONE Maintenance Team arrived and conducted repairs; failure to take directed action on shaft casualty after arriving inport; failure to enforce maintenance on topside crew served weapons; failure to provide OP Commander SOH transit CONOPs; failure to plan for loss of VBSS mission area due to personnel transfers.

In October (b) (6) on TYPHOON) talked with my Deputy (b) (6) severed under my Deputy (b) (6) at his previous command) about the CO undermining him, not talking with and tasking Khaki, and frustration with his CO overall. (b) (6) talked with (b) (6) and encouraged him to have a direct conversation with his CO and he did but things did not change. In November there was a gap of the CHENG billet and I put my (b) (6) onboard to fill the gap and help the CO. (b) (6) is the epitome of Naval Leadership and taking care of Sailors and I told LCDR Daley to listen and learn from him.

At the end of December the new (b) (6) arrived on TYPHOON who is a (b) (6) year (b) (6) and within two weeks he was talking with the Deputy about the CO not trusting anyone, constantly skipping the COC by going directly to Sailors to the point that Department Heads don't understand what their people are doing, and micro management. Deputy and I talked with LCDR Daily and advised him to use the COC and trust his Department Heads. After one or two weeks the (b) (6) said nothing had changed and I directed the ship to do a CMEQ survey so I could determine if it was one or two Officers not getting along with the CO or a command wide issue.

ENCL 20

FULL NAME (b) (6)	Last 4 SSN (b) (6)	RATE/RANK (b) (6)
----------------------	-----------------------	----------------------

COMMAND (b) (6)	DIVISION (b) (6)
--------------------	---------------------

While the CMEO is in progress, there were several other CO failure items that happened and I felt needed to be documented in another LOI, they were: failure to report Navigator hospitalization (4 days and I find out from my Squadron Medical RPT), failure to plan for ordnance loadout prior to going on mission (twice), and failure to meet Urinalysis Program testing requirements.

On 18 FEB 2016 I received the CMEO survey and read it in it's entirety and it was apparent to me that there was a command wide issue with the CO. After reviewing the report over the weekend I forwarded a quick summary to (b) (6) who is the (b) (6) for the PC ships to let him know we had a big problem. He stated that a Command Investigation was needed and I agreed with him. I then coordinated with (b) (6) and CTF-52 (MCMRON 3) to get the support of an Investigating Officer. CTF-52 recommended (b) (6) and I directed (b) (6) to investigate USS TYPHOON based on CMEO survey results.

During the investigation it was brought to my attention that LCDR Daley was interfering by asking his crew to tell him everything they were being asked and what all was going on. LCDR Daley also approached my (b) (6) asking him the same questions and to text him. When I asked LCDR Daley if he was asking the crew and my staff questions about the investigation he said no. I told him that I did not believe him and to stop discussing the investigation with his crew and that if he wants to talk about the investigation to utilize his JAG.

Finally, during the previous week TYPHOON got U/W and left a pile of equipment and halon bottles on the pier and when I questioned LCDR Daley on it he lied to me about arrangements being made with my Supply Department.

The information in the statement above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6)

1 26 FEB 2016

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/

DATE

(b) (6)

1 26 FEB 2016

SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR

DATE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

1. PLACE
NSA 2 (b) (6)
2. DATE
22FEB16

I, (b) (6), make the following
free and voluntary statement to (b) (6),
whom I know to be (b) (6).

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this
statement is given concerning my knowledge of

On 19 February around 1222, Commodore (b) (6) called me and asked if I had worked something out with the TYPHOON about the washer, dryer and halon bottles on the pier. I informed him that I didn't know what he was talking about and explained that I overheard my (b) (6) Sailors talking about issuing a washer and dryer. He asked me to check with my guys to see if they had made any arrangements with the TYPHOON about picking up these items on the pier. I called (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6) (b) (6) and (b) (6) and they all informed me that they didn't work anything out with the TYPHOON about picking up the items. (b) (6) said maybe (b) (6) might have worked it out with them because he is from their ship and is responsible for making deliveries to the ship. I instructed (b) (6) to call him and ask about the order. (b) (6) called me back about an hour later saying that he talked to (b) (6) and he said that he didn't work anything out with the TYPHOON in regards to picking up parts on the pier.

On 21 February around 0700, (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6) and myself went on the pier and removed about two truck load of supply items that consisted of parts, halon bottles, paint punt, broken washer, dryer, power washer and trash.

On 21 February around 0800, at departmental quarters with all personnel present I asked my (b) (6) Sailors individually did they worked anything out with the TYPHOON about picking the items I listed above. Each one of my personnel said that they had not. At that moment, I went to CDRE (b) (6) office and let him know that I had asked all my personnel about the incident and that they all informed me that they did not work anything out with the TYPHOON about removing the items off of the pier for them.

SIGN (b) (6) PRINT (b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 (b) (6) (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6), (b) (3) (B) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at (b) (6).

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

I am the CMED for (b) (6). I HAVE BEEN ASSISTING IN THE MOST RECENT COMMAND CLIMATE SURVEY. I HELPED THE TYPHOON CMED ORDER THE SURVEY AND CONDUCTED THE FOCUS GROUPS. THE INVESTIGATION INTERVIEWS WERE BEING CONDUCTED IN DEPUTY (b) (6) OFFICE WHICH IS ABOUT TWO FEET BEHIND ME. THE SKIPPER ASKED ME TO TEXT HIM WHILE I WAS IN MY OFFICE ON OR ABOUT 1630 25 FEB 2016. I WORK CLOSELY WITH ALL THE CO'S ON ALL MATTERS RELATED TO PERS, PAY, TRAVEL AND MANPOWER, AS THE ISIC CMED CO'S SEEK MY ADVICE ON COMMAND CLIMATE ISSUES. I HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH ALL CO'S AND SHIP CMED'S DUE TO THE UPCOMING CNSL PROGRAM REVIEW. THIS IS TO GAUGE THE HEALTH OF THE FORCE FOR THE EDNF PC'S.

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) / 25 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) / 25 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

(b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 (b) (6) (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement
 to (b) (6)
 (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at
 (b) (6)

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential
 negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in
 recent command climate survey.

(b) (6) RETURNED TO THE SHIP AFTER HIS INTERVIEW
 WITH (b) (6) HE WAS SHAKEN UP ABOUT THE CHARGES
 THAT HE WAS INFORMED ABOUT. AS I WAS TRYING TO CALM HIM
 DOWN WHEN THE CO WALKED BY AND BEGAN TO INQUIRE
 AS TO WHAT WE WERE DISCUSSING ~~WAS~~ HE THEN BEGAN
 TO DISCUSS ALL OF HIS CHARGES WITH (b) (6). IT WAS
 VISIBLY OBVIOUS THAT (b) (6) DID NOT WANT TO HAVE THE
 CONVERSATION, BUT BY HIM COMPLETELY TURNING HIS BACK
 TO THE CO, THE CO HAS HAD THESE CONVERSATION
 WITH MULTIPLE PEOPLE TO INCLUDE MYSELF, (b) (6)
 (b) (6) (b) (6) AND OTHERS. I AM CONCERNED
 ABOUT REPRISAL FOR MY INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INVESTIGATION.

~~Nothing further~~
 (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 (b) (6) (b) (6)

The information in the statement above and on the 1 attached
 page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 125 FEB 16
 DATE
 (b) (6) 25 FEB 16
 DATE
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
 (b) (6)

WITNESS STATEMENT

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
 FULL NAME Last 4 SSN RATE/RANK
 USS Typhoon (b) (6)
 COMMAND DIVISION

I, (b) (6), hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at (b) (6)

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

On Feb 25th (b) (6) after my interview with (b) (6) I was speaking to my Department Head, (b) (6), and I was approached by my CO. I was fairly upset due to the findings that affected me out of the investigation and I did not want to speak to my CO. After several attempts to avoid conversation, professionally of course, I turned my back to him while he was speaking to (b) (6). (b) (6) assisted with letting the CO know that I did not want to speak about the details of my part of the investigation.

(b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)

The information in the statement above and on the attached page(s) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b) (6) 126 Feb 16
 SIGNATURE OF WITNESS DATE

(b) (6) 26 FEB 2016
 SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

From: Daley, Jeremiah LCDR (CO) USS TYPHOON (PC-5) (b) (6) >
Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 11:50 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: PIER

CDRE,

Discussion had already taken place with supply earlier in the week on the Halon bottles and old washer/dryer. I spoke with the PCRON staff on the pier today and informed them supply was aware. I will re-engage with suppo.

V/r,

LCDR Jeremiah M. Daley
Commanding Officer
USS TYPHOON PC 5
(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 11:50 AM
To: CO
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: PIER

Jerry,

What is your plan for the Washer/Dryer and halon bottles you left on the pier?

V/R,
CDRE (b) (6)

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
DSN: (b) (6)
VOSIP: (b) (6)
Cell: (b) (6)
NIPR: (b) (6)
SIPR: (b) (6)

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ENU 26

(b) (6)

Subject: FW: Items left on the pier

-----Original Message-----

From: Daley, Jeremiah LCDR (CO) USS TYPHOON (PC-5) [mailto:(b) (6)]

Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 4:53 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: RE: Items left on the pier

(b) (6)

My (b) (6) spoke with (b) (6) about the TYP items remaining on the pier (Halon bottles from 11/12 FEB changeout and washer/dryer from 17/18 replacement).

I am not trying to cause any undue headache, I promise.

V/r,

Jerry

LCDR Jeremiah M. Daley
Commanding Officer
USS TYPHOON PC 5

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2016 3:29 PM

To: CO

Subject: Items left on the pier

Jerry,

When you get a chance can you please tell me who you talked with at PCRON IRT getting your washer/dryer and other parts such as the Halon Bottles, pumps and hoses removed from the pier when you got u/w.

We are trying to improve the flow of communication between the staff and reworking a phone tree for the enlisted, Chiefs and Officers to follow.

Thanks and Sail Safe!

V/r

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: FILE, REPORT ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL
NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)
Subj: SUMMARY OF VERBAL COMMENTS MADE DURING INTERVIEW WITH (b) (6)
ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE
ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

1. This memo is to document the summary of verbal statements made during the course of the interview.
2. Not all of the below bullet points in paragraph (5) were included in the written statement and are recorded here for the record.
3. The statements are to the best of my knowledge/recollection.
4. The individual interviewed did not review this memorandum.
5. Summary of verbal statements:
 - a. 2nd tour DIVO, first tour on DDG
 - b. Been onboard since Jan 2015
 - c. Ship uses a POW, no POD - frequent changes to POW
 - d. 0700 Khaki Call - all except CO
 - e. 0730 Department/Division quarters (combined due to small crew)
 - f. Reports ASM (the qual record system, like R-ADM) has been an issue to access
 - g. CO goes directly to GM3 Duchesne often to task the department and to get information about the department, even if he (WEPS) is onboard.
 - h. Stated his verbal counseling from CO has been justified and appropriate.

(b) (6)

ENCL 32

5830

24 Feb 2016

From: (b) (6)
To: FILE, REPORT ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL
NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)
Subj: SUMMARY OF VERBAL COMMENTS MADE DURING INTERVIEW WITH (b) (6)
(b) (6) ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE
COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

1. This memo is to document the summary of verbal statements made during the course of the interview.
2. Not all of the below bullet points in paragraph (5) were included in the written statement and are recorded here for the record.
3. The statements are to the best of my knowledge/recollection.
4. The individual interviewed did not review this memorandum.
5. Summary of verbal statements:
 - a. (b) (6) (24 Dec 2016)
 - b. (b) (6) years of service, been onboard since (b) (6) 2015
 - c. Was onboard over a month before his first real discussion with the CO
 - d. CO has attended one " (b) (6) " since 29 Dec 2015.
 - e. (b) (6) Meetings occur without him (b) (6) in attendance - he has attended 2 since 29 Dec 2015.
 - f. CO disqualified (b) (6) as (b) (6) and ordered (b) (6) & (b) (6). (b) (6) (b) (6). The issue was proper documentation of his qualification and being correctly added to an approved watchbill signed by the CO. (b) (6) reports that the PQS qualifiers instruction states (b) (6) is final approval for (b) (6)
 - g. (b) (6) stated no eight o'clock reports being used - at least not since 29 Dec 2015. CO occasionally reviews CSMP but it is ineffective process in tracking defects.
 - h. (b) (6) stated the weekly maintenance meeting is ineffective in communicating material defects of USS TYPHOON to PCRON ONE
 - i. (b) (6) stated the CO routinely - very nearly 100% of the time - goes directly to (b) (6) to task Engineering Dept and to receive information regarding the department.
 - j. (b) (6) stated the ship conducts weekly all hands call; (b) (6) starts it off and CO speaks at the end. (usually on Thursday afternoon)

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: FILE, REPORT ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL
NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)
Subj: SUMMARY OF VERBAL COMMENTS MADE DURING INTERVIEW WITH (b) (6)
(b) (6) ; ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND
CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

1. This memo is to document the summary of verbal statements made during the course of the interview.
2. Not all of the below bullet points in paragraph (5) were included in the written statement and are recorded here for the record.
3. The statements are to the best of my knowledge/recollection.
4. The individual interviewed did not review this memorandum.
5. Summary of verbal statements:
 - a. Amazing pride in his ship
 - b. great respect for his CO
 - c. (b) (6) stated the CO hosted a party at his place on the 4th of July, all crew invited, about half or a little more attended.
 - d. (b) (6) stated (b) (6) hosted a going away party for (b) (6) in Oct/Nov 2015 time frame, entire crew invited via all hands email, about half of the crew attended including the CO
 - e. (b) (6) stated he played golf with the CO during a visit in Jebel Ali and alcohol was consumed by all, including the CO. (b) (6) remembered it as (b) (6) (b) (6) and WEPS playing also.

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
To: FILE, REPORT ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL
NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

Subj: SUMMARY OF VERBAL COMMENTS MADE DURING INTERVIEW WITH (b) (6)
(b) (6) ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE COMMAND
CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

1. This memo is to document the summary of verbal statements made during the course of the interview.
2. Not all of the below bullet points in paragraph (5) were included in the written statement and are recorded here for the record.
3. The statements are to the best of my knowledge/recollection.
4. The individual interviewed did not review this memorandum.
5. Summary of verbal statements:

- a. Been onboard since July 2015
- b. Admitted to having a ramp up to sea duty again and differences with PC life
- c. Stated he was protective of a (b) (6) that was struggling, but in his opinion being treated unfairly by (b) (6) and (b) (6). (b) (6) was detached due to mental health issues.
- d. Does not think his ranking as (b) (6) of (b) (6) in Nov 2015 evaluations was fair.
- e. (b) (6) stated his relationship with other (b) (6) in his department (b) (6) (b) (6) was very poor due to (b) (6) harsh techniques with Sailors and the appearance of favoritism for (b) (6) by the CO. (b) (6) also stated that (b) (6) as a part of the issue between him and (b) (6) (b) (6). (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) and he have a very good relationship now.
- f. (b) (6) stated the CO told him that he received a 3.0 in leadership because his guys had a meme poster about OPHOLDS on the wall. Also stated he received a 3.0 in teamwork because he missed a snoopy team assembly for real world (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) had told the CO that (b) (6) was playing around on the mess decks instead of showing up for snoopy team). This was part of the relationship stress created by CO and (b) (6) having direct communications.

(b) (6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, PATROL COASTAL SQUADRON ONE
PSC 851 BOX 920
FPO AE 09834-0010

ENCL 35

5830
N00/025
27 Feb 16

From: Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE
To: (b) (6), USN

Subj: EXTENTION FOR TIME REPORTING OF FINDINGS FOR COMMAND
INVESTIGATION OF USS TYPHOON

Ref: (a) COMPCRON ONE ltr 5830 N00 of 23 Feb 16

1. Per reference (a) you are authorized an extended period of 24-hours to report your findings on the command climate investigation for USS TYPHOON.

(b) (6)

ENCL 36

WITNESS STATEMENT

FULL NAME	Last 4 SSN	RATE/RANK
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)

COMMAND	DIVISION
PCRON ONE	(b) (6)

I, (b) (6) hereby make the following statement to (b) (6) (b) (6) USN, (b) (6) who has been identified as an Investigating Officer at NSA 2 Bahrain, PCRON HQ.

This statement concerns my knowledge regarding potential negative climate onboard USS TYPHOON (PC-5) as indicated in recent command climate survey.

I directed USS TYPHOON to conduct a CMEQ survey on 19 JAN 2016. Direction was to my CMEQ (b) (6) (b) (6) who ordered the survey and informed TYPHOON's CMEQ.

The information in the statement above is true to the best of my knowledge.

(b) (6)

127 FEB 2016
DATE

127 FEB 2016
DATE

ENCL 37

1700
N00
17 Feb 16

MEMORANDUM

From: Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Manager,
Patrol Coastal Squadron One, PCRON ONE
To: Commanding Officer, USS TYPHOON, (PC-5)

Subj: DEOCS FOCUS GROUP WITH USS TYPHOON (PC 5)

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5354.1F

1. The Command Assessment Team (CAT), surveyed a sample group of seven (b) (6) from USS TYPHOON (PC 5), Feb. 17, 2016, in the shared conference room as part of a command climate assessment. The survey was led by PCRON ONE's CMEO, (b) (6) (b) (6) and annotated by CAT member, (b) (6).

2. During the focus group, the following command specific items were assessed by the CAT: climate of inclusion, fair distribution of collateral duties, trust in leadership, perceived favoritism; operational stress and effective communication.

3.

(b) (5), (b) (6)

4. For any questions or concerns please contact (b) (6) at (b) (6) or (b) (6)

(b) (6)

ENCL 38

1700
N00
18 Feb 16

MEMORANDUM

From: Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Manager,
Patrol Coastal Squadron One, PCRON ONE
To: Commanding Officer, USS TYPHOON, (PC-5)
Subj: DEOCS FOCUS GROUP WITH USS TYPHOON (PC 5)
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5354.1F

1. The Command Assessment Team (CAT), surveyed a sample group of six (b) (6) from USS TYPHOON (PC 5), Feb. 17, 2016, in the shared conference room as part of a command climate assessment. The survey was led by PCRON ONE's CMEO, (b) (6) (b) (6).

2. During the focus group, the following command specific items were assessed by the CAT: climate of inclusion, fair distribution of collateral duties, trust in leadership, perceived favoritism; operational stress and effective communication.

3.

(b) (5), (b) (6)

(b) (5), (b) (6)

4. For any questions or concerns please contact (b) (6) at
(b) (6) or (b) (6)

(b) (6)

1700
N00
18 Feb 16

MEMORANDUM

From: Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Manager,
Patrol Coastal Squadron One, PCRON ONE
To: Commanding Officer, USS TYPHOON, (PC-5)
Subj: DEOCS FOCUS GROUP WITH USS TYPHOON (PC 5)
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5354.1F

1. The Command Assessment Team (CAT), surveyed a sample group of five (b) (6) from USS TYPHOON (PC 5), Feb. 18, 2016, in the shared conference room as part of a command climate assessment. The survey was led by PCRON ONE's CMEO, (b) (6) (b) (6)

2. During the focus group, the following command specific items were assessed by the CAT: climate of inclusion, fair distribution of collateral duties, trust in leadership, perceived favoritism; operational stress and effective communication.

3.

(b) (5), (b) (6)

ENLL 39

(b) (5), (b) (6)

4. For any questions or concerns please contact (b) (6) at
(b) (6) or (b) (6)

(b) (6)

ENC 41

5830
28 Feb 2016

From: (b) (6)
To: FILE, REPORT ICO COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL
NEGATIVE COMMAND CLIMATE ON USS TYPHOON (PC 5)
Subj: SUMMARY OF PHONE CONVERSATION WITH (b) (6), COMMANDER, PATROL
COASTAL SQUADRON ONE ON 28 FEB 2016

1. This memo is to document the summary of (b) (6)' response to my questions regarding verbal counseling sessions with LCDR Daley, CO, USS TYPHOON (PC-5) between June 2015 and February 2016.

2. The statements are to the best of my knowledge/recollection.

3. The individual interviewed did not review this memorandum.

4. Summary of responses from (b) (6) :

He has also received two verbal mentoring sessions from ME and three verbal mentoring/counseling sessions from THE DEPUTY regarding his frequent circumvention of the chain of command. These sessions also included discussions about command leadership in general.

(b) (6)